|
|
| by Christopher
Spencer |
Former Senior
Advisor International Organizations, Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade |
| Updated: 20 FEB
10 | |
John L.Esposito The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Revised Edition(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 95):-plethora of recent books on Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism and the Islamic"threat" partly reflects a
tendency in the West to confuse the new political power of Islamism(which is not”fundamentalist”in the
Christian sense, and influences such major countries as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and
Indonesia)with Arab nationalism(which involves a considerably smaller number of states and people -
from Morocco to Iraq - most deeply concerned with the Israeli issue). This book is among the best on
Islamism. It is neither an apologia nor an alarm, but an objective and informative source for Western
readers, particularly those concerned about an inevitable"Clash of Civilizations"(see Huntington,op.cit.).
Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey(New York: Pantheon, 1998):-UN”peace agenda” seems overwhelmed by ethnic conflict, which competes with its Charter role of
constraining broader national ambitions. Yet both ethnicity and nationalism have long provided motives
for violence - and even world wars. Their deep-seated combination constitutes an inflammable and
enduring cause of conflict, both inter- and intra-state. This is tragically true of the Arab world, through the
20th century a focus of instability. Ajami's well-written book tells the story of Arab intellectuals' key role
in generating pan-Arabic nationalism, pro-and anti-Western cultural aspirations and hatred of Israel - and
in impeding development. The very arguments and myths used to foster Arab identity are promoting
ethnic conflict in Arab states. The process is globally relevant. Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill: Usama bin
Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad”in Foreign Affairs Vol.77/No.6(Nov/Dec 1998):-offers a valuable historical and
religious gloss for the amazing, if largely ignored, declaration of jihad against“the Jews and the
Crusaders”(sic)issued by bin Ladin(suspected of bombing two US embassies in Africa)and several
Islamist leaders. The statement accuses the US of occupying, plundering and humiliating Islam’s holiest
territory (i.e. Arabia) and of planning to repeat the slaughter of a million(sic)Iraqis, for religious(sic)and
economic reasons and[of course]to serve Israel. Fatwa:“To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and
military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any[possible] country”(p.15). A specific
demand for mass terror. The Economist 19 Feb 00“Iran, Islam and Democracy”(19-20):-also takes a careful
and objective look at Islamism, this time in the context of an Iranian election in which the world’s most
revolutionary and militant theocracy was sharply instructed to become more democratic and tolerant by
a generally religious electorate frustrated with“clerical despotism”opposed to all things Western. The
Editor notes that while the Islamic world is“not burdened with examples of good government, let alone
democracy,...religion is seldom the culprit; look, rather, for cruel autocrats, corrupt feudal systems,
overbearing armies[, with] Arabs inhabiting the least democratic patch on God’s earth...Religion is largely
irrelevant to this common misbehaviour”. Sometimes Islamism itself is a”principal villain”[Sudan,
Afghanistan], but in general the”actions of a few zealots have helped to discolour understanding of
political Islam.” While this“still provides dangers,[the Iranian example]also provides reasons for hope”.
John F. Burns,“An Arab Militia, Glimpsing Victory, Could Lose Peace” New York Times 28 Feb:-rare
summary of the history, actions and aims of Hezbollah, a key player in Middle East events, whose
apparent mutation may be relevant to wider trends in terrorism, sub-state violence and religious politics.
Hezbollah has”dispensed and suffered sudden death on a numbing scale for 18 years” -mainly around
the“security zone” Israel has maintained in southern Lebanon since 1985, and from which Israel has
undertaken to withdraw. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, a Shiite cleric, still leads 1500 guerrillas and 20,000
active members, but the”Party of God”is no longer the umbrella body that“once directed the Middle East’s
most brutal Islamic terrorists”. Instead it controls the largest single bloc in the Lebanese Parliament, and
runs major social and media networks. Its two principal backers, Iran and Syria, and Lebanon’s
government, will influence Hezbollah’s options following any general peace agreement, but its conversion
to moderate politics and democracy, and from dreams of a militant Islamic state, appears to be genuine.
Nevertheless, its self-identity as a trans-Arab and trans-Islamic movement remains, as does its
membership. Jeffrey Goldberg,“The Education of a Holy Warrior”NYT 24 Jun:-Afghanistan’s Taliban
regime may now be the world’s strictest theocracy. Moreover, its rule is based on an extremely rigid,
reactionary, and belligerent interpretation of Islamic doctrine and tradition. This first-hand account of the
methods and views found in or created by key religious schools(madrasas)that produced the Taliban
zealots, thus gives valuable insight into the perspectives and motives of Osama bin Laden(accused of
anti-US bombings), a variety of Islamic terrorist and combat movements, and probably many militant
Islamist organizations. The 2,800-student Haqqania madrasa in the North-West Frontier Province
produced many Taliban leaders, but is only one of 10,000 or so in Pakistan alone, most of their million
students primarily studying militant Islam: “Haqqania madrasa is, in fact, a jihad factory”. This long essay
also offers interesting examples of the attitudes of Islamists plus Pakistanis with broader views(e.g.
General Musharraf)on world affairs and jihads. Susan Sachs, “Everyone Asks for Arab Unity. Getting It
Is Harder”NYT 06 Aug:-offers a current view of the state and significance of the Arab identity following
the impasse at Jul Arafat-Barak summit, specifically over the status of Jerusalem but reflecting the
world’s most intensely-competing ethnicities. Diagnosis: no political slogan is“more musty with
age”than“Arab unity”: chances for an Arab summit to regroup and create a new Arab consensus are
slim.”Still, the chimera of a united Arab front continues to shimmer on the horizon”- and even the US is
now hoping to see an agreed Arab compromise on Jerusalem. Yet, however the new leaders of Jordan,
Morocco and Syria might wish more flexibility, all have inherited domestic imperatives, while Islamism
has split all governments’ reactions. Arab“Unity...has historically been reactive: a collective“no”, and the
region remains“clouded with illusions””. Foreign Affairs Vol.79/No.5(Sep/Oct 00)contains four Reviews
of recent books directly relevant to this topic: Shaul Mishal and Abraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas:
Vision, Violence, and Coexistence(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-includes possibility of bringing
this violent group eventually into the peace process. Abdolkarim Soroush, Translated/Edited by Mahoud
& Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000)-a
“penetrating and coherent”statement of ability to synthesize Islam with democracy and reason(science).
L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics(New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
2000)-a balanced analysis of Islamic political engagement that argues”fundamentalist”thought is a radical
deviation [ordered for later summary focused on relevance to global issues]. Nehemia Levtzion & Randall
L. Pouwels edit., The History of Islam in Africa(Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 2000)-up-to-date reference book
covering all aspects of the subject. The Economist 07 Oct 00:“The Road to War?”(19-20);“War in
Palestine”(53-5);“Burn, Baby, Burn”(54):-the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seemed at last to be
focusing on the final core issue - with a US-devised complex and delicate formula for fudging East
Jerusalem’s hotly-disputed sovereignty. At this moment, like”a bull deliberately charging a china shop”,
Ariel Sharon, the hard-line leader of Israel’s opposition Likud party, paid a“crudely provocative”visit to
the deeply/doubly-revered Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, “to demonstrate Israel’s continuing sovereignty
over Islam’s third-holiest shrine”. Palestinian anger over Israeli dominance, whether generated or just
ignited by this taunt, at first took the form mainly of stone-throwing demonstrations, though even these -
and Israeli reactions - were stronger and more bitter than during the 1980's Intifada. More relevant,
however, as the(mostly Palestinian)death toll mounted, feelings on both sides became deeper and, in the
Arab case, widespread. “[A]groundswell of fury has swept the[Arab] region. Angry protesters from
Morocco to Oman have burnt Israeli flags...[S]eldom has an event stirred such feeling as the sight of Ariel
Sharon trampling on Muslim holy ground. Even the Arab world’s undemocratic governments are having
to sit up, listen and maybe do something”. Associated Press“Arab Unity Remains an Elusive Dream”NYT
11 Oct:-this article also stresses that protesters“all over the Arab world have spilled into the street to vent
their outrage”, even from pro-Western Gulf countries. The imminent Arab summit will be under pressure
from this”display of unity among Arab masses...to exhibit the same kind of solidarity”. Yet Arab unity is“a
dream that has eluded its most ardent supporters”. Disputes and suspicions[still] divide, and have made
the Arab League”little more than a talking shop”. Mubarak has long called for annual Arab summits like
those of African states, but lamented,”we cannot even sit down and talk about a summit”. Can Arabs
change? Economist 14 Oct“Pogrom: Libya and Africa”(56):-there are many recent cases of Muslim
(particularly Islamist)violence against those whose different religion is a/the major factor in the conflict
(Azerbaijan; Bosnia; Chechnya; Egypt; Fergana; India; Indonesia; Israel; Lebanon; Nigeria; Pakistan;
Sudan; Xinjiang). Conscious racist(as opposed to ethnic)violence involving Muslims/Arabs is relatively
rare(Irian Jaya). Article reports on vicious(ostensibly)anti-foreigner riots in Libya, which clearly had strong
elements of racism. Not only did the Libyan mob spare the 1m Arab migrant workers, but it attacked some
of the 1m indigenous black Libyans(all blacks were refused entry to some hospitals/public transport). At
least 150 people were killed, including 16 Libyans. “Anti-black violence[was]fired by an economic
crisis[in] Africa’s richest state...per person”where most oil income is spent on Qaddafi’s whims. Lately
he was pushing a US of Africa, with open borders. One result was over 1m black African migrants. All of
these are now being shipped“home”, dead or alive, and Qaddafi is rebuilding ties with other Arab states.
In Letters, published in 28 Oct Economist(6),Geoffrey Davis fully supports an irrational, racist
interpretation of the riots. He notes that the riot reported is”only the latest of several outbursts of anti-black sentiment over the past few years. It is not anti-Qaddafi in its origins or intent. Nor is it based on
Africans taking away jobs that Libyans want. Workers from surrounding countries are cheap and do the
manual and menial jobs that Libyans disdain”. Oil revenues enable Qaddafi to satisfy his whims and still
give a previously poverty-ridden people the“good life”of cash, subsidies, and free services. “The problem
is a lack of challenge and purpose in the lives of ordinary Libyans, coupled with a rumour-prone
society...Black Africans are the convenient and innocent victims of bouts of madness in a sick society”.
[Except for the aliens’ skin colour, this might describe any Gulf state.] Sachs,“Arab League Meeting May
Seek Balancing Act”NYT 20 Oct:-the 21-2 Oct summit meeting of the whole Arab League faced a dilemma:
to appease popular demand to punish Israel, yet not to threaten future Arab-Israeli peace talks. “The tide
of anger - more open and more defiant than any display of grass-roots political activity in at least a decade
- has left many...Arab leaders in a state of near panic that the demonstrations could turn into more
generalized protest against their own governments”.This is ironic since it is government media that have
been”stoking popular rage”. Yet even if particularly anxious to produce more than rhetoric, the leaders
had varying if not contradictory positions on most issues. Radical proposals included using the”oil
weapon” against the West, and providing mass arms transfers and Arab fighters to help in a Palestinian
uprising; but more moderate/realistic views prevailed. Unusually, all supported Arafat, badly needing Arab
backing for his next moves. Economist 21 Oct“Things Fall Apart”(29-31):-probes why recent Arab-Palestinian clashes inflamed the whole Arab world: New factors had made peace seem possible. “On the
Arab side, the Gulf war had exposed both military weakness and political disunity. Combined with
faltering economies and the threat of Islamic extremism, this concentrated leaders’ minds on the danger
of letting old wounds fester. If the price of joining the new world order was a begrudging accommodation
with Israel, it seemed just about worth paying-...belligerent rhetoric was now evidently worthless”. But
Palestinians became frustrated by glacial progress, shocked at Israeli contempt for their essential needs,
and weary of unabated“petty humiliations”-while Arafat’s high-handedness isolated him. The Camp David
“package” was seen as an attempt to force Arabs into unthinkable concessions, so the stand-off was
bitter. It turned to fury when Sharon(and 1,000 security men)taunted all Islam by desecrating holy ground,
and the next day when police cleared stone-throwers from the sanctuary, killing five and injuring scores.
“[If] you pit mobs ignited by a sudden outrage, fuelled by long oppression, against a nervous army that
is equipped to kill and shaped by a national belief in never showing weakness, you tend to get bloody,
lopsided battles, punctuated by nasty revenge attacks. Much more surprising is the wider Arab and
Islamic resonance of these events”. The provocations had fallen on fertile ground: Islamic revival is
making inroads, using the emotive language of victimization and xenophobia. Even Saddam Hussein,
although ”widely recognized as... responsible for destroying the last vestiges of Arab unity”, is seen as
severely punished for disobeying UN resolutions while Israel is treated leniently. So“Arabs identify with
the Palestinians. It is an empathy not only of kith and kin, but also one born from a feeling that the huge
injustice inflicted on the Palestinians is...a reflection of wider injustices experienced by Arabs and
Muslims everywhere”. Reuters“Arabs Angry at Israel but Still Want Peace”NYT 21 Oct:-article reports the
agreed summit statement charging Israel with jeopardising Middle East peace was so lacking in“practical
measures that will deter the aggressive Israeli practices”that the Libyans walked out. Syria argued Arabs
must show that they, and not“foreign forces”, determined the future of the region. “We have to
understand the danger of taking empty decisions, which will only lead to more violence and more deaths”.
Saudi Arabia proposed that Arabs raise $200m for the Palestinians and $800m to“retain the Arab and
Islamic character of (East) Jerusalem”. Mubarak admitted all Arab were“angry and full of resentment”, but
Arab leaders had a responsibility to ”attempt to salvage the peace process”. Iraq’s position alone was the
call to liberate Palestine by jihad. Sachs, “Arab Leaders Declare Freeze on All Contacts with Israel”NYT
22 Oct; Sachs,“Arab States Take Diplomatic Steps to Punish Israel”NYT 23 Oct:-[significantly different
articles using the same frame, as new material was available; these highlights include both.] The summit
declaration inter alia stated: Arab states will freeze all contacts with Israel until it makes tangible progress
towards peace; Israel has committed “atrocities”,so the UN is urged to set up a war crimes tribunal to
judge its actions; $1b in aid is pledged to protect Islamic and Arab properties in Jerusalem and help the
families of killed or wounded Palestinians; Arab states will boycott any multilateral meetings on regional
economic cooperation, and suspend trade and political contacts, with Israel; Jerusalem should not be
recognized as the capital of Israel. Since Arab journalists repeatedly questioned whether the Arab League
was truly in touch with the public mood and would follow through on its promises, the summit spokesman
stressed that Arab governments were not indifferent to the anger in their streets at Israeli conduct. Yet
old divisions were not healed(e.g. Kuwaitis/Saudis ignored Iraqis), and the meeting”provided a glimpse
of the shape of future disputes among Arab leaders. Iraq and Syria[advocated] a long-term strategy that
would approach Israel as a rival military and economic power”. Morocco and Jordan argued”military
consolidation was outdated, that the world around the Middle East had organized itself into common
markets and that the Arabs should concentrate on competing economically and technologically”. William
A. Orme Jr.,“A Parallel Mideast Battle: Is It News or Incitement?”NYT 24 Oct:-stresses use of Palestinian
radio/TV to generate and maintain support for the intifada or, as Israelis see it, to deliberately “incite mass
violence and ethnic hatred”. For this reason, the Voice of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority radio
network, was bombed off the air by Israeli helicopter attacks after the killing in a police station of two
Israeli soldiers by an angry crowd. “[T]he network’s news bulletins, commentaries and martial music have
become the ubiquitous soundtrack to life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, and radio and TV programs
are ”regularly interrupted by live coverage of clashes with Israeli troops and eulogies for each Palestinian
killed”- all are martyrs. More fundamental is the Palestinian “unapologetically nationalistic coverage.
Radio talk shows praise Palestinian ‘resistance’ and excoriate Israeli ‘war criminals’”. Israeli news media
beyond doubt also present at minimum a distorted view of events/deaths to their public -both in what they
show and in what they leave out. The truce agreement reached in Egypt called for a halt to“incitement”,
but it clearly continues-and will significantly impede ceasefires, let alone peace agreements. Sachs,“Anti-U.S. Fever: Arab Bitterness and Boycott Talk”NYT 27 Oct:-”Long a distant and sometimes bothersome
distraction for ordinary people in Arab countries, the Palestinian issue has become a daily fixation and
a rallying point for a revival of pan-Arab nationalism, which had been dormant for decades”. This article
deals mainly with the major and continuing effect of the media in Arab countries in creating this new
situation. The”fevered programming” on nearly all Arab radio and television stations, that began with the
outbreak of violence,“has eased off somewhat...But reminders of the conflict are everywhere, stirring a
sense of solidarity, and if the grass-roots anger can be sustained, even at a low level, the impact on
regional politics could be substantial”. Various groups are contributing a day’s pay for the cause in
response to a recommendation from the Arab League, an action described by an Arab journalist as”a
qualitative leap in cooperation between rulers and ruled in support of a cause”. The”anti-US fever”in the
title refers to calls on the media by radical anti-Israel groups to boycott US products/companies.
Economist 28 Oct“After Peace Has Crashed”(14);“The Spreading of Palestine’s War”(42-3):-both Editorial
and article express serious concern that the Arab/Muslim-Israel confrontation,”[w]ith passion and
prejudice the ruling emotions”, could find Israel and its neighbours ”spiralling backwards into an ugliness
from which retrieval would be[hard and long]”(14). Not only will Arab governments“nervously watch the
spreading of pro-Palestinian feeling among their people”,but now“Arab leaders are fearful of being drawn
into the Palestinian mayhem”(42). This was evident in the Arab summit “sound-and-fury”statement, but
promised no action -and generated region-wide demonstrations.”[W]hat now most concerns the Arab
regimes is not Jerusalem...It is their own survival”(43). Patrick E. Tyler,“Islamic Revival Wears Many Faces
in a Secular Asian Land”NYT 29 Oct:-Tajikistan is unusual among the newly independent states of former
Soviet Central Asia in that the Islamic Revival Party (IRP)is not only legal but has two members in
Parliament and over 50 in local governments. Islamic parties are outlawed or suppressed in the other
successor states since the Islamic revival spreading through the region is identified with Islamic
extremism. Although Muslims took up arms in a 1992-7 civil war that left at least 50,000 dead, the IRP now
joins the government in condemning the Islamic extremism practised by the Taliban in Afghanistan. An
IRP leader(and ex-rebel)explains:”war is not the best means for creating an Islamic society...Now that the
obstacles to propagating Islam have been removed in Tajikistan, we have the possibility to come to power,
and that is the big difference[from] neighbouring countries”. Significantly, however, Islam seems less
popular here than where it is repressed. Douglas Frantz,“Persecution Charged in Ex-Soviet Republic”NYT
29 Oct:-Uzbekistan, unlike Tajikistan, is waging a“largely unnoticed war”against those whose only crime
is that they are pious Muslims. Religious and human rights leaders contend the government, “which has
already banned opposition parties and silenced the independent press, is using a trumped-up threat of
radical Islam to stamp out the last vestige of dissent”. It is true that”[s]ince the Soviet Union collapsed,
there has been a slow resurgence of Islam in traditionally Muslim Central Asia. The governments have
tried to control its growth[non-violently,b]ut officials across the region, who tend to have an authoritarian
bent, fear Islamic extremism”. There are indeed fire-fights with Islamic movements, but the major Party
of Liberation claims it promotes Islam as a religious and social force, and its leaders urge Muslims to pray
and study for a future Islamic state; while critical of government corruption and repression, they have not
promoted violence. Yet since 1992, 4-5,000 have been arrested for advocating an Islamic regime or simply
distributing religious tracts, and received harsh sentences on spurious grounds. Clearly, many are
tortured; many die in prison. Sachs“Defying U.S., Arabs Widen Iraqi Ties”NYT 01 Nov:-trans-Arab
sympathy for Iraq is one spillover from the Palestinian-Israeli violence, and has“prompted a resurgence
of public support for the idea that the West...behaves badly toward the Arab world”. Violation by Arab
countries of UN air sanctions against Iraq reflects a strong feeling“across the Arab political spectrum”that
the US follows a“double standard”in its reluctance to hold Israel to account for its treatment of
Palestinians, and in its stubborn opposition to lifting the Iraqi sanctions. “Iraq has also found a newly
receptive audience for its assertion that it is the only true defender of Arab and Palestinian interests”.
