|
|
| by Christopher
Spencer |
Former Senior
Advisor International Organizations, Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
| Updated: 25 MAY
09 | |
John L.Esposito The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Revised Edition(New York: Oxford Univ.
Press 95):-plethora of recent books on Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism and the Islamic"threat"
partly reflects a tendency in the West to confuse the new political power of Islamism(which is
not”fundamentalist”in the Christian sense, and influences such major countries as Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia)with Arab nationalism(which involves a
considerably smaller number of states and people - from Morocco to Iraq - most deeply
concerned with the Israeli issue). This book is among the best on Islamism. It is neither an
apologia nor an alarm, but an objective and informative source for Western readers, particularly
those concerned about an inevitable"Clash of Civilizations"(see Huntington,op.cit.). Fouad
Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey(New York: Pantheon, 1998):-UN”peace agenda” seems overwhelmed by ethnic conflict, which competes with its Charter role
of constraining broader national ambitions. Yet both ethnicity and nationalism have long
provided motives for violence - and even world wars. Their deep-seated combination constitutes
an inflammable and enduring cause of conflict, both inter- and intra-state. This is tragically true
of the Arab world, through the 20th century a focus of instability. Ajami's well-written book tells
the story of Arab intellectuals' key role in generating pan-Arabic nationalism, pro-and anti-Western cultural aspirations and hatred of Israel - and in impeding development. The very
arguments and myths used to foster Arab identity are promoting ethnic conflict in Arab states.
The process is globally relevant. Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration
of Jihad”in Foreign Affairs Vol.77/No.6(Nov/Dec 1998):-offers a valuable historical and religious
gloss for the amazing, if largely ignored, declaration of jihad against“the Jews and the
Crusaders”(sic)issued by bin Ladin(suspected of bombing two US embassies in Africa)and
several Islamist leaders. The statement accuses the US of occupying, plundering and humiliating
Islam’s holiest territory (i.e. Arabia) and of planning to repeat the slaughter of a million(sic)Iraqis,
for religious(sic)and economic reasons and[of course]to serve Israel. Fatwa:“To kill Americans
and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in
any[possible] country”(p.15). A specific demand for mass terror. The Economist 19 Feb 00“Iran,
Islam and Democracy”(19-20):-also takes a careful and objective look at Islamism, this time in
the context of an Iranian election in which the world’s most revolutionary and militant theocracy
was sharply instructed to become more democratic and tolerant by a generally religious
electorate frustrated with“clerical despotism”opposed to all things Western. The Editor notes
that while the Islamic world is“not burdened with examples of good government, let alone
democracy,...religion is seldom the culprit; look, rather, for cruel autocrats, corrupt feudal
systems, overbearing armies[, with] Arabs inhabiting the least democratic patch on God’s
earth...Religion is largely irrelevant to this common misbehaviour”. Sometimes Islamism itself
is a”principal villain”[Sudan, Afghanistan], but in general the”actions of a few zealots have
helped to discolour understanding of political Islam.” While this“still provides dangers,[the
Iranian example]also provides reasons for hope”. John F. Burns,“An Arab Militia, Glimpsing
Victory, Could Lose Peace” New York Times 28 Feb:-rare summary of the history, actions and
aims of Hezbollah, a key player in Middle East events, whose apparent mutation may be relevant
to wider trends in terrorism, sub-state violence and religious politics. Hezbollah has”dispensed
and suffered sudden death on a numbing scale for 18 years” -mainly around the“security zone”
Israel has maintained in southern Lebanon since 1985, and from which Israel has undertaken
to withdraw. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, a Shiite cleric, still leads 1500 guerrillas and 20,000 active
members, but the”Party of God”is no longer the umbrella body that“once directed the Middle
East’s most brutal Islamic terrorists”. Instead it controls the largest single bloc in the Lebanese
Parliament, and runs major social and media networks. Its two principal backers, Iran and Syria,
and Lebanon’s government, will influence Hezbollah’s options following any general peace
agreement, but its conversion to moderate politics and democracy, and from dreams of a militant
Islamic state, appears to be genuine. Nevertheless, its self-identity as a trans-Arab and trans-Islamic movement remains, as does its membership. Jeffrey Goldberg,“The Education of a Holy
Warrior”NYT 24 Jun:-Afghanistan’s Taliban regime may now be the world’s strictest theocracy.
Moreover, its rule is based on an extremely rigid, reactionary, and belligerent interpretation of
Islamic doctrine and tradition. This first-hand account of the methods and views found in or
created by key religious schools(madrasas)that produced the Taliban zealots, thus gives
valuable insight into the perspectives and motives of Osama bin Laden(accused of anti-US
bombings), a variety of Islamic terrorist and combat movements, and probably many militant
Islamist organizations. The 2,800-student Haqqania madrasa in the North-West Frontier Province
produced many Taliban leaders, but is only one of 10,000 or so in Pakistan alone, most of their
million students primarily studying militant Islam: “Haqqania madrasa is, in fact, a jihad factory”.
This long essay also offers interesting examples of the attitudes of Islamists plus Pakistanis with
broader views(e.g. General Musharraf)on world affairs and jihads. Susan Sachs, “Everyone Asks
for Arab Unity. Getting It Is Harder”NYT 06 Aug:-offers a current view of the state and
significance of the Arab identity following the impasse at Jul Arafat-Barak summit, specifically
over the status of Jerusalem but reflecting the world’s most intensely-competing ethnicities.
Diagnosis: no political slogan is“more musty with age”than“Arab unity”: chances for an Arab
summit to regroup and create a new Arab consensus are slim.”Still, the chimera of a united Arab
front continues to shimmer on the horizon”- and even the US is now hoping to see an agreed
Arab compromise on Jerusalem. Yet, however the new leaders of Jordan, Morocco and Syria
might wish more flexibility, all have inherited domestic imperatives, while Islamism has split all
governments’ reactions. Arab“Unity...has historically been reactive: a collective“no”, and the
region remains“clouded with illusions””. Foreign Affairs Vol.79/No.5(Sep/Oct 00)contains four
Reviews of recent books directly relevant to this topic: Shaul Mishal and Abraham Sela, The
Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-includes possibility of bringing this violent group eventually into the peace process. Abdolkarim
Soroush, Translated/Edited by Mahoud & Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in
Islam(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000)-a “penetrating and coherent”statement of ability to
synthesize Islam with democracy and reason(science). L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The
Muslim Approach to Politics(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-a balanced analysis of
Islamic political engagement that argues”fundamentalist”thought is a radical deviation [ordered
for later summary focused on relevance to global issues]. Nehemia Levtzion & Randall L.
Pouwels edit., The History of Islam in Africa(Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 2000)-up-to-date reference
book covering all aspects of the subject. The Economist 07 Oct 00:“The Road to War?”(19-20);“War in Palestine”(53-5);“Burn, Baby, Burn”(54):-the Israeli-Palestinian peace process
seemed at last to be focusing on the final core issue - with a US-devised complex and delicate
formula for fudging East Jerusalem’s hotly-disputed sovereignty. At this moment, like”a bull
deliberately charging a china shop”, Ariel Sharon, the hard-line leader of Israel’s opposition
Likud party, paid a“crudely provocative”visit to the deeply/doubly-revered Temple Mount/Haram
al-Sharif, “to demonstrate Israel’s continuing sovereignty over Islam’s third-holiest shrine”.
Palestinian anger over Israeli dominance, whether generated or just ignited by this taunt, at first
took the form mainly of stone-throwing demonstrations, though even these - and Israeli
reactions - were stronger and more bitter than during the 1980's Intifada. More relevant, however,
as the(mostly Palestinian)death toll mounted, feelings on both sides became deeper and, in the
Arab case, widespread. “[A]groundswell of fury has swept the[Arab] region. Angry protesters
from Morocco to Oman have burnt Israeli flags...[S]eldom has an event stirred such feeling as
the sight of Ariel Sharon trampling on Muslim holy ground. Even the Arab world’s undemocratic
governments are having to sit up, listen and maybe do something”. Associated Press“Arab Unity
Remains an Elusive Dream”NYT 11 Oct:-this article also stresses that protesters“all over the
Arab world have spilled into the street to vent their outrage”, even from pro-Western Gulf
countries. The imminent Arab summit will be under pressure from this”display of unity among
Arab masses...to exhibit the same kind of solidarity”. Yet Arab unity is“a dream that has eluded
its most ardent supporters”. Disputes and suspicions[still] divide, and have made the Arab
League”little more than a talking shop”. Mubarak has long called for annual Arab summits like
those of African states, but lamented,”we cannot even sit down and talk about a summit”. Can
Arabs change? Economist 14 Oct“Pogrom: Libya and Africa”(56):-there are many recent cases
of Muslim (particularly Islamist)violence against those whose different religion is a/the major
factor in the conflict (Azerbaijan; Bosnia; Chechnya; Egypt; Fergana; India; Indonesia; Israel;
Lebanon; Nigeria; Pakistan; Sudan; Xinjiang). Conscious racist(as opposed to ethnic)violence
involving Muslims/Arabs is relatively rare(Irian Jaya). Article reports on vicious(ostensibly)anti-foreigner riots in Libya, which clearly had strong elements of racism. Not only did the Libyan
mob spare the 1m Arab migrant workers, but it attacked some of the 1m indigenous black
Libyans(all blacks were refused entry to some hospitals/public transport). At least 150 people
were killed, including 16 Libyans. “Anti-black violence[was]fired by an economic crisis[in]
Africa’s richest state...per person”where most oil income is spent on Qaddafi’s whims. Lately
he was pushing a US of Africa, with open borders. One result was over 1m black African
migrants. All of these are now being shipped“home”, dead or alive, and Qaddafi is rebuilding ties
with other Arab states. In Letters, published in 28 Oct Economist(6),Geoffrey Davis fully supports
an irrational, racist interpretation of the riots. He notes that the riot reported is”only the latest
of several outbursts of anti-black sentiment over the past few years. It is not anti-Qaddafi in its
origins or intent. Nor is it based on Africans taking away jobs that Libyans want. Workers from
surrounding countries are cheap and do the manual and menial jobs that Libyans disdain”. Oil
revenues enable Qaddafi to satisfy his whims and still give a previously poverty-ridden people
the“good life”of cash, subsidies, and free services. “The problem is a lack of challenge and
purpose in the lives of ordinary Libyans, coupled with a rumour-prone society...Black Africans
are the convenient and innocent victims of bouts of madness in a sick society”. [Except for the
aliens’ skin colour, this might describe any Gulf state.] Sachs,“Arab League Meeting May Seek
Balancing Act”NYT 20 Oct:-the 21-2 Oct summit meeting of the whole Arab League faced a
dilemma: to appease popular demand to punish Israel, yet not to threaten future Arab-Israeli
peace talks. “The tide of anger - more open and more defiant than any display of grass-roots
political activity in at least a decade - has left many...Arab leaders in a state of near panic that
the demonstrations could turn into more generalized protest against their own
governments”.This is ironic since it is government media that have been”stoking popular rage”.
Yet even if particularly anxious to produce more than rhetoric, the leaders had varying if not
contradictory positions on most issues. Radical proposals included using the”oil weapon”
against the West, and providing mass arms transfers and Arab fighters to help in a Palestinian
uprising; but more moderate/realistic views prevailed. Unusually, all supported Arafat, badly
needing Arab backing for his next moves. Economist 21 Oct“Things Fall Apart”(29-31):-probes
why recent Arab-Palestinian clashes inflamed the whole Arab world: New factors had made
peace seem possible. “On the Arab side, the Gulf war had exposed both military weakness and
political disunity. Combined with faltering economies and the threat of Islamic extremism, this
concentrated leaders’ minds on the danger of letting old wounds fester. If the price of joining
the new world order was a begrudging accommodation with Israel, it seemed just about worth
paying-...belligerent rhetoric was now evidently worthless”. But Palestinians became frustrated
by glacial progress, shocked at Israeli contempt for their essential needs, and weary of
unabated“petty humiliations”-while Arafat’s high-handedness isolated him. The Camp David
“package” was seen as an attempt to force Arabs into unthinkable concessions, so the stand-off
was bitter. It turned to fury when Sharon(and 1,000 security men)taunted all Islam by desecrating
holy ground, and the next day when police cleared stone-throwers from the sanctuary, killing
five and injuring scores. “[If] you pit mobs ignited by a sudden outrage, fuelled by long
oppression, against a nervous army that is equipped to kill and shaped by a national belief in
never showing weakness, you tend to get bloody, lopsided battles, punctuated by nasty revenge
attacks. Much more surprising is the wider Arab and Islamic resonance of these events”. The
provocations had fallen on fertile ground: Islamic revival is making inroads, using the emotive
language of victimization and xenophobia. Even Saddam Hussein, although ”widely recognized
as... responsible for destroying the last vestiges of Arab unity”, is seen as severely punished for
disobeying UN resolutions while Israel is treated leniently. So“Arabs identify with the
Palestinians. It is an empathy not only of kith and kin, but also one born from a feeling that the
huge injustice inflicted on the Palestinians is...a reflection of wider injustices experienced by
Arabs and Muslims everywhere”. Reuters“Arabs Angry at Israel but Still Want Peace”NYT 21
Oct:-article reports the agreed summit statement charging Israel with jeopardising Middle East
peace was so lacking in“practical measures that will deter the aggressive Israeli practices”that
the Libyans walked out. Syria argued Arabs must show that they, and not“foreign forces”,
determined the future of the region. “We have to understand the danger of taking empty
decisions, which will only lead to more violence and more deaths”. Saudi Arabia proposed that
Arabs raise $200m for the Palestinians and $800m to“retain the Arab and Islamic character of
(East) Jerusalem”. Mubarak admitted all Arab were“angry and full of resentment”, but Arab
leaders had a responsibility to ”attempt to salvage the peace process”. Iraq’s position alone was
the call to liberate Palestine by jihad. Sachs, “Arab Leaders Declare Freeze on All Contacts with
Israel”NYT 22 Oct; Sachs,“Arab States Take Diplomatic Steps to Punish Israel”NYT 23 Oct:-[significantly different articles using the same frame, as new material was available; these
highlights include both.] The summit declaration inter alia stated: Arab states will freeze all
contacts with Israel until it makes tangible progress towards peace; Israel has committed
“atrocities”,so the UN is urged to set up a war crimes tribunal to judge its actions; $1b in aid is
pledged to protect Islamic and Arab properties in Jerusalem and help the families of killed or
wounded Palestinians; Arab states will boycott any multilateral meetings on regional economic
cooperation, and suspend trade and political contacts, with Israel; Jerusalem should not be
recognized as the capital of Israel. Since Arab journalists repeatedly questioned whether the
Arab League was truly in touch with the public mood and would follow through on its promises,
the summit spokesman stressed that Arab governments were not indifferent to the anger in their
streets at Israeli conduct. Yet old divisions were not healed(e.g. Kuwaitis/Saudis ignored Iraqis),
and the meeting”provided a glimpse of the shape of future disputes among Arab leaders. Iraq
and Syria[advocated] a long-term strategy that would approach Israel as a rival military and
economic power”. Morocco and Jordan argued”military consolidation was outdated, that the
world around the Middle East had organized itself into common markets and that the Arabs
should concentrate on competing economically and technologically”. William A. Orme Jr.,“A
Parallel Mideast Battle: Is It News or Incitement?”NYT 24 Oct:-stresses use of Palestinian
radio/TV to generate and maintain support for the intifada or, as Israelis see it, to deliberately
“incite mass violence and ethnic hatred”. For this reason, the Voice of Palestine, the Palestinian
Authority radio network, was bombed off the air by Israeli helicopter attacks after the killing in
a police station of two Israeli soldiers by an angry crowd. “[T]he network’s news bulletins,
commentaries and martial music have become the ubiquitous soundtrack to life in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip”, and radio and TV programs are ”regularly interrupted by live coverage of
clashes with Israeli troops and eulogies for each Palestinian killed”- all are martyrs. More
fundamental is the Palestinian “unapologetically nationalistic coverage. Radio talk shows praise
Palestinian ‘resistance’ and excoriate Israeli ‘war criminals’”. Israeli news media beyond doubt
also present at minimum a distorted view of events/deaths to their public -both in what they
show and in what they leave out. The truce agreement reached in Egypt called for a halt
to“incitement”, but it clearly continues-and will significantly impede ceasefires, let alone peace
agreements. Sachs,“Anti-U.S. Fever: Arab Bitterness and Boycott Talk”NYT 27 Oct:-”Long a
distant and sometimes bothersome distraction for ordinary people in Arab countries, the
Palestinian issue has become a daily fixation and a rallying point for a revival of pan-Arab
nationalism, which had been dormant for decades”. This article deals mainly with the major and
continuing effect of the media in Arab countries in creating this new situation. The”fevered
programming” on nearly all Arab radio and television stations, that began with the outbreak of
violence,“has eased off somewhat...But reminders of the conflict are everywhere, stirring a
sense of solidarity, and if the grass-roots anger can be sustained, even at a low level, the impact
on regional politics could be substantial”. Various groups are contributing a day’s pay for the
cause in response to a recommendation from the Arab League, an action described by an Arab
journalist as”a qualitative leap in cooperation between rulers and ruled in support of a cause”.
The”anti-US fever”in the title refers to calls on the media by radical anti-Israel groups to boycott
US products/companies. Economist 28 Oct“After Peace Has Crashed”(14);“The Spreading of
Palestine’s War”(42-3):-both Editorial and article express serious concern that the Arab/Muslim-Israel confrontation,”[w]ith passion and prejudice the ruling emotions”, could find Israel and its
neighbours ”spiralling backwards into an ugliness from which retrieval would be[hard and
long]”(14). Not only will Arab governments“nervously watch the spreading of pro-Palestinian
feeling among their people”,but now“Arab leaders are fearful of being drawn into the Palestinian
mayhem”(42). This was evident in the Arab summit “sound-and-fury”statement, but promised
no action -and generated region-wide demonstrations.”[W]hat now most concerns the Arab
regimes is not Jerusalem...It is their own survival”(43). Patrick E. Tyler,“Islamic Revival Wears
Many Faces in a Secular Asian Land”NYT 29 Oct:-Tajikistan is unusual among the newly
independent states of former Soviet Central Asia in that the Islamic Revival Party (IRP)is not only
legal but has two members in Parliament and over 50 in local governments. Islamic parties are
outlawed or suppressed in the other successor states since the Islamic revival spreading
through the region is identified with Islamic extremism. Although Muslims took up arms in a
1992-7 civil war that left at least 50,000 dead, the IRP now joins the government in condemning
the Islamic extremism practised by the Taliban in Afghanistan. An IRP leader(and ex-rebel)explains:”war is not the best means for creating an Islamic society...Now that the obstacles
to propagating Islam have been removed in Tajikistan, we have the possibility to come to power,
and that is the big difference[from] neighbouring countries”. Significantly, however, Islam seems
less popular here than where it is repressed. Douglas Frantz,“Persecution Charged in Ex-Soviet
Republic”NYT 29 Oct:-Uzbekistan, unlike Tajikistan, is waging a“largely unnoticed war”against
those whose only crime is that they are pious Muslims. Religious and human rights leaders
contend the government, “which has already banned opposition parties and silenced the
independent press, is using a trumped-up threat of radical Islam to stamp out the last vestige
of dissent”. It is true that”[s]ince the Soviet Union collapsed, there has been a slow resurgence
of Islam in traditionally Muslim Central Asia. The governments have tried to control its
growth[non-violently,b]ut officials across the region, who tend to have an authoritarian bent, fear
Islamic extremism”. There are indeed fire-fights with Islamic movements, but the major Party of
Liberation claims it promotes Islam as a religious and social force, and its leaders urge Muslims
to pray and study for a future Islamic state; while critical of government corruption and
repression, they have not promoted violence. Yet since 1992, 4-5,000 have been arrested for
advocating an Islamic regime or simply distributing religious tracts, and received harsh
sentences on spurious grounds. Clearly, many are tortured; many die in prison. Sachs“Defying
U.S., Arabs Widen Iraqi Ties”NYT 01 Nov:-trans-Arab sympathy for Iraq is one spillover from the
Palestinian-Israeli violence, and has“prompted a resurgence of public support for the idea that
the West...behaves badly toward the Arab world”. Violation by Arab countries of UN air sanctions
against Iraq reflects a strong feeling“across the Arab political spectrum”that the US follows
a“double standard”in its reluctance to hold Israel to account for its treatment of Palestinians,
and in its stubborn opposition to lifting the Iraqi sanctions. “Iraq has also found a newly
receptive audience for its assertion that it is the only true defender of Arab and Palestinian
interests”. AP“Qatar Shuts Israeli Trade Office”09 Nov:-following the Arab League meeting, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference holds a summit 12-4 Nov to give greater support for the
Palestinians. This meeting, in Doha, Qatar, will be attended by Iran’s President Khatami. Partly
in this connection, Qatar is shutting down the Israeli trade mission in Doha. Since Oman had
already severed relations with Israel, it left Qatar as the only Gulf state maintaining commercial
ties with Israel. Tunisia and Morocco also closed their interest sections in Israel after the Arab
summit. (Egypt and Jordan are the only Arab states to maintain full diplomatic relations with
Israel.) Sachs,“Muslim Nations Bitterly Denounce Israel at Summit”NYT 13 Nov; Reuters
“Muslims to Slam Israel, Reject Terror - Delegates”NYT 13 Nov:-two articles reporting on
decisions of the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC), whose 56 member-states ostensibly represent the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims. Being more politically variegated and
less concerned with Israel than the Arab League, OIC triennial summits since the peace process
began in 1991 have avoided referring to jihad against Israel - but the Doha Declaration included
some pretty tough language. “An outpouring of anti-Israel feeling in their own countries has put
pressure on many Arab and Islamic leaders to pay more than lip service to the Palestinian
cause”. Still, since 20 members(mostly African and Central Asian) have diplomatic relations with
Israel, a full boycott was rejected and the relevant resolution stated:”The leaders invite member
states which have established relations with Israel, or are taking steps toward ties with Israel
within the framework of the peace process, to cut these ties...and stop all forms of normalization
until it complies accurately and honestly with UN resolutions dealing with Palestine and holy
Jerusalem”. They did affirm however their “determination to cut relations with any country that
moves its embassy to Jerusalem or recognizes it as the capital of Israel”. To allay
Western(US)fears of armed reprisals by pro-Palestinian militants the leaders deplored”all forms
of terrorism from whatever source”,but also”reaffirmed the need to distinguish between
terrorism and peoples’ struggle for liberation”.The Palestinians were promised full political and
financial support. More valuable for Arafat would be solid political backing for his next move.
