ETHNICITY: TRENDS IN ISLAMISM AND ARAB UNITY
from

Global Issues of the Twenty-First Century
and United Nations Challenges
A GUIDE TO FACTS AND VIEWS ON MAJOR OR FUTURE TRENDS

BACK INDEX NEXT

by Christopher Spencer
Former Senior Advisor International Organizations,
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Updated: 13 SEP 08




John L.Esposito The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Revised Edition(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 95):-plethora of recent books on Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism and the Islamic"threat" partly reflects a tendency in the West to confuse the new political power of Islamism(which is not”fundamentalist”in the Christian sense, and influences such major countries as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia)with Arab nationalism(which involves a considerably smaller number of states and people - from Morocco to Iraq - most deeply concerned with the Israeli issue). This book is among the best on Islamism. It is neither an apologia nor an alarm, but an objective and informative source for Western readers, particularly those concerned about an inevitable"Clash of Civilizations"(see Huntington,op.cit.). Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey(New York: Pantheon, 1998):-UN”peace agenda” seems overwhelmed by ethnic conflict, which competes with its Charter role of constraining broader national ambitions. Yet both ethnicity and nationalism have long provided motives for violence - and even world wars. Their deep-seated combination constitutes an inflammable and enduring cause of conflict, both inter- and intra-state. This is tragically true of the Arab world, through the 20th century a focus of instability. Ajami's well-written book tells the story of Arab intellectuals' key role in generating pan-Arabic nationalism, pro-and anti-Western cultural aspirations and hatred of Israel - and in impeding development. The very arguments and myths used to foster Arab identity are promoting ethnic conflict in Arab states. The process is globally relevant. Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad”in Foreign Affairs Vol.77/No.6(Nov/Dec 1998):-offers a valuable historical and religious gloss for the amazing, if largely ignored, declaration of jihad against“the Jews and the Crusaders”(sic)issued by bin Ladin(suspected of bombing two US embassies in Africa)and several Islamist leaders. The statement accuses the US of occupying, plundering and humiliating Islam’s holiest territory (i.e. Arabia) and of planning to repeat the slaughter of a million(sic)Iraqis, for religious(sic)and economic reasons and[of course]to serve Israel. Fatwa:“To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any[possible] country”(p.15). A specific demand for mass terror. The Economist 19 Feb 00“Iran, Islam and Democracy”(19-20):-also takes a careful and objective look at Islamism, this time in the context of an Iranian election in which the world’s most revolutionary and militant theocracy was sharply instructed to become more democratic and tolerant by a generally religious electorate frustrated with“clerical despotism”opposed to all things Western. The Editor notes that while the Islamic world is“not burdened with examples of good government, let alone democracy,...religion is seldom the culprit; look, rather, for cruel autocrats, corrupt feudal systems, overbearing armies[, with] Arabs inhabiting the least democratic patch on God’s earth...Religion is largely irrelevant to this common misbehaviour”. Sometimes Islamism itself is a”principal villain”[Sudan, Afghanistan], but in general the”actions of a few zealots have helped to discolour understanding of political Islam.” While this“still provides dangers,[the Iranian example]also provides reasons for hope”. John F. Burns,“An Arab Militia, Glimpsing Victory, Could Lose Peace” New York Times 28 Feb:-rare summary of the history, actions and aims of Hezbollah, a key player in Middle East events, whose apparent mutation may be relevant to wider trends in terrorism, sub-state violence and religious politics. Hezbollah has”dispensed and suffered sudden death on a numbing scale for 18 years” -mainly around the“security zone” Israel has maintained in southern Lebanon since 1985, and from which Israel has undertaken to withdraw. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, a Shiite cleric, still leads 1500 guerrillas and 20,000 active members, but the”Party of God”is no longer the umbrella body that“once directed the Middle East’s most brutal Islamic terrorists”. Instead it controls the largest single bloc in the Lebanese Parliament, and runs major social and media networks. Its two principal backers, Iran and Syria, and Lebanon’s government, will influence Hezbollah’s options following any general peace agreement, but its conversion to moderate politics and democracy, and from dreams of a militant Islamic state, appears to be genuine. Nevertheless, its self-identity as a trans-Arab and trans-Islamic movement remains, as does its membership. Jeffrey Goldberg,“The Education of a Holy Warrior”NYT 24 Jun:-Afghanistan’s Taliban regime may now be the world’s strictest theocracy. Moreover, its rule is based on an extremely rigid, reactionary, and belligerent interpretation of Islamic doctrine and tradition. This first-hand account of the methods and views found in or created by key religious schools(madrasas)that produced the Taliban zealots, thus gives valuable insight into the perspectives and motives of Osama bin Laden(accused of anti-US bombings), a variety of Islamic terrorist and combat movements, and probably many militant Islamist organizations. The 2,800-student Haqqania madrasa in the North-West Frontier Province produced many Taliban leaders, but is only one of 10,000 or so in Pakistan alone, most of their million students primarily studying militant Islam: “Haqqania madrasa is, in fact, a jihad factory”. This long essay also offers interesting examples of the attitudes of Islamists plus Pakistanis with broader views(e.g. General Musharraf)on world affairs and jihads. Susan Sachs, “Everyone Asks for Arab Unity. Getting It Is Harder”NYT 06 Aug:-offers a current view of the state and significance of the Arab identity following the impasse at Jul Arafat-Barak summit, specifically over the status of Jerusalem but reflecting the world’s most intensely-competing ethnicities. Diagnosis: no political slogan is“more musty with age”than“Arab unity”: chances for an Arab summit to regroup and create a new Arab consensus are slim.”Still, the chimera of a united Arab front continues to shimmer on the horizon”- and even the US is now hoping to see an agreed Arab compromise on Jerusalem. Yet, however the new leaders of Jordan, Morocco and Syria might wish more flexibility, all have inherited domestic imperatives, while Islamism has split all governments’ reactions. Arab“Unity...has historically been reactive: a collective“no”, and the region remains“clouded with illusions””. Foreign Affairs Vol.79/No.5(Sep/Oct 00)contains four Reviews of recent books directly relevant to this topic: Shaul Mishal and Abraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-includes possibility of bringing this violent group eventually into the peace process. Abdolkarim Soroush, Translated/Edited by Mahoud & Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000)-a “penetrating and coherent”statement of ability to synthesize Islam with democracy and reason(science). L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-a balanced analysis of Islamic political engagement that argues”fundamentalist”thought is a radical deviation [ordered for later summary focused on relevance to global issues]. Nehemia Levtzion & Randall L. Pouwels edit., The History of Islam in Africa(Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 2000)-up-to-date reference book covering all aspects of the subject. The Economist 07 Oct 00:“The Road to War?”