AP“Qatar Shuts Israeli Trade Office”09 Nov:-following the Arab League meeting, the Organization of the
Islamic Conference holds a summit 12-4 Nov to give greater support for the Palestinians. This meeting,
in Doha, Qatar, will be attended by Iran’s President Khatami. Partly in this connection, Qatar is shutting
down the Israeli trade mission in Doha. Since Oman had already severed relations with Israel, it left Qatar
as the only Gulf state maintaining commercial ties with Israel. Tunisia and Morocco also closed their
interest sections in Israel after the Arab summit. (Egypt and Jordan are the only Arab states to maintain
full diplomatic relations with Israel.) Sachs,“Muslim Nations Bitterly Denounce Israel at Summit”NYT 13
Nov; Reuters “Muslims to Slam Israel, Reject Terror - Delegates”NYT 13 Nov:-two articles reporting on
decisions of the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC), whose 56 member-states
ostensibly represent the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims. Being more politically variegated and less concerned
with Israel than the Arab League, OIC triennial summits since the peace process began in 1991 have
avoided referring to jihad against Israel - but the Doha Declaration included some pretty tough language.
“An outpouring of anti-Israel feeling in their own countries has put pressure on many Arab and Islamic
leaders to pay more than lip service to the Palestinian cause”. Still, since 20 members(mostly African and
Central Asian) have diplomatic relations with Israel, a full boycott was rejected and the relevant resolution
stated:”The leaders invite member states which have established relations with Israel, or are taking steps
toward ties with Israel within the framework of the peace process, to cut these ties...and stop all forms
of normalization until it complies accurately and honestly with UN resolutions dealing with Palestine and
holy Jerusalem”. They did affirm however their “determination to cut relations with any country that
moves its embassy to Jerusalem or recognizes it as the capital of Israel”. To allay Western(US)fears of
armed reprisals by pro-Palestinian militants the leaders deplored”all forms of terrorism from whatever
source”,but also”reaffirmed the need to distinguish between terrorism and peoples’ struggle for
liberation”.The Palestinians were promised full political and financial support. More valuable for Arafat
would be solid political backing for his next move. Reuters,“Arab Women Slam Israeli Force Against
Palestinians”NYT 18 Nov:-unprecedented Cairo“summit” organized by Arab League, Lebanese and
Egyptian women’s groups, and bringing together most respected women in the Arab world, loudly
denounced Israeli violence. Mrs. Mubarak claimed its voice was”raised in 1686protest against the terrible
injustice”done to Palestinians, and”expressed the anger of half the Arab World population...at violations
committed against Palestinian women and children”. While aimed primarily at Arab women’s common
issues, supporting their rights to justice and equality in all fields, and calling for removal of societal
restrictions, the impetus was evidently a unifying Arab concern over“the Palestinian problem”.
Sachs,“News Analysis: Mubarak’s Move”NYT 22 Nov:-Egypt’s recall of its ambassador to Israel”marks
the end of a long period of relative restraint in Arab-Israeli relations”. Mubarak’s angry response to Israel’s
bombing of the densely populated Gaza Strip”signals that at least for now, he has abandoned the chatty
personal diplomacy that had become his trademark”. The implications go to the substance of Arab
engagement in peacemaking. Mubarak’s policy of moderation and dialogue have now subjected him to“a
relentless storm of criticism from Arab commentators ...leaders”,and demands for stronger action from
his own citizens. John F. Burns,“One Sheik’s Mission: To Teach the Young to Despise Western
Culture”NYT 17 Dec:-since the terrorist attack on USS Cole in Aden harbor, US media/security services
have paid special attention to Yemen and its ties with Osama bin Ladin(of Yemeni origin). Article
describes the views and activities of Sheik Muqbel bin Hadi al-Wadi, a”seminal influence”on bin Laden
and”one of the Arab world’s most militantly anti-Western Islamic clerics”. His main base/school is a large
guarded compound located in Dammaj, northern Yemen, where at least 3,000 Islamic militants from the
whole Muslim world -and even some from the West- teach and study. The FBI sees Sheik Muqbel’s study
centers(five in Yemen)”as incubators for the Islamic holy war...declared against the[US]”(see above:
Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill:”). He is a“font of vituperation against the[US]and Israel, Christians and
Jews”, but contends the center is strictly a theological school -”albeit one that propagates a purist,
militant, stridently anti-Western form of Islam...the essence of[which]is that Muslims should shun the
corrupt ways of the modern world and return to the austerity and zeal of the Prophet”. Almost all
technology is forbidden(plus music and women), but in the sheik’s view,”the most dangerous enemies
of Islam...are Western life and culture - democracy, pluralism, tolerance and any kind of voting”. Western
intelligence believes the centers,”even if not military camps, act as ideological proving grounds for young
Muslims who go on to train elsewhere, often in Afghanistan, and to become terrorists”. Jane Perlez,“Fork
in Arafat’s Road: New Peace or Old Victimhood”NYT 29 Dec:-written at a/the“moment of truth”in the
Clinton-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and from the viewpoint of Yasser Arafat, the profound
dilemmas described apply in varying degrees to all Arabs and Israelis concerned. For these many, the
sting of the dilemmas faced reflects their extremely emotive, deeply religious, and timeless historical
nature. Even in the shorter term(over half a century), they relate to strong positions taken(and great
sacrifices demanded)by most of the region's governments, that tie them to ethnic/religious identity and
honour, and constitute”battle-cries”that brook no compromise. (For the origin of some utopian Zionist
concepts, see The Economist, 23 Dec“Dreaming of Altneuland”(59-60)). Yet they are totally incompatible
(“united Jerusalem”; ”right of return”, etc.)so that critical concessions are demanded of both sides, and
any compromise - however balanced - will generate violent opposition and probably at minimum the
political death of the compromisers. Yet the status quo is inherently unstable(besides being painful for
millions). Such is the power of ethnicity. [During the first half of 2001, I may have missed, among my
sources, key articles/essays/books on Arab/Islamic (dis)unity. However, my impression is that the huge
volume of material on Palestinian-Israeli violence and their diplomatic impasse included little or no
analysis directly relevant to these summaries. Partly related trends have been: a gradual reduction in the
isolation of Iraq - but mainly by neighbouring states that gain economically; the increased isolation of the
Taliban regime in Afghanistan(except by Pakistan); and the redirection of Qaddafi’s interest from Arab
to African unity. Finally, directly relevant is a follow-up to the Oct Arab summit on solidarity with the
Palestinians.] AP“Arab States Slow in Paying Funds”NYT 18 Aug 01:-reports that the Islamic Development
Bank privately admits Arab states have paid less than half the $1b they pledged at the summit. Although
the total pledge was already cut to $693b after contributions fell short, so far 12 participating Arab nations
have deposited only $442.5b. While there is no date by which countries should fulfil their pledges, Algeria,
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Syria have paid their commitments in full, totalling $100m. The most wealthy,
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, have given $325m of the $550m pledged. Yemen has paid over $8m of the
$10m it pledged, Jordan $1.5m out of $2m pledged, Sudan $.5m out of $1m pledged, but Egypt only $7.5m
out of $30m pledged. Contributions go into two accounts: for supporting the Palestinian Authority’s
budget, and for development projects. So far, $240m has been spent: $225m for PA budget;$15m on
projects. Reuters“Words, Not Deeds Expected at Emergency Arab Talks”NYT 22 Aug:-announces the
opening of the fifth Arab foreign ministers’ emergency meeting to be held since the Palestinian uprising
began in Sep 00. There have also been two Arab Summits: the first in Oct 00 pledged the $1b in
assistance; the second in Mar 01 is remarkable mainly in being the first regular Arab League summit in
10 years. Since none of these meetings has produced anything substantive in the way of agreement/action
except the unmet pledge, the article/analysts predict this one will again result only in soothing words for
Palestinians, and condemnation of Israeli actions. The article quotes an Egyptian columnist:”The Arabs
have made themselves laughing stocks ...We want a full scale economic and political boycott of Israel”.
But this cannot be agreed upon, and Egypt, the host, is actually working as a peace mediator. Agreement
might be reached to meet the original pledge, but Arab governments are aware”the pressure of public
opinion is growing on them”. AP “Arafat Appeals to U.N. for State”NYT 22 Aug:-at Cairo meeting of 14
Arab FMs, Yasser Arafat called on the UNSC to stop Israel from“destroying the Palestinian dream”of a
free, independent state. While the Qatari FM(and chair) assured Palestinians they will not be alone in their
confrontation -”[t]he Arab brothers are standing with political, financial and moral support”- the Syrian
FM was skeptical:”We’ve met many times...and we did not put forward any plan”. Meanwhile, Israeli and
Palestinian delegates clashed in UNSC over an Arab-Muslim resolution calling for international monitors
to be sent to the West Bank and Gaza. Reuters “Arab Foreign Ministers Are Urged to Aid Palestinians”NYT
23 Aug:-as expected, the two-day emergency meeting of Arab FMs ended with calls for political and
economic help for Palestinians and the usual condemnation of “aggressive” Israeli policies. Inter alia the
FMs”called on Arabs to refrain from opening contacts with Israel...but did not call on states to end
existing ties”. They also called for a global boycott of Israeli goods produced in settlements in the West
Bank and Gaza, and a study of ways to revive the full Arab boycott of Israel - though difficult to apply.
Some resolutions were not made public. AP “Arab League Ministers Discuss Mideast”NYT 09 Sep:-reports
on another Arab League meeting, whose result was more appeal and advice than joint action. The foreign
ministers urged the US to stop Israel’s“aggressive policies”and its assassination of Palestinian militants,
and advised the(absent)Arafat about meeting Israeli FM Peres. Earlier, the six members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council had issued a similar appeal and discussed a Saudi plan to present Arab concerns
over Israeli violence to the Bush administration. Bernard Lewis What Went Wrong? Western Impact and
Middle Eastern Response(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 02):-in recent years, many people in all parts of
world, including in Middle Eastern countries and via the UN, have become seriously concerned why these
people, in area that for centuries was most advanced and sophisticated on earth, are broadly missing
advanced economies, widely-sympathetic governments, and ingenuity-benefited lifestyles. All are also
concerned in some manner about the Middle Eastern generation of terrorist organizations. Expert writers
offer interesting analyses on how the area is now, and will adapt in future(e.g. Marina Ottaway op.cit).This
book, written by the doyen of Middle Eastern studies and foremost authority on Islamic history and
culture, draws on his unique knowledge of area over recent centuries to describe how and why it
absorbed slowly and selectively from world-dominant European rapidly-modernizing culture. It explains
a great deal - both today and tomorrow. “If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their
differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in common creative endeavour, then they can
once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major
center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own.”Amy Chua WORLD ON FIRE: How
Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability(New York: Doubleday 03):-this easy-to-read 350page survey of special political/economic/social problems in many parts of the world
has generated good reviews and more influence. Its strong warning is not against either globalization
trade or pure democracy in developing countries, but against pressing these ideas too quickly when rich
but unpopular minorities dominate their economies - widely common situation that is carefully described.
She concludes by first naming three goals: "[1] the best economic hope for developing and post-socialist
countries lies in some form of market-generated growth; [2] the best political hope for these countries lies
in some form of democracy, with constitutional constraints, tailored to local realities; [3] avoiding ethnic
oppression and bloodshed must be a constant priority. But if these goals are to be achieved - if global free
market democracy is to be peaceably sustainable - then the problem of market-dominant minorities,
however unsettling, must be confronted head-on. [Finally, four specific "tonics" are addressed:] (1) the
possibility of 'leveling the playing field' between market-dominant minorities and the impoverished
'indigenous' majorities around them; (2) ways of getting the poor, frustrated majorities of the world a
greater stake in global markets; (3) ways of promoting liberal rather than illiberal democracies; and (4)
approaches that market-dominant minorities themselves might take to forestall majority-based, often
murderous ethnonationalist backlashes". Chapter sub-titles show where and how these major challenges
exist and must be addressed: (1)Chinese Minority Dominance in Southeast Asia; (2)'White' Wealth in Latin
America; (3)The Jewish Billionaires of Post-Communist Russia; (4)Market-Dominant Minorities in Africa;
(5)Ethnically Targeted Seizures and Nationalizations; (6)Crony Capitalism and Minority Rule;
(7)Expulsions and Genocide; (8)Assimilation, Globalization, and the Case of Thailand;(9)From Jim Crow
to the Holocaust;(10)Israeli Jews as a Regional Market-Dominant Minority; (11)US as a Global Market-Dominant Minority; (12)The Future of Free Market Democracy; Bernard Lewis The Crisis of Islam: Holy
War and Unholy Terror(New York: Modern Library 03):- Lewis "examines the historical roots of the
resentments that dominate the Islamic world today and that are increasingly being expressed in acts of
terrorism. [He] is internationally recognized as one of our era's greatest historians of the Middle East[,
and] his books have been translated into more than 20 languages, including
Arabic/Persian/Turkish/Indonesian"[from dustcover]. Chapters generally move from past to present - but
can even be read individually: Introduction; I Defining Islam; II The House of War; III From Crusaders to
Imperialists; IV Discovering America; V Satan and the Soviets; VI Double Standards; VII A Failure of
Modernity; VIII The Marriage of Saudi Power and Wahhabi Teaching; IX The Rise of Terrorism. Final
paragraphs include: "For Usama bin Laden, his declaration of war against US marks the resumption of
the struggle for religious dominance of the world. For him and his followers, this is a moment of
opportunity... But there are others for whom US offers a different kind of temptation - the promise of
human rights, of free institutions, and of a responsible and representative government... It is difficult for
us to help those people, but at least we should not hinder them... Meanwhile, there is a more urgent
problem. If the leaders of Al-Qa'ida can persuade the world of Islam to accept their views and their
leadership, then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead... If the fundamentalists are correct in their
calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world"; "Anonymous"Imperial Hubris:
Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(DullesVA: Brassey's 04):-author is a senior US intelligence
official with nearly 20 years experience in national security issues related to Afghanistan and South Asia.
This strong critique of arrogant US/allies' policies towards Osama bin Laden/al Qaeda, and military action
against Afghanistan/Iraq, proved quickly influential in many respects, and advocates less US loyalty to
Israel/corrupt Muslim regimes or presence in Mideast. Motivation of Muslim terrorists is identified not as
hatred/fear of Western national systems but of their broadly negative actions against Islamic peoples. All
complex chapter titles: (1)Some Thoughts on the Power of Focused, Principled Hatred. (2) An Unprepared
and Ignorant Lunge to Defeat - The US in Afghanistan. (3) Not Down, Not Out: Al Qaeda's Resiliency,
Expansion, and Momentum. (4) The World's View of bin Laden: A Muslim Leader and Hero Coming into
Focus? (5) Bin Laden Views the World: Some Old, Some New, and a Twist. (6) Blinding Hubris Abounding:
Inflicting Defeat on Ourselves - Non-War, Leaks, and Missionary Democracy. (7) When the Enemy Sets the
Stage: How US's Stubborn Obtuseness Aids Its Foes. (8) The Way Ahead: A Few Suggestions for Debate.
Epilogue: No Basis for Optimism; James Fallows“Blind Into Baghdad”Atlantic Monthly Jan/Feb 04(52-74):-writer honoured US national correspondent for Atlantic. Carefully exposed account of US government’s
relatively small and almost purely military attack on Iraq - relatively little involvement prepared to maintain
conquered control/ restore economy/unify three rival peoples in democracy. Author’s knowledge of
government’s simplified plan was substantially explained by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense
for Policy, who noted how more careful policies had been rejected by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, and hence by President Bush. Key extracts from article:“U.S. occupation of Iraq is debacle not
because government did no planning but because vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored
by people in charge...Problems encountered precisely ones U.S. expert agencies warned against...All
government working groups concluded that occupying Iraq would be far more difficult than defeating it...If
failure to stop looting was major sin of omission, disbanding Iraqi army was catastrophic error of
commission - creating instant enemy class. Every pre-war study had warned against it.”The Economist
07 Aug 04“Arab Foreign Policy: Always Prickly, Sometimes Paranoid, Occasionally Pragmatic” (37-8);“Palestine: Who’s In Charge?”(38);“Morocco: The Slow March To Reform”(38-9);“Iraq’s Christians:
Less Safe Than Before?”(39):-first report analyses outstandingly how Arab governments/peoples deal
with outside world and each other, three other reports on national Arab states provide interesting
descriptions of how different attitudes/prejudices within nations delay their progress. Arabs find it hard
to act together to solve region’s manifold problems. Suspicion of US runs deep in Arab world and can
generate strong misinterpretations of events.“Many Arab governments would sincerely like to help heal
festering regional sores such as mayhem in Iraq and misery in Palestine and Darfur. Not only would this
reduce risk of infection, it would also improve strained relations with superpower. But popular distrust
of western, and particularly US, motives keeps getting in way...More western sensitivity to Arab concerns
and less blinkered Arab prickliness about sacredness of sovereignty in countries with vicious regimes.”