Reuters,“Arab Women Slam Israeli Force Against Palestinians”NYT 18 Nov:-unprecedented
Cairo“summit” organized by Arab League, Lebanese and Egyptian women’s groups, and
bringing together most respected women in the Arab world, loudly denounced Israeli violence.
Mrs. Mubarak claimed its voice was”raised in 1686protest against the terrible injustice”done to
Palestinians, and”expressed the anger of half the Arab World population...at violations
committed against Palestinian women and children”. While aimed primarily at Arab women’s
common issues, supporting their rights to justice and equality in all fields, and calling for
removal of societal restrictions, the impetus was evidently a unifying Arab concern over“the
Palestinian problem”. Sachs,“News Analysis: Mubarak’s Move”NYT 22 Nov:-Egypt’s recall of its
ambassador to Israel”marks the end of a long period of relative restraint in Arab-Israeli
relations”. Mubarak’s angry response to Israel’s bombing of the densely populated Gaza
Strip”signals that at least for now, he has abandoned the chatty personal diplomacy that had
become his trademark”. The implications go to the substance of Arab engagement in
peacemaking. Mubarak’s policy of moderation and dialogue have now subjected him to“a
relentless storm of criticism from Arab commentators ...leaders”,and demands for stronger
action from his own citizens. John F. Burns,“One Sheik’s Mission: To Teach the Young to
Despise Western Culture”NYT 17 Dec:-since the terrorist attack on USS Cole in Aden harbor, US
media/security services have paid special attention to Yemen and its ties with Osama bin
Ladin(of Yemeni origin). Article describes the views and activities of Sheik Muqbel bin Hadi al-Wadi, a”seminal influence”on bin Laden and”one of the Arab world’s most militantly anti-Western Islamic clerics”. His main base/school is a large guarded compound located in Dammaj,
northern Yemen, where at least 3,000 Islamic militants from the whole Muslim world -and even
some from the West- teach and study. The FBI sees Sheik Muqbel’s study centers(five in
Yemen)”as incubators for the Islamic holy war...declared against the[US]”(see above: Bernard
Lewis,“Licence to Kill:”). He is a“font of vituperation against the[US]and Israel, Christians and
Jews”, but contends the center is strictly a theological school -”albeit one that propagates a
purist, militant, stridently anti-Western form of Islam...the essence of[which]is that Muslims
should shun the corrupt ways of the modern world and return to the austerity and zeal of the
Prophet”. Almost all technology is forbidden(plus music and women), but in the sheik’s
view,”the most dangerous enemies of Islam...are Western life and culture - democracy,
pluralism, tolerance and any kind of voting”. Western intelligence believes the centers,”even if
not military camps, act as ideological proving grounds for young Muslims who go on to train
elsewhere, often in Afghanistan, and to become terrorists”. Jane Perlez,“Fork in Arafat’s Road:
New Peace or Old Victimhood”NYT 29 Dec:-written at a/the“moment of truth”in the Clinton-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and from the viewpoint of Yasser Arafat, the
profound dilemmas described apply in varying degrees to all Arabs and Israelis concerned. For
these many, the sting of the dilemmas faced reflects their extremely emotive, deeply religious,
and timeless historical nature. Even in the shorter term(over half a century), they relate to strong
positions taken(and great sacrifices demanded)by most of the region's governments, that tie
them to ethnic/religious identity and honour, and constitute”battle-cries”that brook no
compromise. (For the origin of some utopian Zionist concepts, see The Economist, 23
Dec“Dreaming of Altneuland”(59-60)). Yet they are totally incompatible (“united Jerusalem”;
”right of return”, etc.)so that critical concessions are demanded of both sides, and any
compromise - however balanced - will generate violent opposition and probably at minimum the
political death of the compromisers. Yet the status quo is inherently unstable(besides being
painful for millions). Such is the power of ethnicity. [During the first half of 2001, I may have
missed, among my sources, key articles/essays/books on Arab/Islamic (dis)unity. However, my
impression is that the huge volume of material on Palestinian-Israeli violence and their
diplomatic impasse included little or no analysis directly relevant to these summaries. Partly
related trends have been: a gradual reduction in the isolation of Iraq - but mainly by
neighbouring states that gain economically; the increased isolation of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan(except by Pakistan); and the redirection of Qaddafi’s interest from Arab to African
unity. Finally, directly relevant is a follow-up to the Oct Arab summit on solidarity with the
Palestinians.] AP“Arab States Slow in Paying Funds”NYT 18 Aug 01:-reports that the Islamic
Development Bank privately admits Arab states have paid less than half the $1b they pledged
at the summit. Although the total pledge was already cut to $693b after contributions fell short,
so far 12 participating Arab nations have deposited only $442.5b. While there is no date by which
countries should fulfil their pledges, Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Syria have paid their
commitments in full, totalling $100m. The most wealthy, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, have
given $325m of the $550m pledged. Yemen has paid over $8m of the $10m it pledged, Jordan
$1.5m out of $2m pledged, Sudan $.5m out of $1m pledged, but Egypt only $7.5m out of $30m
pledged. Contributions go into two accounts: for supporting the Palestinian Authority’s budget,
and for development projects. So far, $240m has been spent: $225m for PA budget;$15m on
projects. Reuters“Words, Not Deeds Expected at Emergency Arab Talks”NYT 22 Aug:-announces the opening of the fifth Arab foreign ministers’ emergency meeting to be held since
the Palestinian uprising began in Sep 00. There have also been two Arab Summits: the first in
Oct 00 pledged the $1b in assistance; the second in Mar 01 is remarkable mainly in being the
first regular Arab League summit in 10 years. Since none of these meetings has produced
anything substantive in the way of agreement/action except the unmet pledge, the
article/analysts predict this one will again result only in soothing words for Palestinians, and
condemnation of Israeli actions. The article quotes an Egyptian columnist:”The Arabs have made
themselves laughing stocks ...We want a full scale economic and political boycott of Israel”. But
this cannot be agreed upon, and Egypt, the host, is actually working as a peace mediator.
Agreement might be reached to meet the original pledge, but Arab governments are aware”the
pressure of public opinion is growing on them”. AP “Arafat Appeals to U.N. for State”NYT 22
Aug:-at Cairo meeting of 14 Arab FMs, Yasser Arafat called on the UNSC to stop Israel
from“destroying the Palestinian dream”of a free, independent state. While the Qatari FM(and
chair) assured Palestinians they will not be alone in their confrontation -”[t]he Arab brothers are
standing with political, financial and moral support”- the Syrian FM was skeptical:”We’ve met
many times...and we did not put forward any plan”. Meanwhile, Israeli and Palestinian delegates
clashed in UNSC over an Arab-Muslim resolution calling for international monitors to be sent to
the West Bank and Gaza. Reuters “Arab Foreign Ministers Are Urged to Aid Palestinians”NYT
23 Aug:-as expected, the two-day emergency meeting of Arab FMs ended with calls for political
and economic help for Palestinians and the usual condemnation of “aggressive” Israeli policies.
Inter alia the FMs”called on Arabs to refrain from opening contacts with Israel...but did not call
on states to end existing ties”. They also called for a global boycott of Israeli goods produced
in settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and a study of ways to revive the full Arab boycott of
Israel - though difficult to apply. Some resolutions were not made public. AP “Arab League
Ministers Discuss Mideast”NYT 09 Sep:-reports on another Arab League meeting, whose result
was more appeal and advice than joint action. The foreign ministers urged the US to stop
Israel’s“aggressive policies”and its assassination of Palestinian militants, and advised
the(absent)Arafat about meeting Israeli FM Peres. Earlier, the six members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council had issued a similar appeal and discussed a Saudi plan to present Arab
concerns over Israeli violence to the Bush administration. Bernard Lewis What Went Wrong?
Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 02):-in recent years,
many people in all parts of world, including in Middle Eastern countries and via the UN, have
become seriously concerned why these people, in area that for centuries was most advanced
and sophisticated on earth, are broadly missing advanced economies, widely-sympathetic
governments, and ingenuity-benefited lifestyles. All are also concerned in some manner about
the Middle Eastern generation of terrorist organizations. Expert writers offer interesting analyses
on how the area is now, and will adapt in future(e.g. Marina Ottaway op.cit).This book, written
by the doyen of Middle Eastern studies and foremost authority on Islamic history and culture,
draws on his unique knowledge of area over recent centuries to describe how and why it
absorbed slowly and selectively from world-dominant European rapidly-modernizing culture. It
explains a great deal - both today and tomorrow. “If they can abandon grievance and victimhood,
settle their differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in common creative
endeavour, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in
antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is
their own.”Amy Chua WORLD ON FIRE: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic
Hatred and Global Instability(New York: Doubleday 03):-this easy-to-read 350page survey of
special political/economic/social problems in many parts of the world has generated good
reviews and more influence. Its strong warning is not against either globalization trade or pure
democracy in developing countries, but against pressing these ideas too quickly when rich but
unpopular minorities dominate their economies - widely common situation that is carefully
described. She concludes by first naming three goals: "[1] the best economic hope for
developing and post-socialist countries lies in some form of market-generated growth; [2] the
best political hope for these countries lies in some form of democracy, with constitutional
constraints, tailored to local realities; [3] avoiding ethnic oppression and bloodshed must be a
constant priority. But if these goals are to be achieved - if global free market democracy is to be
peaceably sustainable - then the problem of market-dominant minorities, however unsettling,
must be confronted head-on. [Finally, four specific "tonics" are addressed:] (1) the possibility
of 'leveling the playing field' between market-dominant minorities and the impoverished
'indigenous' majorities around them; (2) ways of getting the poor, frustrated majorities of the
world a greater stake in global markets; (3) ways of promoting liberal rather than illiberal
democracies; and (4) approaches that market-dominant minorities themselves might take to
forestall majority-based, often murderous ethnonationalist backlashes". Chapter sub-titles show
where and how these major challenges exist and must be addressed: (1)Chinese Minority
Dominance in Southeast Asia; (2)'White' Wealth in Latin America; (3)The Jewish Billionaires of
Post-Communist Russia; (4)Market-Dominant Minorities in Africa; (5)Ethnically Targeted
Seizures and Nationalizations; (6)Crony Capitalism and Minority Rule; (7)Expulsions and
Genocide; (8)Assimilation, Globalization, and the Case of Thailand;(9)From Jim Crow to the
Holocaust;(10)Israeli Jews as a Regional Market-Dominant Minority; (11)US as a Global Market-Dominant Minority; (12)The Future of Free Market Democracy; Bernard Lewis The Crisis of Islam:
Holy War and Unholy Terror(New York: Modern Library 03):- Lewis "examines the historical roots
of the resentments that dominate the Islamic world today and that are increasingly being
expressed in acts of terrorism. [He] is internationally recognized as one of our era's greatest
historians of the Middle East[, and] his books have been translated into more than 20 languages,
including Arabic/Persian/Turkish/Indonesian"[from dustcover]. Chapters generally move from
past to present - but can even be read individually: Introduction; I Defining Islam; II The House
of War; III From Crusaders to Imperialists; IV Discovering America; V Satan and the Soviets; VI
Double Standards; VII A Failure of Modernity; VIII The Marriage of Saudi Power and Wahhabi
Teaching; IX The Rise of Terrorism. Final paragraphs include: "For Usama bin Laden, his
declaration of war against US marks the resumption of the struggle for religious dominance of
the world. For him and his followers, this is a moment of opportunity... But there are others for
whom US offers a different kind of temptation - the promise of human rights, of free institutions,
and of a responsible and representative government... It is difficult for us to help those people,
but at least we should not hinder them... Meanwhile, there is a more urgent problem. If the
leaders of Al-Qa'ida can persuade the world of Islam to accept their views and their leadership,
then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead... If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations
and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world"; "Anonymous"Imperial Hubris:
Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(DullesVA: Brassey's 04):-author is a senior US
intelligence official with nearly 20 years experience in national security issues related to
Afghanistan and South Asia. This strong critique of arrogant US/allies' policies towards Osama
bin Laden/al Qaeda, and military action against Afghanistan/Iraq, proved quickly influential in
many respects, and advocates less US loyalty to Israel/corrupt Muslim regimes or presence in
Mideast. Motivation of Muslim terrorists is identified not as hatred/fear of Western national
systems but of their broadly negative actions against Islamic peoples. All complex chapter titles:
(1)Some Thoughts on the Power of Focused, Principled Hatred. (2) An Unprepared and Ignorant
Lunge to Defeat - The US in Afghanistan. (3) Not Down, Not Out: Al Qaeda's Resiliency,
Expansion, and Momentum. (4) The World's View of bin Laden: A Muslim Leader and Hero
Coming into Focus? (5) Bin Laden Views the World: Some Old, Some New, and a Twist. (6)
Blinding Hubris Abounding: Inflicting Defeat on Ourselves - Non-War, Leaks, and Missionary
Democracy. (7) When the Enemy Sets the Stage: How US's Stubborn Obtuseness Aids Its Foes.
(8) The Way Ahead: A Few Suggestions for Debate. Epilogue: No Basis for Optimism; James
Fallows“Blind Into Baghdad”Atlantic Monthly Jan/Feb 04(52-74):-writer honoured US national
correspondent for Atlantic. Carefully exposed account of US government’s relatively small and
almost purely military attack on Iraq - relatively little involvement prepared to maintain
conquered control/ restore economy/unify three rival peoples in democracy. Author’s knowledge
of government’s simplified plan was substantially explained by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary
of Defense for Policy, who noted how more careful policies had been rejected by Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and hence by President Bush. Key extracts from article:“U.S.
occupation of Iraq is debacle not because government did no planning but because vast amount
of expert planning was willfully ignored by people in charge...Problems encountered precisely
ones U.S. expert agencies warned against...All government working groups concluded that
occupying Iraq would be far more difficult than defeating it...If failure to stop looting was major
sin of omission, disbanding Iraqi army was catastrophic error of commission - creating instant
enemy class. Every pre-war study had warned against it.”The Economist 07 Aug 04“Arab Foreign
Policy: Always Prickly, Sometimes Paranoid, Occasionally Pragmatic” (37-8);“Palestine: Who’s
In Charge?”(38);“Morocco: The Slow March To Reform”(38-9);“Iraq’s Christians: Less Safe Than
Before?”(39):-first report analyses outstandingly how Arab governments/peoples deal with
outside world and each other, three other reports on national Arab states provide interesting
descriptions of how different attitudes/prejudices within nations delay their progress. Arabs find
it hard to act together to solve region’s manifold problems. Suspicion of US runs deep in Arab
world and can generate strong misinterpretations of events.“Many Arab governments would
sincerely like to help heal festering regional sores such as mayhem in Iraq and misery in
Palestine and Darfur. Not only would this reduce risk of infection, it would also improve strained
relations with superpower. But popular distrust of western, and particularly US, motives keeps
getting in way...More western sensitivity to Arab concerns and less blinkered Arab prickliness
about sacredness of sovereignty in countries with vicious regimes.” Jason Burke"Al-Qaeda:
Casting a Shadow of Terror"(New York: I.B.Tauris & Co 03):-while I read this book long after
summarizing Burke‛s valuable article in 04 Foreign Policy(op cit), many of author‛s FP views also
stated/implied in book, so aren‛t repeated. Book, however, is a valuable - and concentrated(300
pp) - report on the origins/members/relationships/aims of "al-Qaeda" in global terms, plus
involvement of bin Laden to events of 11 Sep 01. Material is derived from both author‛s
extraordinary interviews/experience and information from many other personal sources. Advice
in book‛s conclusion is of special importance - and has much in common with "Christopher
Spencer" item: "We [West] need to counter the twisted vision of world that is becoming so
prevalent. Every time force is used it reinforces that vision by providing more evidence of a
‛clash of civilisations‛ and a ‛cosmic struggle‛... ‛War on terror‛ should have a military component
[:] hardened militants cannot be rehabilitated[; b]ut if we are to win battle against terrorism, our
strategies must be made broader and more sophisticated. [G]reatest weapon available in war
on terrorism is the courage, decency, humour and integrity of the vast proportion of the world‛s
Muslims [-] restricting the spread of ‛al-Qaeda‛ and its warped worldview. [B]attle between West
and men like bin Laden...is not a battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds
[-] battle we, and our allies in the Muslim world, losing. [Yet all] modern Islamic terrorism... can
be acted on by well-judged, properly executed policies. Causes of terrorism must be addressed,
careful analysis of...threat...undertaken, moderate Muslim leaders engaged, spread of hardline
strands of Islam rolled back, and enormous effort to counter growing sympathy for ‛al-Qaeda‛
worldview must be made... All terrorist violence, ‛Islamic‛ or otherwise, is unjustifiable/
unforgivable/ cowardly/contemptible. But just because we condemn does not mean we should
not strive to comprehend. We need to keep asking why"(249-50); Jason Burke"THINK AGAIN:
Al Qaeda"Foreign Policy No.142(May/Jun 04):-summarizing (global) public (mis)concepts about
current capacities and aims of al Qaeda forces and ideas, and its future strength, Burke, chief
reporter of Britain's Observer and author of Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror(New York: I.B.
Tauris 03)(op cit),offers nine widely believed views about issues, and then denies accuracy of
each. "Al Qaeda Is a Global Terrorist Organization" -NO. "It is less an organization than an
ideology... Today, structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed... There is no
longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. But al Qaeda workview... is growing stronger every
day." "Capturing or Killing Bin Laden Will Deal a Severe Blow to Al Qaeda" -WRONG "If...he
surrenders without a fight, which is very unlikely, many followers will be deeply disillusioned.
If he achieves martyrdom in way that his cohorts can spin as heroic, he will beinspiration for
generations to come. Either way, bin Laden's removal from scene will not stop Islamic militancy.
"The Militants Seek to Destroy the West So They Can Impose a Global Islamic State" -FALSE
"Islamic militants' main objective is not conquest, but to beat back what they perceive as an
aggressive West. [S]econdary goal is establishment of...single Islamic state, in lands roughly
corresponding to furthest extent of Islamic empire." "The Militants Reject Modern Ideas in Favor
of Traditional Muslim Theology" -NO "Islamic hard-liners...have little compunction about
embracing tools that modernity provides... [M]ilitants are framing modern political concerns
...within mythic and religious narrative. They do not reject modernization per se, but...resent their
failure to benefit from that modernization." "Since the Rise of Al Qaeda, Islamic Moderates Have
Been Marginalized" -INCORRECT "Al Qaeda represents lunatic fringe of political thought in
Islamic world. While al Qaeda has made significant inroads in recent years, only tiny minority
of world's 1.3b Muslims adhere to its doctrine." "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Central to the
Militants' Cause" -WRONG "Televised images... reinforce militants' key message that lands of
Islam under attack, and that all Muslims must rise up and fight. However,...resolution...would not
end threat of militant Islam...Two-state solution...would still leave 'Zionist entity' intact." "Sort
Out Saudi Arabia and the Whole Problem Will Disappear" -NO "Inequities of Saudi system...
continues to create sense of disenfranchisement that allows extremism to flourish...Saudi Arabia
is one of many causes of modern Islamicmilitancy, but it has no monopoly on blame." "It Is Only
a Matter of Time Before Islamic Militants Use Weapons of Mass Destruction" -CALM DOWN
"Although Islamic militants...have attempted to develop basic chemical or biological arsenal,
efforts have been largely unsuccessful due to technical difficulty...Islamic militants far more
likely to use conventional bombs or employ conventional devices in imaginative ways." "The
West Is Winning the War on Terror" -UNFORTUNATELY, NO "If countries to win war on terror,
must eradicate enemies without creating new ones...Invasion of Iraq...has made task more
pressing... Ben Laden's aim to radicalize/mobilize. He is closer to achieving goals than West is
to deterring him". Reza Aslan No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam(New
York: Random House 05):-The widely-read author defines his aim in the Prologue: "This book
is not just critical reexamination of the origins and evolution of Islam, nor is it merely an account
of the current struggle among Muslims to define the future of this magnificent yet
misunderstood faith. This book is, above all else, an argument for reform"(xx). William Grimes,
in his New York Times 04 May 05 review, quotes the book:"What is taking place now in the
Muslim world is an internal conflict between Muslims, not an external battle between Islam and
the West"(248). Grimes himself argues: "[Islam's] history, grippingly narrated and thoughtfully
examined, takes up nearly all of 'No god but God'. Aslan... has written a literate, accessible
introduction to Islam.,. carefully placing its message/rituals in historical context. Complete with
glossary/annotated bibliography, it could easily serve as a college textbook". The 310-page book
includes 21st century arguments: "[T]he attacks of 11 Sep 01 were not a defensive strike against
a specific act of aggression against Islam. They were never sanctioned by a qualified mujtahid.