(19-20);“War in Palestine”(53-5);“Burn, Baby, Burn”(54):-the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seemed at last to be focusing on the final core issue - with a US-devised complex and delicate formula for fudging East Jerusalem’s hotly-disputed sovereignty. At this moment, like”a bull deliberately charging a china shop”, Ariel Sharon, the hard-line leader of Israel’s opposition Likud party, paid a“crudely provocative”visit to the deeply/doubly-revered Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, “to demonstrate Israel’s continuing sovereignty over Islam’s third-holiest shrine”. Palestinian anger over Israeli dominance, whether generated or just ignited by this taunt, at first took the form mainly of stone-throwing demonstrations, though even these - and Israeli reactions - were stronger and more bitter than during the 1980's Intifada. More relevant, however, as the(mostly Palestinian)death toll mounted, feelings on both sides became deeper and, in the Arab case, widespread. “[A]groundswell of fury has swept the[Arab] region. Angry protesters from Morocco to Oman have burnt Israeli flags...[S]eldom has an event stirred such feeling as the sight of Ariel Sharon trampling on Muslim holy ground. Even the Arab world’s undemocratic governments are having to sit up, listen and maybe do something”. Associated Press“Arab Unity Remains an Elusive Dream”NYT 11 Oct:-this article also stresses that protesters“all over the Arab world have spilled into the street to vent their outrage”, even from pro-Western Gulf countries. The imminent Arab summit will be under pressure from this”display of unity among Arab masses...to exhibit the same kind of solidarity”. Yet Arab unity is“a dream that has eluded its most ardent supporters”. Disputes and suspicions[still] divide, and have made the Arab League”little more than a talking shop”. Mubarak has long called for annual Arab summits like those of African states, but lamented,”we cannot even sit down and talk about a summit”. Can Arabs change? Economist 14 Oct“Pogrom: Libya and Africa”(56):-there are many recent cases of Muslim (particularly Islamist)violence against those whose different religion is a/the major factor in the conflict (Azerbaijan; Bosnia; Chechnya; Egypt; Fergana; India; Indonesia; Israel; Lebanon; Nigeria; Pakistan; Sudan; Xinjiang). Conscious racist(as opposed to ethnic)violence involving Muslims/Arabs is relatively rare(Irian Jaya). Article reports on vicious(ostensibly)anti-foreigner riots in Libya, which clearly had strong elements of racism. Not only did the Libyan mob spare the 1m Arab migrant workers, but it attacked some of the 1m indigenous black Libyans(all blacks were refused entry to some hospitals/public transport). At least 150 people were killed, including 16 Libyans. “Anti-black violence[was]fired by an economic crisis[in] Africa’s richest state...per person”where most oil income is spent on Qaddafi’s whims. Lately he was pushing a US of Africa, with open borders. One result was over 1m black African migrants. All of these are now being shipped“home”, dead or alive, and Qaddafi is rebuilding ties with other Arab states. In Letters, published in 28 Oct Economist(6),Geoffrey Davis fully supports an irrational, racist interpretation of the riots. He notes that the riot reported is”only the latest of several outbursts of anti-black sentiment over the past few years. It is not anti-Qaddafi in its origins or intent. Nor is it based on Africans taking away jobs that Libyans want. Workers from surrounding countries are cheap and do the manual and menial jobs that Libyans disdain”. Oil revenues enable Qaddafi to satisfy his whims and still give a previously poverty-ridden people the“good life”of cash, subsidies, and free services. “The problem is a lack of challenge and purpose in the lives of ordinary Libyans, coupled with a rumour-prone society...Black Africans are the convenient and innocent victims of bouts of madness in a sick society”. [Except for the aliens’ skin colour, this might describe any Gulf state.] Sachs,“Arab League Meeting May Seek Balancing Act”NYT 20 Oct:-the 21-2 Oct summit meeting of the whole Arab League faced a dilemma: to appease popular demand to punish Israel, yet not to threaten future Arab-Israeli peace talks. “The tide of anger - more open and more defiant than any display of grass-roots political activity in at least a decade - has left many...Arab leaders in a state of near panic that the demonstrations could turn into more generalized protest against their own governments”.This is ironic since it is government media that have been”stoking popular rage”. Yet even if particularly anxious to produce more than rhetoric, the leaders had varying if not contradictory positions on most issues. Radical proposals included using the”oil weapon” against the West, and providing mass arms transfers and Arab fighters to help in a Palestinian uprising; but more moderate/realistic views prevailed. Unusually, all supported Arafat, badly needing Arab backing for his next moves. Economist 21 Oct“Things Fall Apart”(29-31):-probes why recent Arab-Palestinian clashes inflamed the whole Arab world: New factors had made peace seem possible. “On the Arab side, the Gulf war had exposed both military weakness and political disunity. Combined with faltering economies and the threat of Islamic extremism, this concentrated leaders’ minds on the danger of letting old wounds fester. If the price of joining the new world order was a begrudging accommodation with Israel, it seemed just about worth paying-...belligerent rhetoric was now evidently worthless”. But Palestinians became frustrated by glacial progress, shocked at Israeli contempt for their essential needs, and weary of unabated“petty humiliations”-while Arafat’s high-handedness isolated him. The Camp David “package” was seen as an attempt to force Arabs into unthinkable concessions, so the stand-off was bitter. It turned to fury when Sharon(and 1,000 security men)taunted all Islam by desecrating holy ground, and the next day when police cleared stone-throwers from the sanctuary, killing five and injuring scores. “[If] you pit mobs ignited by a sudden outrage, fuelled by long oppression, against a nervous army that is equipped to kill and shaped by a national belief in never showing weakness, you tend to get bloody, lopsided battles, punctuated by nasty revenge attacks. Much more surprising is the wider Arab and Islamic resonance of these events”. The provocations had fallen on fertile ground: Islamic revival is making inroads, using the emotive language of victimization and xenophobia. Even Saddam Hussein, although ”widely recognized as... responsible for destroying the last vestiges of Arab unity”, is seen as severely punished for disobeying UN resolutions while Israel is treated leniently. So“Arabs identify with the Palestinians. It is an empathy not only of kith and kin, but also one born from a feeling that the huge injustice inflicted on the Palestinians is...a reflection of wider injustices experienced by Arabs and Muslims everywhere”. Reuters“Arabs Angry at Israel but Still Want Peace”NYT 21 Oct:-article reports the agreed summit statement charging Israel with jeopardising Middle East peace was so lacking in“practical measures that will deter the aggressive Israeli practices”that the Libyans walked out. Syria argued Arabs must show that they, and not“foreign forces”, determined the future of the region. “We have to understand the danger of taking empty decisions, which will only lead to more violence and more deaths”. Saudi Arabia proposed that Arabs raise $200m for the Palestinians and $800m to“retain the Arab and Islamic character of (East) Jerusalem”. Mubarak admitted all Arab were“angry and full of resentment”, but