Jason Burke"Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror"(New York: I.B.Tauris & Co 03):-while I read this book
long after summarizing Burke‛s valuable article in 04 Foreign Policy(op cit), many of author‛s FP views
also stated/implied in book, so aren‛t repeated. Book, however, is a valuable - and concentrated(300 pp) -
report on the origins/members/relationships/aims of "al-Qaeda" in global terms, plus involvement of bin
Laden to events of 11 Sep 01. Material is derived from both author‛s extraordinary interviews/experience
and information from many other personal sources. Advice in book‛s conclusion is of special importance -
and has much in common with "Christopher Spencer" item: "We [West] need to counter the twisted vision
of world that is becoming so prevalent. Every time force is used it reinforces that vision by providing more
evidence of a ‛clash of civilisations‛ and a ‛cosmic struggle‛... ‛War on terror‛ should have a military
component [:] hardened militants cannot be rehabilitated[; b]ut if we are to win battle against terrorism,
our strategies must be made broader and more sophisticated. [G]reatest weapon available in war on
terrorism is the courage, decency, humour and integrity of the vast proportion of the world‛s Muslims [-]
restricting the spread of ‛al-Qaeda‛ and its warped worldview. [B]attle between West and men like bin
Laden...is not a battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds [-] battle we, and our allies
in the Muslim world, losing. [Yet all] modern Islamic terrorism... can be acted on by well-judged, properly
executed policies. Causes of terrorism must be addressed, careful analysis of...threat...undertaken,
moderate Muslim leaders engaged, spread of hardline strands of Islam rolled back, and enormous effort
to counter growing sympathy for ‛al-Qaeda‛ worldview must be made... All terrorist violence, ‛Islamic‛ or
otherwise, is unjustifiable/ unforgivable/ cowardly/contemptible. But just because we condemn does not
mean we should not strive to comprehend. We need to keep asking why"(249-50); Jason Burke"THINK
AGAIN: Al Qaeda"Foreign Policy No.142(May/Jun 04):-summarizing (global) public (mis)concepts about
current capacities and aims of al Qaeda forces and ideas, and its future strength, Burke, chief reporter
of Britain's Observer and author of Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror(New York: I.B. Tauris 03)(op
cit),offers nine widely believed views about issues, and then denies accuracy of each. "Al Qaeda Is a
Global Terrorist Organization" -NO. "It is less an organization than an ideology... Today, structure that was
built in Afghanistan has been destroyed... There is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. But al
Qaeda workview... is growing stronger every day." "Capturing or Killing Bin Laden Will Deal a Severe Blow
to Al Qaeda" -WRONG "If...he surrenders without a fight, which is very unlikely, many followers will be
deeply disillusioned. If he achieves martyrdom in way that his cohorts can spin as heroic, he will
beinspiration for generations to come. Either way, bin Laden's removal from scene will not stop Islamic
militancy. "The Militants Seek to Destroy the West So They Can Impose a Global Islamic State" -FALSE
"Islamic militants' main objective is not conquest, but to beat back what they perceive as an aggressive
West. [S]econdary goal is establishment of...single Islamic state, in lands roughly corresponding to
furthest extent of Islamic empire." "The Militants Reject Modern Ideas in Favor of Traditional Muslim
Theology" -NO "Islamic hard-liners...have little compunction about embracing tools that modernity
provides... [M]ilitants are framing modern political concerns ...within mythic and religious narrative. They
do not reject modernization per se, but...resent their failure to benefit from that modernization." "Since
the Rise of Al Qaeda, Islamic Moderates Have Been Marginalized" -INCORRECT "Al Qaeda represents
lunatic fringe of political thought in Islamic world. While al Qaeda has made significant inroads in recent
years, only tiny minority of world's 1.3b Muslims adhere to its doctrine." "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
Is Central to the Militants' Cause" -WRONG "Televised images... reinforce militants' key message that
lands of Islam under attack, and that all Muslims must rise up and fight. However,...resolution...would not
end threat of militant Islam...Two-state solution...would still leave 'Zionist entity' intact." "Sort Out Saudi
Arabia and the Whole Problem Will Disappear" -NO "Inequities of Saudi system... continues to create
sense of disenfranchisement that allows extremism to flourish...Saudi Arabia is one of many causes of
modern Islamicmilitancy, but it has no monopoly on blame." "It Is Only a Matter of Time Before Islamic
Militants Use Weapons of Mass Destruction" -CALM DOWN "Although Islamic militants...have attempted
to develop basic chemical or biological arsenal, efforts have been largely unsuccessful due to technical
difficulty...Islamic militants far more likely to use conventional bombs or employ conventional devices in
imaginative ways." "The West Is Winning the War on Terror" -UNFORTUNATELY, NO "If countries to win
war on terror, must eradicate enemies without creating new ones...Invasion of Iraq...has made task more
pressing... Ben Laden's aim to radicalize/mobilize. He is closer to achieving goals than West is to
deterring him". Reza Aslan No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam(New York:
Random House 05):-The widely-read author defines his aim in the Prologue: "This book is not just critical
reexamination of the origins and evolution of Islam, nor is it merely an account of the current struggle
among Muslims to define the future of this magnificent yet misunderstood faith. This book is, above all
else, an argument for reform"(xx). William Grimes, in his New York Times 04 May 05 review, quotes the
book:"What is taking place now in the Muslim world is an internal conflict between Muslims, not an
external battle between Islam and the West"(248). Grimes himself argues: "[Islam's] history, grippingly
narrated and thoughtfully examined, takes up nearly all of 'No god but God'. Aslan... has written a literate,
accessible introduction to Islam.,. carefully placing its message/rituals in historical context. Complete with
glossary/annotated bibliography, it could easily serve as a college textbook". The 310-page book includes
21st century arguments: "[T]he attacks of 11 Sep 01 were not a defensive strike against a specific act of
aggression against Islam. They were never sanctioned by a qualified mujtahid. They made no
differentiation between combatant/noncombatant.,. indiscriminately killed women, children, and
approximately 200 Muslims. In other words, they fell far short of the regulations imposed by Muhammad
for a legitimate jihadi response, which is why, despite common perception in the West, they were so
roundly condemned by the vast majority of the world's Muslims"(87). "Tragic events of 11 Sep... initiated
a vibrant discourse among Muslims about meaning/message of Islam in 21st century... It may be too early
to know who will write the next chapter of Islam's story, but it is not too early to recognize who will
ultimately win the war between reform/counterreform... But the cleansing inevitable, and tide of reform
cannot be stopped. Islamic Reformation is already here"(266). Jason Burke"It May Well Take 20 Years. But
al-Qaeda‛s Days Are Numbered" Guardian 10 Sep 06:-Special Report by expert/famous journalist,
published five years after "9/11", claims: "Osama bin Laden waits in vain for a Muslim ‛awakening‛. The
lure of the West is just too powerful a force". Full Burke text (plus 70 optional pages of the item‛s wide
Email reactions) is available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,1869182,00.html. Highlights:
"There is a sense that history, far from ending, is accelerating. That the centre cannot hold. That the
individual counts for nothing. [Burke‛s reactions to some of bin Laden‛s 01 claims: H]e was wrong. Yes,
there is increasing radicalisation. Yes, a new and powerfully globalised ‛Muslim‛ identity is spreading,
aided by communications technology that renders national frontiers obsolete. Yes, there is a small, if
growing, number of Muslims who are attracted to ‛al-Qaedism‛ in its largest sense. But truth is that out
of a total of 1.6b Muslims, very few have joined terrorist organisations. In [some Muslim] countries... there
has been strong counter-reaction to the atrocities... World‛s Muslims are not behaving as bin Laden wants
them to... The [London] bombs were a strike against a continuing and largely successful process of
integration on a national scale. The attacks across the world in the past five years are strikes against a
similar process of integration on an international scale. This process is largely driven by the continuing
popularity and attraction of the Western model of secular liberal democracy, Enlightment values, and
capitalist economics. It is the success of this model that has provoked the violence against it, not its
failure. [N]eed to ask why so many people... recently came to view the apparently ineluctable process of
Westernisation. [T]he arithmetic of terrorism means that you only need a small shift in public opinion to
create enough angry individuals to cause a major problem... The appeal of the West is founded not just
on a dream of a high level of material comfort but also on the satisfaction of basic and universal human
values such as dignity, protection of life and justice. This gives West considerable moral capital,.. a fragile
commodity... profligately spent in recent years... But for all the clumsiness with which the misconceived
‛war on terror‛ has been handled, the attraction, however conflicted, of ‛the West‛ for billions of people
remains our greatest strength. Remember that and, over 10 or 20 years, it will become clear bin Laden‛s
life or death will indeed have no significance. He and his kind will have been consigned to the history
books". Related Burke volume is:On the Road to Kandahar(Bond Street Books 06 or St. Martin‛s Press
07)"From one of world‛s leading experts..how we are to get to grips with radical Islam/what it really
means". Paul William Roberts"A Profile of the Prophet" Globe & Mail 11 Feb 2006:-Focus: "The outrage
sparked by the controversial cartoons published in Denmark has led many around the world to realize just
how tenuous their grasp of Islam really is. To help fill the gap, Middle East specialist PAUL WILLIAM
ROBERTS tells: the story of Mohammed and why it means so much to the Muslim faithful." [An excellent
and sympathetic description of the origin and basic beliefs of the Islamic religion, written for Christian,
Jewish, atheist, etc. readers, not to gain converts but to offer those with other philosophies and/or
religious views an objective account that avoids assigning historical perfection. Viewed fair by my Islamic
friends]; Faisal Devji Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy . Morality . Modernity(Ithaca: Cornell Univ.Press
05):-very thoughtful analysis of Al-Qaeda's jihad motives behind the 11 Sep 01 attack against USA. To
determine and describe this, the less-than-200-page book draws often on written/spoken rationales by
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular. Following is derived from its own summary: "Devji
focuses on the ethical content of [the Al-Qaeda's] jihad, as opposed to its purported political intent. Al-Qaeda differs radically from such groups as... Muslim Brotherhood and Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah,
which aim to establish fundamentalist Islamist states. In fact,.. Al-Qaeda [has] a decentralized structure,
and emphasis on moral rather than political action... Bin Laden and his lieutenants view their cause as
a response to oppressive conditions faced by Muslim world[; not] an Islamic attempt to build states. Al-Qaeda culls diverse symbols/fragments from Islam's past in order to legitimize its global war against the
'metaphysical evil' emanating from the West. Most salient example of this assemblage... is concept of
jihad itself, which Al-Qaeda defines as 'individual duty' incumbent on all Muslims, [and] weapon of
spiritual conflict. Al Qaeda and its jihad, Devji suggests, are only the most visible manifestations of wider
changes in the Muslim world. Such changes include fragmentation of traditional/fundamentalist forms
of authority. [Hence] Al-Qaeda represents a dangerous new way of organizing Muslim belief/practice
within a global landscape and does not require ideological/institutional unity. [Book] is at once a
sophisticated work of historical/cultural analysis, and an invaluable guide to the world's most prominent
terrorist movement"; The Economist 01 Jul 06"Democracy in the Arab World: Not Yet, Thanks"(42-3):-item
illustrates how"Recent hopes for the steady advance of democracy are being widely stifled". It tells of
many limited democracy-related movements in Arab countries, and counter-reform developments there
more recently. General pictures then and now as follows: "A few years back, and especially in wake of
US invasion of Iraq, many [Arab leaders] found it politic to sound responsive to mounting pressure for
reform. It was partly internal, inspired by factors such as demography, fading potency of long-ruling
ideologies, and impact of harder-to-control new media such as TV. External forces helped, too, most
notably [US/]other Western governments, [pushing] political freedom as the ultimate foil for extremism...
But now, the tide appears to have turned". Politically reactionary events are described in: Syria, Egypt,
Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even Lebanon. "Several factors explain the
waning of reform momentum. One is the high price of oil. Exporters... find themselves so flush with cash
that they can again buy off dissent. But a bigger factor is advance of Islamist opposition groups. In past
year, religious parties have crushed secular rivals in Iraq, Hamas has captured shaky government of
Palestine, Islamists have performed strongly in Saudi Arabia's polls, and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood won
unprecedented fifth of parliament's seats... Islamic surge has frightened not only the region's
governments, but also foreign promoters of democracy... Western officials and academics at a recent
conference appeared to 'wash their hands of supporting democracy in the Arab world'. [Some US
politicians have revived support for an old Arab leader.] Similar signs of return to [Western] realpolitik
have been noted with relief by Arab governments". The Economist 22 Jul 06"Israel and Lebanon: The
Accidental War"(Edit.13-4); "Special Report: The Crisis in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine: Ending Will Be
Harder"(29-32):-My aim is to offer just titles/summaries of selected articles and books which provide
valuable information and/or views on global issues. Hence I have offered for years a special 'chapter' on
Lebanon/Syria under RECENT DEVELOPMENTS because of their unique developments/potentials.
Outbreak of very serious violence between Israel and Lebanon-located Hizbullah 12 Jul 06 was a true 21st
century crisis, and for at least weeks generated hundreds of articles a day. I do not have the time or
speciality to list even their titles. Instead, here is a summary of the analytical sections or arguments by
The Economist as one relatively reliable source on (global) issues involved. The essence of Editorial is:"A
pointless war that no one may have wanted and no one can win. It should stop now". Highlights:"[I]t
started with a pinprick[:] decision of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, to send his fighters on
cross-border raid into Israel on 12 Jul, where they killed several soldiers and captured two... Israel says
timing - 3 days before G8 summit - was no coincidence[:] Iran was using Hizbullah to deflect
attention...Equally plausible explanation is[:] Nasrallah..doing nothing new... Hizbullah has mounted
several similar raids into Israel. It got away with them[: Israel's] reactions astonishingly mild. Reason, as
Nasrallah constantly boasted, was his arsenal of around 12,000 Iranian/Syrian rockets/missiles. With
[such] deterrent[, he] felt free to pursue intermittent cross-border war against much stronger neighbour...
This time too, Nasrallah may have expected usual token response. If so, he miscalculated[: capturing two
Israeli soldiers]. Hamas movement had [just] mounted equally daring raid into Israel from Gaza[,] killing
two soldiers, nabbing another. Perhaps precisely because his non-military background required him to
look strong, Israel's new PM Ehud Olmert decided this double humiliation was more than he could survive
or Israel could bear. So he has chosen to go to war [see Special Report]. Conditions for it have been
building, in slow motion, for years. [S]ince Israel's invasion of 1982, Hizbullah has emerged as strongest
local military force in Lebanon [,] cannot be disarmed [by] Lebanese army [and] has shown little interest
in UNSC Resolution 1559 which calls...for disbanding of all Lebanese militias... Hezbullah is political party
in parliament and government, but militia does not take [their] orders[, probably taking] ideological/tactical
advice from Iran, its chief armourer and mentor. [B]y giving Hizbullah all those rockets and missiles, Iran
has transformed a small militia into a strategic threat to the Jewish state [and] it was utter hubris for
Hizbullah to believe that, with its rockets in reserve, its fighters could keep crossing into Israel with
impunity. A war that starts by accident is not necessarily easy to end... Stakes could hardly be higher for
both sides[; hence] both have rushed...up the ladder of escalation". The next issue of The Economist (29
Jul 06 in North America) contains another thoughtful Editorial and three related articles on the violence
and initial discussion of peacekeeping. Titles and their own summaries are as follows: "Israel and
Lebanon: Stuck in Lebanon"(Edit.):-"Why this war is likely to be long, unless US tries harder to shorten
it";"The Lebanese Crisis: Can Diplomacy Be Given a Chance?":-"The first signs that Israel's attack on
Hizbullah is losing momentum could give a fillip to the diplomacy now getting under way, but timing is
crucial";"Lebanon's Government: So Who's Running the Show?":-"As Israel tries to destroy Hizbullah,
Lebanon's government is floundering";"The Ethics of War: Mind Those Proportions":-"As the war in
Lebanon shows, there are several ways to make a moral judgment". The essential and final argument of
the second Editorial is, once again,"The right thing for US is to call for an immediate stop to the fighting,
postponing its plans for the reordering of Lebanon until the period after the guns fall silent". Economist
22 Jul 06 "Arabs and Democracy: Not Yet, Say the Arabs"(79-80):-this review of three books is officially
summed as arguing (like the above item): "Why democracy will not sink roots in the Arab world, at least
in a hurry". It later says: "None of these books asserts categorically that the Arabs are unfit for, or
incapable of, democracy, but all make plain how extraordinarily hard it will be for a system of one-person-one-vote to sink roots in such unfamiliar soil". Fouad Ajami The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the
Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq(Free Press):-"[D]ominant tone...is one of lamentation. Despite the supposed
attractions of new deal US offered Iraqis, beneficiaries have been patently unable...to grasp it". Rory
Stewart The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq(Harcourt):-"[S]tory
of appalling chaos, local Iraqi chicanery/violence, and administrative mayhem imposed from outside".
Mark Allen Arabs(Continuum):-"[T]houghtful pot-pourri of observations on the Arab psyche and identity.
[O]ld-fashioned bonds of blood, tribe, religion and pan-Arab identity tend to govern behaviour";
Economist 08 Jul 06 "Security in Asia: The Trouble With Pakistan"(Edit.10); "A Survey of Pakistan: Too
Much for One Man To Do"(1-12); "Special Report: Afghanistan: A Geographical Expression in Search of
a State"(22-4); "The Army in Afghanistan: Taliban Time for Britain"(50):-the four items are inter-related in
their discussion of many problems that are both similar and found in two neighbouring states. Following
is derived essentially from single Editorial commenting on both states. "Terrorism has many sources and
claimed justifications, but if it can be said to have a centre, it lies in the training camps, madrassas and
battlefields of northern Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan. There the Taliban and their ally, al-Qaeda,
were both formed. From there, in hellish diaspora, jihadis have fanned out across the globe... [C]lear why
what happens in those two places is of huge importance to the rest of the world. From neither place is
there much good news. The West has invested a huge amount in Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf,
who seized power Oct 99... After 11 Sep 01 he was recast as a provider of relative stability in a dangerous
neighbourhood and essential ally in 'war on terror'... In past 5 years, he has not done very much to make
Pakistan a less dangerous place... [P]erhaps most damning criticism of Musharraf is that he continues
to do grave damage to the long-term political health of Pakistan (see Survey)... It would not be fair to
blame Pakistan for everything that is going wrong in Afghanistan. Government of Hamid Karzai is weak
and corrupt; because of West's continued failure to live up to its promises, much of country, outside the
big cities, is in the grip of bandits and warlords. But Pakistan's contribution...should not be
underestimated. Both Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda are able to take refuge on Pakistani soil, which
makes job of the soldiers from Western countries who have been struggling to eliminate them for past
5 years much more difficult. Taliban... were in part a creation of Pakistan.., which saw in them a way to
establish a friendly state on their western flank [since] locked in perpetual conflict with India to its east...
As for al-Qaeda,.. Osama bin Laden is generally reckoned to be holed up in Pakistani soil... An unstable,
nuclear-armed Pakistan, intertwined with a chaotic and Taliban-dominated Afghanistan: it is not a settling
prospect. It has all happened before. Result was 11 Sep 01"; Economist 02 Sep 06"The World Since
September 11th: Five Years On"(Edit.9-10);"Special Report: September 11th 2001: [US]'s Longest War"(22-4):-"Essence of [al-Qaeda] idea..is that Islam is everywhere under attack by the infidel and that every
Muslim has a duty to wage holy war, jihad, in its defence... Jihadists are hungry to topple...superpower.