They made no differentiation between combatant/noncombatant.,. indiscriminately killed women,
children, and approximately 200 Muslims. In other words, they fell far short of the regulations
imposed by Muhammad for a legitimate jihadi response, which is why, despite common
perception in the West, they were so roundly condemned by the vast majority of the world's
Muslims"(87). "Tragic events of 11 Sep... initiated a vibrant discourse among Muslims about
meaning/message of Islam in 21st century... It may be too early to know who will write the next
chapter of Islam's story, but it is not too early to recognize who will ultimately win the war
between reform/counterreform... But the cleansing inevitable, and tide of reform cannot be
stopped. Islamic Reformation is already here"(266). Jason Burke"It May Well Take 20 Years. But
al-Qaeda‛s Days Are Numbered" Guardian 10 Sep 06:-Special Report by expert/famous journalist,
published five years after "9/11", claims: "Osama bin Laden waits in vain for a Muslim
‛awakening‛. The lure of the West is just too powerful a force". Full Burke text (plus 70 optional
pages of the item‛s wide Email reactions) is available:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,1869182,00.html. Highlights: "There is a sense that
history, far from ending, is accelerating. That the centre cannot hold. That the individual counts
for nothing. [Burke‛s reactions to some of bin Laden‛s 01 claims: H]e was wrong. Yes, there is
increasing radicalisation. Yes, a new and powerfully globalised ‛Muslim‛ identity is spreading,
aided by communications technology that renders national frontiers obsolete. Yes, there is a
small, if growing, number of Muslims who are attracted to ‛al-Qaedism‛ in its largest sense. But
truth is that out of a total of 1.6b Muslims, very few have joined terrorist organisations. In [some
Muslim] countries... there has been strong counter-reaction to the atrocities... World‛s Muslims
are not behaving as bin Laden wants them to... The [London] bombs were a strike against a
continuing and largely successful process of integration on a national scale. The attacks across
the world in the past five years are strikes against a similar process of integration on an
international scale. This process is largely driven by the continuing popularity and attraction of
the Western model of secular liberal democracy, Enlightment values, and capitalist economics.
It is the success of this model that has provoked the violence against it, not its failure. [N]eed
to ask why so many people... recently came to view the apparently ineluctable process of
Westernisation. [T]he arithmetic of terrorism means that you only need a small shift in public
opinion to create enough angry individuals to cause a major problem... The appeal of the West
is founded not just on a dream of a high level of material comfort but also on the satisfaction of
basic and universal human values such as dignity, protection of life and justice. This gives West
considerable moral capital,.. a fragile commodity... profligately spent in recent years... But for
all the clumsiness with which the misconceived ‛war on terror‛ has been handled, the attraction,
however conflicted, of ‛the West‛ for billions of people remains our greatest strength. Remember
that and, over 10 or 20 years, it will become clear bin Laden‛s life or death will indeed have no
significance. He and his kind will have been consigned to the history books". Related Burke
volume is:On the Road to Kandahar(Bond Street Books 06 or St. Martin‛s Press 07)"From one
of world‛s leading experts..how we are to get to grips with radical Islam/what it really means".
Paul William Roberts"A Profile of the Prophet" Globe & Mail 11 Feb 2006:-Focus: "The outrage
sparked by the controversial cartoons published in Denmark has led many around the world to
realize just how tenuous their grasp of Islam really is. To help fill the gap, Middle East specialist
PAUL WILLIAM ROBERTS tells: the story of Mohammed and why it means so much to the
Muslim faithful." [An excellent and sympathetic description of the origin and basic beliefs of the
Islamic religion, written for Christian, Jewish, atheist, etc. readers, not to gain converts but to
offer those with other philosophies and/or religious views an objective account that avoids
assigning historical perfection. Viewed fair by my Islamic friends]; Faisal Devji Landscapes of
the Jihad: Militancy . Morality . Modernity(Ithaca: Cornell Univ.Press 05):-very thoughtful analysis
of Al-Qaeda's jihad motives behind the 11 Sep 01 attack against USA. To determine and describe
this, the less-than-200-page book draws often on written/spoken rationales by Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular. Following is derived from its own summary: "Devji focuses
on the ethical content of [the Al-Qaeda's] jihad, as opposed to its purported political intent. Al-Qaeda differs radically from such groups as... Muslim Brotherhood and Indonesia's Jemaah
Islamiyah, which aim to establish fundamentalist Islamist states. In fact,.. Al-Qaeda [has] a
decentralized structure, and emphasis on moral rather than political action... Bin Laden and his
lieutenants view their cause as a response to oppressive conditions faced by Muslim world[; not]
an Islamic attempt to build states. Al-Qaeda culls diverse symbols/fragments from Islam's past
in order to legitimize its global war against the 'metaphysical evil' emanating from the West. Most
salient example of this assemblage... is concept of jihad itself, which Al-Qaeda defines as
'individual duty' incumbent on all Muslims, [and] weapon of spiritual conflict. Al Qaeda and its
jihad, Devji suggests, are only the most visible manifestations of wider changes in the Muslim
world. Such changes include fragmentation of traditional/fundamentalist forms of authority.
[Hence] Al-Qaeda represents a dangerous new way of organizing Muslim belief/practice within
a global landscape and does not require ideological/institutional unity. [Book] is at once a
sophisticated work of historical/cultural analysis, and an invaluable guide to the world's most
prominent terrorist movement"; The Economist 01 Jul 06"Democracy in the Arab World: Not Yet,
Thanks"(42-3):-item illustrates how"Recent hopes for the steady advance of democracy are
being widely stifled". It tells of many limited democracy-related movements in Arab countries,
and counter-reform developments there more recently. General pictures then and now as
follows: "A few years back, and especially in wake of US invasion of Iraq, many [Arab leaders]
found it politic to sound responsive to mounting pressure for reform. It was partly internal,
inspired by factors such as demography, fading potency of long-ruling ideologies, and impact
of harder-to-control new media such as TV. External forces helped, too, most notably [US/]other
Western governments, [pushing] political freedom as the ultimate foil for extremism... But now,
the tide appears to have turned". Politically reactionary events are described in: Syria, Egypt,
Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even Lebanon. "Several factors
explain the waning of reform momentum. One is the high price of oil. Exporters... find
themselves so flush with cash that they can again buy off dissent. But a bigger factor is advance
of Islamist opposition groups. In past year, religious parties have crushed secular rivals in Iraq,
Hamas has captured shaky government of Palestine, Islamists have performed strongly in Saudi
Arabia's polls, and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood won unprecedented fifth of parliament's seats...
Islamic surge has frightened not only the region's governments, but also foreign promoters of
democracy... Western officials and academics at a recent conference appeared to 'wash their
hands of supporting democracy in the Arab world'. [Some US politicians have revived support
for an old Arab leader.] Similar signs of return to [Western] realpolitik have been noted with relief
by Arab governments". The Economist 22 Jul 06"Israel and Lebanon: The Accidental
War"(Edit.13-4); "Special Report: The Crisis in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine: Ending Will Be
Harder"(29-32):-My aim is to offer just titles/summaries of selected articles and books which
provide valuable information and/or views on global issues. Hence I have offered for years a
special 'chapter' on Lebanon/Syria under RECENT DEVELOPMENTS because of their unique
developments/potentials. Outbreak of very serious violence between Israel and Lebanon-located
Hizbullah 12 Jul 06 was a true 21st century crisis, and for at least weeks generated hundreds of
articles a day. I do not have the time or speciality to list even their titles. Instead, here is a
summary of the analytical sections or arguments by The Economist as one relatively reliable
source on (global) issues involved. The essence of Editorial is:"A pointless war that no one may
have wanted and no one can win. It should stop now". Highlights:"[I]t started with a pinprick[:]
decision of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, to send his fighters on cross-border
raid into Israel on 12 Jul, where they killed several soldiers and captured two... Israel says timing
- 3 days before G8 summit - was no coincidence[:] Iran was using Hizbullah to deflect
attention...Equally plausible explanation is[:] Nasrallah..doing nothing new... Hizbullah has
mounted several similar raids into Israel. It got away with them[: Israel's] reactions astonishingly
mild. Reason, as Nasrallah constantly boasted, was his arsenal of around 12,000 Iranian/Syrian
rockets/missiles. With [such] deterrent[, he] felt free to pursue intermittent cross-border war
against much stronger neighbour... This time too, Nasrallah may have expected usual token
response. If so, he miscalculated[: capturing two Israeli soldiers]. Hamas movement had [just]
mounted equally daring raid into Israel from Gaza[,] killing two soldiers, nabbing another.
Perhaps precisely because his non-military background required him to look strong, Israel's new
PM Ehud Olmert decided this double humiliation was more than he could survive or Israel could
bear. So he has chosen to go to war [see Special Report]. Conditions for it have been building,
in slow motion, for years. [S]ince Israel's invasion of 1982, Hizbullah has emerged as strongest
local military force in Lebanon [,] cannot be disarmed [by] Lebanese army [and] has shown little
interest in UNSC Resolution 1559 which calls...for disbanding of all Lebanese militias...
Hezbullah is political party in parliament and government, but militia does not take [their]
orders[, probably taking] ideological/tactical advice from Iran, its chief armourer and mentor. [B]y
giving Hizbullah all those rockets and missiles, Iran has transformed a small militia into a
strategic threat to the Jewish state [and] it was utter hubris for Hizbullah to believe that, with its
rockets in reserve, its fighters could keep crossing into Israel with impunity. A war that starts
by accident is not necessarily easy to end... Stakes could hardly be higher for both sides[;
hence] both have rushed...up the ladder of escalation". The next issue of The Economist (29 Jul
06 in North America) contains another thoughtful Editorial and three related articles on the
violence and initial discussion of peacekeeping. Titles and their own summaries are as follows:
"Israel and Lebanon: Stuck in Lebanon"(Edit.):-"Why this war is likely to be long, unless US tries
harder to shorten it";"The Lebanese Crisis: Can Diplomacy Be Given a Chance?":-"The first
signs that Israel's attack on Hizbullah is losing momentum could give a fillip to the diplomacy
now getting under way, but timing is crucial";"Lebanon's Government: So Who's Running the
Show?":-"As Israel tries to destroy Hizbullah, Lebanon's government is floundering";"The Ethics
of War: Mind Those Proportions":-"As the war in Lebanon shows, there are several ways to make
a moral judgment". The essential and final argument of the second Editorial is, once again,"The
right thing for US is to call for an immediate stop to the fighting, postponing its plans for the
reordering of Lebanon until the period after the guns fall silent". Economist 22 Jul 06 "Arabs and
Democracy: Not Yet, Say the Arabs"(79-80):-this review of three books is officially summed as
arguing (like the above item): "Why democracy will not sink roots in the Arab world, at least in
a hurry". It later says: "None of these books asserts categorically that the Arabs are unfit for, or
incapable of, democracy, but all make plain how extraordinarily hard it will be for a system of
one-person-one-vote to sink roots in such unfamiliar soil". Fouad Ajami The Foreigner's Gift: The
Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq(Free Press):-"[D]ominant tone...is one of
lamentation. Despite the supposed attractions of new deal US offered Iraqis, beneficiaries have
been patently unable...to grasp it". Rory Stewart The Prince of the Marshes: And Other
Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq(Harcourt):-"[S]tory of appalling chaos, local Iraqi
chicanery/violence, and administrative mayhem imposed from outside". Mark Allen
Arabs(Continuum):-"[T]houghtful pot-pourri of observations on the Arab psyche and identity.
[O]ld-fashioned bonds of blood, tribe, religion and pan-Arab identity tend to govern behaviour";
Economist 08 Jul 06 "Security in Asia: The Trouble With Pakistan"(Edit.10); "A Survey of
Pakistan: Too Much for One Man To Do"(1-12); "Special Report: Afghanistan: A Geographical
Expression in Search of a State"(22-4); "The Army in Afghanistan: Taliban Time for Britain"(50):-the four items are inter-related in their discussion of many problems that are both similar and
found in two neighbouring states. Following is derived essentially from single Editorial
commenting on both states. "Terrorism has many sources and claimed justifications, but if it can
be said to have a centre, it lies in the training camps, madrassas and battlefields of northern
Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan. There the Taliban and their ally, al-Qaeda, were both
formed. From there, in hellish diaspora, jihadis have fanned out across the globe... [C]lear why
what happens in those two places is of huge importance to the rest of the world. From neither
place is there much good news. The West has invested a huge amount in Pakistan's General
Pervez Musharraf, who seized power Oct 99... After 11 Sep 01 he was recast as a provider of
relative stability in a dangerous neighbourhood and essential ally in 'war on terror'... In past 5
years, he has not done very much to make Pakistan a less dangerous place... [P]erhaps most
damning criticism of Musharraf is that he continues to do grave damage to the long-term
political health of Pakistan (see Survey)... It would not be fair to blame Pakistan for everything
that is going wrong in Afghanistan. Government of Hamid Karzai is weak and corrupt; because
of West's continued failure to live up to its promises, much of country, outside the big cities, is
in the grip of bandits and warlords. But Pakistan's contribution...should not be underestimated.
Both Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda are able to take refuge on Pakistani soil, which makes
job of the soldiers from Western countries who have been struggling to eliminate them for past
5 years much more difficult. Taliban... were in part a creation of Pakistan.., which saw in them
a way to establish a friendly state on their western flank [since] locked in perpetual conflict with
India to its east... As for al-Qaeda,.. Osama bin Laden is generally reckoned to be holed up in
Pakistani soil... An unstable, nuclear-armed Pakistan, intertwined with a chaotic and Taliban-dominated Afghanistan: it is not a settling prospect. It has all happened before. Result was 11
Sep 01"; Economist 02 Sep 06"The World Since September 11th: Five Years On"(Edit.9-10);"Special Report: September 11th 2001: [US]'s Longest War"(22-4):-"Essence of [al-Qaeda]
idea..is that Islam is everywhere under attack by the infidel and that every Muslim has a duty to
wage holy war, jihad, in its defence... Jihadists are hungry to topple...superpower. [S]ince
11Sep01, number of jihadists and their sympathisers has probably multiplied, partly as result of
way US responded... Al-Qaeda operated openly in Afghanistan and enjoyed protection of its
noxious Taliban regime, which refused US request to hand Osama bin Laden over. US
invasion...therefore enjoyed broad international support... By 04 a first-ever free election had
legitimated presidency of Hamid Karzai; parliament took office in 05. Now plagued by warlordism
and opium trade, and Taliban mounting a challenge in the south. But not yet look capable of
dislodging new government in Kabul. [I]nvasion deprived al-Qaeda of a haven for
planning/training. [H]owever, invasion of Iraq in Mar03 providing jihadists with both a banner
around which to recruit and a live arena in which to sharpen their military skills... Like most
Sunni extremists, some in al-Qaeda regard Shia Muslims as virtual apostates[, and] organised
so many attacks on Shias/holy places that Shias at last struck back, turning into a bitter
sectarian war... In [Iraq] the battle for world opinion...had calamitous consequences. [M]illions
of Muslims now think US real aim in Iraq was to grab its oil, help Israel, or, as bin Laden said all
along, wage war on Islam... Bush/PM Blair refused after the war to be embarrassed by the
absence of the [Iraqi] weapons that had so alarmed them beforehand. [Their] arguments no
longer sell in the West, let alone the Muslim world... Hussein's was a secular dictatorship in
which Islamists of all stripes kept their heads down... But portraying the whole enterprise as if
it had from the start been all about an experiment in democracy just makes Muslims crosser.
[Now] poll after poll shows deep distrust among traditional US allies... Bush has played straight
into anti-US hands. One vast mistake has been his neglect to push seriously for creation of a
Palestinian state... But worse has been his disregard for civil liberties [Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo.
So US] won more recruits for the jihadists. Still, not everything has gone al-Qaeda's way either.
[I]f bin Laden's aim was to topple pro-US regimes in Muslim world, he has failed... Saudi
regime...is still standing, and so far... the violence has served mainly to strengthen it. Another
prize to have eluded al-Qaeda is Pakistan. [Also,] all of al-Qaeda's efforts to kill Musharraf, or to
deflect from US alliance... have so far come to naught... [J]ihadists' grandiose aims and
gruesome methods have prevented them from turning a resentment of US into an appetite for
revolution at home. Most of [Iraqi] victims of al-Qaeda have been fellow Muslims,[while] attacks
inside such as Indonesia/Turkey/Jordan, where the victims were mainly Muslim, have turned
local people away from al-Qaeda's cause. If anything, that cause may have fared better in the
West, among those whose identity as Muslims has come to take precedence over loyalty to the
host country [Britain/Canada].To many susceptible Muslims the message that the faith is
everywhere under attack is evidently compelling. Jihadists are skilled at weaving the 'resistance'
in Palestine/Lebanon/ Kashmir/Chechnya/Iraq/Afghanistan into single narrative of persecution
by the infidel. [H]ijackers proved in US/Madrid that small numbers of terrorists can produce
devastating results. [J]ihadist notion that the faith is everywhere under attack looks absurd [cf.
Palestine/Caucasus/ Kashmir/Balkans/East Timor]. In Kosovo, NATO [protected] Muslims from
Christians. [Y]et a troubling recent development is emergence in US of an equal and opposite
distortion[:] idea that West and its values are everywhere under attack, and everywhere by the
same seamless front... It is wrong to look at post-11Sep world this way, as if every local conflict
is part of a civilisational clash [cf. Hamas/Hizbullah/ Iran]. [T]errorism was the background noise
of the second half of 20th century. But 11Sep seemed to portend something new... Al-Qaeda's
fantastic aims - sweeping away regimes, reversing history and restoring the caliphate - are
married to an appetite for killing that knows no limits. It boasts openly that it is seeking nuclear
weapons... The world must still strive to destroy al-Qaeda and, even more, the idea it represents.
But it had better do so with cleverer means than those Bush has used so far"; Economist 02 Sep
06"Special Report:The Middle East: A Big And Then a Bigger Mess"(25-6):-"Bombing of Beirut's
suburbs was ugly episode in the latest of many nasty Mideast wars... Al-Qaeda's attacks did not
themselves change Mideast, but...more now share [Osama] bin Laden's feeling Islam is under
attack, and that US is their enemy. [S]wift intervention in Afghanistan Nov 01 bothered many
Muslims, if only because it evoked memories of colonial invasions. But...most quietly glad to see
obscurantist Taliban defeated... Determined US policies produced some tangible results... Yet
several things went wrong. 'Crusade' to describe war on terror [created] damage... When Bush
said you are either with us or against us, he in effect pushed fence-sitters into enemy camp...
Iraq turned into crucible for terrorism[: US] so like Israelis stomping on Palestinans that many
Arabs/Muslims grew simply to equate occupations as twin assaults. Guanatanamo/Abu Ghraib
silenced US remaining fans. [R]eason for US invasion [seen as:] to control Iraqi oil/build military
bases/help Israel[,and frightened] those who opposed US policy/ emboldened Iran... Hizbullah
felt encouraged to escalate its hostility to Israel. Currency of anti-US [views] boosted Islamists[,
including] Muslim Brotherhood. Most dramatic Islamist advance came in Palestine. Despite
Bush's declared wish to see creation of Palestinian state, US did little to make it happen. Bush
was disenchanted with Arafat... Israeli settlement accelerated. In Mar 02 all 22 Arab heads of
state... agreed to end conflict if Israel withdrew to its pre-67 borders. However...Ariel Sharon
reoccup[ied] West Bank, and idea went nowhere [except] evacuat[ion of] Gaza Strip. [L]ikelihood
of resolution looked further away than ever. Palestinians voted in Hamas. Israelis elected...plan
for unilateral withdrawal behind controversial 'security barrier' until peace. [S]oon clear that plan
would not suit Israel after all[: t]o many, recent war in Lebanon, and Hizbullah's rain of rockets,
proved that any disengagement with Arab neighbours in absence of political guarantees would
be big mistake. Meanwhile, suffering of most Palestinians continued to mount[, so] Arabs said
it was hypocritical to promote democracy and then balk at its results. Within this gloomy picture,
[dizzy oil price] stands out";
Next item(drafted Oct 06),supported by varied Ottawans, is listed often as very broad issues are
involved.
Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST COOPERATE - IN
TERMS OF BOTH THEIR WEALTH AND KNOWLEDGE - IN ORDER TO SURVIVE:-Brief
paragraphs first identify some genuine and trans-species (but not simply idealistic) physical and
emotional human traditions, confrontations, disasters, or prospects that raise globally-relevant
threats. These are followed by a few relatively cheap and realistic, but world-wide and trans-human, policies. The challenges reflect the already serious - and often inter-related - concerns
of everyone, everywhere: all human beings now face “global” threats in terms of: (a) mobile,
unprecedented inter-human violence; (b) widespread, potentially global, mis-health; (c) dangers
generated to the earth on which all survive.
(1) All the wealthier societies on the planet now possess grand and growing assets of both
physical goods - far beyond essential human needs - and rapidly-expanding
scientific/technical/economic knowledge - enough to create/improve their comfort and health.
It now appears possible, and universally profitable in terms of generating the good trade and
health of all, to share such quantities of global assets with all who lack them, so all groups could
fully address painful and globally-destabilizing needs. Even if competition were the pure
motivation of large advanced companies, they would develop globally.
(2) Yet throughout the history of human beings, and contrary to the philosophy of the world’s
strongest religions, four social factors have been dominant among the whole species: human
groups have been mainly small (families or villages); their members have been grossly ignorant
about almost all other groups’ characteristics, strengths and problems; they have exhibited deep
and general dislike and often fear towards all other groups; and, above all, have felt no sense
of responsibility for them. Violence against, or at least selfishness towards, other groups has
been chronic - but is suddenly not beneficial.
(3) Now, for the first time in human history, the entire planet is massively/increasingly
interdependent, not simply in terms of ‘globalization’ trade, but also regarding enormous
travels/transfers of humans, goods and bacteria between societies. We are also now living in
unprecedented planetwide situations where basic global knowledge is both vast and expanding -
often via TV/Internet/phones in even isolated villages. All human beings, however rich/poor,
educated/formally ignorant, global travellers/physically fixed, are potentially aware of other
groups with greater/other power or assets - and/or apparent harm or nonrelationship - in their
own societies or another. Any group can feel independent/hurt/frustrated/ opinioned toward
another, physically or emotionally. Nature/scale of interdependence: widely unknown.
(4) An unprecedented but expanding global fact is that ills, ranging from the mildly-harmful to
the multi-fatal, can now easily be transferred via weapons, explosives, poisons, virus, serious
misuse of nature. The deliberate, unknown or accidental transfer of critical action to virtually
anywhere else on earth, by land, sea or air - could in future be, deliberately or otherwise,
generated or passed by groups or individuals that may or may not wish to inflict some ‘pain’ on
others. Victims of such action/accident can be in or from any society at all, and can hurt any type
or groups of humans, animals, machines, transport, buildings, towns or key liquids/gases/foods/
medicines/power-sources etc. The effects of deliberate or accidental “spreads” or organized
action range from minor diseases to mass murders.
(5) Any group will ultimately be responsible for “using” any of a variety of existing or
developable actions against/in any society on earth. Hence an essential way to reduce the world-wide threat - apart from easing sharp and dangerous ill-feelings - must involve help in reducing
serious/perceived pain/poverty/ (potential)disease/global misuse. It would also involve obtaining
- through cooperative intelligence/law among all regimes everywhere - advance information
about relevant threats -since any/all societies may somehow be threatened. But the most
defensive and selfishly-beneficial means of easing global threats is for the wealthier/more
informed to provide the funds/goods/skills necessary to accelerate equity - by both offering and
obtaining relevant knowledge. Richer societies would no longer live safely while ignoring any
others’ agonies - nor even suffer from giving assistance. Isolation is no longer an option -
anywhere - for any rich and/or traditional society. We must all think, at least minimally, as global
citizens.
The Economist 21 Oct 06 "Iraq: Between Staying and Going"(Edit.12); "Special Report: The Arab
World: Coalitions of the Unwilling"(25-8); "Moderates and Rejectionists: The Palestinian Test
Case"(28):-while the three items' emphases vary, the main problems stressed are interrelated.
Editorial's own summary:"A search for new ideas should not blind Americans to the stark choice
they face in Iraq". Highlights:"[They] long for a middle way. Why not split the country into Shia,
Sunni and Kurdish statelets? Instead of going right now, why not set a timetable, to galvanise
the warring parties to settle their differences before a free-for-all? One far-fetched idea...is said
to be to withdraw 'over the horizon' and control Iraq from a neighbouring country. Another is...
to be less fastidious about establishing democracy, and concentrate on smaller aim of
establishing a government that works. [N]one of these...stands up to scrutiny... At end of day,
the three-pronged policy US is already pursuing may very well be the best of a bad lot. Stated
briefly, this consists of trying to keep the lid on the violence, build up Iraq's own security forces,
and prod Iraqi politicians into making a power-sharing deal... If US willing to stay... for a few
more years, success is still possible... Only honest alternative is indeed probably just to go, and
let one side win... But just going would be a fantastic gamble, not only with US's global
power/prestige, but also with other people's lives. Better, still, to stay". Special's own
summary:"Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are the pillars of a rapidly
strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region". This substantial essay offers the
following introductory arguments: "Some [of Mideast's] imagined threats to the global order
have been leftist and nationalist, some reactionary and religious, some radical and violent. Yet
all have drawn their mobilising power from... urge to challenge the dominant perceived injustice
of the day... Most reliable populist cry today remains 'resistance': [Sudan, Iraq, Hizbullah].
Clearly, although times have changed, this dynamic has not. What has changed is that the call
to resist now inspires unprecedented enthusiasm, galvanizing many disparate political streams
at once, secular and nationalist as well as Islamist. Religious element, boosted by the great
revival that has swept Muslim societies across the globe, adds a scriptural drumbeat to the call.
Lately the impulse to resist also strengthened by failing prestige of traditional countervailing
forces - US, moderate governments in region, and liberal-minded minority of their citizens".
These points are then well-amplified. It concludes:"[C]lear that a powerful sector of Islamist
opinion is so fundamentally rejectionist that it will never change. Best the West can do may be
to ensure does not push more moderates into that camp. Could start by remembering that
people choose to 'resist' when they feel threatened". Palestinian item's thrust: "Pressures on
Hamas build from both sides...In recent months, poor Palestinians have, not for first time, found
themselves used as rope in tug-of-war between Mideast 'accomodationist' and 'rejectionist'
governments. [Yet] split would truly render PA ungovernable and peace talks impossible. Greg
Mortenson & David Oliver Relin Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Fight Terrorism and
Build Nations... One School at a Time (New York: Viking 06):-a beautifully written (by Relin), and
very popular book: (often-quoted) Mortenson's extraordinary gift of life to northernmost Pakistan
and Afghanistan. As a poor but pure mountain climber in 1993 he nearly died in attempting to
conquer K2, "world's deadliest peak" whose height is exceeded only by Everest. He survived
through the warm hospitality of an isolated, poverty-stricken village in Karakorum, Himalaya. He
found it had no school, almost no access to rest of Pakistan; so in extraordinary thanks Greg
promised to return one day and build a school for their boys and girls. On return to US, he
launched what gradually became"one of the most remarkable humanitarian campaigns of our
time". As director of the Central Asia Institute, Greg has built 55 schools serving Pakistan and
Afghanistan's poorest communities. "He provides not only hope to tens of thousands of
children, but living proof that one passionately dedicated person truly can change the world".
Economist 21 Oct 06"Nuclear-Weapons Proliferation: Going Critical, Defying the World"(69-70);
"Sanctions: History Lessons"(70-1);"North Korea: Pinched Bellies"(52):-Nuclear item's own
summary: "A big-power stand against North Korea and Iran? Or rivalry as usual?"
Highlights:"North Korea and Iran, past partners in missile roguery, seem bent on testing world's
anti-nuclear rules to destruction... Whether Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) survives this
combined assault depends on how big powers rise to challenge: by cooperating to press both
regimes to abandon their nuclear exploits and uphold the rules, or by competing in the wider
struggle for regional influence... China...has no wish to see Japan or South Korea frightened into
going nuclear too, but North Korea may test credibility of US's deterrence pledge...[I]t calls new
[UNSC] sanctions 'declaration of war'. Ms Rice's task: to win agreement from the neighbours on
a sanctions regime 'unlike anything [North has] faced before'. Japan has banned ships...and
halted trade/financial flows. But China wants to avoid economic collapse in North [which] would
enable US to throw its weight about too much. [Yet] China is livid that Kim [Jong Il] brushed
aside repeated warnings not to test... His nuclear antics have also upset South Korea's
president,.. whose 'sunshine'policy towards North is in tatters...Traditional sanctions have their
limits,..but UNSCresolution 1718 gives new backing to US-led Proliferation Security Initiative,
posse of like-minded countries that share intelligence and intercept cargoes of suspected
proliferators... North is dangerous, but isolated. An Iran with nuclear weapons...would be a
'game-changer'. Virulence of regime's revolutionary ardour, its role as 'central banker of
terrorism' to organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah that preach and practise violence against
Israel, and its ambition for dominance in the region and Islamic world, all make it imperative,
from West's viewpoint, to stop Iran before it gets bomb. Sight of a nuclear-armed Shia Iran would
probably encourage Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere to want their own
finger on a nuclear trigger... Sanctions are supposed to become steadily tougher if Iran carries
on enriching... Helps Iran that, just as world gears up to enforce anti-nuclear rules, the rules may
be changing. Spread of weapons of mass destruction is a clear threat to international peace and
security. It remains to be seen whether tackling proliferation is something world's big powers
are ready to put ahead of their own rivalries". Sanctions offers history of varied aims, effects and
targets of past/continuing sanctions, both UN and US. Pinched covers fact: "Fresh sanctions on
North Korea are not supposed to hurt its people, but may do[:] A nuclear capability may be toast
of North's leaders, but blight on their poor countrymen's bellies... To feed itself, North needs
5.5m tonnes of grain/year. Cannot produce anything like this, even with bumper harvest last
year... As if this not bad enough, 10 days after its offending missile tests, North suffered worst
flooding in recent memory... To alleviate crisis, South said it would make flood relief an
exception to its suspension of aid. But only half of promised 100,000 tonnes of grain had arrived
before the nuclear test, whereupon South suspended the rest... Western powers seem unfussed
by this shortage... Last year North imported over $1billion-worth of Chinese goods. New UN
sanctions against it may change that... A barbed-wire fence going up along the border; China
is taking no risks".Noah Feldman"Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age"New York Times
29 Oct 06:-this is the leading article of the New York Times Magazine of this date, and runs to
18 pages when printed from the Internet. This time the author is identified as follows:"Noah
Feldman, a contributing writer, is a law professor at New York University and adjunct senior
fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations". Summarized extracts from the introductory section:
"Today the nuclear game in [Mideast] has changed. When Arab League's SG... called for 'a
Mideast free of nuclear weapons' this past May, it wasn't Israel that prompted his remarks. He
was worried about Iran, whose self-declared ambition to become nuclear power has been
steadily approaching realization. The anti-Israel statements of Iranian president.,. coupled with
Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas, might lead you to think that Arab states would welcome
Iran's nuclear program... But interests of Shiite non-Arab Iran do not always coincide with those
of Arab leaders. A nuclear Iran... could potentially mean... a historic shift in the position of the
long-subordinated Shiite minority relative to the power/prestige of the Sunni majority... Sunni
Arab leaders...also seem worried that Iranians might actually use nuclear weapons if they got
them. A nuclear attack on Israel would engulf the whole region. But that is not the only danger:
Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere fear that Iranians might just use a nuclear bomb against
them... If Iran is going to get the bomb, its neighbours will have no choice but to keep up. North
Korea, now protected by its own bomb, has threatened proliferation - and in the Mideast it would
find a number of willing buyers... Given the increasing instability of the Mideast, nuclear
proliferation there is more worrisome than almost anywhere else on earth. As nuclear technology
spreads, terrorists will enjoy increasing odds of getting their hands on nuclear weapons...
Bombing through an intermediary has its advantages: deniability is, after all, the name of the
game for a government trying to avoid nuclear retaliation. [A]s more countries get the bomb,
tracing the seller will become harder and harder, and the incentive to make a sale will increase".
Much of item carefully discusses rationales used by/for Islamic killers of themselves, infidels,
civilians, women and children”; Economist 25 Nov 06"The Future of NATO: The Test in
Afghanistan"(Edit.12); "Special Report: NATO's Future: Predictions of its Death Were
Premature"(24-6):-official summary of Editorial:"Thanks to some shortsighted European
politicians, the world's foremost military alliance is at risk". Highlights: "[W]ith demise of Soviet
communism,.. alliance has grown bigger,.. is busier than it ever was during cold war [and] faces
many tricky questions about the future... NATO's leaders must find unity of purpose on one issue
above all others: overcoming the weaknesses of mission in Afghanistan [where] for first time
engaged in bloody ground combat. Task made even harder by two failures[:] to modernize...
armies for expeditionary operations [or] to send soldiers... to dangerous regions where most
needed. Although have 2.4m men under arms, NATO's European members...struggled to meet
requests for extra 2,200... British and Dutch have put troops at sharp end in southern
Afghanistan, heartland of Taliban[, while] Canadians...spearheaded NATO's assault on
entrenched Taliban fighters. [But] too many others... are working in safer areas and refused to
be deployed as NATO commander would like... It is difficult for any government to expose
soldiers to danger in far-away lands; harder still to watch one's soldiers die while allies look the
other way. No excuse for such half-heartedness. In Afghanistan, as distinct from Iraq, there
should be no quarrel about the lawfulness of the mission. NATO is in the country under a UN
mandate, operating in defence and at the behest of an elected government. The stakes are high:
failure would not only bring back the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but embolden jihadists around the
world. Military alliance that stretches across Atlantic will not always be able to unify around such
a clear cause... NATO and EU do not need to see each other as competitors... Nor should a
stronger NATO mean a weaker role for UN... May even be a case for UN one day to recruit military
forces of its own, capable of intervening in conflicts under a UN mandate. [Now] NATO remains
world's foremost military alliance. [Members] may no longer face one common enemy, but they
face common dangers, including terrorism, Islamic radicalism, increasingly troublesome Russia,
Iran nuclear ambitions and instability in Mideast. [A]ll the more reason not to fail the test in
Afghanistan"; Economist 09 Dec 06“Lebanon: A Battle for the Nation’s Heart”(51-2):-official
summary:“Outcome of bitter struggle in streets of capital could affect balance of power in wider
region”. Highlights: “Lebanon not moving. It is stuck. Talks between faction leaders... collapsed
last month. Since then, fractures between religious sects, divided political loyalties and clashing
understandings of Lebanon’s own history/identity widened dangerously fast... Huge crowds
gather nightly for [PM Siniora’s] downfall, even as he receives endless delegations of supportive
dignitaries. [Showdown] shows no sign of ending soon. Protesters... insist vigil will not end until
PM... appoints enough opposition ministers to grant them effective veto. Government... has
offered bigger share of posts [but] remains adamant this must fall short of veto. Siniora said to
have accepted proposal to up number of cabinet posts from 24 to 30, giving 9 or 10 to Hizbullah-led opposition, 19 to anti-Syrian coalition and couple to neutrals. Not enough said Hizbullah.
Siniora’s lot [also raise issues of: tribunal to look into murder of ex-PM Hariri; replacement of
pro-Syrian president.] In government’s view, demonstrations subverting democracy [with] aim
not so much to achieve sectarian balance as to bring Lebanon back into orbit of Syria and Iran
[and] renew ‘resistance’ against Israel. Nawaf Musawi [of] Hizbullah counters that government’s
acceptance of UN troops and foreign aid is whittling away sovereignty... Opposition appears
stronger[:] demonstrations of more than 1m[, with] Hizbullah [lending] formidable organizing
skills [plus] menace of its unrivalled guerrilla force. Siniora not bereft[:] Western powers/Sunni
Arab allies[;] strong support from anti-Syrian Christian factions [plus] near-unanimous backing
from Sunni/Druze minorities... In fact, striking symmetry between sides[: e]ach accuses other
of being stooge of foreign powers, of stoking sectarian rivalry and of ‘trading in blood of
martyrs’... Both sides claim majority backing and both see the clash as defining moment for
Lebanon - perhaps even for the wider region. Conservative Arab governments... are worried[: if]
Siniora forced out,.. angry Sunni Arab fears of a new ‘Shia arc’...will grow”; Economist 16 Dec
06"Kurdistan: Can the Americans Satisfy Both Turks and Kurds?"(43-4):-official summary:"As
tension rises between Turkish government and Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Americans are in
quandary". Highlights:"Iraqi Kurds enjoy extreme autonomy in what is now the only stable part
of Iraq ...Turks, for their part, increasingly angered by renewal of attacks in Turkey by guerrillas
of the home-grown Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) [and] have never liked idea of an
autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, seeing it as a magnet for Kurdish nationalism in the region -
especially in Turkey... Growing chance Turkish army will, perhaps next spring, invade northern
Iraq in effort to clobber PKK in its safe haven just inside Iraq [see full item:"Turkish Kurds in
Iraq: Lonesome Rebels"(44)]. Iraqi Kurds might then feel obliged to help their ethnic kinsmen
fight back. [U]nclear what US would do... Iraqi Kurds' biggest worry now is that US wobble might
hasten the feared Turkish invasion... Iraq's 4-5m Kurds fear Turks' true aim would be to ruin their
successful experiment in self-rule, which has been inspiring Turkey's own restive Kurds, some
14m strong... US would be loth to let the Iraqi Kurds help their PKK kinsmen fight back, since
Turkey is a cherished NATO ally. [C]onfident Iraqi Kurds... now say they will no longer kill fellow
Kurds [and] instead strengthening links with them... US been telling Turks to stay out of Iraq[,
and Turks had hoped] US would deal with PKK[, but US] failure to do so is perhaps biggest
cause of rampant anti-US feeling in Turkey. [Turkish PM warned Bush by phone] that he might
be unable to restrain his hawkish generals [against PKK, whose] attacks went on despite its
proclaimed ceasefire in Sep. One big reason for Turkish restraint against PKK has been repeated
warnings from EU, [b]ut that restraint may weaken as EU... continues to snub Turkey... If Turkish
forces do invade Iraq, US response will depend largely on scope/scale... Plainly in US interest
to cut deal between Turks and Kurds, including to disarm PKK for good, in return for wider
cultural/political rights for Kurds in Turkey. Conceivably, Turkey might then be persuaded to
accept ...an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan... But pessimists... say the Turks...will never tolerate
Kurdish independence... If it comes to a stark choice, it is hard to say which way US would
tilt".Related:"Turkey and Europe: The Blackballers' Club"(Edit.12-3);"[US] and Iraq: The War Over
the War"(29);"Iraq: How Dare You[, US]"(45);"Charlemagne: Turkey and Enlargement"(53);
Economist 13 Jan 07"Israel and the Jews: Diaspora Blues"(Edit.14-5); "Israel and the Jews:
Second Thoughts About the Promised Land"(53-6):-Editorial's official summary:-"Jews around
the world should join the debate about Israel, not just defend whatever it does". Highlights:
"Early settlers came for a variety of reasons:.. to escape stifling constraints of religious dogma;..
hasten the coming of Messiah;.. as anti-Semitism grew, [gain] a safe haven; after the Holocaust,
save Jewish lives. Soon another role: being a potential Israeli citizen became one of the anchor
points of what it means to be a Jew. Since [its establishment,] Jews have continued
debating/reshaping relationships to country. Secular Jews found Israeliness a handy substitute
for religious observance. Some religious Jews revived... messianic Zionism, holding that to
settle in all biblical land... is a God-given duty. To...ultra-Orthodox, state should [be] subsidising
Jewish learning/maintaining piety... Meanwhile, diaspora Jews have developed an even more
eclectic mix of Jewish culture and attitudes to Zionism(see 53-6),partly because... growing
number neither feel comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor... invoke Israel in
defining Jewish[ness]. Yet big Jewish diaspora institutions not caught up[, but] still supporting
[Israel] in times of crisis/critics. [True especially of] lobby groups in US, formed to influence
foreign policy in Israel's favour... Their attitude persists [in suggesting Israel's] critics are anti-Semites[, and they] have an unholy alliance with evangelical Christian groups. This knee-jerk
defensiveness of Israel does not help Jewish diaspora in keeping young Jews from leaving the
faith [and] many are simply drifting away. [Also,] it locks diaspora Jews out of the fateful/often
bitter debates that rage inside Israel itself[, where] interests have been diverging. [Israelis]
disagree on the most basic questions: borders, who is a Jew, role of religion, status of non-Jews... Israeli Jews swim in a sea of conflicting ideas about who they should be... Helping Israel
should no longer mean defending it uncritically. [D]iaspora institutions should...encourage lively
debate about Israeli politics[,] allowing an Israel at peace to return to its original vocation of
providing a safe and democratic haven for the world's Jews. Other items in this issue offer
information on Israeli attitudes towards/from some vital Mideasterners (titles/pages plus official
summaries): "Israel and Iran: How Imminent Or Real a Threat?"(43):-"Israelis vary in their views
of Iranian menace"; "Obituary: Teddy Kollek"(78):-"Theodor('Teddy')Kollek, mayor of Jerusalem,
died on 02 Jan 07, aged 95"; Economist 13 Jan 07"Chinese Foreign Policy: A Quintet, Anyone?"