Arab leaders had a responsibility to ”attempt to salvage the peace process”. Iraq’s position alone was the call to liberate Palestine by jihad. Sachs, “Arab Leaders Declare Freeze on All Contacts with Israel”NYT 22 Oct; Sachs,“Arab States Take Diplomatic Steps to Punish Israel”NYT 23 Oct:-[significantly different articles using the same frame, as new material was available; these highlights include both.] The summit declaration inter alia stated: Arab states will freeze all contacts with Israel until it makes tangible progress towards peace; Israel has committedatrocities”,so the UN is urged to set up a war crimes tribunal to judge its actions; $1b in aid is pledged to protect Islamic and Arab properties in Jerusalem and help the families of killed or wounded Palestinians; Arab states will boycott any multilateral meetings on regional economic cooperation, and suspend trade and political contacts, with Israel; Jerusalem should not be recognized as the capital of Israel. Since Arab journalists repeatedly questioned whether the Arab League was truly in touch with the public mood and would follow through on its promises, the summit spokesman stressed that Arab governments were not indifferent to the anger in their streets at Israeli conduct. Yet old divisions were not healed(e.g. Kuwaitis/Saudis ignored Iraqis), and the meeting”provided a glimpse of the shape of future disputes among Arab leaders. Iraq and Syria[advocated] a long-term strategy that would approach Israel as a rival military and economic power”. Morocco and Jordan argued”military consolidation was outdated, that the world around the Middle East had organized itself into common markets and that the Arabs should concentrate on competing economically and technologically”. William A. Orme Jr.,“A Parallel Mideast Battle: Is It News or Incitement?”NYT 24 Oct:-stresses use of Palestinian radio/TV to generate and maintain support for the intifada or, as Israelis see it, to deliberately “incite mass violence and ethnic hatred”. For this reason, the Voice of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority radio network, was bombed off the air by Israeli helicopter attacks after the killing in a police station of two Israeli soldiers by an angry crowd. “[T]he network’s news bulletins, commentaries and martial music have become the ubiquitous soundtrack to life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, and radio and TV programs are ”regularly interrupted by live coverage of clashes with Israeli troops and eulogies for each Palestinian killed”- all are martyrs. More fundamental is the Palestinian “unapologetically nationalistic coverage. Radio talk shows praise Palestinian ‘resistance’ and excoriate Israeli ‘war criminals’”. Israeli news media beyond doubt also present at minimum a distorted view of events/deaths to their public -both in what they show and in what they leave out. The truce agreement reached in Egypt called for a halt to“incitement”, but it clearly continues-and will significantly impede ceasefires, let alone peace agreements. Sachs,“Anti-U.S. Fever: Arab Bitterness and Boycott Talk”NYT 27 Oct:-”Long a distant and sometimes bothersome distraction for ordinary people in Arab countries, the Palestinian issue has become a daily fixation and a rallying point for a revival of pan-Arab nationalism, which had been dormant for decades”. This article deals mainly with the major and continuing effect of the media in Arab countries in creating this new situation. The”fevered programming” on nearly all Arab radio and television stations, that began with the outbreak of violence,“has eased off somewhat...But reminders of the conflict are everywhere, stirring a sense of solidarity, and if the grass-roots anger can be sustained, even at a low level, the impact on regional politics could be substantial”. Various groups are contributing a day’s pay for the cause in response to a recommendation from the Arab League, an action described by an Arab journalist as”a qualitative leap in cooperation between rulers and ruled in support of a cause”. The”anti-US fever”in the title refers to calls on the media by radical anti-Israel groups to boycott US products/companies. Economist 28 Oct“After Peace Has Crashed”(14);“The Spreading of Palestine’s War”(42-3):-both Editorial and article express serious concern that the Arab/Muslim-Israel confrontation,”[w]ith passion and prejudice the ruling emotions”, could find Israel and its neighbours ”spiralling backwards into an ugliness from which retrieval would be[hard and long]”(14). Not only will Arab governments“nervously watch the spreading of pro-Palestinian feeling among their people”,but now“Arab leaders are fearful of being drawn into the Palestinian mayhem”(42). This was evident in the Arab summit “sound-and-fury”statement, but promised no action -and generated region-wide demonstrations.”[W]hat now most concerns the Arab regimes is not Jerusalem...It is their own survival”(43). Patrick E. Tyler,“Islamic Revival Wears Many Faces in a Secular Asian Land”NYT 29 Oct:-Tajikistan is unusual among the newly independent states of former Soviet Central Asia in that the Islamic Revival Party (IRP)is not only legal but has two members in Parliament and over 50 in local governments. Islamic parties are outlawed or suppressed in the other successor states since the Islamic revival spreading through the region is identified with Islamic extremism. Although Muslims took up arms in a 1992-7 civil war that left at least 50,000 dead, the IRP now joins the government in condemning the Islamic extremism practised by the Taliban in Afghanistan. An IRP leader(and ex-rebel)explains:”war is not the best means for creating an Islamic society...Now that the obstacles to propagating Islam have been removed in Tajikistan, we have the possibility to come to power, and that is the big difference[from] neighbouring countries”. Significantly, however, Islam seems less popular here than where it is repressed. Douglas Frantz,“Persecution Charged in Ex-Soviet Republic”NYT 29 Oct:-Uzbekistan, unlike Tajikistan, is waging a“largely unnoticed war”against those whose only crime is that they are pious Muslims. Religious and human rights leaders contend the government, “which has already banned opposition parties and silenced the independent press, is using a trumped-up threat of radical Islam to stamp out the last vestige of dissent”. It is true that”[s]ince the Soviet Union collapsed, there has been a slow resurgence of Islam in traditionally Muslim Central Asia. The governments have tried to control its growth[non-violently,b]ut officials across the region, who tend to have an authoritarian bent, fear Islamic extremism”. There are indeed fire-fights with Islamic movements, but the major Party of Liberation claims it promotes Islam as a religious and social force, and its leaders urge Muslims to pray and study for a future Islamic state; while critical of government corruption and repression, they have not promoted violence. Yet since 1992, 4-5,000 have been arrested for advocating an Islamic regime or simply distributing religious tracts, and received harsh sentences on spurious grounds. Clearly, many are tortured; many die in prison. Sachs“Defying U.S., Arabs Widen Iraqi Ties”NYT 01 Nov:-trans-Arab sympathy for Iraq is one spillover from the Palestinian-Israeli violence, and has“prompted a resurgence of public support for the idea that the West...behaves badly toward the Arab world”. Violation by Arab countries of UN air sanctions against Iraq reflects a strong feeling“across the Arab political spectrum”that the US follows a“double standard”in its reluctance to hold Israel to account for its treatment of Palestinians, and in its stubborn opposition to lifting the Iraqi sanctions. “Iraq has also found a newly receptive audience for its assertion that it is the only true defender of