[S]ince 11Sep01, number of jihadists and their sympathisers has probably multiplied, partly as result of
way US responded... Al-Qaeda operated openly in Afghanistan and enjoyed protection of its noxious
Taliban regime, which refused US request to hand Osama bin Laden over. US invasion...therefore enjoyed
broad international support... By 04 a first-ever free election had legitimated presidency of Hamid Karzai;
parliament took office in 05. Now plagued by warlordism and opium trade, and Taliban mounting a
challenge in the south. But not yet look capable of dislodging new government in Kabul. [I]nvasion
deprived al-Qaeda of a haven for planning/training. [H]owever, invasion of Iraq in Mar03 providing
jihadists with both a banner around which to recruit and a live arena in which to sharpen their military
skills... Like most Sunni extremists, some in al-Qaeda regard Shia Muslims as virtual apostates[, and]
organised so many attacks on Shias/holy places that Shias at last struck back, turning into a bitter
sectarian war... In [Iraq] the battle for world opinion...had calamitous consequences. [M]illions of Muslims
now think US real aim in Iraq was to grab its oil, help Israel, or, as bin Laden said all along, wage war on
Islam... Bush/PM Blair refused after the war to be embarrassed by the absence of the [Iraqi] weapons that
had so alarmed them beforehand. [Their] arguments no longer sell in the West, let alone the Muslim
world... Hussein's was a secular dictatorship in which Islamists of all stripes kept their heads down... But
portraying the whole enterprise as if it had from the start been all about an experiment in democracy just
makes Muslims crosser. [Now] poll after poll shows deep distrust among traditional US allies... Bush has
played straight into anti-US hands. One vast mistake has been his neglect to push seriously for creation
of a Palestinian state... But worse has been his disregard for civil liberties [Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo. So
US] won more recruits for the jihadists. Still, not everything has gone al-Qaeda's way either. [I]f bin
Laden's aim was to topple pro-US regimes in Muslim world, he has failed... Saudi regime...is still standing,
and so far... the violence has served mainly to strengthen it. Another prize to have eluded al-Qaeda is
Pakistan. [Also,] all of al-Qaeda's efforts to kill Musharraf, or to deflect from US alliance... have so far
come to naught... [J]ihadists' grandiose aims and gruesome methods have prevented them from turning
a resentment of US into an appetite for revolution at home. Most of [Iraqi] victims of al-Qaeda have been
fellow Muslims,[while] attacks inside such as Indonesia/Turkey/Jordan, where the victims were mainly
Muslim, have turned local people away from al-Qaeda's cause. If anything, that cause may have fared
better in the West, among those whose identity as Muslims has come to take precedence over loyalty to
the host country [Britain/Canada].To many susceptible Muslims the message that the faith is everywhere
under attack is evidently compelling. Jihadists are skilled at weaving the 'resistance' in
Palestine/Lebanon/ Kashmir/Chechnya/Iraq/Afghanistan into single narrative of persecution by the infidel.
[H]ijackers proved in US/Madrid that small numbers of terrorists can produce devastating results.
[J]ihadist notion that the faith is everywhere under attack looks absurd [cf. Palestine/Caucasus/
Kashmir/Balkans/East Timor]. In Kosovo, NATO [protected] Muslims from Christians. [Y]et a troubling
recent development is emergence in US of an equal and opposite distortion[:] idea that West and its
values are everywhere under attack, and everywhere by the same seamless front... It is wrong to look at
post-11Sep world this way, as if every local conflict is part of a civilisational clash [cf. Hamas/Hizbullah/
Iran]. [T]errorism was the background noise of the second half of 20th century. But 11Sep seemed to
portend something new... Al-Qaeda's fantastic aims - sweeping away regimes, reversing history and
restoring the caliphate - are married to an appetite for killing that knows no limits. It boasts openly that
it is seeking nuclear weapons... The world must still strive to destroy al-Qaeda and, even more, the idea
it represents. But it had better do so with cleverer means than those Bush has used so far"; Economist
02 Sep 06"Special Report:The Middle East: A Big And Then a Bigger Mess"(25-6):-"Bombing of Beirut's
suburbs was ugly episode in the latest of many nasty Mideast wars... Al-Qaeda's attacks did not
themselves change Mideast, but...more now share [Osama] bin Laden's feeling Islam is under attack, and
that US is their enemy. [S]wift intervention in Afghanistan Nov 01 bothered many Muslims, if only because
it evoked memories of colonial invasions. But...most quietly glad to see obscurantist Taliban defeated...
Determined US policies produced some tangible results... Yet several things went wrong. 'Crusade' to
describe war on terror [created] damage... When Bush said you are either with us or against us, he in
effect pushed fence-sitters into enemy camp... Iraq turned into crucible for terrorism[: US] so like Israelis
stomping on Palestinans that many Arabs/Muslims grew simply to equate occupations as twin assaults.
Guanatanamo/Abu Ghraib silenced US remaining fans. [R]eason for US invasion [seen as:] to control Iraqi
oil/build military bases/help Israel[,and frightened] those who opposed US policy/ emboldened Iran...
Hizbullah felt encouraged to escalate its hostility to Israel. Currency of anti-US [views] boosted Islamists[,
including] Muslim Brotherhood. Most dramatic Islamist advance came in Palestine. Despite Bush's
declared wish to see creation of Palestinian state, US did little to make it happen. Bush was disenchanted
with Arafat... Israeli settlement accelerated. In Mar 02 all 22 Arab heads of state... agreed to end conflict
if Israel withdrew to its pre-67 borders. However...Ariel Sharon reoccup[ied] West Bank, and idea went
nowhere [except] evacuat[ion of] Gaza Strip. [L]ikelihood of resolution looked further away than ever.
Palestinians voted in Hamas. Israelis elected...plan for unilateral withdrawal behind controversial 'security
barrier' until peace. [S]oon clear that plan would not suit Israel after all[: t]o many, recent war in Lebanon,
and Hizbullah's rain of rockets, proved that any disengagement with Arab neighbours in absence of
political guarantees would be big mistake. Meanwhile, suffering of most Palestinians continued to mount[,
so] Arabs said it was hypocritical to promote democracy and then balk at its results. Within this gloomy
picture, [dizzy oil price] stands out";
Next item(drafted Oct 06),supported by varied Ottawans, is listed often as very broad issues are involved.
Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST COOPERATE - IN TERMS OF
BOTH THEIR WEALTH AND KNOWLEDGE - IN ORDER TO SURVIVE:-Brief paragraphs first identify some
genuine and trans-species (but not simply idealistic) physical and emotional human traditions,
confrontations, disasters, or prospects that raise globally-relevant threats. These are followed by a few
relatively cheap and realistic, but world-wide and trans-human, policies. The challenges reflect the already
serious - and often inter-related - concerns of everyone, everywhere: all human beings now face “global”
threats in terms of: (a) mobile, unprecedented inter-human violence; (b) widespread, potentially global,
mis-health; (c) dangers generated to the earth on which all survive.
(1) All the wealthier societies on the planet now possess grand and growing assets of both physical
goods - far beyond essential human needs - and rapidly-expanding scientific/technical/economic
knowledge - enough to create/improve their comfort and health. It now appears possible, and universally
profitable in terms of generating the good trade and health of all, to share such quantities of global assets
with all who lack them, so all groups could fully address painful and globally-destabilizing needs. Even
if competition were the pure motivation of large advanced companies, they would develop globally.
(2) Yet throughout the history of human beings, and contrary to the philosophy of the world’s strongest
religions, four social factors have been dominant among the whole species: human groups have been
mainly small (families or villages); their members have been grossly ignorant about almost all other
groups’ characteristics, strengths and problems; they have exhibited deep and general dislike and often
fear towards all other groups; and, above all, have felt no sense of responsibility for them. Violence
against, or at least selfishness towards, other groups has been chronic - but is suddenly not beneficial.
(3) Now, for the first time in human history, the entire planet is massively/increasingly interdependent, not
simply in terms of ‘globalization’ trade, but also regarding enormous travels/transfers of humans, goods
and bacteria between societies. We are also now living in unprecedented planetwide situations where
basic global knowledge is both vast and expanding - often via TV/Internet/phones in even isolated
villages. All human beings, however rich/poor, educated/formally ignorant, global travellers/physically
fixed, are potentially aware of other groups with greater/other power or assets - and/or apparent harm or
nonrelationship - in their own societies or another. Any group can feel independent/hurt/frustrated/
opinioned toward another, physically or emotionally. Nature/scale of interdependence: widely unknown.
(4) An unprecedented but expanding global fact is that ills, ranging from the mildly-harmful to the multi-fatal, can now easily be transferred via weapons, explosives, poisons, virus, serious misuse of nature.
The deliberate, unknown or accidental transfer of critical action to virtually anywhere else on earth, by
land, sea or air - could in future be, deliberately or otherwise, generated or passed by groups or
individuals that may or may not wish to inflict some ‘pain’ on others. Victims of such action/accident can
be in or from any society at all, and can hurt any type or groups of humans, animals, machines, transport,
buildings, towns or key liquids/gases/foods/ medicines/power-sources etc. The effects of deliberate or
accidental “spreads” or organized action range from minor diseases to mass murders.
(5) Any group will ultimately be responsible for “using” any of a variety of existing or developable actions
against/in any society on earth. Hence an essential way to reduce the world-wide threat - apart from
easing sharp and dangerous ill-feelings - must involve help in reducing serious/perceived pain/poverty/
(potential)disease/global misuse. It would also involve obtaining - through cooperative intelligence/law
among all regimes everywhere - advance information about relevant threats -since any/all societies may
somehow be threatened. But the most defensive and selfishly-beneficial means of easing global threats
is for the wealthier/more informed to provide the funds/goods/skills necessary to accelerate equity - by
both offering and obtaining relevant knowledge. Richer societies would no longer live safely while
ignoring any others’ agonies - nor even suffer from giving assistance. Isolation is no longer an option -
anywhere - for any rich and/or traditional society. We must all think, at least minimally, as global citizens.
The Economist 21 Oct 06 "Iraq: Between Staying and Going"(Edit.12); "Special Report: The Arab World:
Coalitions of the Unwilling"(25-8); "Moderates and Rejectionists: The Palestinian Test Case"(28):-while
the three items' emphases vary, the main problems stressed are interrelated. Editorial's own summary:"A
search for new ideas should not blind Americans to the stark choice they face in Iraq". Highlights:"[They]
long for a middle way. Why not split the country into Shia, Sunni and Kurdish statelets? Instead of going
right now, why not set a timetable, to galvanise the warring parties to settle their differences before a free-for-all? One far-fetched idea...is said to be to withdraw 'over the horizon' and control Iraq from a
neighbouring country. Another is... to be less fastidious about establishing democracy, and concentrate
on smaller aim of establishing a government that works. [N]one of these...stands up to scrutiny... At end
of day, the three-pronged policy US is already pursuing may very well be the best of a bad lot. Stated
briefly, this consists of trying to keep the lid on the violence, build up Iraq's own security forces, and prod
Iraqi politicians into making a power-sharing deal... If US willing to stay... for a few more years, success
is still possible... Only honest alternative is indeed probably just to go, and let one side win... But just
going would be a fantastic gamble, not only with US's global power/prestige, but also with other people's
lives. Better, still, to stay". Special's own summary:"Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are
the pillars of a rapidly strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region". This substantial essay
offers the following introductory arguments: "Some [of Mideast's] imagined threats to the global order
have been leftist and nationalist, some reactionary and religious, some radical and violent. Yet all have
drawn their mobilising power from... urge to challenge the dominant perceived injustice of the day... Most
reliable populist cry today remains 'resistance': [Sudan, Iraq, Hizbullah]. Clearly, although times have
changed, this dynamic has not. What has changed is that the call to resist now inspires unprecedented
enthusiasm, galvanizing many disparate political streams at once, secular and nationalist as well as
Islamist. Religious element, boosted by the great revival that has swept Muslim societies across the globe,
adds a scriptural drumbeat to the call. Lately the impulse to resist also strengthened by failing prestige
of traditional countervailing forces - US, moderate governments in region, and liberal-minded minority of
their citizens". These points are then well-amplified. It concludes:"[C]lear that a powerful sector of
Islamist opinion is so fundamentally rejectionist that it will never change. Best the West can do may be
to ensure does not push more moderates into that camp. Could start by remembering that people choose
to 'resist' when they feel threatened". Palestinian item's thrust: "Pressures on Hamas build from both
sides...In recent months, poor Palestinians have, not for first time, found themselves used as rope in tug-of-war between Mideast 'accomodationist' and 'rejectionist' governments. [Yet] split would truly render
PA ungovernable and peace talks impossible. Greg Mortenson & David Oliver Relin Three Cups of Tea:
One Man's Mission to Fight Terrorism and Build Nations... One School at a Time (New York: Viking 06):-a
beautifully written (by Relin), and very popular book: (often-quoted) Mortenson's extraordinary gift of life
to northernmost Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a poor but pure mountain climber in 1993 he nearly died
in attempting to conquer K2, "world's deadliest peak" whose height is exceeded only by Everest. He
survived through the warm hospitality of an isolated, poverty-stricken village in Karakorum, Himalaya. He
found it had no school, almost no access to rest of Pakistan; so in extraordinary thanks Greg promised
to return one day and build a school for their boys and girls. On return to US, he launched what gradually
became"one of the most remarkable humanitarian campaigns of our time". As director of the Central Asia
Institute, Greg has built 55 schools serving Pakistan and Afghanistan's poorest communities. "He
provides not only hope to tens of thousands of children, but living proof that one passionately dedicated
person truly can change the world". Economist 21 Oct 06"Nuclear-Weapons Proliferation: Going Critical,
Defying the World"(69-70); "Sanctions: History Lessons"(70-1);"North Korea: Pinched Bellies"(52):-Nuclear item's own summary: "A big-power stand against North Korea and Iran? Or rivalry as usual?"
Highlights:"North Korea and Iran, past partners in missile roguery, seem bent on testing world's anti-nuclear rules to destruction... Whether Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) survives this combined
assault depends on how big powers rise to challenge: by cooperating to press both regimes to abandon
their nuclear exploits and uphold the rules, or by competing in the wider struggle for regional influence...
China...has no wish to see Japan or South Korea frightened into going nuclear too, but North Korea may
test credibility of US's deterrence pledge...[I]t calls new [UNSC] sanctions 'declaration of war'. Ms Rice's
task: to win agreement from the neighbours on a sanctions regime 'unlike anything [North has] faced
before'. Japan has banned ships...and halted trade/financial flows. But China wants to avoid economic
collapse in North [which] would enable US to throw its weight about too much. [Yet] China is livid that Kim
[Jong Il] brushed aside repeated warnings not to test... His nuclear antics have also upset South Korea's
president,.. whose 'sunshine'policy towards North is in tatters...Traditional sanctions have their limits,..but
UNSCresolution 1718 gives new backing to US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, posse of like-minded
countries that share intelligence and intercept cargoes of suspected proliferators... North is dangerous,
but isolated. An Iran with nuclear weapons...would be a 'game-changer'. Virulence of regime's
revolutionary ardour, its role as 'central banker of terrorism' to organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah
that preach and practise violence against Israel, and its ambition for dominance in the region and Islamic
world, all make it imperative, from West's viewpoint, to stop Iran before it gets bomb. Sight of a nuclear-armed Shia Iran would probably encourage Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere to want
their own finger on a nuclear trigger... Sanctions are supposed to become steadily tougher if Iran carries
on enriching... Helps Iran that, just as world gears up to enforce anti-nuclear rules, the rules may be
changing. Spread of weapons of mass destruction is a clear threat to international peace and security.
It remains to be seen whether tackling proliferation is something world's big powers are ready to put
ahead of their own rivalries". Sanctions offers history of varied aims, effects and targets of
past/continuing sanctions, both UN and US. Pinched covers fact: "Fresh sanctions on North Korea are
not supposed to hurt its people, but may do[:] A nuclear capability may be toast of North's leaders, but
blight on their poor countrymen's bellies... To feed itself, North needs 5.5m tonnes of grain/year. Cannot
produce anything like this, even with bumper harvest last year... As if this not bad enough, 10 days after
its offending missile tests, North suffered worst flooding in recent memory... To alleviate crisis, South said
it would make flood relief an exception to its suspension of aid. But only half of promised 100,000 tonnes
of grain had arrived before the nuclear test, whereupon South suspended the rest... Western powers seem
unfussed by this shortage... Last year North imported over $1billion-worth of Chinese goods. New UN
sanctions against it may change that... A barbed-wire fence going up along the border; China is taking
no risks".Noah Feldman"Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age"New York Times 29 Oct 06:-this is the
leading article of the New York Times Magazine of this date, and runs to 18 pages when printed from the
Internet. This time the author is identified as follows:"Noah Feldman, a contributing writer, is a law
professor at New York University and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations".
Summarized extracts from the introductory section: "Today the nuclear game in [Mideast] has changed.
When Arab League's SG... called for 'a Mideast free of nuclear weapons' this past May, it wasn't Israel that
prompted his remarks. He was worried about Iran, whose self-declared ambition to become nuclear power
has been steadily approaching realization. The anti-Israel statements of Iranian president.,. coupled with
Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas, might lead you to think that Arab states would welcome Iran's
nuclear program... But interests of Shiite non-Arab Iran do not always coincide with those of Arab leaders.
A nuclear Iran... could potentially mean... a historic shift in the position of the long-subordinated Shiite
minority relative to the power/prestige of the Sunni majority... Sunni Arab leaders...also seem worried that
Iranians might actually use nuclear weapons if they got them. A nuclear attack on Israel would engulf the
whole region. But that is not the only danger: Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere fear that Iranians
might just use a nuclear bomb against them... If Iran is going to get the bomb, its neighbours will have
no choice but to keep up. North Korea, now protected by its own bomb, has threatened proliferation - and
in the Mideast it would find a number of willing buyers... Given the increasing instability of the Mideast,
nuclear proliferation there is more worrisome than almost anywhere else on earth. As nuclear technology
spreads, terrorists will enjoy increasing odds of getting their hands on nuclear weapons... Bombing
through an intermediary has its advantages: deniability is, after all, the name of the game for a
government trying to avoid nuclear retaliation. [A]s more countries get the bomb, tracing the seller will
become harder and harder, and the incentive to make a sale will increase". Much of item carefully
discusses rationales used by/for Islamic killers of themselves, infidels, civilians, women and children”;
Economist 25 Nov 06"The Future of NATO: The Test in Afghanistan"(Edit.12); "Special Report: NATO's
Future: Predictions of its Death Were Premature"(24-6):-official summary of Editorial:"Thanks to some
shortsighted European politicians, the world's foremost military alliance is at risk". Highlights: "[W]ith
demise of Soviet communism,.. alliance has grown bigger,.. is busier than it ever was during cold war
[and] faces many tricky questions about the future... NATO's leaders must find unity of purpose on one
issue above all others: overcoming the weaknesses of mission in Afghanistan [where] for first time
engaged in bloody ground combat. Task made even harder by two failures[:] to modernize... armies for
expeditionary operations [or] to send soldiers... to dangerous regions where most needed. Although have
2.4m men under arms, NATO's European members...struggled to meet requests for extra 2,200... British
and Dutch have put troops at sharp end in southern Afghanistan, heartland of Taliban[, while]
Canadians...spearheaded NATO's assault on entrenched Taliban fighters. [But] too many others... are
working in safer areas and refused to be deployed as NATO commander would like... It is difficult for any
government to expose soldiers to danger in far-away lands; harder still to watch one's soldiers die while
allies look the other way. No excuse for such half-heartedness. In Afghanistan, as distinct from Iraq, there
should be no quarrel about the lawfulness of the mission. NATO is in the country under a UN mandate,
operating in defence and at the behest of an elected government. The stakes are high: failure would not
only bring back the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but embolden jihadists around the world. Military alliance that
stretches across Atlantic will not always be able to unify around such a clear cause... NATO and EU do
not need to see each other as competitors... Nor should a stronger NATO mean a weaker role for UN... May
even be a case for UN one day to recruit military forces of its own, capable of intervening in conflicts
under a UN mandate. [Now] NATO remains world's foremost military alliance. [Members] may no longer
face one common enemy, but they face common dangers, including terrorism, Islamic radicalism,
increasingly troublesome Russia, Iran nuclear ambitions and instability in Mideast. [A]ll the more reason
not to fail the test in Afghanistan"; Economist 09 Dec 06“Lebanon: A Battle for the Nation’s Heart”(51-2):-official summary:“Outcome of bitter struggle in streets of capital could affect balance of power in wider
region”. Highlights: “Lebanon not moving. It is stuck. Talks between faction leaders... collapsed last
month. Since then, fractures between religious sects, divided political loyalties and clashing
understandings of Lebanon’s own history/identity widened dangerously fast... Huge crowds gather nightly
for [PM Siniora’s] downfall, even as he receives endless delegations of supportive dignitaries.