(37-8):-complements 06Jan"China: Coming Over the Horizon" item on trends in global role of a
developing superpower. Official summary: "China making it clear it wants a bigger role in
Mideast". Highlights:"[I]n Mideast, China is on good terms with everyone [and its] non-government seminar [of] former senior Israeli and Palestinian officials reached consensus...
China should increase its influence in Mideast, and join 'Quartet'... pursuing peace efforts... To
all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-export[ers, it is] big customer/investor[; to Iran and
Syria[, its] veto power at UN and shared misgivings about US make it a welcome friend.
Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy. Israel... courts China['s] potential
influence[, knowing they] share distaste for Islamic militancy [and are important military industry
producers/markets]. US worries China has been hesitant to put pressure on Iran[, its] third-biggest supplier of oil, and Sudan[, where] China has invested hugely in oil. China sees
advantages for itself in any diminution of US power[;] US preoccupation in Iraq strengthens
China's hand in its dealings with Taiwan. In both Sudan and Iran, China has often balked at US-led initiatives in UN that could be seen as legitimising strong-arm tactics against countries
deviating from international norms. China fear[ed] it might be next[, but] has recently edged
closer to US position... Despite disdain for US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan,.. it has not
attempted to frustrate US operations[,] has pledged more than $300m for Afghan reconstruction,
begun debt-[cancel] negotiations with Iraq[ and, s]ince 1990s, far more sympathetic to US
concerns about weapons proliferation. China worries about its dependence on US military might
for the security of its oil shipments from Mideast [(see 06 Jan)] so has little choice but to support
efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with US tactics, but will share the same broad
objective". In same issue, these three items (their titles/pages plus their official summaries)
discuss China's equally-vital international financial/trade relations: "Chinese Business: Truth
From Facts"(Edit.13-4):-"The best test of China's new accounting standards: a few public
disasters"; "Chinese Accounting: Cultural Revolution"(63-4):-"New accounting rules have
replaced the Little Red Book [by Mao] as China's guide to self-improvement. Can the state
handle the truth?"; "Briefing: The Problem With Made in China"(68-70):-"China is choking on its
success at attracting the world's factories. That has handed its Asian neighbours a big
opportunity"; Economist 24 Feb 07"India and Pakistan: Staying on Track"(Edit.18-9); "Terrorism
in India: Murder on the Friendship Express"(47-8); "Pakistan: Musharraf Shows His Hand"(48-52):-Editorial‛s official summary:"United in anger at another atrocity, India and Pakistan should
speed up their peace process". Highlights: "Every few months a bombing... in India [is] killing
random unfortunates. [A]ttacks usually blamed on militant groups fighting Indian rule in part of
divided Kashmir [and] set back painstaking progress.,. ending rancorous, bloody feud that has
scarred 60 years since independence/partition. So far, however, none has succeeded in
scuppering the 3-year-old peace process.[Latest bombing, of a train, is described in
"Terrorism..." which notes:"Pakistan also seen more terrorism than usual.,. probably organised
by the same militants, or by their Islamist allies".] Both countries condemned the outrage [and]
insisted the peace progress was intact... Both should be urged to go further [and] make a real
effort to bring it to a successful conclusion [- the] fanatics have political, religious and even
financial interests in keeping [them] at odds. It would be easier to identify the culprits if India and
Pakistan were to share intelligence more fully. [I]t is time to move from interminable process to
possible outcome. [A]s each outrage proves, present dispensation is intolerable. [T]he outlines
of a settlement acceptable to both sides are emerging. It would involve ‛softer‛ border, some
cooperative institutions, greater autonomy for both bits of Kashmir and a gradual withdrawal of
Indian soldiers from Kashmir as violence decreases... Such might not bring an immediate/
perpetual end to bombings, but it would dispel the murk of ambiguity where terrorism thrives...
pointlessly."Economist 17 Mar 07"Lexington: The American-Jewish Lobby"(38):-official summary
: "These are both the best of times and the worst of times for the... lobby". Highlights: "The
American Israel Public Affairs Committee(AIPAC)[has] awesome power/unnerving efficiency...
Congress has more Jewish members than ever before: 30 in House; 13 in Senate. Both parties
are competing...to be ‛soundest‛ on Israel. About two-thirds [in US] hold a favourable view of the
place. Yet... feel a bit nervous, too. Iraq debacle has produced a fierce backlash against pro-war
hawks, of which AIPAC was certainly one. Also... awkward questions about US‛s alliance with
Israel [and] a growing number of people want to push against AIPAC... Some of the most
determined are Arab-Americans, who been growing in numbers/influence for years - probably
about 3.5m of them [and] a growing political force... But so far their performance has been
unimpressive. Arab-Americans are badly split between Christians(63%) and Muslims(24%). Also
been late in taking to politics. AIPAC‛s ace is idea that it represents Jewish interests in a country
generally philo-Semitic. But liberal Jewish groups... persuad[ed] Congress to water down a
particularly uncompromising bit of legislation... which would have prevented any US contact
with Palestinian leadership... A liberal version of AIPAC... has yet to materialise[, but] most Jews
are fairly left-wing... An even bigger threat to AIPAC [is that] serious people... ask hard questions
about US‛s relationship with Israel. [F]ormer security adviser worries that US is seen in Mideast
as ‛acting increasingly on behalf of Israel‛... The biggest challenge facing AIPAC is how to deal
with this changing climate... US needs an open debate about its role in Mideast"; Economist 24
Mar 07"Briefing: Iraq: Mugged By Reality"(29-31);"The Iraq War: Collateral[US] Damage"(33-4):-"What went wrong? [M]ost popular answer of US neoconservatives who argued loudest for the
war is that it was a good idea badly executed... [Some] called Bush national-security team
‛among the most incompetent‛... Others also blame Iraqis for inability to accept US gift of
freedom. That excuse too convenient[;] can be no denying project was bungled from the start.
Western intelligence failed to discover Saddam had destroyed all his WMD - main rationale for
war. However, incompetence beyond this: war launched by divided administration [with] no
settled notion of how to run Iraq after conquest. Rumsfeld... sent too few and they did nothing
to prevent looters. US plans for Iraq‛s political transition were also rudimentary, to extent they
existed at all... State Dept. organized a pre-invasion Future of Iraq project, but Pentagon declined
to adopt its ideas. [Under-staffed, ad hoc US body] received no intelligible instructions from
Washington, and baffled the liberated Iraqis [who] could not [run] state whose institutions had
collapsed. [Even the replaced US ‛viceroy‛] produced big mistakes[:] disbanded the Iraqi army
and put tens of thousands of resentful, jobless men on the streets[;] turfed thousands of Baath
Party members out of bureaucracy, depriving many ministries of their only trained staff. In the
end, political transition of sorts on advice of UN [and] 2005 year of elections... Unfortunately,..
government cannot govern[, as] Iraqis voted along ethnic lines and produced impasse... Sunnis
feel locked out of new Iraq dominated by Shias[ - themselves] divided... Main reason for
government‛s inability to govern, however, is that it cannot stem a tidal wave of criminal and
political violence [-] Baghdad and central Iraq in multiple conflicts. Many Sunnis have taken up
arms against the new Shia-dominated order[;] al-Qaeda is running jihad against US and Shias
alike, provoking a torrent of revenge killings[;] in places, Shia militias also attack US soldiers.
Prevalence of violence and absence of law erodes the legitimacy of the elected government and
makes it almost impossible to rebuild an economy that even before the war had been prostrated
by a dozen years of UN sanctions... Only when the killing declines will Iraq‛s new government
be able to buttress its legitimacy, suck support away from the militias, and rebuild the
economy... Iraq‛s cabinet agreed last month on how to share oil revenues between the regions.
[B]ut it is uncertain whether the politicians who claim to speak for the Sunnis are close enough
even in the event of a political settlement. [T]ime may show that the democratic structure US
worked so hard to install can neither run Iraq nor reconcile its warring clans". All remainder of
Briefing and the entire "Collateral" item discuss the relevant US national policies/effects;
Economist 28 Apr 07"The United States in the Middle East: Weakness - Or a New Realism?" (51-2):-official summary:"Why US is having to adjust policies in region". Highlights:"[T]hree-quarters
of Iraqis think US plays 'negative role' in their country; most want US troops to go [see "Iraq: A
Row Over a Wall"(51)]. [S]trengthening perception in Mideast of [US] administration at bay.
[O]pinion survey in four Muslim countries - Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia - shows 79%
of respondents believe US aims to divide and weaken Muslim world. Big majorities want US
troops out of all Muslim [-] in Egypt, 91% endorse attacks on US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan
["Afghanistan: The Arrival at Last of Party Politics"(46)]. [This]reflected in government behaviour
[:] exasperation with US/sense that Iraq debacle has sapped its will, [thus] stiffening resistance
to US policies and emboldening others [-] Iran‛s ambitions/Sudan‛s intransigence/Arab-Israeli
conflict/questioning democratic reform. [P]ressure is [more] on Bush to moderate own policies...
US has rejected dealings with states/parties it considers hostile. But Bush agreed [to] talk
directly to Iran [since] cannot be ignored [over] Iraq. US still chastises Syria [but]probably matter
of time before... comes back from isolation... US-led boycott has failed to dislodge [Palestine
regime] led by Hamas,.. prompting Saudi Arabia to [sponsor] a national-unity government that
diluted Hamas's control but preserved its rejectionist stand towards Israel. US officials now re-engaged with Palestinian president [and] strongly endorsed relaunch [of Arab peace initiative].
Even US policy towards Sudan has shifted [:]deal for a far smaller [peacekeeping force in Darfur]
under 'hybrid' UN-African Union command... Perhaps plainest shift is over democratic reform[:]
recent political tide appears to have flowed back against [it]. Syria['s] budding reform movement
floundering[, and many] have reacted passively to their government's latest crackdown. Egypt's
government appears almost to relish... just to show it can fend off US scolding. Reforms in arch-autocratic Saudi Arabia have stalled completely, with no audible protest from Wshdc. Perhaps
more serious... is the rumbling that can be heard in regional allies. Turkey has rarely found itself
at such cross-purposes with US... Over Iraq it finds itself more in tune with Iran and Syria, due
to worries about... Kurdish minority. Egypt and Jordan have close military ties to US too, but
must constantly parry sniping from such exuberantly anti-US opponents as Muslim Brotherhood.
Yet US military footprint in region remains huge. For Persian Gulf monarchies it is vital protector.
US has close military ties to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and strongly beefing up military
cooperation with array of countries in the Sahelian belt in their war against Islamist terrorism.
Egypt, Jordan and Israel still bank on US aid, and stand as symbols that rewards of friendship
with US [alone] can be [so] large. Do shifts in US policy reveal weakness, flexibility or renewed
realism? Condoleezza Rice may be adopting less abrasive policies in region. 'They've come to
realise that the multilateral approach can be more effective', says an Arab ambassador";
Economist 28 Apr 07"Capital Punishment: Edging Out of Fashion"(69-70):-official summary:
"More and more countries have doubts about death penalty". Highlights:"[C]ruelly administered,
or botched, executions are not confined to developing countries, or to lands that follow...
traditional Islamic punishment... 'At least' 1,591 executions were carried out worldwide 2006, well
down on 2005 but 40% higher than 2003. [N]umber of countries that carry out executions... has
fallen steadily from 40 a decade ago to just 25 last year. Since 1985, 55 countries have ended the
death penalty or, having already limited it to 'extraordinary' crimes,.. have now banned it outright.
During the same period, only four reintroduced death penalty[:] Nepal/Philippines have since
abolished it again, and in Gambia/Papua New Guinea, no executions. [In all,] 89 countries have
abolished death penalty for all crimes, another ten for all but exceptional crimes, and a further
30 are abolitionist in practice. [UN] has called for complete abolition of death penalty. In Europe,
where abolition is a condition of membership of both EU and 46-nation Council of Europe
(Russia is member), Belarus is only country that still uses it. In Africa, only four carried out death
penalty 2006, and in Americas, US is only country to have executed anybody since 2003. Only
Asia and Mideast seem largely untouched by global movement away from death penalty. Even
China [in 2006 death sentences may be near 8,000] might be having second thoughts [Olympics].
Six countries-China/Iran/Pakistan/Iraq/Sudan/US- accounted for 90%+ of 2006 known executions.
Methods of execution vary widely [stoning/stabbing/beheading/electrocution/shooting/hanging/
lethal injection]. Injection is now the preferred method in all but one of 38 [US] states that retain
death penalty... US is one of very few democracies [along with Japan/India/South Korea/Taiwan]
still to have death penalty"; Economist 19 May 07"Pakistan: Time to Cut a Deal"(Edit.10):-official
sum:"General Pervez Musharraf needs allies. Pakistan needs democracy. Enter Benazir Bhutto?"
Highlights:"[This] key ally in fight against terrorism is facing the first large-scale popular
protests since he grabbed power. [S]laughter of around 40 in Karachi 12-13 May was country‛s
worst non-sectarian political violence in decades [and it] looks more unstable than ever".
Analysis of a globally-relevant crisis in a state both complicated and strategically-located, offers
the reasons/implications:"Briefing: Pakistan: A General State of Disarray"(23-5):-official sum:"A
slaughter in Karachi/vengeful judge are signs... Musharraf is struggling to remain in power".
Editorial continues:"A small war with al-Qaeda supporters along border with Afghanistan is
fueling a wave of jihadist terrorism. In Islamabad, a hardline mosque staffed by armed zealots
is defying government. Indeed, general's efforts to fight these forces, and his pro-US stance, are
part of reason so unpopular. But a panicky clampdown not solve problems. Killing in Karachi
carried out by weak [Musharraf coalition]. Many victims protested against his attempt to sack
head of Supreme Court[, including] Pakistan's two mainstream parties, led by exiled former PMs,
Benazir Bhutto/Nawaz Sharif. Violence was intolerable [and] unlikely to succeed[:] democracy
has been rekindled... Combating militancy... requires more than hunting down militants[:]
democratic institutions needed to address the defections terrorism feeds upon. [Musharraf
understands this, yet] his efforts at controlled democracy have failed. [E]lections alone do not
add up to 'real democracy'[, but] nor does autocrat. [E]lection is due this year which Musharraf
looks determined to survive[: be] re-elected president in last days of current parliament.
Common sense/constitution dictate he should instead seek election from next one[, so] legal
challenges ahead. [That's]why he wants to see back of [the judge. He] can do better than this[:
in aligning with US against extremism, and in efforts to make peace with India, he has shown
foresight/readiness to take right risks. He needs to do the same to broaden his political support.
Ms Bhutto, who leads biggest/most liberal party, thought to have offered to support his reform
agenda/re-election. Price would be to escape corruption charges that hang over her, allowing
return. She also demands fair election, and that general keep to constitution/shed uniform. [Deal
looks least-bad option: Bhutto's demands are admirable for country. Pakistan needs genuine
democracy, not imitation. [A]lso needs continuity/ stability army man able to provide... If general
fears he would lose most from such cooperation, he is wrong. Without greater legitimacy,
opposition will grow and his authority will diminish"; Economist 26 May 07"Lebanon: The
Cauldron May Bubble Over Again"(47-8):-official sum:-"The latest outbreak of violence in
northern Lebanon menaces the whole region". Highlights:-"Fighting between Lebanese army
and radical Islamists entrenched in a Palestine refugee camp near Tripoli. [M]any of camp's
30,000 residents fled[, but] militants inside declared a fight to the death [-] a radical jihadist
faction known as Fatah al-Islam... Though small/marginal, [it] has been linked to at least one of
sporadic bomb attacks that have hit Christian areas... Violence comes at difficult time for
Lebanon, shaken by devastating war with Israel last summer, [and] Western-backed government
locked in stand-off against pro-Syrian coalition led by Hizbullah [demanding] veto-wielding share
of cabinet. Though fighting in north pits a widely disparaged Sunni Muslim group against a
national army.,. many Lebanese view clash through prism of this wider political contest.
[O]fficials charge Syria is sowing such strife to regain its power-broking role [or] block [UNSC-involved] tribunal to try suspects in a string of political murders[, but] adamantly denies any link.
[M]ost of Lebanon's Palestinian camps [long] controlled by Syrian military intelligence[, which]
also known to have sponsored jihadist groups - against US in Iraq. Leader of Fatah al-Islam,
whose ideology close to al-Qaeda's, [was ] in Syria before surfacing in Lebanon last year.
[G]roup has recruited not only among Palestinian refugees [there], but also among international
jihadists... When violence erupted, Palestinian factions united with Lebanon's rival parties,
including Hizbullah, in rare unanimous condemnation of Fatah al-Islam as dangerous/alien force,
[although] anxiety grew over danger to civilians [and] shelling looked indiscriminate... Some
[refugees] claim gunmen holding the camp hostage[, while] most Lebanese solidly back their
army, and government bolstered by support from Arab League/US... Whatever outcome, fighting
is also reminder that Lebanon - and rest of world - should not let country's wretched Palestinian
camps continue to fester as ghettos of misery/extremism which stoke up anger across region";
Economist 02 Jun 07"Palestinians in Lebanon: A History of the Hapless"(46):-official sum:"Long
the unluckiest of the lot". Highlights:-"Lebanon [has] 12 Palestinian camps [-] dense warrens
of breeze-block shanties. Three were flattened in the civil war [and all] residents were made
refugees twice. [Two camps were laid waste; others ravaged in] attacks by everyone... Nahr al-Bared was only camp spared in those dark times; it prospered afterwards... Lebanese army siege
of radical jihadist cult [there] has left at least 80 dead... One ingredient [for violence] is despair
of Lebanon's 420,000 Palestinians. Not only has hope of returning to Palestine faded; living
conditions have deteriorated too. The 4m or so UN-registered Palestinian refugees elsewhere
in the diaspora - Jordan, Syria, Israeli-controlled territories - hardly been happy, but treatment
in Lebanon notably harsh. Local laws give Lebanon's Palestinians a raw deal, reflecting fears
assimilating them could upset [its] sectarian balance... Recent developments increase the
poverty imposed[, and] UNRWA... stretched because of chaos in Gaza strip/West Bank. As one
result, class sizes in schools UNRWA runs in Lebanon have soared. Troubles also slashed
spending by...agencies that once...supported camps; foreign donors...diverted towards
widespread destruction by Israeli bombing... Camps have grown more lawless[: initially were
under PLO deal; then power vacuum in mid-80s, followed in 90s by Syrian military intelligence...
Syrian withdrawal in 2005... left many camps with no effective administration[, so] grew more
divided than ever[: split between Hamas-Fatah in Palestine,] exacerbated... by emergence of
more extreme factions. [Y]ouths turned to pan-Islamist fervour. Many naturally turned to Nahr
al-Bared [-] just outside Tripoli,.. a hotbed of Islamist radicals. Joined by hundreds of militants,
very few of them Palestinian, the radical cult Fatah al-Islam has vowed to fight here to the death";
Economist 23 Jun 07"The Arab Predicament: Martyrs or Traitors"(Edit.15)[official sum after each
title]"A choice the West must be careful not to force on the people of the Middle East";"The
Palestinians: June Amazed Them"(30-2):"From now on, the Palestinians are not themselves";
"Reactions in the Region and Beyond: Emotions Not Politics"(32):"The Palestinians' chances
of avoiding the worst depend partly on others"; [plus in previous issue 16 Jun 07:]"Palestine and
Israel: As Bleak As It Gets"(16-8):"A civil war among Palestinians is bad for the Israelis too";"The
Palestinians: War Between Brothers"(53):"The Palestinians' two main groups are on the verge
of a struggle that could split the two parts of a putative Palestinian state in half":-Editorial's
highlights:-"[S]cenes from Gaza have shocked Arabs far beyond Palestine... In one brutal week
Hamas's swift destruction of Arafat's Fatah movement in Gaza summed up a change that is
spreading across a broad swathe of Mideast. Secular nationalism... is coming to look like the
weak force and radical Islam like the strong force. This poses huge danger... Western policy in
danger of strengthening the wrong side by making Islamists looks like martyrs and secularists
like traitors. [US President Bush's]hope is that if Gaza fails under Hamas while the West Bank
prospers under Fatah, Palestinian opinion will eventually swing back behind the moderates. Can
such a plan possibly work? [A]ssumption of many Muslims that a pro-US leader must in some
way be a traitor to the cause extends beyond the Arab world[, while] US's allies cannot stop the
martyrs from calling them traitors. US has made itself deeply unpopular in the Islamic world by
invading Iraq and standing by Israel. This is bound to taint any Muslim leader who looks as if he
owes his position to US military/economic power. But guilt by association is only half of reason
for the growing popularity of the martyrs and the spreading idea that US's allies must be traitors.