Arab and Palestinian interests”. AP“Qatar Shuts Israeli Trade Office”09 Nov:-following the Arab League meeting, the Organization of the Islamic Conference holds a summit 12-4 Nov to give greater support for the Palestinians. This meeting, in Doha, Qatar, will be attended by Iran’s President Khatami. Partly in this connection, Qatar is shutting down the Israeli trade mission in Doha. Since Oman had already severed relations with Israel, it left Qatar as the only Gulf state maintaining commercial ties with Israel. Tunisia and Morocco also closed their interest sections in Israel after the Arab summit. (Egypt and Jordan are the only Arab states to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel.) Sachs,“Muslim Nations Bitterly Denounce Israel at Summit”NYT 13 Nov; Reuters “Muslims to Slam Israel, Reject Terror - Delegates”NYT 13 Nov:-two articles reporting on decisions of the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC), whose 56 member-states ostensibly represent the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims. Being more politically variegated and less concerned with Israel than the Arab League, OIC triennial summits since the peace process began in 1991 have avoided referring to jihad against Israel - but the Doha Declaration included some pretty tough language. “An outpouring of anti-Israel feeling in their own countries has put pressure on many Arab and Islamic leaders to pay more than lip service to the Palestinian cause”. Still, since 20 members(mostly African and Central Asian) have diplomatic relations with Israel, a full boycott was rejected and the relevant resolution stated:”The leaders invite member states which have established relations with Israel, or are taking steps toward ties with Israel within the framework of the peace process, to cut these ties...and stop all forms of normalization until it complies accurately and honestly with UN resolutions dealing with Palestine and holy Jerusalem”. They did affirm however their “determination to cut relations with any country that moves its embassy to Jerusalem or recognizes it as the capital of Israel”. To allay Western(US)fears of armed reprisals by pro-Palestinian militants the leaders deploredall forms of terrorism from whatever source”,but also”reaffirmed the need to distinguish between terrorism and peoples’ struggle for liberation”.The Palestinians were promised full political and financial support. More valuable for Arafat would be solid political backing for his next move. Reuters,“Arab Women Slam Israeli Force Against Palestinians”NYT 18 Nov:-unprecedented Cairo“summit” organized by Arab League, Lebanese and Egyptian women’s groups, and bringing together most respected women in the Arab world, loudly denounced Israeli violence. Mrs. Mubarak claimed its voice was”raised in 1686protest against the terrible injustice”done to Palestinians, and”expressed the anger of half the Arab World population...at violations committed against Palestinian women and children”. While aimed primarily at Arab women’s common issues, supporting their rights to justice and equality in all fields, and calling for removal of societal restrictions, the impetus was evidently a unifying Arab concern over“the Palestinian problem”. Sachs,“News Analysis: Mubarak’s Move”NYT 22 Nov:-Egypt’s recall of its ambassador to Israelmarks the end of a long period of relative restraint in Arab-Israeli relations”. Mubarak’s angry response to Israel’s bombing of the densely populated Gaza Strip”signals that at least for now, he has abandoned the chatty personal diplomacy that had become his trademark”. The implications go to the substance of Arab engagement in peacemaking. Mubarak’s policy of moderation and dialogue have now subjected him to“a relentless storm of criticism from Arab commentators ...leaders”,and demands for stronger action from his own citizens. John F. Burns,“One Sheik’s Mission: To Teach the Young to Despise Western Culture”NYT 17 Dec:-since the terrorist attack on USS Cole in Aden harbor, US media/security services have paid special attention to Yemen and its ties with Osama bin Ladin(of Yemeni origin). Article describes the views and activities of Sheik Muqbel bin Hadi al-Wadi, a”seminal influence”on bin Laden and”one of the Arab world’s most militantly anti-Western Islamic clerics”. His main base/school is a large guarded compound located in Dammaj, northern Yemen, where at least 3,000 Islamic militants from the whole Muslim world -and even some from the West- teach and study. The FBI sees Sheik Muqbel’s study centers(five in Yemen)”as incubators for the Islamic holy war...declared against the[US]”(see above: Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill:”). He is a“font of vituperation against the[US]and Israel, Christians and Jews”, but contends the center is strictly a theological school -”albeit one that propagates a purist, militant, stridently anti-Western form of Islam...the essence of[which]is that Muslims should shun the corrupt ways of the modern world and return to the austerity and zeal of the Prophet”. Almost all technology is forbidden(plus music and women), but in the sheik’s view,”the most dangerous enemies of Islam...are Western life and culture - democracy, pluralism, tolerance and any kind of voting”. Western intelligence believes the centers,”even if not military camps, act as ideological proving grounds for young Muslims who go on to train elsewhere, often in Afghanistan, and to become terrorists”. Jane Perlez,“Fork in Arafat’s Road: New Peace or Old Victimhood”NYT 29 Dec:-written at a/the“moment of truth”in the Clinton-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and from the viewpoint of Yasser Arafat, the profound dilemmas described apply in varying degrees to all Arabs and Israelis concerned. For these many, the sting of the dilemmas faced reflects their extremely emotive, deeply religious, and timeless historical nature. Even in the shorter term(over half a century), they relate to strong positions taken(and great sacrifices demanded)by most of the region's governments, that tie them to ethnic/religious identity and honour, and constitute”battle-criesthat brook no compromise. (For the origin of some utopian Zionist concepts, see The Economist, 23 Dec“Dreaming of Altneuland”(59-60)). Yet they are totally incompatible (“united Jerusalem”; ”right of return”, etc.)so that critical concessions are demanded of both sides, and any compromise - however balanced - will generate violent opposition and probably at minimum the political death of the compromisers. Yet the status quo is inherently unstable(besides being painful for millions). Such is the power of ethnicity. [During the first half of 2001, I may have missed, among my sources, key articles/essays/books on Arab/Islamic (dis)unity. However, my impression is that the huge volume of material on Palestinian-Israeli violence and their diplomatic impasse included little or no analysis directly relevant to these summaries. Partly related trends have been: a gradual reduction in the isolation of Iraq - but mainly by neighbouring states that gain economically; the increased isolation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan(except by Pakistan); and the redirection of Qaddafi’s interest from Arab to African unity. Finally, directly relevant is a follow-up to the Oct Arab summit on solidarity with the Palestinians.] AP“Arab States Slow in Paying Funds”NYT 18 Aug 01:-reports that the Islamic Development Bank privately admits Arab states have paid less than half the $1b they pledged at the summit. Although the total pledge was already cut to $693b after contributions fell short, so far 12 participating Arab nations have deposited only $442.5b. While there is no date by which countries should fulfil their pledges, Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Syria have paid their