[Showdown] shows no sign of ending soon. Protesters... insist vigil will not end until PM... appoints
enough opposition ministers to grant them effective veto. Government... has offered bigger share of posts
[but] remains adamant this must fall short of veto. Siniora said to have accepted proposal to up number
of cabinet posts from 24 to 30, giving 9 or 10 to Hizbullah-led opposition, 19 to anti-Syrian coalition and
couple to neutrals. Not enough said Hizbullah. Siniora’s lot [also raise issues of: tribunal to look into
murder of ex-PM Hariri; replacement of pro-Syrian president.] In government’s view, demonstrations
subverting democracy [with] aim not so much to achieve sectarian balance as to bring Lebanon back into
orbit of Syria and Iran [and] renew ‘resistance’ against Israel. Nawaf Musawi [of] Hizbullah counters that
government’s acceptance of UN troops and foreign aid is whittling away sovereignty... Opposition appears
stronger[:] demonstrations of more than 1m[, with] Hizbullah [lending] formidable organizing skills [plus]
menace of its unrivalled guerrilla force. Siniora not bereft[:] Western powers/Sunni Arab allies[;] strong
support from anti-Syrian Christian factions [plus] near-unanimous backing from Sunni/Druze minorities...
In fact, striking symmetry between sides[: e]ach accuses other of being stooge of foreign powers, of
stoking sectarian rivalry and of ‘trading in blood of martyrs’... Both sides claim majority backing and both
see the clash as defining moment for Lebanon - perhaps even for the wider region. Conservative Arab
governments... are worried[: if] Siniora forced out,.. angry Sunni Arab fears of a new ‘Shia arc’...will grow”;
Economist 16 Dec 06"Kurdistan: Can the Americans Satisfy Both Turks and Kurds?"(43-4):-official
summary:"As tension rises between Turkish government and Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Americans are
in quandary". Highlights:"Iraqi Kurds enjoy extreme autonomy in what is now the only stable part of Iraq
...Turks, for their part, increasingly angered by renewal of attacks in Turkey by guerrillas of the home-grown Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) [and] have never liked idea of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan,
seeing it as a magnet for Kurdish nationalism in the region - especially in Turkey... Growing chance
Turkish army will, perhaps next spring, invade northern Iraq in effort to clobber PKK in its safe haven just
inside Iraq [see full item:"Turkish Kurds in Iraq: Lonesome Rebels"(44)]. Iraqi Kurds might then feel
obliged to help their ethnic kinsmen fight back. [U]nclear what US would do... Iraqi Kurds' biggest worry
now is that US wobble might hasten the feared Turkish invasion... Iraq's 4-5m Kurds fear Turks' true aim
would be to ruin their successful experiment in self-rule, which has been inspiring Turkey's own restive
Kurds, some 14m strong... US would be loth to let the Iraqi Kurds help their PKK kinsmen fight back, since
Turkey is a cherished NATO ally. [C]onfident Iraqi Kurds... now say they will no longer kill fellow Kurds
[and] instead strengthening links with them... US been telling Turks to stay out of Iraq[, and Turks had
hoped] US would deal with PKK[, but US] failure to do so is perhaps biggest cause of rampant anti-US
feeling in Turkey. [Turkish PM warned Bush by phone] that he might be unable to restrain his hawkish
generals [against PKK, whose] attacks went on despite its proclaimed ceasefire in Sep. One big reason
for Turkish restraint against PKK has been repeated warnings from EU, [b]ut that restraint may weaken
as EU... continues to snub Turkey... If Turkish forces do invade Iraq, US response will depend largely on
scope/scale... Plainly in US interest to cut deal between Turks and Kurds, including to disarm PKK for
good, in return for wider cultural/political rights for Kurds in Turkey. Conceivably, Turkey might then be
persuaded to accept ...an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan... But pessimists... say the Turks...will never tolerate
Kurdish independence... If it comes to a stark choice, it is hard to say which way US would
tilt".Related:"Turkey and Europe: The Blackballers' Club"(Edit.12-3);"[US] and Iraq: The War Over the
War"(29);"Iraq: How Dare You[, US]"(45);"Charlemagne: Turkey and Enlargement"(53); Economist 13 Jan
07"Israel and the Jews: Diaspora Blues"(Edit.14-5); "Israel and the Jews: Second Thoughts About the
Promised Land"(53-6):-Editorial's official summary:-"Jews around the world should join the debate about
Israel, not just defend whatever it does". Highlights: "Early settlers came for a variety of reasons:.. to
escape stifling constraints of religious dogma;.. hasten the coming of Messiah;.. as anti-Semitism grew,
[gain] a safe haven; after the Holocaust, save Jewish lives. Soon another role: being a potential Israeli
citizen became one of the anchor points of what it means to be a Jew. Since [its establishment,] Jews
have continued debating/reshaping relationships to country. Secular Jews found Israeliness a handy
substitute for religious observance. Some religious Jews revived... messianic Zionism, holding that to
settle in all biblical land... is a God-given duty. To...ultra-Orthodox, state should [be] subsidising Jewish
learning/maintaining piety... Meanwhile, diaspora Jews have developed an even more eclectic mix of
Jewish culture and attitudes to Zionism(see 53-6),partly because... growing number neither feel
comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor... invoke Israel in defining Jewish[ness]. Yet big
Jewish diaspora institutions not caught up[, but] still supporting [Israel] in times of crisis/critics. [True
especially of] lobby groups in US, formed to influence foreign policy in Israel's favour... Their attitude
persists [in suggesting Israel's] critics are anti-Semites[, and they] have an unholy alliance with
evangelical Christian groups. This knee-jerk defensiveness of Israel does not help Jewish diaspora in
keeping young Jews from leaving the faith [and] many are simply drifting away. [Also,] it locks diaspora
Jews out of the fateful/often bitter debates that rage inside Israel itself[, where] interests have been
diverging. [Israelis] disagree on the most basic questions: borders, who is a Jew, role of religion, status
of non-Jews... Israeli Jews swim in a sea of conflicting ideas about who they should be... Helping Israel
should no longer mean defending it uncritically. [D]iaspora institutions should...encourage lively debate
about Israeli politics[,] allowing an Israel at peace to return to its original vocation of providing a safe and
democratic haven for the world's Jews. Other items in this issue offer information on Israeli attitudes
towards/from some vital Mideasterners (titles/pages plus official summaries): "Israel and Iran: How
Imminent Or Real a Threat?"(43):-"Israelis vary in their views of Iranian menace"; "Obituary: Teddy
Kollek"(78):-"Theodor('Teddy')Kollek, mayor of Jerusalem, died on 02 Jan 07, aged 95"; Economist 13 Jan
07"Chinese Foreign Policy: A Quintet, Anyone?" (37-8):-complements 06Jan"China: Coming Over the
Horizon" item on trends in global role of a developing superpower. Official summary: "China making it
clear it wants a bigger role in Mideast". Highlights:"[I]n Mideast, China is on good terms with everyone
[and its] non-government seminar [of] former senior Israeli and Palestinian officials reached consensus...
China should increase its influence in Mideast, and join 'Quartet'... pursuing peace efforts... To all sides,
it still has much to offer. To oil-export[ers, it is] big customer/investor[; to Iran and Syria[, its] veto power
at UN and shared misgivings about US make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions
about democracy. Israel... courts China['s] potential influence[, knowing they] share distaste for Islamic
militancy [and are important military industry producers/markets]. US worries China has been hesitant
to put pressure on Iran[, its] third-biggest supplier of oil, and Sudan[, where] China has invested hugely
in oil. China sees advantages for itself in any diminution of US power[;] US preoccupation in Iraq
strengthens China's hand in its dealings with Taiwan. In both Sudan and Iran, China has often balked at
US-led initiatives in UN that could be seen as legitimising strong-arm tactics against countries deviating
from international norms. China fear[ed] it might be next[, but] has recently edged closer to US position...
Despite disdain for US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan,.. it has not attempted to frustrate US
operations[,] has pledged more than $300m for Afghan reconstruction, begun debt-[cancel] negotiations
with Iraq[ and, s]ince 1990s, far more sympathetic to US concerns about weapons proliferation. China
worries about its dependence on US military might for the security of its oil shipments from Mideast [(see
06 Jan)] so has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with US tactics,
but will share the same broad objective". In same issue, these three items (their titles/pages plus their
official summaries) discuss China's equally-vital international financial/trade relations: "Chinese
Business: Truth From Facts"(Edit.13-4):-"The best test of China's new accounting standards: a few public
disasters"; "Chinese Accounting: Cultural Revolution"(63-4):-"New accounting rules have replaced the
Little Red Book [by Mao] as China's guide to self-improvement. Can the state handle the truth?";
"Briefing: The Problem With Made in China"(68-70):-"China is choking on its success at attracting the
world's factories. That has handed its Asian neighbours a big opportunity"; Economist 24 Feb 07"India
and Pakistan: Staying on Track"(Edit.18-9); "Terrorism in India: Murder on the Friendship Express"(47-8);
"Pakistan: Musharraf Shows His Hand"(48-52):-Editorial‛s official summary:"United in anger at another
atrocity, India and Pakistan should speed up their peace process". Highlights: "Every few months a
bombing... in India [is] killing random unfortunates. [A]ttacks usually blamed on militant groups fighting
Indian rule in part of divided Kashmir [and] set back painstaking progress.,. ending rancorous, bloody
feud that has scarred 60 years since independence/partition. So far, however, none has succeeded in
scuppering the 3-year-old peace process.[Latest bombing, of a train, is described in "Terrorism..." which
notes:"Pakistan also seen more terrorism than usual.,. probably organised by the same militants, or by
their Islamist allies".] Both countries condemned the outrage [and] insisted the peace progress was
intact... Both should be urged to go further [and] make a real effort to bring it to a successful conclusion
[- the] fanatics have political, religious and even financial interests in keeping [them] at odds. It would be
easier to identify the culprits if India and Pakistan were to share intelligence more fully. [I]t is time to move
from interminable process to possible outcome. [A]s each outrage proves, present dispensation is
intolerable. [T]he outlines of a settlement acceptable to both sides are emerging. It would involve ‛softer‛
border, some cooperative institutions, greater autonomy for both bits of Kashmir and a gradual
withdrawal of Indian soldiers from Kashmir as violence decreases... Such might not bring an immediate/
perpetual end to bombings, but it would dispel the murk of ambiguity where terrorism thrives...
pointlessly."Economist 17 Mar 07"Lexington: The American-Jewish Lobby"(38):-official summary : "These
are both the best of times and the worst of times for the... lobby". Highlights: "The American Israel Public
Affairs Committee(AIPAC)[has] awesome power/unnerving efficiency... Congress has more Jewish
members than ever before: 30 in House; 13 in Senate. Both parties are competing...to be ‛soundest‛ on
Israel. About two-thirds [in US] hold a favourable view of the place. Yet... feel a bit nervous, too. Iraq
debacle has produced a fierce backlash against pro-war hawks, of which AIPAC was certainly one. Also...
awkward questions about US‛s alliance with Israel [and] a growing number of people want to push against
AIPAC... Some of the most determined are Arab-Americans, who been growing in numbers/influence for
years - probably about 3.5m of them [and] a growing political force... But so far their performance has
been unimpressive. Arab-Americans are badly split between Christians(63%) and Muslims(24%). Also been
late in taking to politics. AIPAC‛s ace is idea that it represents Jewish interests in a country generally
philo-Semitic. But liberal Jewish groups... persuad[ed] Congress to water down a particularly
uncompromising bit of legislation... which would have prevented any US contact with Palestinian
leadership... A liberal version of AIPAC... has yet to materialise[, but] most Jews are fairly left-wing... An
even bigger threat to AIPAC [is that] serious people... ask hard questions about US‛s relationship with
Israel. [F]ormer security adviser worries that US is seen in Mideast as ‛acting increasingly on behalf of
Israel‛... The biggest challenge facing AIPAC is how to deal with this changing climate... US needs an open
debate about its role in Mideast"; Economist 24 Mar 07"Briefing: Iraq: Mugged By Reality"(29-31);"The
Iraq War: Collateral[US] Damage"(33-4):-"What went wrong? [M]ost popular answer of US
neoconservatives who argued loudest for the war is that it was a good idea badly executed... [Some]
called Bush national-security team ‛among the most incompetent‛... Others also blame Iraqis for inability
to accept US gift of freedom. That excuse too convenient[;] can be no denying project was bungled from
the start. Western intelligence failed to discover Saddam had destroyed all his WMD - main rationale for
war. However, incompetence beyond this: war launched by divided administration [with] no settled notion
of how to run Iraq after conquest. Rumsfeld... sent too few and they did nothing to prevent looters. US
plans for Iraq‛s political transition were also rudimentary, to extent they existed at all... State Dept.
organized a pre-invasion Future of Iraq project, but Pentagon declined to adopt its ideas. [Under-staffed,
ad hoc US body] received no intelligible instructions from Washington, and baffled the liberated Iraqis
[who] could not [run] state whose institutions had collapsed. [Even the replaced US ‛viceroy‛] produced
big mistakes[:] disbanded the Iraqi army and put tens of thousands of resentful, jobless men on the
streets[;] turfed thousands of Baath Party members out of bureaucracy, depriving many ministries of their
only trained staff. In the end, political transition of sorts on advice of UN [and] 2005 year of elections...
Unfortunately,.. government cannot govern[, as] Iraqis voted along ethnic lines and produced impasse...
Sunnis feel locked out of new Iraq dominated by Shias[ - themselves] divided... Main reason for
government‛s inability to govern, however, is that it cannot stem a tidal wave of criminal and political
violence [-] Baghdad and central Iraq in multiple conflicts. Many Sunnis have taken up arms against the
new Shia-dominated order[;] al-Qaeda is running jihad against US and Shias alike, provoking a torrent of
revenge killings[;] in places, Shia militias also attack US soldiers. Prevalence of violence and absence of
law erodes the legitimacy of the elected government and makes it almost impossible to rebuild an
economy that even before the war had been prostrated by a dozen years of UN sanctions... Only when the
killing declines will Iraq‛s new government be able to buttress its legitimacy, suck support away from the
militias, and rebuild the economy... Iraq‛s cabinet agreed last month on how to share oil revenues between
the regions. [B]ut it is uncertain whether the politicians who claim to speak for the Sunnis are close
enough even in the event of a political settlement. [T]ime may show that the democratic structure US
worked so hard to install can neither run Iraq nor reconcile its warring clans". All remainder of Briefing
and the entire "Collateral" item discuss the relevant US national policies/effects; Economist 28 Apr 07"The
United States in the Middle East: Weakness - Or a New Realism?" (51-2):-official summary:"Why US is
having to adjust policies in region". Highlights:"[T]hree-quarters of Iraqis think US plays 'negative role'
in their country; most want US troops to go [see "Iraq: A Row Over a Wall"(51)]. [S]trengthening
perception in Mideast of [US] administration at bay. [O]pinion survey in four Muslim countries - Egypt,
Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia - shows 79% of respondents believe US aims to divide and weaken Muslim
world. Big majorities want US troops out of all Muslim [-] in Egypt, 91% endorse attacks on US troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan ["Afghanistan: The Arrival at Last of Party Politics"(46)]. [This]reflected in
government behaviour [:] exasperation with US/sense that Iraq debacle has sapped its will, [thus]
stiffening resistance to US policies and emboldening others [-] Iran‛s ambitions/Sudan‛s
intransigence/Arab-Israeli conflict/questioning democratic reform. [P]ressure is [more] on Bush to
moderate own policies... US has rejected dealings with states/parties it considers hostile. But Bush
agreed [to] talk directly to Iran [since] cannot be ignored [over] Iraq. US still chastises Syria [but]probably
matter of time before... comes back from isolation... US-led boycott has failed to dislodge [Palestine
regime] led by Hamas,.. prompting Saudi Arabia to [sponsor] a national-unity government that diluted
Hamas's control but preserved its rejectionist stand towards Israel. US officials now re-engaged with
Palestinian president [and] strongly endorsed relaunch [of Arab peace initiative]. Even US policy towards
Sudan has shifted [:]deal for a far smaller [peacekeeping force in Darfur] under 'hybrid' UN-African Union
command... Perhaps plainest shift is over democratic reform[:] recent political tide appears to have flowed
back against [it]. Syria['s] budding reform movement floundering[, and many] have reacted passively to
their government's latest crackdown. Egypt's government appears almost to relish... just to show it can
fend off US scolding. Reforms in arch-autocratic Saudi Arabia have stalled completely, with no audible
protest from Wshdc. Perhaps more serious... is the rumbling that can be heard in regional allies. Turkey
has rarely found itself at such cross-purposes with US... Over Iraq it finds itself more in tune with Iran and
Syria, due to worries about... Kurdish minority. Egypt and Jordan have close military ties to US too, but
must constantly parry sniping from such exuberantly anti-US opponents as Muslim Brotherhood. Yet US
military footprint in region remains huge. For Persian Gulf monarchies it is vital protector. US has close
military ties to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and strongly beefing up military cooperation with array
of countries in the Sahelian belt in their war against Islamist terrorism. Egypt, Jordan and Israel still bank
on US aid, and stand as symbols that rewards of friendship with US [alone] can be [so] large. Do shifts
in US policy reveal weakness, flexibility or renewed realism? Condoleezza Rice may be adopting less
abrasive policies in region. 'They've come to realise that the multilateral approach can be more effective',
says an Arab ambassador"; Economist 28 Apr 07"Capital Punishment: Edging Out of Fashion"(69-70):-official summary: "More and more countries have doubts about death penalty". Highlights:"[C]ruelly
administered, or botched, executions are not confined to developing countries, or to lands that follow...
traditional Islamic punishment... 'At least' 1,591 executions were carried out worldwide 2006, well down
on 2005 but 40% higher than 2003. [N]umber of countries that carry out executions... has fallen steadily
from 40 a decade ago to just 25 last year. Since 1985, 55 countries have ended the death penalty or, having
already limited it to 'extraordinary' crimes,.. have now banned it outright. During the same period, only
four reintroduced death penalty[:] Nepal/Philippines have since abolished it again, and in Gambia/Papua
New Guinea, no executions. [In all,] 89 countries have abolished death penalty for all crimes, another ten
for all but exceptional crimes, and a further 30 are abolitionist in practice. [UN] has called for complete
abolition of death penalty. In Europe, where abolition is a condition of membership of both EU and 46-nation Council of Europe (Russia is member), Belarus is only country that still uses it. In Africa, only four
carried out death penalty 2006, and in Americas, US is only country to have executed anybody since 2003.