Other half is that, by comparison with traitors, martyrs look clean[:] Hamas in Palestine,
Hizbullah in Lebanon and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/Jordan have earned reputation for both
honesty and efficiency[, and often] health/social services... Martyrs have another selling point[:
Hizbullah and Hamas] are still 'resisting' Israel. [I]t is not enough for Israel and US to release the
economic help withheld from Palestinians when Hamas was still formally in charge[:] principal
grievance [is] Israel's occupation of West Bank as well as Gaza... US must now prove moderate
Arab allies, far from being traitors, can actually deliver desirable results. In case of Palestine,
[Fatah must] govern cleanly and get Israel to start dismantling outposts and leaving West Bank";
Economist 23 Jun 07"A Counter-Insurgency in Trouble: Fatal Errors in Afghanistan"(Edit.17-8);
"Western Forces in Afghanistan: Unfriendly Fire"(51):-Editorial's sum:"Too few soldiers and too
much bombing from the air is damaging the US-led campaign". Highlights:"Afghan civilian
deaths caused by Western forces as dangerous as most callous of Taliban suicide-bombs.
[Operation] was never going to be easy. [According to the famous "Anonymous"Imperial Hubris:
Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(Wshdc: Brassey's Inc. 04), it was initiated by Wshdc
in Oct 01 without reflecting the enormous knowledge accumulated by the intense US help to
Afghans when occupied by USSR in 1979-89. Chapter 2.:"An Unprepared and Ignorant Lunge to
Defeat - The United States in Afghanistan"(21-58).] But allies hobbled themselves by creating two
separate forces - both dominated/led by US generals - that at times work at cross-purposes. One
is International Security Assistance Force(ISAF), NATO-led operation that does peacekeeping,
stabilisation and, for some contingents in south, counter-insurgency against Taliban. Combined
Joint Task Force 82, consists of special force/elite infantry who hunt Taliban and al-Qaeda
leaders under US's Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF). Two are supposed to coordinate their
activity. Both groups have killed civilians, but [worst] are responsibility of OEF[see":Unfriendly"].
ISAF commanders complain... OEF troops often operate in their areas and undermine their work.
[E]verybody suffers consequences of mistakes[:] anti-Western riots have started to break out
[and President Karzai] complained civilian deaths/arbitrary searches of homes had reached
unacceptable level. [Yet] 'mistakes' go on. [Since] foe hides among civilians,.. no amount of care
will eliminate deaths of innocents. But West must do better, or risk losing support/[worse]...
Having two separate forces makes little military sense. Many NATO... do not want to be too
closely associated with US aggressive tactics [while] US reluctant to place its warriors too firmly
under control of wishy-washy Europeans. Neither side wholly wrong. [F]orces should be merged,
but if proves impossible, should be made clear ISAF has primacy, and oversight over OEF action.
More important, aim of military operations should be to protect civilian population and win its
trust, not to kill as many insurgents as possible... Unity of effort requires much more than
rejigging command structures; it is about managing complexity of nation-building. Problem is
not just strength of Taliban, but also weakness of Afghan government, and disillusion with
corruption and slow reconstruction. [Above all,] Western and Afghan forces too thinly stretched
[; and r]educing Afghan deaths will require... putting more Western soldiers in harm's way";
Economist 30 Jun 07"United States Power: Still No.1"(Edit.11-2); "Briefing: US Power: The
Hobbled Hegemon"(29-32):-Editorial's official sum:"Wounded, tetchy and less effective than it
should be, US is still the power that counts". Briefing's official sum:"Its troubles in Iraq have
much weakened it; but US is likely to remain the dominant superpower". Inevitably very selective
highlights from the substantial/complex Editorial: "[F]or a growing [US] number, superpower's
inability to impose its will on [Iraq] is symptomatic of a deeper malaise... Nearly six years after
11 Sep 01, nervousness about state of US's 'hard power' is growing [refs. made to Briefing, then
to the huge US army weight of Iraq and Afghanistan]. Other demons are jangling US nerves
[China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Europe, Arabs, Chavez]. Nor is it just a matter of geopolitics
[Wall Street, borders, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, climate change, Palestinians]. A sense of
waning power is not just bad for US self-esteem. It is already having dangerous consequences
['China-bashing', isolationism]. Outside US, consequences could be even graver [Islamic
revolutionaries, Putin, Western alliance]. Yet US being underestimated. Friends and enemies
have mistaken short-term failure of Bush admin for deeper weakness. Neither US hard nor soft
power fading. Rather, not being used as well as could be. The opportunity is greater than the
threat. [But] while [US] talk was loud, the stick was spindly. [I]t is hard to imagine any future US
admins making such [Bush regime] howlers when it comes to regime change. Yet in one way
Bush is unfairly maligned... US did not enjoy untrammelled influence abroad before he arrived
[Vietnam, Iran, North Korea, France]. [Superpower's relative]strength lies as much in what it can
prevent... as in what it can achieve. Even today, US's 'negative power' is considerable [Iran,
North Korea, global warming, Arab-Israeli peace] - US is quite simply indispensable [since] still
has the most hard power... Better diplomacy would enhance its power [- and] al-Qaeda is still
small beer. [W]in the battle for hearts and minds and you do not need as much hard power to get
your way. [This applies to China. US is] an undervalued market leader, in need of new
management... More than any rival, US corrects itself... Bush has already rediscovered some of
the charms of multilateralism; he is talking about climate change[; and] a Mideast peace initiative
is possible. [E]lection offers a chance for renewal[, and US] will bounce back stronger again";
Economist 07 Jul 07"Lebanon: From Crisis To Crisis"(47-8):-official sum:"Echoes of civil war as
the country slides towards political deadlock". Highlights:"War with Israel [in 2006] left 1,200
dead and thousands more homeless. [Since then, a political split] widened into a seemingly
unbridgeable chasm, crippling a state struggling to manage reconstruction, $33b foreign debt,
presidential election, continued series of assassinations. Meanwhile, siege of jihadist guerrillas
holed up in Palestinian camp has killed more than 160 and uprooted 30,000 refugees, [plus] a
roadside bomb hit UN peacekeepers, killing six. [L]ikely links between all these events[:] ruling
majority... accuses Syria of having a hand in most troubles[, while] Syria's friends - Shia party-cum-militia Hizbullah - [blame] Israel/US/Sunni powers... More neutral observers agree that while
Syria may indeed be fighting a covert struggle to defend its soft underbelly, unlikely to control
any but a few of varied groups seeking to undermine Lebanese government... Outside meddling
certainly plays a part in Lebanon's troubles. But much trouble stems from internal causes.
Sectarian fragmentation that makes Lebanon the Arab world's most tolerant society also tends
to generate scrappy, paranoid politics. [N]eed to resolve political crimes, reform electoral laws
and contain jihadist groups are subsumed within struggles over turf and spoils... Talk in recent
weeks among the opposition of setting up a parallel government of its own seems to have jolted
consciences as well as sad memories [of Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war]"; Economist 14 Jul
07"Briefing: Internet Jihad: A World Wide Web of Terror"(28-30):- "[C]apability of the internet to
promote terrorism is worrying intelligence agencies. Past technological innovations...have
quickly been exploited by terrorists. But the information revolution is particularly useful to them.
Encrypted communications, whether in e-mail or voice-over-internet audio, make it much harder
for investigators to monitor their activity... More important, internet gives jihadists an ideal
vehicle for propaganda, providing access to large audiences free of government censorship or
media filters, while carefully preserving their anonymity. Its ability to connect disparate jihadi
groups creates a sense of a global Islamic movement fighting to defend the global ummah, or
community, from a common enemy. It provides a low-risk means of taking part in jihad for
sympathisers across the world... Al-Qaeda now sends out regular 'news bulletins' with a masked
man in a studio recounting events from the many fronts of jihad [Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Palestine]... Battlefield footage [appears] on the internet within minutes of attacks taking place[,
some] with musical soundtracks. [T]he hand-held video camera has become as important a tool
of insurgency as the AK-47 or the RPG rocket-launcher... Internet's decentralised structure... now
gives jihadi networks tremendous resilience. Number of extremist websites increasing
exponentially, from a handful in 2000 to several thousand today. Some are overtly militant, while
others give jihad second place to promoting a puritanical brand of piety. [M]ost headline-grabbing material... is military manuals - giving instruction on a myriad of subjects, not least
weapons/assassination/poisons/explosives. [I]nternet-based compilations... make it easier for
self-starting groups around world to try their hand at terrorism. [I]n password-protected areas[,]
participants can be gradually groomed... But very anonymity that internet affords jihadists can
also work against them[:] police/intelligence agencies enter jihadists' without being identified...
Contributors to jihadi web sites regularly told not to divulge secrets... For many who study jihadi
websites, [big] danger is indoctrination... At least 60% of material...deals not with current events
or with war videos, but instead ideological/ cultural questions. Jihadists... fighting less a war
against West than 'a civil war for the minds of Muslim youth'... A key text is ever-expanding e-book, 'Questions and Uncertainties Concerning the Mujahideen and their Operations', which
seeks to arm jihadists with responses to questions and doubts about their actions, ranging from
admissibility of killing Muslims, use of weapons of mass destruction and acceptability of shaving
one's beard for the sake of jihad... What is needed is a systematic campaign of counter-propaganda, not least in support of friendly Muslim governments and moderate Muslims, to try
to reclaim the ground ceded to the jihadists"; Economist 21 Jul 07"Nuclear Proliferation: The
Riddle of Iran"(Edit.11-2); "Special Report: Iran"(1-16 special pages):-Edit official sum:"Iran's
leaders think nuclear weapon could rejuvenate their tired revolution. How can they be stopped?"
Highlights:"Iran... moving relentlessly closer to where could build atomic bomb[:] has converted
yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride; now spinning the gas through... centrifuges underground/
secretly. Guess is: if runs 3,000 centrifuges at high speed for a year, enough fuel for first bomb
[-] next aim up to 54,000.[U]sable weapon will also take time. Experts[:] may have bomb by end
of 09[; IAEA:]could build within 3-8 years. What Iran doing entirely illegal[:] signed NPT/says its
aims peaceful. [D]isbelieved even by its friends. Russia and China joined UNSC passing two
resolutions...applying sanctions. So what next? [Option analysed is:] Iran is attacked/enraged/
retaliates - and still ends up with a bomb anyway. [T]his would be attack from the air, aimed at
disabling or destroying Iran's nuclear sites. [S]uch attack well within US capabilities... and
perhaps within Israel's too. Yet would be huge gamble. Even if it delayed/stopped Iran's program,
new holes in US relations with Muslim world [and] Iran almost certainly hit back[:] fire missiles
at Israel, attack US forces in Iraq/Afghanistan, organise terrorist attacks in West, or choke off
tankers through world's oil windpipe... Knowing that a nuclear attack on Israel or US would
result in its own prompt annihilation, Iran could probably be deterred. [C]ontainment of a nuclear
Iran would be less awful than a risky pre-emptive attack that would probably cause mayhem,
strengthen the regime and merely delay the bomb. [Yet Iran's] mere possession might encourage
it to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy[and] other countries in the region... would probably
feel compelled to follow suit... But the sanctions so far are not working. [S]uggests that a third
sanctions resolution, with sharper teeth, needs to be enacted without delay... Sanctions that cut
off equipment for its decrepit oilfields or struck hard at the financial interests... would have
immediate impact on its own assessment of the cost of its nuclear program... If at same time Iran
was offered a dignified ladder to climb down - above all reconciliation with US - the troubled
leadership of a tired revolution might just grab it"; Economist 21 Jul 07"Turkey's Election: Of
Mullahs and Majors"(Edit.13-4); "Briefing: Turkey's Election: A Battle for the Future"(25-8):-Briefing's official sum:"The importance of this... election goes well beyond Turkey itself".
Editorial's highlights:"General election is momentous not just for the country and region but for
the cause of democracy in the Muslim world. It was called early by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PM
and leader of ruling Justice and Development(AK) Party... Opposition harps on AK's Islamist
roots and claimed election a fight between secularism and political Islam. In reality, it [was] over
the future of Turkish democracy. AK Party [won]. The government has been a success[:] stable
and relatively clean. [I]t has tamed inflation, seen economic growth of around 7% a year and
lured in record foreign investment [see Briefing. A]lso has modernised constitution[,] shaken
up judiciary[,] nudged army towards civilian control... AK has taken tentative steps to improve
treatment of minorities, especially Turkey's 14m Kurds, although fighting against guerrillas of
Kurdistan Workers Party(PKK) has flared up anew... These successes were crowned by
negotiations for membership of EU. [While these] have run into roadblocks on both sides, [m]ost
people in AK have become more like European-style Christian Democrats[;] no longer a huge
threat to secularism. [W]ould be wise for Erdogan to reach out to his opponents, above all over
presidency... Turkey faces two big foreign problems. First, what to do about PKK fighters in
northern Iraq. Turkey has troops in the area now but a big invasion would be disastrous. Best
bet is to persuade US/political leaders of northern Iraq to disarm PKK terrorists themselves, and
to keep talking to modern Kurds... Second, how to keep door to EU ajar. [G]esture towards
legitimacy of Cypriot government would help. But best policy is one of patience. Turkey should
quietly continue to make the reforms needed for full membership"; Economist 28 Jul 07"Islam
and Democracy: The Lesson From Turkey"(Edit.13):-official sum: "Islamist parties that follow
the rules should be allowed to win elections". Highlights:"Decisive victory by [AK] shows every
sign so far of having been an excellent result. [It] could have been a recipe for trouble, coups,
internal strife[; b]ut in fact [was] a thoroughly democratic election, not too much violence, a big
turnout and a clear result [see "Elections in Turkey: The Burden of Victory"(51-2), with official
sum:"The ruling AK party has won resoundingly, but it needs to act cautiously"]. [T]his seems
strong rebuke by voters to the army, which had hinted at interfering in AK's choice of
presidential candidate [-] most do not feel it should intervene in politics. Also rewarding
government... and punishing oppositions'... incoherent/unconvincing policies. Exactly how
democracy should work... Is there a lesson in Turkey for the future of democracy in wider Muslim
world? Yes, but approach with care... Turkey has an exceptional history[:] autocratic rule of a
moderniser pushed Islam ruthlessly to the margins; then waited better half of a century for
emergence of Islamist party that looks mild and moderate enough to be trusted. [T]rouble with
this approach is that things can go calamitously wrong both at squeezing-out stage [experience
of Iran described]and at letting-in stage [experience of Algeria described]. Recep Tayyip Erdogan
...as PM... got the gist of what democracy really means. There is now no serious doubt that AK
would surrender power if it were to be defeated at the ballot box... [R]eal and arguably stronger
discipline on AK arises from the experience of democracy itself[:] continuing political success
and underlying legitimacy depend on listening closely to the desires of voters, which in turn
requires it to moderate its Islamist ambitions and obey the rules of the democratic game...
Islamic parties [elsewhere who] declare themselves willing to abide by the rules ought to be
allowed to participate fully in electoral politics"; Christopher Hitchens God Is Not Great: How
Religion Poisons Everything(Toronto:McClelland & Stewart 07):-while the basic aim here is to
specifically criticize the beliefs and activities of all major religions, the widely-travelled, -researched, and -admired author deeply reports on the religious origin of instability in all parts
of world. From official sum:"With his unique brand of erudition and wit, [he] addresses the most
urgent issue of today: the malignant force of religion in the world". Chapter titles: (1)Putting It
Mildly; (2)Religion Kills; (3)A Short Digression on the Pig or, Why Heaven Hates Him; (4)A Note
on Health, to Which Religion Can Be Hazardous; (5)The Metaphysical Claims of Religion Are
False; (6)Arguments from Design; (7)Revelation: The Nightmare of the"Old"Testament;
(8)The"New"Testament Exceeds the Evil of the"Old"One; (9) The Koran Is Borrowed from Both
Jewish and Christian Myths; (10)The Tawdriness of the Miraculous and the Decline of Hell;
(11)"The Lowly Stamp of Their Origin"; Religion's Corrupt Beginnings; (12)A Coda: How
Religions End; (13)Does Religion Make People Behave Better?; (14)There Is
No"Eastern"Solution; (15)Religion as an Original Sin; (16)Is Religion Child Abuse?; (17)An
Objection Anticipated: The Last-Ditch"Case"Against Secularism; (18)A Finer Tradition: The
Resistance of the Rational; (19)In Conclusion: The Need for a New Enlightenment; William
Langewiesche The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor(New York: Farrar, Straus &
Giroux 07):-this useful but selective description of nuclear weapons distributions and prospects
is very easy for non-specialists to read. It does not attempt to analyse in detail all likely nuclear
threats of the world this century, but offers three analyses carefully. First is the way in which
nuclear weapons explode and the ways in which the key materials can be obtained/ created.
According to the book, "For ordinary fission bombs, there are really only two choices - either
plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Plutonium is a man-made element produced by uranium
reactors, from which it emerges initially mixed in with the other radioactive waste, but is
separable through chemical processes... The alternative is highly enriched uranium, or HEU,
containing more than 90% of the fissionable isotope, U-235"(21-2). Second subject analysed is
danger of inadequately-secure Cold War assets falling into hands of terrorists: "US government
reacted rapidly to a perception of chaos and opportunity in post-Soviet nuclear affairs and in
1993 launched an ambitious complex of 'cooperative' programs with all the former Soviet states
to lessen the chance that nuclear weapons might end up in the wrong hands"(28). Third analysis
is "the story of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist at the forefront of nuclear development and
trade in the Middle East, who masterminded the theft and sale of centrifuge designs that helped
to build Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and who single-handedly peddled nuclear plans to North
Korea, Iran and other countries potentially hostile to Western interests"(from dust-cover sum);
Economist 11 Aug 07"US, Israel and the Palestinians: A Modest Ambition"(Edit.10-1):-official
sum:"What George Bush should do for the Palestinians in the final phase of his presidency".
Highlights:"Conditions have seldom looked less ripe for peace. Both sides' leaders are fragile
and risk averse... Israelis have learned in Gaza and Lebanon that when they pull out of occupied
territory without a peace deal, rockets/fighters pursue them across the border... Israel's only
remaining option, apart from sitting still, is to negotiate agreement with Abbas, under which it
can leave the West Bank and so make room for independent Palestine. [M]ight look easier now
Hamas have been booted out[, but truth] is starkly different. Hamas... is not out of the picture
[so] no peace deal without its consent. [It] remains popular not only in Gaza but also in West
Bank [and] could swiftly sabotage any [opposed] peace by mounting violent attacks against
Israel or [Abbas]. So long as Hamas remains excluded,.. Bush's meeting better be modest [eg]
some sort of declaration of principles... For past 20 years, as Israeli settlements continued to
spread in West Bank, Palestinians see negotiations as all process and no destination. By forcing
Olmert to give Abbas a clear promise of what and where independent Palestine will be, US/Arab
partners may be able to restore a modicum of Palestinian enthusiasm. This means writing down
some detail on borders.,. refugees and Jerusalem. Since no Israeli PM [can] accept [any]
refugees to homes now in Israel, Olmert will have to [offer] shared capital in Jerusalem [-]
hellishly controversial in Israel but would play well with Arab states. [M]ay be gestures, too, such
as evacuation of some Israeli outposts[, but] no grand bargain will be implemented against
Hamas's will. Nor... a deal negotiated with Hamas on board... while it continues to reject the very
principle of permanent peace with Israel. [Yet] the world should avoid temptation to punish
Palestinians of Gaza economically for their leaders' obduracy" - see:"The Gaza Strip: Staying
Alive"(39):-official sum:"Hamas brings some order, but little else, to embattled Gazans". Also see
"Religion: Rules of the Game"(75-6): Review of Olivier Roy Secularism Confronts Islam(Columbia
Univ Press 07),translated by George Holoch. "Central contention is that 'problem is not Islam but
religion or, rather, the contemporary forms of the revival of religion'... New believers are often
individualistic, rejecting conformity with either orthodox theology or institutionalised religion";
Nayan Chanda Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped
Globalization(New Haven: Yale Univ Press 07):-this fascinating survey of the development of
globalization since 6000BCE is valuable as a unique reminder - to specialists in history, politics,
economics, religion, movement, technology, science, etc - of how their own knowledge relates
to other specialized information, and to the present/future of the intense/expanding relations
across this planet. (This aim corresponds exactly with my purpose in this information source.)