commitments in full, totalling $100m. The most wealthy, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, have given $325m of the $550m pledged. Yemen has paid over $8m of the $10m it pledged, Jordan $1.5m out of $2m pledged, Sudan $.5m out of $1m pledged, but Egypt only $7.5m out of $30m pledged. Contributions go into two accounts: for supporting the Palestinian Authority’s budget, and for development projects. So far, $240m has been spent: $225m for PA budget;$15m on projects. Reuters“Words, Not Deeds Expected at Emergency Arab Talks”NYT 22 Aug:-announces the opening of the fifth Arab foreign ministers’ emergency meeting to be held since the Palestinian uprising began in Sep 00. There have also been two Arab Summits: the first in Oct 00 pledged the $1b in assistance; the second in Mar 01 is remarkable mainly in being the first regular Arab League summit in 10 years. Since none of these meetings has produced anything substantive in the way of agreement/action except the unmet pledge, the article/analysts predict this one will again result only in soothing words for Palestinians, and condemnation of Israeli actions. The article quotes an Egyptian columnist:”The Arabs have made themselves laughing stocks ...We want a full scale economic and political boycott of Israel”. But this cannot be agreed upon, and Egypt, the host, is actually working as a peace mediator. Agreement might be reached to meet the original pledge, but Arab governments are aware”the pressure of public opinion is growing on them”. AP “Arafat Appeals to U.N. for State”NYT 22 Aug:-at Cairo meeting of 14 Arab FMs, Yasser Arafat called on the UNSC to stop Israel from“destroying the Palestinian dreamof a free, independent state. While the Qatari FM(and chair) assured Palestinians they will not be alone in their confrontation -”[t]he Arab brothers are standing with political, financial and moral support”- the Syrian FM was skeptical:”We’ve met many times...and we did not put forward any plan”. Meanwhile, Israeli and Palestinian delegates clashed in UNSC over an Arab-Muslim resolution calling for international monitors to be sent to the West Bank and Gaza. Reuters “Arab Foreign Ministers Are Urged to Aid Palestinians”NYT 23 Aug:-as expected, the two-day emergency meeting of Arab FMs ended with calls for political and economic help for Palestinians and the usual condemnation of “aggressive” Israeli policies. Inter alia the FMs”called on Arabs to refrain from opening contacts with Israel...but did not call on states to end existing ties”. They also called for a global boycott of Israeli goods produced in settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and a study of ways to revive the full Arab boycott of Israel - though difficult to apply. Some resolutions were not made public. AP “Arab League Ministers Discuss Mideast”NYT 09 Sep:-reports on another Arab League meeting, whose result was more appeal and advice than joint action. The foreign ministers urged the US to stop Israel’s“aggressive policies”and its assassination of Palestinian militants, and advised the(absent)Arafat about meeting Israeli FM Peres. Earlier, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council had issued a similar appeal and discussed a Saudi plan to present Arab concerns over Israeli violence to the Bush administration. Bernard Lewis What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 02):-in recent years, many people in all parts of world, including in Middle Eastern countries and via the UN, have become seriously concerned why these people, in area that for centuries was most advanced and sophisticated on earth, are broadly missing advanced economies, widely-sympathetic governments, and ingenuity-benefited lifestyles. All are also concerned in some manner about the Middle Eastern generation of terrorist organizations. Expert writers offer interesting analyses on how the area is now, and will adapt in future(e.g. Marina Ottaway op.cit).This book, written by the doyen of Middle Eastern studies and foremost authority on Islamic history and culture, draws on his unique knowledge of area over recent centuries to describe how and why it absorbed slowly and selectively from world-dominant European rapidly-modernizing culture. It explains a great deal - both today and tomorrow. “If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in common creative endeavour, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own.”Amy Chua WORLD ON FIRE: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability(New York: Doubleday 03):-this easy-to-read 350page survey of special political/economic/social problems in many parts of the world has generated good reviews and more influence. Its strong warning is not against either globalization trade or pure democracy in developing countries, but against pressing these ideas too quickly when rich but unpopular minorities dominate their economies - widely common situation that is carefully described. She concludes by first naming three goals: "[1] the best economic hope for developing and post-socialist countries lies in some form of market-generated growth; [2] the best political hope for these countries lies in some form of democracy, with constitutional constraints, tailored to local realities; [3] avoiding ethnic oppression and bloodshed must be a constant priority. But if these goals are to be achieved - if global free market democracy is to be peaceably sustainable - then the problem of market-dominant minorities, however unsettling, must be confronted head-on. [Finally, four specific "tonics" are addressed:] (1) the possibility of 'leveling the playing field' between market-dominant minorities and the impoverished 'indigenous' majorities around them; (2) ways of getting the poor, frustrated majorities of the world a greater stake in global markets; (3) ways of promoting liberal rather than illiberal democracies; and (4) approaches that market-dominant minorities themselves might take to forestall majority-based, often murderous ethnonationalist backlashes". Chapter sub-titles show where and how these major challenges exist and must be addressed: (1)Chinese Minority Dominance in Southeast Asia; (2)'White' Wealth in Latin America; (3)The Jewish Billionaires of Post-Communist Russia; (4)Market-Dominant Minorities in Africa; (5)Ethnically Targeted Seizures and Nationalizations; (6)Crony Capitalism and Minority Rule; (7)Expulsions and Genocide; (8)Assimilation, Globalization, and the Case of Thailand;(9)From Jim Crow to the Holocaust;(10)Israeli Jews as a Regional Market-Dominant Minority; (11)US as a Global Market-Dominant Minority; (12)The Future of Free Market Democracy; Bernard Lewis The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror(New York: Modern Library 03):- Lewis "examines the historical roots of the resentments that dominate the Islamic world today and that are increasingly being expressed in acts of terrorism. [He] is internationally recognized as one of our era's greatest historians of the Middle East[, and] his books have been translated into more than 20 languages, including Arabic/Persian/Turkish/Indonesian"[from dustcover]. Chapters generally move from past to present - but can even be read individually: Introduction; I Defining Islam; II The House of War; III From Crusaders to Imperialists; IV Discovering America; V Satan and the Soviets; VI Double Standards; VII A Failure of Modernity; VIII The Marriage of Saudi Power and Wahhabi Teaching; IX The Rise of Terrorism. Final paragraphs include: "For Usama bin Laden, his declaration of war against US marks the resumption of the struggle for religious dominance of the world. For him and his followers, this is a moment of opportunity... But there are others for whom US offers a different kind of temptation - the promise of human rights, of free institutions, and of a responsible and representative