Only Asia and Mideast seem largely untouched by global movement away from death penalty. Even China
[in 2006 death sentences may be near 8,000] might be having second thoughts [Olympics]. Six countries-China/Iran/Pakistan/Iraq/Sudan/US- accounted for 90%+ of 2006 known executions. Methods of execution
vary widely [stoning/stabbing/beheading/electrocution/shooting/hanging/ lethal injection]. Injection is now
the preferred method in all but one of 38 [US] states that retain death penalty... US is one of very few
democracies [along with Japan/India/South Korea/Taiwan] still to have death penalty"; Economist 19 May
07"Pakistan: Time to Cut a Deal"(Edit.10):-official sum:"General Pervez Musharraf needs allies. Pakistan
needs democracy. Enter Benazir Bhutto?" Highlights:"[This] key ally in fight against terrorism is facing
the first large-scale popular protests since he grabbed power. [S]laughter of around 40 in Karachi 12-13
May was country‛s worst non-sectarian political violence in decades [and it] looks more unstable than
ever". Analysis of a globally-relevant crisis in a state both complicated and strategically-located, offers
the reasons/implications:"Briefing: Pakistan: A General State of Disarray"(23-5):-official sum:"A slaughter
in Karachi/vengeful judge are signs... Musharraf is struggling to remain in power". Editorial continues:"A
small war with al-Qaeda supporters along border with Afghanistan is fueling a wave of jihadist terrorism.
In Islamabad, a hardline mosque staffed by armed zealots is defying government. Indeed, general's efforts
to fight these forces, and his pro-US stance, are part of reason so unpopular. But a panicky clampdown
not solve problems. Killing in Karachi carried out by weak [Musharraf coalition]. Many victims protested
against his attempt to sack head of Supreme Court[, including] Pakistan's two mainstream parties, led
by exiled former PMs, Benazir Bhutto/Nawaz Sharif. Violence was intolerable [and] unlikely to succeed[:]
democracy has been rekindled... Combating militancy... requires more than hunting down militants[:]
democratic institutions needed to address the defections terrorism feeds upon. [Musharraf understands
this, yet] his efforts at controlled democracy have failed. [E]lections alone do not add up to 'real
democracy'[, but] nor does autocrat. [E]lection is due this year which Musharraf looks determined to
survive[: be] re-elected president in last days of current parliament. Common sense/constitution dictate
he should instead seek election from next one[, so] legal challenges ahead. [That's]why he wants to see
back of [the judge. He] can do better than this[: in aligning with US against extremism, and in efforts to
make peace with India, he has shown foresight/readiness to take right risks. He needs to do the same to
broaden his political support. Ms Bhutto, who leads biggest/most liberal party, thought to have offered
to support his reform agenda/re-election. Price would be to escape corruption charges that hang over her,
allowing return. She also demands fair election, and that general keep to constitution/shed uniform. [Deal
looks least-bad option: Bhutto's demands are admirable for country. Pakistan needs genuine democracy,
not imitation. [A]lso needs continuity/ stability army man able to provide... If general fears he would lose
most from such cooperation, he is wrong. Without greater legitimacy, opposition will grow and his
authority will diminish"; Economist 26 May 07"Lebanon: The Cauldron May Bubble Over Again"(47-8):-official sum:-"The latest outbreak of violence in northern Lebanon menaces the whole region".
Highlights:-"Fighting between Lebanese army and radical Islamists entrenched in a Palestine refugee
camp near Tripoli. [M]any of camp's 30,000 residents fled[, but] militants inside declared a fight to the
death [-] a radical jihadist faction known as Fatah al-Islam... Though small/marginal, [it] has been linked
to at least one of sporadic bomb attacks that have hit Christian areas... Violence comes at difficult time
for Lebanon, shaken by devastating war with Israel last summer, [and] Western-backed government
locked in stand-off against pro-Syrian coalition led by Hizbullah [demanding] veto-wielding share of
cabinet. Though fighting in north pits a widely disparaged Sunni Muslim group against a national army.,.
many Lebanese view clash through prism of this wider political contest. [O]fficials charge Syria is sowing
such strife to regain its power-broking role [or] block [UNSC-involved] tribunal to try suspects in a string
of political murders[, but] adamantly denies any link. [M]ost of Lebanon's Palestinian camps [long]
controlled by Syrian military intelligence[, which] also known to have sponsored jihadist groups - against
US in Iraq. Leader of Fatah al-Islam, whose ideology close to al-Qaeda's, [was ] in Syria before surfacing
in Lebanon last year. [G]roup has recruited not only among Palestinian refugees [there], but also among
international jihadists... When violence erupted, Palestinian factions united with Lebanon's rival parties,
including Hizbullah, in rare unanimous condemnation of Fatah al-Islam as dangerous/alien force,
[although] anxiety grew over danger to civilians [and] shelling looked indiscriminate... Some [refugees]
claim gunmen holding the camp hostage[, while] most Lebanese solidly back their army, and government
bolstered by support from Arab League/US... Whatever outcome, fighting is also reminder that Lebanon -
and rest of world - should not let country's wretched Palestinian camps continue to fester as ghettos of
misery/extremism which stoke up anger across region"; Economist 02 Jun 07"Palestinians in Lebanon:
A History of the Hapless"(46):-official sum:"Long the unluckiest of the lot". Highlights:-"Lebanon [has]
12 Palestinian camps [-] dense warrens of breeze-block shanties. Three were flattened in the civil war
[and all] residents were made refugees twice. [Two camps were laid waste; others ravaged in] attacks by
everyone... Nahr al-Bared was only camp spared in those dark times; it prospered afterwards... Lebanese
army siege of radical jihadist cult [there] has left at least 80 dead... One ingredient [for violence] is despair
of Lebanon's 420,000 Palestinians. Not only has hope of returning to Palestine faded; living conditions
have deteriorated too. The 4m or so UN-registered Palestinian refugees elsewhere in the diaspora -
Jordan, Syria, Israeli-controlled territories - hardly been happy, but treatment in Lebanon notably harsh.
Local laws give Lebanon's Palestinians a raw deal, reflecting fears assimilating them could upset [its]
sectarian balance... Recent developments increase the poverty imposed[, and] UNRWA... stretched
because of chaos in Gaza strip/West Bank. As one result, class sizes in schools UNRWA runs in Lebanon
have soared. Troubles also slashed spending by...agencies that once...supported camps; foreign
donors...diverted towards widespread destruction by Israeli bombing... Camps have grown more lawless[:
initially were under PLO deal; then power vacuum in mid-80s, followed in 90s by Syrian military
intelligence... Syrian withdrawal in 2005... left many camps with no effective administration[, so] grew
more divided than ever[: split between Hamas-Fatah in Palestine,] exacerbated... by emergence of more
extreme factions. [Y]ouths turned to pan-Islamist fervour. Many naturally turned to Nahr al-Bared [-] just
outside Tripoli,.. a hotbed of Islamist radicals. Joined by hundreds of militants, very few of them
Palestinian, the radical cult Fatah al-Islam has vowed to fight here to the death"; Economist 23 Jun 07"The
Arab Predicament: Martyrs or Traitors"(Edit.15)[official sum after each title]"A choice the West must be
careful not to force on the people of the Middle East";"The Palestinians: June Amazed Them"(30-2):"From
now on, the Palestinians are not themselves"; "Reactions in the Region and Beyond: Emotions Not
Politics"(32):"The Palestinians' chances of avoiding the worst depend partly on others"; [plus in previous
issue 16 Jun 07:]"Palestine and Israel: As Bleak As It Gets"(16-8):"A civil war among Palestinians is bad
for the Israelis too";"The Palestinians: War Between Brothers"(53):"The Palestinians' two main groups
are on the verge of a struggle that could split the two parts of a putative Palestinian state in half":-Editorial's highlights:-"[S]cenes from Gaza have shocked Arabs far beyond Palestine... In one brutal week
Hamas's swift destruction of Arafat's Fatah movement in Gaza summed up a change that is spreading
across a broad swathe of Mideast. Secular nationalism... is coming to look like the weak force and radical
Islam like the strong force. This poses huge danger... Western policy in danger of strengthening the
wrong side by making Islamists looks like martyrs and secularists like traitors. [US President Bush's]hope
is that if Gaza fails under Hamas while the West Bank prospers under Fatah, Palestinian opinion will
eventually swing back behind the moderates. Can such a plan possibly work? [A]ssumption of many
Muslims that a pro-US leader must in some way be a traitor to the cause extends beyond the Arab world[,
while] US's allies cannot stop the martyrs from calling them traitors. US has made itself deeply unpopular
in the Islamic world by invading Iraq and standing by Israel. This is bound to taint any Muslim leader who
looks as if he owes his position to US military/economic power. But guilt by association is only half of
reason for the growing popularity of the martyrs and the spreading idea that US's allies must be traitors.
Other half is that, by comparison with traitors, martyrs look clean[:] Hamas in Palestine, Hizbullah in
Lebanon and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/Jordan have earned reputation for both honesty and
efficiency[, and often] health/social services... Martyrs have another selling point[: Hizbullah and Hamas]
are still 'resisting' Israel. [I]t is not enough for Israel and US to release the economic help withheld from
Palestinians when Hamas was still formally in charge[:] principal grievance [is] Israel's occupation of West
Bank as well as Gaza... US must now prove moderate Arab allies, far from being traitors, can actually
deliver desirable results. In case of Palestine, [Fatah must] govern cleanly and get Israel to start
dismantling outposts and leaving West Bank"; Economist 23 Jun 07"A Counter-Insurgency in Trouble:
Fatal Errors in Afghanistan"(Edit.17-8); "Western Forces in Afghanistan: Unfriendly Fire"(51):-Editorial's
sum:"Too few soldiers and too much bombing from the air is damaging the US-led campaign".
Highlights:"Afghan civilian deaths caused by Western forces as dangerous as most callous of Taliban
suicide-bombs. [Operation] was never going to be easy. [According to the famous "Anonymous"Imperial
Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(Wshdc: Brassey's Inc. 04), it was initiated by Wshdc
in Oct 01 without reflecting the enormous knowledge accumulated by the intense US help to Afghans
when occupied by USSR in 1979-89. Chapter 2.:"An Unprepared and Ignorant Lunge to Defeat - The United
States in Afghanistan"(21-58).] But allies hobbled themselves by creating two separate forces - both
dominated/led by US generals - that at times work at cross-purposes. One is International Security
Assistance Force(ISAF), NATO-led operation that does peacekeeping, stabilisation and, for some
contingents in south, counter-insurgency against Taliban. Combined Joint Task Force 82, consists of
special force/elite infantry who hunt Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders under US's Operation Enduring
Freedom(OEF). Two are supposed to coordinate their activity. Both groups have killed civilians, but
[worst] are responsibility of OEF[see":Unfriendly"]. ISAF commanders complain... OEF troops often
operate in their areas and undermine their work. [E]verybody suffers consequences of mistakes[:] anti-Western riots have started to break out [and President Karzai] complained civilian deaths/arbitrary
searches of homes had reached unacceptable level. [Yet] 'mistakes' go on. [Since] foe hides among
civilians,.. no amount of care will eliminate deaths of innocents. But West must do better, or risk losing
support/[worse]... Having two separate forces makes little military sense. Many NATO... do not want to be
too closely associated with US aggressive tactics [while] US reluctant to place its warriors too firmly
under control of wishy-washy Europeans. Neither side wholly wrong. [F]orces should be merged, but if
proves impossible, should be made clear ISAF has primacy, and oversight over OEF action. More
important, aim of military operations should be to protect civilian population and win its trust, not to kill
as many insurgents as possible... Unity of effort requires much more than rejigging command structures;
it is about managing complexity of nation-building. Problem is not just strength of Taliban, but also
weakness of Afghan government, and disillusion with corruption and slow reconstruction. [Above all,]
Western and Afghan forces too thinly stretched [; and r]educing Afghan deaths will require... putting more
Western soldiers in harm's way"; Economist 30 Jun 07"United States Power: Still No.1"(Edit.11-2);
"Briefing: US Power: The Hobbled Hegemon"(29-32):-Editorial's official sum:"Wounded, tetchy and less
effective than it should be, US is still the power that counts". Briefing's official sum:"Its troubles in Iraq
have much weakened it; but US is likely to remain the dominant superpower". Inevitably very selective
highlights from the substantial/complex Editorial: "[F]or a growing [US] number, superpower's inability
to impose its will on [Iraq] is symptomatic of a deeper malaise... Nearly six years after 11 Sep 01,
nervousness about state of US's 'hard power' is growing [refs. made to Briefing, then to the huge US army
weight of Iraq and Afghanistan]. Other demons are jangling US nerves [China, Russia, North Korea, Iran,
Europe, Arabs, Chavez]. Nor is it just a matter of geopolitics [Wall Street, borders, Abu Ghraib,
Guantanamo Bay, climate change, Palestinians]. A sense of waning power is not just bad for US self-esteem. It is already having dangerous consequences ['China-bashing', isolationism]. Outside US,
consequences could be even graver [Islamic revolutionaries, Putin, Western alliance]. Yet US being
underestimated. Friends and enemies have mistaken short-term failure of Bush admin for deeper
weakness. Neither US hard nor soft power fading. Rather, not being used as well as could be. The
opportunity is greater than the threat. [But] while [US] talk was loud, the stick was spindly. [I]t is hard to
imagine any future US admins making such [Bush regime] howlers when it comes to regime change. Yet
in one way Bush is unfairly maligned... US did not enjoy untrammelled influence abroad before he arrived
[Vietnam, Iran, North Korea, France]. [Superpower's relative]strength lies as much in what it can prevent...
as in what it can achieve. Even today, US's 'negative power' is considerable [Iran, North Korea, global
warming, Arab-Israeli peace] - US is quite simply indispensable [since] still has the most hard power...
Better diplomacy would enhance its power [- and] al-Qaeda is still small beer. [W]in the battle for hearts
and minds and you do not need as much hard power to get your way. [This applies to China. US is] an
undervalued market leader, in need of new management... More than any rival, US corrects itself... Bush
has already rediscovered some of the charms of multilateralism; he is talking about climate change[; and]
a Mideast peace initiative is possible. [E]lection offers a chance for renewal[, and US] will bounce back
stronger again"; Economist 07 Jul 07"Lebanon: From Crisis To Crisis"(47-8):-official sum:"Echoes of civil
war as the country slides towards political deadlock". Highlights:"War with Israel [in 2006] left 1,200 dead
and thousands more homeless. [Since then, a political split] widened into a seemingly unbridgeable
chasm, crippling a state struggling to manage reconstruction, $33b foreign debt, presidential election,
continued series of assassinations. Meanwhile, siege of jihadist guerrillas holed up in Palestinian camp
has killed more than 160 and uprooted 30,000 refugees, [plus] a roadside bomb hit UN peacekeepers,
killing six. [L]ikely links between all these events[:] ruling majority... accuses Syria of having a hand in
most troubles[, while] Syria's friends - Shia party-cum-militia Hizbullah - [blame] Israel/US/Sunni powers...
More neutral observers agree that while Syria may indeed be fighting a covert struggle to defend its soft
underbelly, unlikely to control any but a few of varied groups seeking to undermine Lebanese
government... Outside meddling certainly plays a part in Lebanon's troubles. But much trouble stems from
internal causes. Sectarian fragmentation that makes Lebanon the Arab world's most tolerant society also
tends to generate scrappy, paranoid politics. [N]eed to resolve political crimes, reform electoral laws and
contain jihadist groups are subsumed within struggles over turf and spoils... Talk in recent weeks among
the opposition of setting up a parallel government of its own seems to have jolted consciences as well
as sad memories [of Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war]"; Economist 14 Jul 07"Briefing: Internet Jihad: A World
Wide Web of Terror"(28-30):- "[C]apability of the internet to promote terrorism is worrying intelligence
agencies. Past technological innovations...have quickly been exploited by terrorists. But the information
revolution is particularly useful to them. Encrypted communications, whether in e-mail or voice-over-internet audio, make it much harder for investigators to monitor their activity... More important, internet
gives jihadists an ideal vehicle for propaganda, providing access to large audiences free of government
censorship or media filters, while carefully preserving their anonymity. Its ability to connect disparate
jihadi groups creates a sense of a global Islamic movement fighting to defend the global ummah, or
community, from a common enemy. It provides a low-risk means of taking part in jihad for sympathisers
across the world... Al-Qaeda now sends out regular 'news bulletins' with a masked man in a studio
recounting events from the many fronts of jihad [Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Palestine]... Battlefield
footage [appears] on the internet within minutes of attacks taking place[, some] with musical soundtracks.
[T]he hand-held video camera has become as important a tool of insurgency as the AK-47 or the RPG
rocket-launcher... Internet's decentralised structure... now gives jihadi networks tremendous resilience.
Number of extremist websites increasing exponentially, from a handful in 2000 to several thousand today.
Some are overtly militant, while others give jihad second place to promoting a puritanical brand of piety.
[M]ost headline-grabbing material... is military manuals - giving instruction on a myriad of subjects, not
least weapons/assassination/poisons/explosives. [I]nternet-based compilations... make it easier for self-starting groups around world to try their hand at terrorism. [I]n password-protected areas[,] participants
can be gradually groomed... But very anonymity that internet affords jihadists can also work against
them[:] police/intelligence agencies enter jihadists' without being identified... Contributors to jihadi web
sites regularly told not to divulge secrets... For many who study jihadi websites, [big] danger is
indoctrination... At least 60% of material...deals not with current events or with war videos, but instead
ideological/ cultural questions. Jihadists... fighting less a war against West than 'a civil war for the minds
of Muslim youth'... A key text is ever-expanding e-book, 'Questions and Uncertainties Concerning the
Mujahideen and their Operations', which seeks to arm jihadists with responses to questions and doubts
about their actions, ranging from admissibility of killing Muslims, use of weapons of mass destruction
and acceptability of shaving one's beard for the sake of jihad... What is needed is a systematic campaign
of counter-propaganda, not least in support of friendly Muslim governments and moderate Muslims, to
try to reclaim the ground ceded to the jihadists"; Economist 21 Jul 07"Nuclear Proliferation: The Riddle
of Iran"(Edit.11-2); "Special Report: Iran"(1-16 special pages):-Edit official sum:"Iran's leaders think
nuclear weapon could rejuvenate their tired revolution. How can they be stopped?" Highlights:"Iran...
moving relentlessly closer to where could build atomic bomb[:] has converted yellowcake into uranium
hexafluoride; now spinning the gas through... centrifuges underground/ secretly. Guess is: if runs 3,000
centrifuges at high speed for a year, enough fuel for first bomb [-] next aim up to 54,000.[U]sable weapon
will also take time. Experts[:] may have bomb by end of 09[; IAEA:]could build within 3-8 years. What Iran
doing entirely illegal[:] signed NPT/says its aims peaceful. [D]isbelieved even by its friends. Russia and
China joined UNSC passing two resolutions...applying sanctions. So what next? [Option analysed is:] Iran
is attacked/enraged/ retaliates - and still ends up with a bomb anyway. [T]his would be attack from the air,
aimed at disabling or destroying Iran's nuclear sites. [S]uch attack well within US capabilities... and
perhaps within Israel's too. Yet would be huge gamble. Even if it delayed/stopped Iran's program, new
holes in US relations with Muslim world [and] Iran almost certainly hit back[:] fire missiles at Israel, attack
US forces in Iraq/Afghanistan, organise terrorist attacks in West, or choke off tankers through world's oil
windpipe... Knowing that a nuclear attack on Israel or US would result in its own prompt annihilation, Iran
could probably be deterred. [C]ontainment of a nuclear Iran would be less awful than a risky pre-emptive
attack that would probably cause mayhem, strengthen the regime and merely delay the bomb. [Yet Iran's]
mere possession might encourage it to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy[and] other countries in
the region... would probably feel compelled to follow suit... But the sanctions so far are not working.