Style is amusing, and novel in all areas but one's expertise, so it is delicious/constructive in all
unstudied fields and hence globally constructive. Final para offers view that fits closely with that
in Christopher Spencer Oct 06(op.cit.):"We benefit from all that the world has to offer, but we
think only in narrow terms of protecting the land and people within our national borders - the
borders that have been established only in the modern era. [All that separates us] from the rest
of the world... cannot change the fact that we are bound together through the invisible filament
of history. [W]e know how we have reached where we are and where we may be headed. We are
in a position to know that the sum of human desires, aspirations, and fears that have woven our
fates together can neither be disentangled nor reeled back. But neither are we capable of
accurately gauging how this elemental mix will shape our planet's future. Still, compared to the
past... we are better equipped to look over the horizon at both the dangers and the opportunities
...There is no alternative to rising above our tribal interests: over the centuries to come, our
destinies will remain inextricably bound together. [W]e can attempt to nudge our rapidly
integrating world toward a more harmonious course - because we are all connected"; The
Economist 01 Sep 07"Mosques in the West: Islam, the American Way"(Edit.10); "The Politics of
Mosque-Building: Constructing Conflict"(53-5):-Edit's official sum:"Why US fairer to Muslims
than 'Eurabia'". Highlights:"[S]omething similar about [mosque-related] vignettes of inter-faith
politics in the Western world. All illustrate the strong emotions, and opportunistic electoral
games, surfacing many countries as Muslim minorities increasingly prosperous/confident, aspire
more mosques/other communal buildings. All show way in which whipped-up fears of a 'clash
of civilisations' can inflame humdrum politics of a locality. But there is a big transatlantic
difference in way such disputes are handled". Major item then pressed. However both follow
usual/unfair policy of comparing a large number of European states against a single North
American one, pity when Canada's particular "multicultural" policy is unusually relevant to issue
here discussed.] "Although US plenty of Islam-bashers ready to play on people's fears, it offers
better protection to mosque builders. In particular, its constitution/legal system/political culture
all generally take side of religious liberty... More important than... law ethos leans in favour of
religious [who] 'new' (to their neighbours) and simply want to practise their faith in a way harms
nobody... European Convention on Human Rights, and court that enforces, also protect religious
freedom. But not central to European politics... Legal principles aside, there are pragmatic
reasons for favouring US [and Canadian?] way. Most mosques in Western world pose no threat
to non-Muslim citizens; but a few do pose such a danger, because of hatred preached in them.
In such cases police generally have legal armoury need to step in and make arrests if necessary.
Quashing extremism surely easier where founding/running mosques open/transparent business.
.. Christians in West long complained about how hard for their brethren in Muslim lands to build
churches... But they should practise what they preach". "Briefing: Capital Punishment in US:
Revenge Begins To Seem Less Sweet"(20-2): much more critical of US legal/political system";
The Economist 01 Sep 07"Egypt: Bashing the Muslim Brothers"(38-44):-official sum:"Egypt‛s
rulers are giving their Islamist compatriots an even worse time than usual". Highlights:"Muslim
Brotherhood... now proclaims belief in freedom, democracy and rule of law... Their enthusiasm
for violent jihad and constant framing of Islam as a faith threatened by vicious enemies helped
spawn more radical Islamist groups... [Egypt's] president, Hosni Mubarak, recently chided
Brothers for 'hiding behind religion to turn back the clock'[, and] past few months resulted in
some 600 arrests... Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, a secular-leaning lobby, details
some 567 cases of police torture in past 14 years, of which 167 led to death,[and] concluded
torture is practised systematically in every place of detention in every part of Egypt... [It] is one
of the world's most heavily policed countries. Its 75m enjoy relative freedom from crime. But
recent years have seen growing public discomfort with the force... widely seen... squashing
dissent. So current campaign against Brotherhood, officially outlawed despite having won a fifth
of seats in last parliamentary elections as independents, has brought the group widespread
sympathy. [P]unishment has several causes. Many cite the erosion of pressure for democratic
reform from US... More immediately pressing, however, [is] Brotherhood's declared intention to
challenge a recently imposed constitutional ban on religiously based political parties, by issuing
a full-fledged legislative platform. [Suggests] group wants to capitalise not only on Egypt's
strong and growing religious conservatism but also on public anger at government's perceived
indifference to the country's myriad social ills"; Economist 15 Sep 07"Pakistan: The Wrong
Direction"(Edit.14); "Briefing: Pakistan: Home And Away"(31-3):-Edit's official sum:"Why US
should push General Musharraf harder towards democracy". Highlights:"It seems odd to claim
that [Nawaz Sharif, an appalling PM 1990-93, and 1997-99 when overthrown by Musharraf,] is
crucial to Pakistan democratic future [-] nevertheless true. Sharif represents something without
which democracy cannot thrive - a real political movement with popular support. By expelling
him.,. Musharraf has demonstrated is not serious about restoring democracy... Whether Pakistan
moves back to democracy, or is condemned to authoritarianism, is of great interest to... the rest
of the world... Musharraf in some ways been impressive leader: managed to stay in power/hold
politicians at bay for 8 years. Technically, he restored democracy in 02, but has rigged elections
[and] ignored Supreme Court ruling that he should allow Sharif back. [G]rowing majority of
Pakistanis want him out but, by persuading US that holding line against Islamist extremists[,
been helped to] hang on to power. Yet its getting difficult for general. [Briefing offers major
report on complex/serious human region]. Presidential election is due next months;
parliamentary one by Jan 08. He may explore [state of emergency]; or may try to do a deal with
Benazir Bhutto, the only other political leader, who is demanding immunity from prosecution,
[right to seek] third PM term, curbing of president's powers, and establishment of a caretaker
government. [S]uch a cosy arrangement... depends on its terms. [I]nsisting Musharraf take off
his uniform if he wants to be president would be worth doing. But a deal that divides power,
general/Bhutto, and deprives Pakistanis of determining own future, would not... A stable
Pakistan is crucial to regional peace and to securing the world against terrorism. But only way
to discourage Islamist extremism in Pakistan is through democracy"; Economist 15 Sep
07"Terrorism: Visions of Osama Bin Laden"(73-4):-official sum:"Al-Qaeda's leader returns and
foresees victory in Iraq". Highlights:"Osama bin Laden has returned from the wilderness to cast
his curse against the evildoers. US, he predicts, will fall in Iraq... Capitalism and democracy are
worst forms of 'polytheism', causing war, global warming, poverty and costly mortgages.
Solution to such wickedness is for US to 'embrace Islam'. Then war would end and US would be
richer, because Islam... has no income taxes except 2.5% title known as zakat. Call to convert
is no rhetorical flourish: Islamic jurisprudence requires that non-believers be given a chance
before attacked. [I]ntelligence will search... for clues about intentions... and state of health... Bin
Laden's return... was his first video appearance since 04 [and] coincides with a resurgence of
his movement... Al-Qaeda and its offshoots have regrouped, replaced lost commanders and built
up a stronger following around the world. [L]atest reminders of violent jihadism [were] inspired,
if not directed, by al-Qaeda. Experts debate whether al-Qaeda is as dangerous, or more so, as
in 01. [Many say] it has recreated a safe haven in Pakistan's lawless tribal belt, alongside its
strengthened Taliban allies. [For Pakistani involvement with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda
see:"Briefing: Pakistan: Home And Away"(31-3) and particularly mid-section of Brief which
reports: "Poll found that 46% of Pakistanis approve of al-Qaeda's chief, against 38% for their
president".] Al-Qaeda's ideology, if not the movement itself, has become more globalised [and]
underlines concern about home-grown terrorism across Europe. Much of al-Qaeda's
propaganda, as well as its military training manuals, are spread through a large network of
jihadist websites. Muslims anywhere can become radicalised and join the fights, with little or no
involvement from al-Qaeda's leaders. [S]ome converts to Islam appear to be particularly prone
to extremism... Though training is much easier abroad, home-grown cells may need no direction
from overseas and can act faster, making it harder to detect them... Al-Qaeda has experienced
some broader setbacks, however, notably in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, where violent jihadist
campaigns have been largely squashed... Still, Iraq is stoking the cause[ and,] like Afghanistan
after Soviet defeat, Iraq too will start exporting hardened terrorists". For relevant material on
situation in Iraq - with official sums - see: "The Iraq War: Why They Should Stay"(13):-"For all
General Petraeus's spin, Iraq is still a violent mess. That is why US should not leave yet"; "US
and Iraq: The General Speaks"(37-8):-"David Petraeus says Iraq is improving and some 30,000
US troops can come home by next summer. Congress wants more"; "Iraq: How Fast Do the
Iraqis Want US to Get Out?"(57):-"While US argues over how and when to bring their boys home,
the Iraqis have their own equally mixed views"; Economist 29 Sep 07"Lebanon: Who's For
President?"(48-9):-official sum:"Finding a new head of state may not stem the slide back
towards bloody chaos". Highlights:"Lebanon's...plot is still getting thicker... On 19 Sep, car
exploded in Beirut, killing MoP from ruling majority and four others [-] 11th prominent opponent
of Syria to be so targeted... Not a single culprit has been caught so far. On 25 Sep, parliament,
which has in effect been suspended since its speaker joined an opposition boycott of it last Dec,
reconvened at last. [It] must elect new president before the term of widely disparaged/doggedly
pro-Syrian incumbent expires 24 Nov. [But] too few showed up to have vote [and] speaker
adjourned until end Oct... Ruling coalition, Sunni-Druze-Christian grouping, backed by
West/Saudi Arabia, said may now elect president merely with simple majority. Opposition, which
groups Shia Hizbullah/disgruntled Christians, backed by Syria/Iran, has declared such move
illegal. 'Declaration of war' said former general Aoun, who believes his tactical alliance with Shia
bolsters his own credentials for post. [S]uch talk is not taken lightly. Lebanon's internal schism
mirrors the polarisation of wider region. It pits those who retain some faith in West/would seek
accomodation with Israel, against who demonise US and dream of liberating Jerusalem. [For a
deep issue against Israeli policy, see "Israel: The Land of Zion"(49):-extracts:"Jewish National
Fund(JNF) was set up to buy land in Palestine for settling Jews there... Now fund is fuelling the
tension inherent in Israel's desire to be both Jewish state and democracy... JNF owns nearly
2,600sqkm, 13% of Israel's land, and its covenant states the land can be leased only to Jews...
Critics counter that at least half fund's lands... were seized by the state after their Palestinian
owners fled in 48... At time when anti-Israel campaigners are seizing on chances to compare
Israel with apartheid South Africa, has troubled some Jews".] Events, such as invasion of Iraq,
war with Israel,..serial murders in Beirut, have fortified [Lebanese] convictions... Intensity of
passions has grown, fears one diplomat, to where another assassination or big event further
afield, such as military attack on Iran, could reignite civil war. [Yet] outcome not necessarily
catastrophic... Amid meetings between leaders of opposing factions, talk of reaching a
compromise over presidency grew louder. [No] effective president can afford to alienate Shias,
who make up third of Lebanon's people. In any case, factional struggle will continue, no matter
who occupies presidency. Several compromise candidates have been tabled... Most Lebanese
at least agree almost anyone would be better than Lahoud"; Economist 06 Oct 07"Civil Liberties:
Detention Without Trial: The Stuff of Nightmares"(70-1):-official sum:"Judges and
parliamentarians are restraining the zeal of governments who want a free hand to fight terror".
Highlights:"[US] Senate Judiciary Committee [discussing] to restore habeas corpus rights to
Guantánamo detainees. Most have been held for nearly six years without charge, without access
to a lawyer or any indication of when, if ever, they might be released... Guantánamo has
become... reaction to the terror attacks of 11 Sep 01. In Britain, too, government has sought new
powers to tackle Islamist terrorism. [I]n both, the doctrine of the balance of powers has passed
a test... Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, coupled with the right to challenge it in an
independent court... are among the civilised world's most sacred and ancient liberties... But
these days, there is more talk of pre-emption and 'preventive detention', even in democracies.
[I]s US's war on terror a real war in the legal sense? If not, then the detainees should be treated
as ordinary criminal suspects. This is the path that most European countries have chosen. Even
if it could be deemed a real war, it is clearly unlike an ordinary state conflict: it has neither a
definable end nor even an identifiable enemy with whom to sue for peace. It could last for
decades... US has also engaged in so-called 'extraordinary rendition' - the abduction of
suspected terrorists to face not justice, but harsh interrogation, perhaps torture, in a third
country... The new system [in Britain] seems as riddled with problems as the old, and almost as
unfair... But no leader of a Western democracy has obtained a completely free hand in detaining
people. US has seen a tug of war between the government and the courts, with many rounds...
Many hope the Supreme Court will seize opportunity to give a view on whether [President]
Bush's 'war on terror' is a real war. Congress, too, is beginning to show its teeth... In Britain, too,
Parliament has baulked at some of the government's demands"; Economist 13 Oct 07"Civil
Liberties: Freedom of Speech: The Tongue Twisters"(66-7):-official sum:"The difficulty of
reconciling traditional freedoms of expression with the new demands of national security".
Highlights:"In countries at war, freedoms of the press and of speech often restricted... Al-Qaeda's attacks of 11 Sep 01, by precipitating a 'war on terror', also raised questions - both legal
and moral - about the role of the media in free societies. Several Western governments used
national security as justification for limiting certain sorts of public information/public speech.
Press itself has... sometimes refused to accept limits on its freedom of expression;.. sometimes
has accepted them. If [accept] the lip service almost all countries pay to a free press - 160 UN
members have ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - then freedom of
expression has had a tough time... UN for first time issued statement condemning the targeting
of journalists and calling for the prosecution of their killers... To some degree, the global
increase in the number of journalists being killed, kidnapped and otherwise harassed may
signify that more journalists at work, and growing bolder... Attacks on media, Freedom House
points out, are not only bad in themselves; they are also a sign of worse to come: other
democratic institutions. In repressive countries, internet has often been greeted as a wonderful
way to bypass government control... For a while, relatively immune to regulation[, but] an
academic think-tank says that censorship of internet has spread from just a handful of countries
five years ago to 26 nations. Some... now blocking entire internet services. It is not surprising
that such countries are suppressing freedom of expression... US gives greater protection to
freedom of expression than any other country... Even so, a Century Foundation [man claims,]
Bush's attempts 'to intimidate/punish the media, or at least to manipulate/mislead it, represents
one of most concerted assaults on [constitution]"[, and] number of documents being stamped
secret or classified has almost quadrupled... For many,.. administration has tilted balance too
far towards maintaining'certain information...in confidence'... In Britain, freedom of expression
has been under attack... It has now gone further [than US]... At first meeting of UNGA, delegates
described freedom of expression as 'the touchstone of all human rights'. In practice, that
freedom has never been totally unfettered... Under European Convention on Human Rights,
freedom of expression is subject to a wide range of possible restrictions, including national laws
banning speech likely to incite/'stir up' hatred against people... Since 01, these sorts of
restrictions expanded to apply to Muslims... Free-speech critics insisted some element of intent
be involved, claiming otherwise religious works... could be deemed unlawful... Sometimes the
press has decided to censor itself... Attempts to gag press in democratic countries usually fail";
Economist 27 Oct 07"Armies of the Future: Brains, Not Bullets"(Edit.15); "Briefing: Fighting
Insurgents: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers"(33-6):-official sums:"Western armies good
at destroying things. Can they be made better at building them?";"Irregular warfare may keep
Western armies busy for decades. They will have to adapt if they are to overcome the odds that
history suggests they are up to". Both tell what must be modified in any effective army in order
to at least control insurgents that can arise anywhere. Most information relates to the West(,as
does General Sir Rupert Smith The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World op cit).
The issues apply to the whole world and involve more than just military action - above all
cooperation(, as argued in: Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH
MUST COOPERATE - IN TERMS OF BOTH THEIR WEALTH AND KNOWLEDGE - IN ORDER TO
SURVIVE op cit). Editorial highlights:"Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive,
when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians. [West] must expect to fight protracted,
enervating counter-insurgency wars that offer no clear-cut victories / risk prospect of humiliation
... Counter-insurgency... is 'armed social work'. It requires more brain than brawn, more patience
than aggression. Model soldier should be... intellectual for 'the graduate level of war', preferably
a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology...Post-colonial politics, stronger concerns
for human rights, the rapid dispersal of news: all these (good) things make today's conflicts even
harder to win for occupiers. So it may well be better to step back and work through local allies.
Few insurgencies have unseated existing governments. In 'war on terror' most important al-Qaeda suspects rounded up... by locals. Strengthening local forces is best way of salvaging Iraq
and Afghanistan, and may help avoid the need for future interventions. [B]uilding 'partner
capacity' may need... creating new specialist units to train allies, embed Western soldiers in local
forces to improve their performance/call in air [aid], and help organise civil reconstruction [and
diplomacy]. [S]hift in focus from destruction to construction... is certainly worth putting more
money into manpower". "Briefing" highlights: "Modern wars are complex affairs conducted
'among the people'... The greater the accuracy of modern weapons, the louder the outcry when
they kill or wound civilians... Guerrillas' main weapons: agility, surprise, support of at least some
sections of the population and, above all, time. [New US manual says that] in fighting an enemy
'among the people', the central objective is not to destroy the enemy but to secure allegiance of
the citizenry. All strands of a campaign - military/economic/political - must be strongly entwined
...Nationalist/pan-Islamic sentiments are much stronger than in the past. Information technology
has helped jihadists spread 'single narrative' that Muslims everywhere are under attack. Internet
provides a new and unassailable sanctuary from which to propagandise/organise/share tactics...
A growing body of opinion... has concluded that insurrections are best fought indirectly, through
local allies. [F]or local governments, fighting insurgents is a matter of survival... To build viable
governments... has proved difficult enough even where the fighting has stopped and the main
political forces have been cooperative (or at least acquiescent)... Although most armies have
now relearnt the limits of force and importance of 'comprehensive approach', other branches of
government have not [foreign policy, aid agencies. US army] needs not just more soldiers - nor
even linguists, civil-affairs officers, engineers - but a fully fledged corps of advisers that will train
and 'embed' themselves with allied forces around the world. Insurgencies may be the face of war
for West in years ahead. [E]xtremists round the world have seen US vulnerability to the rocket-propelled grenade, AK-47 and suicide-bomber"; Economist 27 Oct 07"Afghanistan's Taliban: War
Without End"(50):-official sum:"Not winning, but not losing either". Highlights:"[I]nfiltration
routes from Pakistan will be blocked to the Taliban [soon by snow]. NATO commanders... feel
they were on the front foot during the summer. Since Jan, almost 6,000 killed - 50% increase on
06. Included 200 NATO/more than 3,000 alleged Talibs. Insurgent violence up by 20% on 06,
largely because [NATO] pushed into areas formerly held by Taliban. Nonetheless, few observers
doubt Afghan insurgency has years to run[:] Taliban seem to have enough recruits[;] refuge
/logistical base in Pakistan lawless tribal areas[;]enough funds -40% from drug trade... NATO's
role stopgap, as $billions building Afghan security forces... 20-30% of population in south
support Taliban[ -]whose fighters between 6,000-20,000. Some 6,000 Taliban reported killed since
05, with no sign [this] dented capability. [Hence]will not, by itself, end insurgency. Suicide
bombings[, rare until 05,] this year more than 120. Roadside bombings also increasing. NATO
claims this is sign of desperation [and] focused on attacking Taliban leadership[- some
success]. Locals [say] Taliban taken severe punishment in south. [M]uch talk of prising away
'moderate Taliban' through negotiation[, but] Taliban fighters now appearing in previously placid
provinces [and] NATO's nearly 35,000 not enough to take and hold all parts[- and] publicly
divided. Taliban, too, fragmented. Far from monolithic Islamists they were in 01, they now span
various groups with differing motivations. Alongside the diehard madrassa-trained Talibs are
growing numbers of foreigners with al-Qaeda links. ['T]ier-2' fighters are drawn to fight for many
reasons: unemployment; illegal opium; tribal loyalties... Many Afghans in south would support
any force offering real hope of security/justice. [N]either Taliban nor Afghan government/Western
backers have yet made a convincing case"; Economist 03 Nov 07"Faith and Politics: The New
Wars of Religion"(Edit.15-6); "Special Report: On Religion and Public Life: In God's Name"
(Unique 1-22):-Both official sums: "Faith will unsettle politics everywhere this century; it will do
so least when it is separated from the state"; "Religion will play a big role in this century‛s
politics. John Micklethwait asks how we should deal with it". Editorial's highlights:"[R]eligion
is playing a central role. [P]eople have been slain in God's name; [religion-related] money/
volunteers have poured into regions [; and] religion has forced itself dramatically into the public
square. [Brief references here; Report chapters: US, Turkey, India, Israel/Palestine, China, Iran.]