government... It is difficult for us to help those people, but at least we should not hinder them... Meanwhile, there is a more urgent problem. If the leaders of Al-Qa'ida can persuade the world of Islam to accept their views and their leadership, then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead... If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world"; "Anonymous"Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(DullesVA: Brassey's 04):-author is a senior US intelligence official with nearly 20 years experience in national security issues related to Afghanistan and South Asia. This strong critique of arrogant US/allies' policies towards Osama bin Laden/al Qaeda, and military action against Afghanistan/Iraq, proved quickly influential in many respects, and advocates less US loyalty to Israel/corrupt Muslim regimes or presence in Mideast. Motivation of Muslim terrorists is identified not as hatred/fear of Western national systems but of their broadly negative actions against Islamic peoples. All complex chapter titles: (1)Some Thoughts on the Power of Focused, Principled Hatred. (2) An Unprepared and Ignorant Lunge to Defeat - The US in Afghanistan. (3) Not Down, Not Out: Al Qaeda's Resiliency, Expansion, and Momentum. (4) The World's View of bin Laden: A Muslim Leader and Hero Coming into Focus? (5) Bin Laden Views the World: Some Old, Some New, and a Twist. (6) Blinding Hubris Abounding: Inflicting Defeat on Ourselves - Non-War, Leaks, and Missionary Democracy. (7) When the Enemy Sets the Stage: How US's Stubborn Obtuseness Aids Its Foes. (8) The Way Ahead: A Few Suggestions for Debate. Epilogue: No Basis for Optimism; James Fallows“Blind Into Baghdad”Atlantic Monthly Jan/Feb 04(52-74):-writer honoured US national correspondent for Atlantic. Carefully exposed account of US government’s relatively small and almost purely military attack on Iraq - relatively little involvement prepared to maintain conquered control/ restore economy/unify three rival peoples in democracy. Author’s knowledge of government’s simplified plan was substantially explained by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who noted how more careful policies had been rejected by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and hence by President Bush. Key extracts from article:“U.S. occupation of Iraq is debacle not because government did no planning but because vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by people in charge...Problems encountered precisely ones U.S. expert agencies warned against...All government working groups concluded that occupying Iraq would be far more difficult than defeating it...If failure to stop looting was major sin of omission, disbanding Iraqi army was catastrophic error of commission - creating instant enemy class. Every pre-war study had warned against it.”The Economist 07 Aug 04“Arab Foreign Policy: Always Prickly, Sometimes Paranoid, Occasionally Pragmatic” (37-8);“Palestine: Who’s In Charge?”(38);“Morocco: The Slow March To Reform”(38-9);“Iraq’s Christians: Less Safe Than Before?”(39):-first report analyses outstandingly how Arab governments/peoples deal with outside world and each other, three other reports on national Arab states provide interesting descriptions of how different attitudes/prejudices within nations delay their progress. Arabs find it hard to act together to solve region’s manifold problems. Suspicion of US runs deep in Arab world and can generate strong misinterpretations of events.“Many Arab governments would sincerely like to help heal festering regional sores such as mayhem in Iraq and misery in Palestine and Darfur. Not only would this reduce risk of infection, it would also improve strained relations with superpower. But popular distrust of western, and particularly US, motives keeps getting in way...More western sensitivity to Arab concerns and less blinkered Arab prickliness about sacredness of sovereignty in countries with vicious regimes.” Jason Burke"Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror"(New York: I.B.Tauris & Co 03):-while I read this book long after summarizing Burke‛s valuable article in 04 Foreign Policy(op cit), many of author‛s FP views also stated/implied in book, so aren‛t repeated. Book, however, is a valuable - and concentrated(300 pp) - report on the origins/members/relationships/aims of "al-Qaeda" in global terms, plus involvement of bin Laden to events of 11 Sep 01. Material is derived from both author‛s extraordinary interviews/experience and information from many other personal sources. Advice in book‛s conclusion is of special importance - and has much in common with "Christopher Spencer" item: "We [West] need to counter the twisted vision of world that is becoming so prevalent. Every time force is used it reinforces that vision by providing more evidence of a ‛clash of civilisations‛ and a ‛cosmic struggle‛... ‛War on terrorshould have a military component [:] hardened militants cannot be rehabilitated[; b]ut if we are to win battle against terrorism, our strategies must be made broader and more sophisticated. [G]reatest weapon available in war on terrorism is the courage, decency, humour and integrity of the vast proportion of the world‛s Muslims [-] restricting the spread of ‛al-Qaeda‛ and its warped worldview. [B]attle between West and men like bin Laden...is not a battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds [-] battle we, and our allies in the Muslim world, losing. [Yet all] modern Islamic terrorism... can be acted on by well-judged, properly executed policies. Causes of terrorism must be addressed, careful analysis of...threat...undertaken, moderate Muslim leaders engaged, spread of hardline strands of Islam rolled back, and enormous effort to counter growing sympathy for ‛al-Qaeda‛ worldview must be made... All terrorist violence, ‛Islamic‛ or otherwise, is unjustifiable/ unforgivable/ cowardly/contemptible. But just because we condemn does not mean we should not strive to comprehend. We need to keep asking why"(249-50); Jason Burke"THINK AGAIN: Al Qaeda"Foreign Policy No.142(May/Jun 04):-summarizing (global) public (mis)concepts about current capacities and aims of al Qaeda forces and ideas, and its future strength, Burke, chief reporter of Britain's Observer and author of Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror(New York: I.B. Tauris 03)(op cit),offers nine widely believed views about issues, and then denies accuracy of each. "Al Qaeda Is a Global Terrorist Organization" -NO. "It is less an organization than an ideology... Today, structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed... There is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. But al Qaeda workview... is growing stronger every day." "Capturing or Killing Bin Laden Will Deal a Severe Blow to Al Qaeda" -WRONG "If...he surrenders without a fight, which is very unlikely, many followers will be deeply disillusioned. If he achieves martyrdom in way that his cohorts can spin as heroic, he will beinspiration for generations to come. Either way, bin Laden's removal from scene will not stop Islamic militancy. "The Militants Seek to Destroy the West So They Can Impose a Global Islamic State" -FALSE "Islamic militants' main objective is not conquest, but to beat back what they perceive as an aggressive West. [S]econdary goal is establishment of...single Islamic state, in lands roughly corresponding to furthest extent of Islamic empire." "The Militants Reject Modern Ideas in Favor of Traditional Muslim Theology" -NO "Islamic hard-liners...have little compunction about embracing tools that modernity provides... [M]ilitants are framing modern political concerns ...within mythic and religious narrative. They do not reject modernization per se, but...resent their failure to benefit from that modernization." "Since the Rise of Al Qaeda, Islamic