[S]uggests that a third sanctions resolution, with sharper teeth, needs to be enacted without delay...
Sanctions that cut off equipment for its decrepit oilfields or struck hard at the financial interests... would
have immediate impact on its own assessment of the cost of its nuclear program... If at same time Iran
was offered a dignified ladder to climb down - above all reconciliation with US - the troubled leadership
of a tired revolution might just grab it"; Economist 21 Jul 07"Turkey's Election: Of Mullahs and
Majors"(Edit.13-4); "Briefing: Turkey's Election: A Battle for the Future"(25-8):-Briefing's official sum:"The
importance of this... election goes well beyond Turkey itself". Editorial's highlights:"General election is
momentous not just for the country and region but for the cause of democracy in the Muslim world. It was
called early by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PM and leader of ruling Justice and Development(AK) Party...
Opposition harps on AK's Islamist roots and claimed election a fight between secularism and political
Islam. In reality, it [was] over the future of Turkish democracy. AK Party [won]. The government has been
a success[:] stable and relatively clean. [I]t has tamed inflation, seen economic growth of around 7% a
year and lured in record foreign investment [see Briefing. A]lso has modernised constitution[,] shaken
up judiciary[,] nudged army towards civilian control... AK has taken tentative steps to improve treatment
of minorities, especially Turkey's 14m Kurds, although fighting against guerrillas of Kurdistan Workers
Party(PKK) has flared up anew... These successes were crowned by negotiations for membership of EU.
[While these] have run into roadblocks on both sides, [m]ost people in AK have become more like
European-style Christian Democrats[;] no longer a huge threat to secularism. [W]ould be wise for Erdogan
to reach out to his opponents, above all over presidency... Turkey faces two big foreign problems. First,
what to do about PKK fighters in northern Iraq. Turkey has troops in the area now but a big invasion
would be disastrous. Best bet is to persuade US/political leaders of northern Iraq to disarm PKK terrorists
themselves, and to keep talking to modern Kurds... Second, how to keep door to EU ajar. [G]esture
towards legitimacy of Cypriot government would help. But best policy is one of patience. Turkey should
quietly continue to make the reforms needed for full membership"; Economist 28 Jul 07"Islam and
Democracy: The Lesson From Turkey"(Edit.13):-official sum: "Islamist parties that follow the rules should
be allowed to win elections". Highlights:"Decisive victory by [AK] shows every sign so far of having been
an excellent result. [It] could have been a recipe for trouble, coups, internal strife[; b]ut in fact [was] a
thoroughly democratic election, not too much violence, a big turnout and a clear result [see "Elections
in Turkey: The Burden of Victory"(51-2), with official sum:"The ruling AK party has won resoundingly, but
it needs to act cautiously"]. [T]his seems strong rebuke by voters to the army, which had hinted at
interfering in AK's choice of presidential candidate [-] most do not feel it should intervene in politics. Also
rewarding government... and punishing oppositions'... incoherent/unconvincing policies. Exactly how
democracy should work... Is there a lesson in Turkey for the future of democracy in wider Muslim world?
Yes, but approach with care... Turkey has an exceptional history[:] autocratic rule of a moderniser pushed
Islam ruthlessly to the margins; then waited better half of a century for emergence of Islamist party that
looks mild and moderate enough to be trusted. [T]rouble with this approach is that things can go
calamitously wrong both at squeezing-out stage [experience of Iran described]and at letting-in stage
[experience of Algeria described]. Recep Tayyip Erdogan ...as PM... got the gist of what democracy really
means. There is now no serious doubt that AK would surrender power if it were to be defeated at the
ballot box... [R]eal and arguably stronger discipline on AK arises from the experience of democracy
itself[:] continuing political success and underlying legitimacy depend on listening closely to the desires
of voters, which in turn requires it to moderate its Islamist ambitions and obey the rules of the democratic
game... Islamic parties [elsewhere who] declare themselves willing to abide by the rules ought to be
allowed to participate fully in electoral politics"; Christopher Hitchens God Is Not Great: How Religion
Poisons Everything(Toronto:McClelland & Stewart 07):-while the basic aim here is to specifically criticize
the beliefs and activities of all major religions, the widely-travelled, -researched, and -admired author
deeply reports on the religious origin of instability in all parts of world. From official sum:"With his
unique brand of erudition and wit, [he] addresses the most urgent issue of today: the malignant force of
religion in the world". Chapter titles: (1)Putting It Mildly; (2)Religion Kills; (3)A Short Digression on the
Pig or, Why Heaven Hates Him; (4)A Note on Health, to Which Religion Can Be Hazardous; (5)The
Metaphysical Claims of Religion Are False; (6)Arguments from Design; (7)Revelation: The Nightmare of
the"Old"Testament; (8)The"New"Testament Exceeds the Evil of the"Old"One; (9) The Koran Is Borrowed
from Both Jewish and Christian Myths; (10)The Tawdriness of the Miraculous and the Decline of Hell;
(11)"The Lowly Stamp of Their Origin"; Religion's Corrupt Beginnings; (12)A Coda: How Religions End;
(13)Does Religion Make People Behave Better?; (14)There Is No"Eastern"Solution; (15)Religion as an
Original Sin; (16)Is Religion Child Abuse?; (17)An Objection Anticipated: The Last-Ditch"Case"Against
Secularism; (18)A Finer Tradition: The Resistance of the Rational; (19)In Conclusion: The Need for a New
Enlightenment; William Langewiesche The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor(New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux 07):-this useful but selective description of nuclear weapons distributions and prospects
is very easy for non-specialists to read. It does not attempt to analyse in detail all likely nuclear threats
of the world this century, but offers three analyses carefully. First is the way in which nuclear weapons
explode and the ways in which the key materials can be obtained/ created. According to the book, "For
ordinary fission bombs, there are really only two choices - either plutonium or highly enriched uranium.
Plutonium is a man-made element produced by uranium reactors, from which it emerges initially mixed
in with the other radioactive waste, but is separable through chemical processes... The alternative is
highly enriched uranium, or HEU, containing more than 90% of the fissionable isotope, U-235"(21-2).
Second subject analysed is danger of inadequately-secure Cold War assets falling into hands of terrorists:
"US government reacted rapidly to a perception of chaos and opportunity in post-Soviet nuclear affairs
and in 1993 launched an ambitious complex of 'cooperative' programs with all the former Soviet states
to lessen the chance that nuclear weapons might end up in the wrong hands"(28). Third analysis is "the
story of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist at the forefront of nuclear development and trade in the Middle
East, who masterminded the theft and sale of centrifuge designs that helped to build Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal and who single-handedly peddled nuclear plans to North Korea, Iran and other countries
potentially hostile to Western interests"(from dust-cover sum); Economist 11 Aug 07"US, Israel and the
Palestinians: A Modest Ambition"(Edit.10-1):-official sum:"What George Bush should do for the
Palestinians in the final phase of his presidency". Highlights:"Conditions have seldom looked less ripe
for peace. Both sides' leaders are fragile and risk averse... Israelis have learned in Gaza and Lebanon that
when they pull out of occupied territory without a peace deal, rockets/fighters pursue them across the
border... Israel's only remaining option, apart from sitting still, is to negotiate agreement with Abbas,
under which it can leave the West Bank and so make room for independent Palestine. [M]ight look easier
now Hamas have been booted out[, but truth] is starkly different. Hamas... is not out of the picture [so]
no peace deal without its consent. [It] remains popular not only in Gaza but also in West Bank [and] could
swiftly sabotage any [opposed] peace by mounting violent attacks against Israel or [Abbas]. So long as
Hamas remains excluded,.. Bush's meeting better be modest [eg] some sort of declaration of principles...
For past 20 years, as Israeli settlements continued to spread in West Bank, Palestinians see negotiations
as all process and no destination. By forcing Olmert to give Abbas a clear promise of what and where
independent Palestine will be, US/Arab partners may be able to restore a modicum of Palestinian
enthusiasm. This means writing down some detail on borders.,. refugees and Jerusalem. Since no Israeli
PM [can] accept [any] refugees to homes now in Israel, Olmert will have to [offer] shared capital in
Jerusalem [-] hellishly controversial in Israel but would play well with Arab states. [M]ay be gestures, too,
such as evacuation of some Israeli outposts[, but] no grand bargain will be implemented against Hamas's
will. Nor... a deal negotiated with Hamas on board... while it continues to reject the very principle of
permanent peace with Israel. [Yet] the world should avoid temptation to punish Palestinians of Gaza
economically for their leaders' obduracy" - see:"The Gaza Strip: Staying Alive"(39):-official sum:"Hamas
brings some order, but little else, to embattled Gazans". Also see "Religion: Rules of the Game"(75-6):
Review of Olivier Roy Secularism Confronts Islam(Columbia Univ Press 07),translated by George Holoch.
"Central contention is that 'problem is not Islam but religion or, rather, the contemporary forms of the
revival of religion'... New believers are often individualistic, rejecting conformity with either orthodox
theology or institutionalised religion"; Nayan Chanda Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers,
Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization(New Haven: Yale Univ Press 07):-this fascinating survey
of the development of globalization since 6000BCE is valuable as a unique reminder - to specialists in
history, politics, economics, religion, movement, technology, science, etc - of how their own knowledge
relates to other specialized information, and to the present/future of the intense/expanding relations
across this planet. (This aim corresponds exactly with my purpose in this information source.) Style is
amusing, and novel in all areas but one's expertise, so it is delicious/constructive in all unstudied fields
and hence globally constructive. Final para offers view that fits closely with that in Christopher Spencer
Oct 06(op.cit.):"We benefit from all that the world has to offer, but we think only in narrow terms of
protecting the land and people within our national borders - the borders that have been established only
in the modern era. [All that separates us] from the rest of the world... cannot change the fact that we are
bound together through the invisible filament of history. [W]e know how we have reached where we are
and where we may be headed. We are in a position to know that the sum of human desires, aspirations,
and fears that have woven our fates together can neither be disentangled nor reeled back. But neither are
we capable of accurately gauging how this elemental mix will shape our planet's future. Still, compared
to the past... we are better equipped to look over the horizon at both the dangers and the opportunities
...There is no alternative to rising above our tribal interests: over the centuries to come, our destinies will
remain inextricably bound together. [W]e can attempt to nudge our rapidly integrating world toward a
more harmonious course - because we are all connected"; The Economist 01 Sep 07"Mosques in the
West: Islam, the American Way"(Edit.10); "The Politics of Mosque-Building: Constructing Conflict"(53-5):-Edit's official sum:"Why US fairer to Muslims than 'Eurabia'". Highlights:"[S]omething similar about
[mosque-related] vignettes of inter-faith politics in the Western world. All illustrate the strong emotions,
and opportunistic electoral games, surfacing many countries as Muslim minorities increasingly
prosperous/confident, aspire more mosques/other communal buildings. All show way in which whipped-up fears of a 'clash of civilisations' can inflame humdrum politics of a locality. But there is a big
transatlantic difference in way such disputes are handled". Major item then pressed. However both follow
usual/unfair policy of comparing a large number of European states against a single North American one,
pity when Canada's particular "multicultural" policy is unusually relevant to issue here discussed.]
"Although US plenty of Islam-bashers ready to play on people's fears, it offers better protection to mosque
builders. In particular, its constitution/legal system/political culture all generally take side of religious
liberty... More important than... law ethos leans in favour of religious [who] 'new' (to their neighbours) and
simply want to practise their faith in a way harms nobody... European Convention on Human Rights, and
court that enforces, also protect religious freedom. But not central to European politics... Legal principles
aside, there are pragmatic reasons for favouring US [and Canadian?] way. Most mosques in Western
world pose no threat to non-Muslim citizens; but a few do pose such a danger, because of hatred
preached in them. In such cases police generally have legal armoury need to step in and make arrests if
necessary. Quashing extremism surely easier where founding/running mosques open/transparent
business. .. Christians in West long complained about how hard for their brethren in Muslim lands to build
churches... But they should practise what they preach". "Briefing: Capital Punishment in US: Revenge
Begins To Seem Less Sweet"(20-2): much more critical of US legal/political system"; The Economist 01
Sep 07"Egypt: Bashing the Muslim Brothers"(38-44):-official sum:"Egypt‛s rulers are giving their Islamist
compatriots an even worse time than usual". Highlights:"Muslim Brotherhood... now proclaims belief in
freedom, democracy and rule of law... Their enthusiasm for violent jihad and constant framing of Islam
as a faith threatened by vicious enemies helped spawn more radical Islamist groups... [Egypt's] president,
Hosni Mubarak, recently chided Brothers for 'hiding behind religion to turn back the clock'[, and] past few
months resulted in some 600 arrests... Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, a secular-leaning lobby,
details some 567 cases of police torture in past 14 years, of which 167 led to death,[and] concluded
torture is practised systematically in every place of detention in every part of Egypt... [It] is one of the
world's most heavily policed countries. Its 75m enjoy relative freedom from crime. But recent years have
seen growing public discomfort with the force... widely seen... squashing dissent. So current campaign
against Brotherhood, officially outlawed despite having won a fifth of seats in last parliamentary elections
as independents, has brought the group widespread sympathy. [P]unishment has several causes. Many
cite the erosion of pressure for democratic reform from US... More immediately pressing, however, [is]
Brotherhood's declared intention to challenge a recently imposed constitutional ban on religiously based
political parties, by issuing a full-fledged legislative platform. [Suggests] group wants to capitalise not
only on Egypt's strong and growing religious conservatism but also on public anger at government's
perceived indifference to the country's myriad social ills"; Economist 15 Sep 07"Pakistan: The Wrong
Direction"(Edit.14); "Briefing: Pakistan: Home And Away"(31-3):-Edit's official sum:"Why US should push
General Musharraf harder towards democracy". Highlights:"It seems odd to claim that [Nawaz Sharif, an
appalling PM 1990-93, and 1997-99 when overthrown by Musharraf,] is crucial to Pakistan democratic
future [-] nevertheless true. Sharif represents something without which democracy cannot thrive - a real
political movement with popular support. By expelling him.,. Musharraf has demonstrated is not serious
about restoring democracy... Whether Pakistan moves back to democracy, or is condemned to
authoritarianism, is of great interest to... the rest of the world... Musharraf in some ways been impressive
leader: managed to stay in power/hold politicians at bay for 8 years. Technically, he restored democracy
in 02, but has rigged elections [and] ignored Supreme Court ruling that he should allow Sharif back.
[G]rowing majority of Pakistanis want him out but, by persuading US that holding line against Islamist
extremists[, been helped to] hang on to power. Yet its getting difficult for general. [Briefing offers major
report on complex/serious human region]. Presidential election is due next months; parliamentary one
by Jan 08. He may explore [state of emergency]; or may try to do a deal with Benazir Bhutto, the only other
political leader, who is demanding immunity from prosecution, [right to seek] third PM term, curbing of
president's powers, and establishment of a caretaker government. [S]uch a cosy arrangement... depends
on its terms. [I]nsisting Musharraf take off his uniform if he wants to be president would be worth doing.
But a deal that divides power, general/Bhutto, and deprives Pakistanis of determining own future, would
not... A stable Pakistan is crucial to regional peace and to securing the world against terrorism. But only
way to discourage Islamist extremism in Pakistan is through democracy"; Economist 15 Sep
07"Terrorism: Visions of Osama Bin Laden"(73-4):-official sum:"Al-Qaeda's leader returns and foresees
victory in Iraq". Highlights:"Osama bin Laden has returned from the wilderness to cast his curse against
the evildoers. US, he predicts, will fall in Iraq... Capitalism and democracy are worst forms of 'polytheism',
causing war, global warming, poverty and costly mortgages. Solution to such wickedness is for US to
'embrace Islam'. Then war would end and US would be richer, because Islam... has no income taxes
except 2.5% title known as zakat. Call to convert is no rhetorical flourish: Islamic jurisprudence requires
that non-believers be given a chance before attacked. [I]ntelligence will search... for clues about
intentions... and state of health... Bin Laden's return... was his first video appearance since 04 [and]
coincides with a resurgence of his movement... Al-Qaeda and its offshoots have regrouped, replaced lost
commanders and built up a stronger following around the world. [L]atest reminders of violent jihadism
[were] inspired, if not directed, by al-Qaeda. Experts debate whether al-Qaeda is as dangerous, or more
so, as in 01. [Many say] it has recreated a safe haven in Pakistan's lawless tribal belt, alongside its
strengthened Taliban allies. [For Pakistani involvement with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda see:"Briefing:
Pakistan: Home And Away"(31-3) and particularly mid-section of Brief which reports: "Poll found that 46%
of Pakistanis approve of al-Qaeda's chief, against 38% for their president".] Al-Qaeda's ideology, if not the
movement itself, has become more globalised [and] underlines concern about home-grown terrorism
across Europe. Much of al-Qaeda's propaganda, as well as its military training manuals, are spread
through a large network of jihadist websites. Muslims anywhere can become radicalised and join the
fights, with little or no involvement from al-Qaeda's leaders. [S]ome converts to Islam appear to be
particularly prone to extremism... Though training is much easier abroad, home-grown cells may need no
direction from overseas and can act faster, making it harder to detect them... Al-Qaeda has experienced
some broader setbacks, however, notably in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, where violent jihadist campaigns
have been largely squashed... Still, Iraq is stoking the cause[ and,] like Afghanistan after Soviet defeat,
Iraq too will start exporting hardened terrorists". For relevant material on situation in Iraq - with official
sums - see: "The Iraq War: Why They Should Stay"(13):-"For all General Petraeus's spin, Iraq is still a
violent mess. That is why US should not leave yet"; "US and Iraq: The General Speaks"(37-8):-"David
Petraeus says Iraq is improving and some 30,000 US troops can come home by next summer. Congress
wants more"; "Iraq: How Fast Do the Iraqis Want US to Get Out?"(57):-"While US argues over how and
when to bring their boys home, the Iraqis have their own equally mixed views"; Economist 29 Sep
07"Lebanon: Who's For President?"(48-9):-official sum:"Finding a new head of state may not stem the
slide back towards bloody chaos". Highlights:"Lebanon's...plot is still getting thicker... On 19 Sep, car
exploded in Beirut, killing MoP from ruling majority and four others [-] 11th prominent opponent of Syria
to be so targeted... Not a single culprit has been caught so far. On 25 Sep, parliament, which has in effect
been suspended since its speaker joined an opposition boycott of it last Dec, reconvened at last. [It] must
elect new president before the term of widely disparaged/doggedly pro-Syrian incumbent expires 24 Nov.