How frightening (or inspiring) is this prospect? As Special Report explains, idea religion has re-emerged in public life is to some extent illusion. It never really went away... Its new power is
mostly the consequence of two changes. First is failure of secular creeds. Second, although
some theocracies survive in Islamic world, religion has returned to stage as much more
democratic, individualistic affair... in tune with globalisation... Free up religion and ardent
believers/atheists both do well... Culture wars... may become a global phenomenon; expect fierce
battles about science. [R]eligious conflict today is result as much of popular will as of state
sponsorship: bottom-up, driven by volunteers not conscripts, their activities blessed by rogue
preachers not popes; fury mostly directed at apostates not competing civilisations...
[P]oliticians...to deal with religion, two lessons - one principled, other pragmatic. Principle is that
church and state best kept separate[; eg] teachers not allowed to teach children creationism as
science. [Economist] disapproves of publicly financed faith schools. [R]eligion [in] public square
most overtly is Islam... At its most theocratic, it forces people to follow sharia laws... Yet Islam
can clearly co-exist with a modern liberal state [-] test case will be Turkey... Pragmatic lesson
concerns those wars of religion... Western powers (and religious leaders) too reluctant to look
for faith-driven solutions to religious conflicts... 'Interfaith dialogue'... is more realistic idea than
presenting a secular peace to competing faiths... Atheists and agnostics hate the fact, but these
days religion is inescapable part of politics... Unless politicians learn to take account of religious
feelings and to draw a firm line between church and state, the new wars of religion may prove
as intractable". All above discussed in Special Report; Economist 10 Nov 07"Martial Law in
Pakistan: Time's Up, Mr Musharraf"(Edit.13); "Briefing: Pakistan: Lawyers Against the General"
(31-4):-official sums:"No longer the potential solution, the general has become a big part of
Pakistan's problem"; "However Pervez Musharraf tries to justify his actions, this is a dark time
for his wretched country". Editorial's highlights:"General Musharraf has... seemed, despite his
embarrassing lack of democratic credentials, a relatively safe pair of hands in charge of 165m-strong moderate Islamic nation [-with] nuclear weapons and prey to frightening extremist fringe.
Over years, however, [he] has squandered the goodwill he enjoyed at home and abroad. [H]is
alliance with US[, and] refusal to take off army uniform [or] allow unrigged elections, alienated
[wide] opinion. [H]is second coup came 03 Nov when he dismantled constitutional facade,..
imposed martial law[,] locked up [hundreds and took] private TV off air. Many want him gone[
b]ut not obvious how to force his hand without endangering stability of Pakistan itself.
[Musharraf] is now a central part of Pakistan's instability... In declaring 'a state of emergency',
he cited two threats:.. the spread of violent extremism and the pesky interference of the judiciary
in his efforts to deal with it. [Briefing is recommended here for details.] The extremist violence
has spread from the lawless tribal areas where Pakistan blurs into Afghanistan to the
neighbouring parts of Pakistan proper, and beyond [Islamabad, Karachi. Other threats include]
involvement of Pakistan-trained terrorists in attacks in the West[, while] the radical mullahs of
the border areas people the West's worst nightmares [of] a 'Talibanised', nuclear-armed
Pakistan... But martial law has so clearly pitted [Musharraf] and army against the rest of the
country that, rather than gain a sharper focus, he is now likely more distracted... US and Britain
are loth to do anything that might jeopardise their links with Pakistan's army and its intelligence
services... Logistical support for Afghan war, undermining Taliban's rear base in the tribal areas,
intelligence on planned terrorist attacks in West: all demand Pakistani cooperation. For this
reason,.. threat to withdraw US aid... is difficult to use. But it should be used... Musharraf has
apparently promised to hold elections by mid-Feb... Pakistan can still be dragged back from the
brink. Top brass of Pakistan army[ - ]their loyalty to their boss can be assumed to be finite... It
must be made plain that [US] backing is dependent on restoring democracy, through a free
election open to all. Otherwise, as military dictators go, so should General Musharraf"; Ömer
Taspinar"The Old Turks' Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy"Foreign
Affairs Vol.86/No.6(Nov/Dec 07):-off.sum:"The ruckus over election of a religious conservative
as Turkey's president has exposed the illiberal nature of Turkish secularism - as well as the
pragmatism of the country's reformed Islamists. Preserving democracy in Turkey by keeping the
military out of politics will be a tall order, but the future of the Muslim world's most promising
democratic experiment is at stake"; Economist 24 Nov 07"The Middle East Summit: Mr
Palestine"(Edit.13-4):-off.sum:"George Bush is the only man who can bring an independent
Palestine closer". [Earlier item on summit: 11 Aug 07; for update:]"Israel and Palestine:
Cinderella at Annapolis"(27-9):-off.sum:"Muddled expectations and mismanaged diplomacy may
mean Annapolis peace summit achieves far less than backers once hoped". Edit.highlights:
"[T]wo sides have[recently] not bridged longstanding differences. [W]ould take immense
courage for Abbas to modify Palestinians' mantra: a state on 1967 borders, a capital in
Jerusalem and 'right' of refugees of 60 years ago to return to what is now Israel. [PM Olmert]
governs in coalition with men who hate the very idea of an independent Palestine... Polls show
many Israelis long to be rid of Palestine territories[, b]ut even they wonder how they can trust
Abbas's Palestinian Authority to police state when already lost Gaza to Hamas and might well
lose West Bank too... But Bush has it within his power to make so much more... Israelis right to
say divided Palestinians in no shape right now to govern a state: Hamas has first to be bullied,
bribed or cajoled into... joining the peace camp... In past, US asked Israelis and Palestinians to
thrash out their differences on their own. But they can't. The gap is too wide. [A] US blueprint
that commanded international support would, however, immediately transform the political
dynamic. [Bush] should make it clear that when US talks of a two-state solution, it has in mind
a border based on the pre-1967 line. [H]e can now tell Israel that it cannot keep more than a few
percentage points - say 5% - of West Bank, and must offer Palestinians land from its own side
in compensation. On refugees, right to 'return' should be exercised in new Palestine and not in
pre-1967 Israel... Israel too must accept... Jerusalem... to be capital of both. [O]nly a deal along
[these] lines... stands the remotest chance of bringing permanent peace"; Economist 01 Dec
07"The Annapolis Peace Summit: Much To Be Modest About"(Edit.16); "The Arab-Israeli Summit
in Annapolis: Big Turnout, Small Result"(59-60):-off.sums:"George Bush sent Palestinian
moderates home with little to show and less to sell";"An agreement on further peace talks, if not
much else". Edit. highlights:"Israeli and Palestinian delegations at last minute approved 437
words for US president to read out, but this was the sort of declaration that makes the phase
'lowest common denominator' sound generous. It... is utterly silent on borders, Jerusalem,
Israel's West Bank settlements, fate of the Palestinian refugees - all the issues that have
confounded previous bouts... Hope that US president might fill the gap was confounded too [all
amplified 59-60 item]. US still has pulling power: Saudi Arabia, Syria and a dozen other Arab
countries turned up. [Yet Bush's] own speech was almost miraculously content-free. [S]aying
out loud that the border would have to be based on that of 1967, or that the two states would
have to share Jerusalem, was evidently too daring for this deadbeat White House... Talking is
better than killing[, but] the start of even unpromising peace talks galvanises the spoilers from
both sides[, and] the prospects of escalation are all too real. As soon as one of the many [Hamas
rockets] kills a large number of Israelis, Olmert will come under intense pressure to send his
army back into Gaza Strip... That could lead to war no less brutal than the one Israel fought
against Hizbullah in Lebanon... But in asking Abbas to lead his exhausted/sceptical people back
into the tunnel of negotiations, and neglecting to switch on a light at the end of it, Bush asking
a lot of the Palestinian moderates. If they fail, he will deserve a big share of blame"; Economist
24 Nov 07"Africa: Promises, Promises"(Edit.15); "African Peacekeeping: The Doves of War"(52-4):-Editorial's off.sum:"It is time for both Africans and the rich world to walk the talk in Darfur
and Somalia". Highlights:"Eastern Congo faces a humanitarian disaster; the killing in Sudan's
Darfur region goes on apace; war rages between Islamist militias and Ethiopian troops in
Somalia; rebels threaten the government in Chad; war may resume between Eritrea and Ethiopia
and between Sudan's government and former rebels in autonomous south. [Edit. then
recommends "...Doves of War", with off.sum:"Too many conflicts, too few decent armies to sort
them out". It also briefs other peacekeeping: Burundi-Rwanda, Central African Republic, Cote
d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone.] UN is sending unprecedented numbers of troops to the region.
It already has 17,000 in Congo and 20,000 more due to join existing 6,000-strong African Union
(AU) force in Darfur - largest UN forces in the world. Another 2,000 between Eritreans-Ethiopians,
plus 10,000 in south Sudan. AU also 1,600 Ugandan troops in Somalia... In Congo, UN is doing
its best to hold the ring between several rival ragtag armies, but elsewhere its fine intentions
have yet to bear fruit. In Darfur,.. imperative for UN is to provide both transport and attack
helocopters for [to-be-]expanded force. [A] robust/mobile force is vital if peace is to be restored
to a region where some 300,000 have already died and more than 2m are displaced. In Somalia,..
African countries have failed to deliver. AU promised a force of 8,000 to keep peace in
Mogadishu, [b]ut so far only the Ugandans, too few to do the job, have turned up... and war
threatens to engulf the capital again, perhaps infecting whole region. Africa/West seem to have
lost hope and interest... Main foreign governments involved in negotiations... must not give up";
Economist 01 Dec 07"Lebanon: In Search of a Government"(60) [directly follows:"Who's for
President?" 29 Sep 07]:-off.sum:"Even as the country's people get used to not having one".
Highlights:"[F]inal day of President Emile Lahoud's term of office [was 23 Nov], and parliament
bound to elect a successor... Failure to choose a new head of state, many said, could precipitate
a slide into chaos and even a renewal of 1975-90 civil war... Tensions are still high, but fears of
imminent strife appear to have dissipated. Lebanese have resumed business [and] country has
muddled along without a legislature since last Nov... During this time divisions between ruling
majority [Sunni/Druze/smaller Christian factions] and opponents [Shia/populist Christian groups]
have solidified. Core dispute... concerns opposition demands for a bigger share in government[,
but ]rendered more complex by influence of foreign powers [Iran/Syria/France/US/Saudi Arabia]
... Syria might push its Lebanese allies towards compromising over presidency in exchange for...
attention to its claim on Golan Heights... Yet there are also important Lebanese internal
dynamics at play... between its three largest sects... Most popular Maronite politician, Michel
Aoun, has strong anti-Syrian credentials, but his volatile nature and alliance with Hizbullah
alienate many Christians... [Yet] army commander-in-chief, Michel Suleiman, has gained respect
for keeping his men above the political fray, and using them effectively to maintain security.
Although many Lebanese would be relieved to see the low-key general as president, his election
requires a change to constitution rules barring soldiers from civilian office";Economist 08 Dec
07"Iran's Bomb Program: Pressure Works('High Confidence')"(Edit.13-4) :-off.sum:"US's spies
have changed their minds. But nuclear Iran remains a danger". Highlights: "In 2005 [US
intelligence] said that Iran had a secret nuclear program and was determined to get a bomb. Now
they say they were wrong about that. [For more on the revised analysis and US reactions,
see:"Iran: Nuclear Fallout [in WSHDC]"(38):off.sum:"[US] spooks change their tune, and [US]
politicians recalibrate". For also Iranian reaction:"Iran's Nuclear Program: What's Not To
Celebrate?"(53-4):off.sum:"Mahmoud Ahmadinejad thinks Iran is home free".] NIE says with
'high confidence' that although Iran was indeed working on a bomb until 03, it then stopped. By
middle of 07, it had probably ('moderate confidence') not started again. Unless it got fuel for a
bomb from abroad, would take at least until late 09 ('moderate confidence'), but more likely
between 2010 and 15 to make it at home. [I]ntelligence is... system of best guesses based on
incomplete evidence[, but as] 16 agencies signed report[,] most unlikely to be a tissue of lies.
[H]owever, relieved [US] doves... had better read the report again[:] final sentence says ('high
confidence') that Iran has scientific/technical/industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear
weapons if chooses. ['A]t a minimum' it is keeping the option open[, t]roubling because Iran can
continue to work towards a bomb without resuming secret program US now thinks stopped in
03... But creating warhead is easier part of building a bomb. Harder by far is making the fuel
[which] Iran continues to do, in defiance of UNSC, at uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz. For
now, Iran enriching uranium at below weapons grade[, but] to get the uranium to weapons grade
it has only to run the stuff often enough through Natanz's centrifuges... The case for US pre-eption [attack] now becomes almost impossible to sell [ - ] probably a good thing. [R]eport may
also make it harder for US and EU to maintain, let alone sharpen, [UN] sanctions... to make Iran
stop work at Natanz... US may have to show new flexibility[:] it could offer to talk to Iran [ - which
might refuse,] but that would at least make it clear which side was the spoiler"; Economist 15
Dec 07"Afghanistan and Iraq: Must They Be Wars Without End?"(Edit.13):- off.sum:"No, as
recent successes show. But 'winning' will take many years, and cannot be achieved by force
alone". Editorial initially raises question:"Is it possible that [the two US-led wars] are at least
beginning to come good?", and draws attention to carefully relevant reports (with off.sums):
"Briefing: Iraq: Can a Lull Be Turned Into a Real Peace?"(28-30):"Surge of US troops has
dramatically reduced violence. But Iraq's politicians may still squander an obvious chance for
reconciliation";"Briefing: Afghanistan: Policing a Whirlwind"(31-3):"As foreign troops become
more efficient, government is still the problem". Highlights common to both wars:"At best,
coming good will consist of a tapering off of violence, and a crab-wise movement towards a
political accommodation between the governments... and the militias now fighting them... As in
Iraq, so in Afghanistan: it would be both morally wrong and tactically foolish for West's
politicians to exaggerate temporary gains in the vain hope of stilling the domestic clamour for
withdrawal... 'Victory'... will at most mean preventing catastrophe; and even this modest aim will
for years require spending Western lives and money in campaigns that will demand as much
attention to the once-reviled business of nation-building as to the use of military force... As to
whether either war is worth the prolonged struggle, that is question whose answer must depend
on the changing costs and benefits... Democracies need the courage to withdraw from wars
bringing no good, but also to persevere in just ones - even when the end is not yet in sight";
Philip H.Gordon"Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War"Foreign Affairs
Vol.86/No.6(Nov/Dec 07):-Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, and author of Winning the Right
War: The Path to Security for America and the World(Times Books 07), from which the essay is
drawn, strongly criticizes Bush's anti-terror invasion of Iraq as having 'created more terrorists
than it has eliminated'. Instead he argues:"Considering possible outcomes of the war on terror
makes clear that it can indeed be won, but only with the recognition that this is a new and
different kind of war. Victory will come not when foreign leaders accept certain terms but when
political changes erode and ultimately undermine support for the ideology and strategy of those
determined to destroy(sic) the US. It will come not when Wshdc and its allies kill or capture all
terrorists or potential terrorists but when the ideology the terrorists espouse is discredited,
when their tactics are seen to have failed, and when they come to find more promising paths to
the dignity, respect, and opportunities they crave". The arguments then put forward to gradually
change relevant views and situations abroad are similar in thrust to those very briefly implied
in: Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST...(op.cit); Michael
Levi"Stopping Nuclear Terrorism:The Dangerous Allure of a Perfect Defence"(131-140)Foreign
Affairs Vol.87/No.1(Jan/Feb 2008):-official summary: "Nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat to
global security, but seeking silver bullets to counter it does not make sense. Instead of pursuing
a perfect defence, US policymakers should create an integrated defensive system that takes
advantage of the terrorists' weaknesses and disrupts their plots at every stage, thereby chipping
away at their overal chances of success"; Economist 05 Jan 08"Global Migration: Keep the
Borders Open"(Edit.8-9):-off.sum:"The backlash against immigrants in the rich world is a threat
to prosperity everywhere". Highlights: "[A]round the rich world, immigration has been rising to
the top of voters' lists of concerns - which, for those who believe that migration greatly benefits
both recipient and donor countries, is a worry in itself".[Editorial draws top attention to"Special
Report: Migration" (Unique 1-16):-the 8 sections' titles/off.sums: "Open Up"/"Despite a growing
backlash, the boom in migration has been mostly good for both sending/recipient countries,
says Adam Roberts". "Of Bedsheets and Bison Grass Vodka"/"Rich economies gain from high
levels of migration, but the benefits are unevenly spread". "The Politics of the Gun"/"Migration
has once again become a touchy political issue". "Keep Out"/ "Voters like the idea of tougher
borders, but the cost is high and the benefits are limited". "Send Me a Number"/Migrants'
remittances help ease poverty back home, but they are not a cure-all". "You Don't Have To Be
Rich"/"Developing countries attract migrants too". "Circulate Or Integrate?"/ "A choice of
migration policies". "The Long Term"/"Too much or not enough?" Other relevant items in same
issue: "Briefing: Germany's Jews: Latkes and Vodka"(40-2)/ "Immigrants from former Soviet
Union are transforming Jewish life in Germany". "Immigration Controls: Guarding British
Soil"(47-8)/"Britain's immigration regime, long one of Europe's most liberal, is to tighten up. Will
it secure the jobs of British workers - or those of MPs?"] [M]ost often migration is about young,
motivated, dynamic people seeking to better themselves by hard work [and h]istory has shown
[it] encourages prosperity. Tens of millions of Europeans who made it to the New World in 19th
and 20th centuries improved their lot, just as... today. Many migrants return home with new
skills, savings, technology and bright ideas. Remittances in 2006 were worth at least $260b -
more in many countries than aid and foreign investment combined. Letting in migrants does
vastly more good for the world's poor than [foreign aid]. The movement also helps the rich
world... Indeed, advanced economies compete vigorously for outsiders' skills... Low-skilled are
needed too, especially in farming, services and care for children and the elderly. [So w]hy the
backlash? Partly because politicians prefer to pander to xenophobic fears than to explain
immigration's benefits. But not all fear of foreigners is irrational. Voters have genuine concerns...
To keep borders open, fears have to be acknowledged and dealt with... [I]t is not just futile but
also foolish to build taller fences to keep them out. Better [to open] more routes for legal,
perhaps temporary, migration... Politicians in rich countries should also be honest about, and
quicker to raise spending to deal with, the strains that immigrants place on public services... The
social integration of new arrivals is also crucial... Better to seek ways to isolate the extremist
fringe... Above all, perspective is needed. The vast population movements of past four decades...
have offered a better life for millions of migrants and enriched receiving countries both culturally
and materially. But... politicians need... to deal honestly with the problems sometimes caused";
Economist 12 Jan 08"The Arabs: Between Fitna, Fawda and the Deep Blue Sea"(40-2):-"Huge
differences persist among 300m-odd Arabic speakers and 22 countries of Arab League. With oil
prices high, some Arab economies booming[, but gulfs are as great as any on earth.] Yet Arab
world [displays] sameness of spirit. Particularly among people under 30 [vast majority/one of
world's fastest growth rates,] mood is one of disgruntlement/doubt. Factors[:] failing public-education systems and resilience of social traditions often ill-suited to urban lifestyle - now Arab
norm - but politics above all shapes discontent. [T]he problem of Palestine has stuck out like a
troublesome nail. [Yet hope for its eventual justice] has taken a beating of late[:] if Palestinians
cannot unite,.. why should other Arabs help them? And which side to support? [I]n Iraq, 2003
invasion produced all but universal Arab outrage[, b]ut the rights/wrongs have grown harder...
Elsewhere, become harder to blame slaughter in Darfur region of Sudan, or stalemate between
Lebanon's sects... Many still see Bush's 'war on terrorism' as crusade against Islam[, b]ut many
also note al-Qaeda-style jihadism has killed more Muslims than 'infidels'. In past, Arabs looked
to leaders for guidance[, but m]ost of today's leaders lack an inspirational project[, n]or is any
country a natural leader. [P]ersonality-based leadership of 60s-70s has fallen out of fashion[, yet]
not replaced by more institutionally-based system of rule, let alone...democracy. [O]ften adopting
the outward shape of reform [lacks] substance... The marginally freer press [reflects] the impact
of hard-to-block new media[, yet stratagems still] suck vitality out of politics [and] voter turnout
has steadily declined. [Experts] have long blamed oil wealth... for the survival of authoritarianism
[as governments] neatly absolve themselves of the need [for] heavy taxes. A less obvious source
of state power is a pervasive fear of what might happen in its absence[, and] Moslems have...yet
to resolve whether laws should emanate from the people or from God. [Here stress put on "Islam
and Democracy: The Practice - and the Theory"(53-4):-off.sum:"Can rule by people be reconciled
with sovereignty of Allah?"] [Resolution has] practical consequences. In most Arab countries,
regimes hold power by virtue of tradition or through military-backed movements that claim to
represent the will of the masses. Where top-down authority collapses,.. very hard for bottom-up
politics to repair the damage. [N]ot surprising that people prefer the devil they know to the fitna
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