Moderates Have Been Marginalized" -INCORRECT "Al Qaeda represents lunatic fringe of political thought in Islamic world. While al Qaeda has made significant inroads in recent years, only tiny minority of world's 1.3b Muslims adhere to its doctrine." "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Central to the Militants' Cause" -WRONG "Televised images... reinforce militants' key message that lands of Islam under attack, and that all Muslims must rise up and fight. However,...resolution...would not end threat of militant Islam...Two-state solution...would still leave 'Zionist entity' intact." "Sort Out Saudi Arabia and the Whole Problem Will Disappear" -NO "Inequities of Saudi system... continues to create sense of disenfranchisement that allows extremism to flourish...Saudi Arabia is one of many causes of modern Islamicmilitancy, but it has no monopoly on blame." "It Is Only a Matter of Time Before Islamic Militants Use Weapons of Mass Destruction" -CALM DOWN "Although Islamic militants...have attempted to develop basic chemical or biological arsenal, efforts have been largely unsuccessful due to technical difficulty...Islamic militants far more likely to use conventional bombs or employ conventional devices in imaginative ways." "The West Is Winning the War on Terror" -UNFORTUNATELY, NO "If countries to win war on terror, must eradicate enemies without creating new ones...Invasion of Iraq...has made task more pressing... Ben Laden's aim to radicalize/mobilize. He is closer to achieving goals than West is to deterring him". Reza Aslan No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam(New York: Random House 05):-The widely-read author defines his aim in the Prologue: "This book is not just critical reexamination of the origins and evolution of Islam, nor is it merely an account of the current struggle among Muslims to define the future of this magnificent yet misunderstood faith. This book is, above all else, an argument for reform"(xx). William Grimes, in his New York Times 04 May 05 review, quotes the book:"What is taking place now in the Muslim world is an internal conflict between Muslims, not an external battle between Islam and the West"(248). Grimes himself argues: "[Islam's] history, grippingly narrated and thoughtfully examined, takes up nearly all of 'No god but God'. Aslan... has written a literate, accessible introduction to Islam.,. carefully placing its message/rituals in historical context. Complete with glossary/annotated bibliography, it could easily serve as a college textbook". The 310-page book includes 21st century arguments: "[T]he attacks of 11 Sep 01 were not a defensive strike against a specific act of aggression against Islam. They were never sanctioned by a qualified mujtahid. They made no differentiation between combatant/noncombatant.,. indiscriminately killed women, children, and approximately 200 Muslims. In other words, they fell far short of the regulations imposed by Muhammad for a legitimate jihadi response, which is why, despite common perception in the West, they were so roundly condemned by the vast majority of the world's Muslims"(87). "Tragic events of 11 Sep... initiated a vibrant discourse among Muslims about meaning/message of Islam in 21st century... It may be too early to know who will write the next chapter of Islam's story, but it is not too early to recognize who will ultimately win the war between reform/counterreform... But the cleansing inevitable, and tide of reform cannot be stopped. Islamic Reformation is already here"(266). Jason Burke"It May Well Take 20 Years. But al-Qaeda‛s Days Are Numbered" Guardian 10 Sep 06:-Special Report by expert/famous journalist, published five years after "9/11", claims: "Osama bin Laden waits in vain for a Muslim ‛awakening‛. The lure of the West is just too powerful a force". Full Burke text (plus 70 optional pages of the item‛s wide Email reactions) is available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,1869182,00.html. Highlights: "There is a sense that history, far from ending, is accelerating. That the centre cannot hold. That the individual counts for nothing. [Burke‛s reactions to some of bin Laden‛s 01 claims: H]e was wrong. Yes, there is increasing radicalisation. Yes, a new and powerfully globalised ‛Muslim‛ identity is spreading, aided by communications technology that renders national frontiers obsolete. Yes, there is a small, if growing, number of Muslims who are attracted toal-Qaedismin its largest sense. But truth is that out of a total of 1.6b Muslims, very few have joined terrorist organisations. In [some Muslim] countries... there has been strong counter-reaction to the atrocities... World‛s Muslims are not behaving as bin Laden wants them to... The [London] bombs were a strike against a continuing and largely successful process of integration on a national scale. The attacks across the world in the past five years are strikes against a similar process of integration on an international scale. This process is largely driven by the continuing popularity and attraction of the Western model of secular liberal democracy, Enlightment values, and capitalist economics. It is the success of this model that has provoked the violence against it, not its failure. [N]eed to ask why so many people... recently came to view the apparently ineluctable process of Westernisation. [T]he arithmetic of terrorism means that you only need a small shift in public opinion to create enough angry individuals to cause a major problem... The appeal of the West is founded not just on a dream of a high level of material comfort but also on the satisfaction of basic and universal human values such as dignity, protection of life and justice. This gives West considerable moral capital,.. a fragile commodity... profligately spent in recent years... But for all the clumsiness with which the misconceivedwar on terror‛ has been handled, the attraction, however conflicted, of ‛the West‛ for billions of people remains our greatest strength. Remember that and, over 10 or 20 years, it will become clear bin Laden‛s life or death will indeed have no significance. He and his kind will have been consigned to the history books". Related Burke volume is:On the Road to Kandahar(Bond Street Books 06 or St. Martin‛s Press 07)"From one of world‛s leading experts..how we are to get to grips with radical Islam/what it really means". Paul William Roberts"A Profile of the Prophet" Globe & Mail 11 Feb 2006:-Focus: "The outrage sparked by the controversial cartoons published in Denmark has led many around the world to realize just how tenuous their grasp of Islam really is. To help fill the gap, Middle East specialist PAUL WILLIAM ROBERTS tells: the story of Mohammed and why it means so much to the Muslim faithful." [An excellent and sympathetic description of the origin and basic beliefs of the Islamic religion, written for Christian, Jewish, atheist, etc. readers, not to gain converts but to offer those with other philosophies and/or religious views an objective account that avoids assigning historical perfection. Viewed fair by my Islamic friends]; Faisal Devji Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy . Morality . Modernity(Ithaca: Cornell Univ.Press 05):-very thoughtful analysis of Al-Qaeda's jihad motives behind the 11 Sep 01 attack against USA. To determine and describe this, the less-than-200-page book draws often on written/spoken rationales by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular. Following is derived from its own summary: "Devji focuses on the ethical content of [the Al-Qaeda's] jihad, as opposed to its purported political intent. Al-Qaeda differs radically from such groups as... Muslim Brotherhood and Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, which aim to establish fundamentalist Islamist states. In fact,.. Al-Qaeda [has] a decentralized structure, and emphasis on moral rather than political action... Bin Laden and his lieutenants view their cause as a response to oppressive conditions faced by Muslim world[; not] an Islamic attempt to build states. Al-Qaeda culls diverse symbols/fragments from Islam's past in order to legitimize its global war against the 'metaphysical evil' emanating from the West. Most salient example of this assemblage... is concept of jihad itself, which Al-Qaeda defines as 'individual duty' incumbent on all Muslims, [and] weapon of spiritual conflict. Al Qaeda and its jihad, Devji suggests, are only the most visible manifestations of wider changes in the Muslim world. Such changes include fragmentation of traditional/fundamentalist forms of authority. [Hence] Al-Qaeda represents a dangerous new way of organizing Muslim belief/practice within a global landscape and does not require ideological/institutional unity. [Book] is at once a sophisticated work of historical/cultural analysis, and an invaluable guide to the world's most prominent terrorist movement"; The Economist 01 Jul 06"Democracy in the Arab World: Not Yet, Thanks"(42-3):-item illustrates how"Recent hopes for the steady advance of democracy are being widely stifled". It tells of many limited democracy-related movements in Arab countries, and counter-reform developments there more recently. General pictures then and now as follows: "A few years back, and especially in wake of US invasion of Iraq, many [Arab leaders] found it politic to sound responsive to mounting pressure for reform. It was partly internal, inspired by factors such as demography, fading potency of long-ruling ideologies, and impact of harder-to-control new media such as TV. External forces helped, too, most notably [US/]other Western governments, [pushing] political freedom as the ultimate foil for extremism... But now, the tide appears to have turned". Politically reactionary events are described in: Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even Lebanon. "Several factors explain the waning of reform momentum. One is the high price of oil. Exporters... find themselves so flush with cash that they can again buy off dissent. But a bigger factor is advance of Islamist opposition groups. In past year, religious parties have crushed secular rivals in Iraq, Hamas has captured shaky government of Palestine, Islamists have performed strongly in Saudi Arabia's polls, and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood won unprecedented fifth of parliament's seats... Islamic surge has frightened not only the region's governments, but also foreign promoters of democracy... Western officials and academics at a recent conference appeared to 'wash their hands of supporting democracy in the Arab world'. [Some US politicians have revived support for an old Arab leader.] Similar signs of return to [Western] realpolitik have been noted with relief by Arab governments". The Economist 22 Jul 06"Israel and Lebanon: The Accidental War"(Edit.13-4); "Special Report: The Crisis in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine: Ending Will Be Harder"(29-32):-My aim is to offer just titles/summaries of selected articles and books which provide valuable information and/or views on global issues. Hence I have offered for years a special 'chapter' on Lebanon/Syria under RECENT DEVELOPMENTS because of their unique developments/potentials. Outbreak of very serious violence between Israel and Lebanon-located Hizbullah 12 Jul 06 was a true 21st century crisis, and for at least weeks generated hundreds of articles a day. I do not have the time or speciality to list even their titles. Instead, here is a summary of the analytical sections or arguments by The Economist as one relatively reliable source on (global) issues involved. The essence of Editorial is:"A pointless war that no one may have wanted and no one can win. It should stop now". Highlights:"[I]t started with a pinprick[:] decision of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, to send his fighters on cross-border raid into Israel on 12 Jul, where they killed several soldiers and captured two... Israel says timing - 3 days before G8 summit - was no coincidence[:] Iran was using Hizbullah to deflect attention...Equally plausible explanation is[:] Nasrallah..doing nothing new... Hizbullah has mounted several similar raids into Israel. It got away with them[: Israel's] reactions astonishingly mild. Reason, as Nasrallah constantly boasted, was his arsenal of around 12,000 Iranian/Syrian rockets/missiles. With [such] deterrent[, he] felt free to pursue intermittent cross-border war against much stronger neighbour... This time too, Nasrallah may have expected usual token response. If so, he miscalculated[: capturing two Israeli soldiers]. Hamas movement had [just] mounted equally daring raid into Israel from Gaza[,] killing two soldiers, nabbing another. Perhaps precisely because his non-military background required him to look strong, Israel's new PM Ehud Olmert decided this double humiliation was more than he could survive or Israel could bear. So he has chosen to go to war [see Special Report]. Conditions for it have been building, in slow motion, for years. [S]ince Israel's invasion of 1982, Hizbullah has emerged as strongest local military force in Lebanon [,] cannot be disarmed [by] Lebanese army [and] has shown little interest in UNSC Resolution 1559 which calls...for disbanding of all Lebanese militias... Hezbullah is political party in parliament and government, but militia does not take [their] orders[, probably taking] ideological/tactical advice from Iran, its chief armourer and mentor. [B]y giving Hizbullah all those rockets and missiles, Iran has transformed a small militia into a strategic threat to the Jewish state [and] it was utter hubris for Hizbullah to believe that, with its rockets in reserve, its fighters could keep crossing into Israel with impunity. A war that starts by accident is not necessarily easy to end... Stakes could hardly be higher for both sides[; hence] both have rushed...up the ladder of escalation". The next issue of The Economist (29 Jul 06 in North America) contains another thoughtful Editorial and three related articles on the violence and initial discussion of peacekeeping. Titles and their own summaries are as follows: "Israel and Lebanon: Stuck in Lebanon"(Edit.):-"Why this war is likely to be long, unless US tries harder to shorten it";"The Lebanese Crisis: Can Diplomacy Be Given a Chance?":-"The first signs that Israel's attack on Hizbullah is losing momentum could give a fillip to the diplomacy now getting under way, but timing is crucial";"Lebanon's Government: So Who's Running the Show?":-"As Israel tries to destroy Hizbullah, Lebanon's government is floundering";"The Ethics of War: Mind Those Proportions":-"As the war in Lebanon shows, there are several ways to make a moral judgment". The essential and final argument of the second Editorial is, once again,"The right thing for US is to call for an immediate stop to the fighting, postponing its plans for the reordering of Lebanon until the period after the guns fall silent". Economist 22 Jul 06 "Arabs and Democracy: Not Yet, Say the Arabs"(79-80):-this review of three books is officially summed as arguing (like the above item): "Why democracy will not sink roots in the Arab world, at least in a hurry". It later says: "None of these books asserts categorically that the Arabs are unfit for, or incapable of, democracy, but all make plain how extraordinarily hard it will be for a system of one-person-one-vote to sink roots in such unfamiliar soil". Fouad Ajami The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq(Free Press):-"[D]ominant tone...is one of lamentation. Despite the supposed attractions of new deal US offered Iraqis, beneficiaries have been patently unable...