[But] too few showed up to have vote [and] speaker adjourned until end Oct... Ruling coalition, Sunni-Druze-Christian grouping, backed by West/Saudi Arabia, said may now elect president merely with simple
majority. Opposition, which groups Shia Hizbullah/disgruntled Christians, backed by Syria/Iran, has
declared such move illegal. 'Declaration of war' said former general Aoun, who believes his tactical
alliance with Shia bolsters his own credentials for post. [S]uch talk is not taken lightly. Lebanon's internal
schism mirrors the polarisation of wider region. It pits those who retain some faith in West/would seek
accomodation with Israel, against who demonise US and dream of liberating Jerusalem. [For a deep issue
against Israeli policy, see "Israel: The Land of Zion"(49):-extracts:"Jewish National Fund(JNF) was set up
to buy land in Palestine for settling Jews there... Now fund is fuelling the tension inherent in Israel's desire
to be both Jewish state and democracy... JNF owns nearly 2,600sqkm, 13% of Israel's land, and its
covenant states the land can be leased only to Jews... Critics counter that at least half fund's lands... were
seized by the state after their Palestinian owners fled in 48... At time when anti-Israel campaigners are
seizing on chances to compare Israel with apartheid South Africa, has troubled some Jews".] Events,
such as invasion of Iraq, war with Israel,..serial murders in Beirut, have fortified [Lebanese] convictions...
Intensity of passions has grown, fears one diplomat, to where another assassination or big event further
afield, such as military attack on Iran, could reignite civil war. [Yet] outcome not necessarily catastrophic...
Amid meetings between leaders of opposing factions, talk of reaching a compromise over presidency
grew louder. [No] effective president can afford to alienate Shias, who make up third of Lebanon's people.
In any case, factional struggle will continue, no matter who occupies presidency. Several compromise
candidates have been tabled... Most Lebanese at least agree almost anyone would be better than Lahoud";
Economist 06 Oct 07"Civil Liberties: Detention Without Trial: The Stuff of Nightmares"(70-1):-official
sum:"Judges and parliamentarians are restraining the zeal of governments who want a free hand to fight
terror". Highlights:"[US] Senate Judiciary Committee [discussing] to restore habeas corpus rights to
Guantánamo detainees. Most have been held for nearly six years without charge, without access to a
lawyer or any indication of when, if ever, they might be released... Guantánamo has become... reaction
to the terror attacks of 11 Sep 01. In Britain, too, government has sought new powers to tackle Islamist
terrorism. [I]n both, the doctrine of the balance of powers has passed a test... Freedom from arbitrary
arrest and detention, coupled with the right to challenge it in an independent court... are among the
civilised world's most sacred and ancient liberties... But these days, there is more talk of pre-emption and
'preventive detention', even in democracies. [I]s US's war on terror a real war in the legal sense? If not,
then the detainees should be treated as ordinary criminal suspects. This is the path that most European
countries have chosen. Even if it could be deemed a real war, it is clearly unlike an ordinary state conflict:
it has neither a definable end nor even an identifiable enemy with whom to sue for peace. It could last for
decades... US has also engaged in so-called 'extraordinary rendition' - the abduction of suspected
terrorists to face not justice, but harsh interrogation, perhaps torture, in a third country... The new system
[in Britain] seems as riddled with problems as the old, and almost as unfair... But no leader of a Western
democracy has obtained a completely free hand in detaining people. US has seen a tug of war between
the government and the courts, with many rounds... Many hope the Supreme Court will seize opportunity
to give a view on whether [President] Bush's 'war on terror' is a real war. Congress, too, is beginning to
show its teeth... In Britain, too, Parliament has baulked at some of the government's demands";
Economist 13 Oct 07"Civil Liberties: Freedom of Speech: The Tongue Twisters"(66-7):-official sum:"The
difficulty of reconciling traditional freedoms of expression with the new demands of national security".
Highlights:"In countries at war, freedoms of the press and of speech often restricted... Al-Qaeda's attacks
of 11 Sep 01, by precipitating a 'war on terror', also raised questions - both legal and moral - about the role
of the media in free societies. Several Western governments used national security as justification for
limiting certain sorts of public information/public speech. Press itself has... sometimes refused to accept
limits on its freedom of expression;.. sometimes has accepted them. If [accept] the lip service almost all
countries pay to a free press - 160 UN members have ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights - then freedom of expression has had a tough time... UN for first time issued statement
condemning the targeting of journalists and calling for the prosecution of their killers... To some degree,
the global increase in the number of journalists being killed, kidnapped and otherwise harassed may
signify that more journalists at work, and growing bolder... Attacks on media, Freedom House points out,
are not only bad in themselves; they are also a sign of worse to come: other democratic institutions. In
repressive countries, internet has often been greeted as a wonderful way to bypass government control...
For a while, relatively immune to regulation[, but] an academic think-tank says that censorship of internet
has spread from just a handful of countries five years ago to 26 nations. Some... now blocking entire
internet services. It is not surprising that such countries are suppressing freedom of expression... US
gives greater protection to freedom of expression than any other country... Even so, a Century Foundation
[man claims,] Bush's attempts 'to intimidate/punish the media, or at least to manipulate/mislead it,
represents one of most concerted assaults on [constitution]"[, and] number of documents being stamped
secret or classified has almost quadrupled... For many,.. administration has tilted balance too far towards
maintaining'certain information...in confidence'... In Britain, freedom of expression has been under
attack... It has now gone further [than US]... At first meeting of UNGA, delegates described freedom of
expression as 'the touchstone of all human rights'. In practice, that freedom has never been totally
unfettered... Under European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression is subject to a wide
range of possible restrictions, including national laws banning speech likely to incite/'stir up' hatred
against people... Since 01, these sorts of restrictions expanded to apply to Muslims... Free-speech critics
insisted some element of intent be involved, claiming otherwise religious works... could be deemed
unlawful... Sometimes the press has decided to censor itself... Attempts to gag press in democratic
countries usually fail"; Economist 27 Oct 07"Armies of the Future: Brains, Not Bullets"(Edit.15); "Briefing:
Fighting Insurgents: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers"(33-6):-official sums:"Western armies good
at destroying things. Can they be made better at building them?";"Irregular warfare may keep Western
armies busy for decades. They will have to adapt if they are to overcome the odds that history suggests
they are up to". Both tell what must be modified in any effective army in order to at least control
insurgents that can arise anywhere. Most information relates to the West(,as does General Sir Rupert
Smith The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World op cit). The issues apply to the whole world
and involve more than just military action - above all cooperation(, as argued in: Christopher Spencer
REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST COOPERATE - IN TERMS OF BOTH THEIR WEALTH
AND KNOWLEDGE - IN ORDER TO SURVIVE op cit). Editorial highlights:"Firepower is of little use, and
often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians. [West] must expect to
fight protracted, enervating counter-insurgency wars that offer no clear-cut victories / risk prospect of
humiliation ... Counter-insurgency... is 'armed social work'. It requires more brain than brawn, more
patience than aggression. Model soldier should be... intellectual for 'the graduate level of war', preferably
a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology...Post-colonial politics, stronger concerns for human
rights, the rapid dispersal of news: all these (good) things make today's conflicts even harder to win for
occupiers. So it may well be better to step back and work through local allies. Few insurgencies have
unseated existing governments. In 'war on terror' most important al-Qaeda suspects rounded up... by
locals. Strengthening local forces is best way of salvaging Iraq and Afghanistan, and may help avoid the
need for future interventions. [B]uilding 'partner capacity' may need... creating new specialist units to train
allies, embed Western soldiers in local forces to improve their performance/call in air [aid], and help
organise civil reconstruction [and diplomacy]. [S]hift in focus from destruction to construction... is
certainly worth putting more money into manpower". "Briefing" highlights: "Modern wars are complex
affairs conducted 'among the people'... The greater the accuracy of modern weapons, the louder the
outcry when they kill or wound civilians... Guerrillas' main weapons: agility, surprise, support of at least
some sections of the population and, above all, time. [New US manual says that] in fighting an enemy
'among the people', the central objective is not to destroy the enemy but to secure allegiance of the
citizenry. All strands of a campaign - military/economic/political - must be strongly entwined
...Nationalist/pan-Islamic sentiments are much stronger than in the past. Information technology has
helped jihadists spread 'single narrative' that Muslims everywhere are under attack. Internet provides a
new and unassailable sanctuary from which to propagandise/organise/share tactics... A growing body of
opinion... has concluded that insurrections are best fought indirectly, through local allies. [F]or local
governments, fighting insurgents is a matter of survival... To build viable governments... has proved
difficult enough even where the fighting has stopped and the main political forces have been cooperative
(or at least acquiescent)... Although most armies have now relearnt the limits of force and importance of
'comprehensive approach', other branches of government have not [foreign policy, aid agencies. US army]
needs not just more soldiers - nor even linguists, civil-affairs officers, engineers - but a fully fledged corps
of advisers that will train and 'embed' themselves with allied forces around the world. Insurgencies may
be the face of war for West in years ahead. [E]xtremists round the world have seen US vulnerability to the
rocket-propelled grenade, AK-47 and suicide-bomber"; Economist 27 Oct 07"Afghanistan's Taliban: War
Without End"(50):-official sum:"Not winning, but not losing either". Highlights:"[I]nfiltration routes from
Pakistan will be blocked to the Taliban [soon by snow]. NATO commanders... feel they were on the front
foot during the summer. Since Jan, almost 6,000 killed - 50% increase on 06. Included 200 NATO/more
than 3,000 alleged Talibs. Insurgent violence up by 20% on 06, largely because [NATO] pushed into areas
formerly held by Taliban. Nonetheless, few observers doubt Afghan insurgency has years to run[:] Taliban
seem to have enough recruits[;] refuge /logistical base in Pakistan lawless tribal areas[;]enough funds
-40% from drug trade... NATO's role stopgap, as $billions building Afghan security forces... 20-30% of
population in south support Taliban[ -]whose fighters between 6,000-20,000. Some 6,000 Taliban reported
killed since 05, with no sign [this] dented capability. [Hence]will not, by itself, end insurgency. Suicide
bombings[, rare until 05,] this year more than 120. Roadside bombings also increasing. NATO claims this
is sign of desperation [and] focused on attacking Taliban leadership[- some success]. Locals [say] Taliban
taken severe punishment in south. [M]uch talk of prising away 'moderate Taliban' through negotiation[,
but] Taliban fighters now appearing in previously placid provinces [and] NATO's nearly 35,000 not enough
to take and hold all parts[- and] publicly divided. Taliban, too, fragmented. Far from monolithic Islamists
they were in 01, they now span various groups with differing motivations. Alongside the diehard
madrassa-trained Talibs are growing numbers of foreigners with al-Qaeda links. ['T]ier-2' fighters are
drawn to fight for many reasons: unemployment; illegal opium; tribal loyalties... Many Afghans in south
would support any force offering real hope of security/justice. [N]either Taliban nor Afghan
government/Western backers have yet made a convincing case"; Economist 03 Nov 07"Faith and Politics:
The New Wars of Religion"(Edit.15-6); "Special Report: On Religion and Public Life: In God's Name"
(Unique 1-22):-Both official sums: "Faith will unsettle politics everywhere this century; it will do so least
when it is separated from the state"; "Religion will play a big role in this century‛s politics. John
Micklethwait asks how we should deal with it". Editorial's highlights:"[R]eligion is playing a central role.
[P]eople have been slain in God's name; [religion-related] money/ volunteers have poured into regions
[; and] religion has forced itself dramatically into the public square. [Brief references here; Report
chapters: US, Turkey, India, Israel/Palestine, China, Iran.] How frightening (or inspiring) is this prospect?
As Special Report explains, idea religion has re-emerged in public life is to some extent illusion. It never
really went away... Its new power is mostly the consequence of two changes. First is failure of secular
creeds. Second, although some theocracies survive in Islamic world, religion has returned to stage as
much more democratic, individualistic affair... in tune with globalisation... Free up religion and ardent
believers/atheists both do well... Culture wars... may become a global phenomenon; expect fierce battles
about science. [R]eligious conflict today is result as much of popular will as of state sponsorship: bottom-up, driven by volunteers not conscripts, their activities blessed by rogue preachers not popes; fury mostly
directed at apostates not competing civilisations... [P]oliticians...to deal with religion, two lessons - one
principled, other pragmatic. Principle is that church and state best kept separate[; eg] teachers not
allowed to teach children creationism as science. [Economist] disapproves of publicly financed faith
schools. [R]eligion [in] public square most overtly is Islam... At its most theocratic, it forces people to
follow sharia laws... Yet Islam can clearly co-exist with a modern liberal state [-] test case will be Turkey...
Pragmatic lesson concerns those wars of religion... Western powers (and religious leaders) too reluctant
to look for faith-driven solutions to religious conflicts... 'Interfaith dialogue'... is more realistic idea than
presenting a secular peace to competing faiths... Atheists and agnostics hate the fact, but these days
religion is inescapable part of politics... Unless politicians learn to take account of religious feelings and
to draw a firm line between church and state, the new wars of religion may prove as intractable". All above
discussed in Special Report; Economist 10 Nov 07"Martial Law in Pakistan: Time's Up, Mr
Musharraf"(Edit.13); "Briefing: Pakistan: Lawyers Against the General" (31-4):-official sums:"No longer
the potential solution, the general has become a big part of Pakistan's problem"; "However Pervez
Musharraf tries to justify his actions, this is a dark time for his wretched country". Editorial's
highlights:"General Musharraf has... seemed, despite his embarrassing lack of democratic credentials,
a relatively safe pair of hands in charge of 165m-strong moderate Islamic nation [-with] nuclear weapons
and prey to frightening extremist fringe. Over years, however, [he] has squandered the goodwill he
enjoyed at home and abroad. [H]is alliance with US[, and] refusal to take off army uniform [or] allow
unrigged elections, alienated [wide] opinion. [H]is second coup came 03 Nov when he dismantled
constitutional facade,.. imposed martial law[,] locked up [hundreds and took] private TV off air. Many want
him gone[ b]ut not obvious how to force his hand without endangering stability of Pakistan itself.
[Musharraf] is now a central part of Pakistan's instability... In declaring 'a state of emergency', he cited
two threats:.. the spread of violent extremism and the pesky interference of the judiciary in his efforts to
deal with it. [Briefing is recommended here for details.] The extremist violence has spread from the
lawless tribal areas where Pakistan blurs into Afghanistan to the neighbouring parts of Pakistan proper,
and beyond [Islamabad, Karachi. Other threats include] involvement of Pakistan-trained terrorists in
attacks in the West[, while] the radical mullahs of the border areas people the West's worst nightmares
[of] a 'Talibanised', nuclear-armed Pakistan... But martial law has so clearly pitted [Musharraf] and army
against the rest of the country that, rather than gain a sharper focus, he is now likely more distracted...
US and Britain are loth to do anything that might jeopardise their links with Pakistan's army and its
intelligence services... Logistical support for Afghan war, undermining Taliban's rear base in the tribal
areas, intelligence on planned terrorist attacks in West: all demand Pakistani cooperation. For this
reason,.. threat to withdraw US aid... is difficult to use. But it should be used... Musharraf has apparently
promised to hold elections by mid-Feb... Pakistan can still be dragged back from the brink. Top brass of
Pakistan army[ - ]their loyalty to their boss can be assumed to be finite... It must be made plain that [US]
backing is dependent on restoring democracy, through a free election open to all. Otherwise, as military
dictators go, so should General Musharraf"; Ömer Taspinar"The Old Turks' Revolt: When Radical
Secularism Endangers Democracy"Foreign Affairs Vol.86/No.6(Nov/Dec 07):-off.sum:"The ruckus over
election of a religious conservative as Turkey's president has exposed the illiberal nature of Turkish
secularism - as well as the pragmatism of the country's reformed Islamists. Preserving democracy in
Turkey by keeping the military out of politics will be a tall order, but the future of the Muslim world's most
promising democratic experiment is at stake"; Economist 24 Nov 07"The Middle East Summit: Mr
Palestine"(Edit.13-4):-off.sum:"George Bush is the only man who can bring an independent Palestine
closer". [Earlier item on summit: 11 Aug 07; for update:]"Israel and Palestine: Cinderella at Annapolis"(27-9):-off.sum:"Muddled expectations and mismanaged diplomacy may mean Annapolis peace summit
achieves far less than backers once hoped". Edit.highlights: "[T]wo sides have[recently] not bridged
longstanding differences. [W]ould take immense courage for Abbas to modify Palestinians' mantra: a state
on 1967 borders, a capital in Jerusalem and 'right' of refugees of 60 years ago to return to what is now
Israel. [PM Olmert] governs in coalition with men who hate the very idea of an independent Palestine...
Polls show many Israelis long to be rid of Palestine territories[, b]ut even they wonder how they can trust
Abbas's Palestinian Authority to police state when already lost Gaza to Hamas and might well lose West
Bank too... But Bush has it within his power to make so much more... Israelis right to say divided
Palestinians in no shape right now to govern a state: Hamas has first to be bullied, bribed or cajoled into...
joining the peace camp... In past, US asked Israelis and Palestinians to thrash out their differences on
their own. But they can't. The gap is too wide. [A] US blueprint that commanded international support
would, however, immediately transform the political dynamic. [Bush] should make it clear that when US
talks of a two-state solution, it has in mind a border based on the pre-1967 line. [H]e can now tell Israel
that it cannot keep more than a few percentage points - say 5% - of West Bank, and must offer
Palestinians land from its own side in compensation. On refugees, right to 'return' should be exercised
in new Palestine and not in pre-1967 Israel... Israel too must accept... Jerusalem... to be capital of both.
[O]nly a deal along [these] lines... stands the remotest chance of bringing permanent peace"; Economist
01 Dec 07"The Annapolis Peace Summit: Much To Be Modest About"(Edit.16); "The Arab-Israeli Summit
in Annapolis: Big Turnout, Small Result"(59-60):-off.sums:"George Bush sent Palestinian moderates home
with little to show and less to sell";"An agreement on further peace talks, if not much else". Edit.
highlights:"Israeli and Palestinian delegations at last minute approved 437 words for US president to read
out, but this was the sort of declaration that makes the phase 'lowest common denominator' sound
generous. It... is utterly silent on borders, Jerusalem, Israel's West Bank settlements, fate of the
Palestinian refugees - all the issues that have confounded previous bouts... Hope that US president might
fill the gap was confounded too [all amplified 59-60 item]. US still has pulling power: Saudi Arabia, Syria
and a dozen other Arab countries turned up. [Yet Bush's] own speech was almost miraculously content-free. [S]aying out loud that the border would have to be based on that of 1967, or that the two states would
have to share Jerusalem, was evidently too daring for this deadbeat White House... Talking is better than
killing[, but] the start of even unpromising peace talks galvanises the spoilers from both sides[, and] the
prospects of escalation are all too real. As soon as one of the many [Hamas rockets] kills a large number
of Israelis, Olmert will come under intense pressure to send his army back into Gaza Strip... That could
lead to war no less brutal than the one Israel fought against Hizbullah in Lebanon... But in asking Abbas
to lead his exhausted/sceptical people back into the tunnel of negotiations, and neglecting to switch on
a light at the end of it, Bush asking a lot of the Palestinian moderates. If they fail, he will deserve a big
share of blame"; Economist 24 Nov 07"Africa: Promises, Promises"(Edit.15); "African Peacekeeping: The
Doves of War"(52-4):-Editorial's off.sum:"It is time for both Africans and the rich world to walk the talk in
Darfur and Somalia". Highlights:"Eastern Congo faces a humanitarian disaster; the killing in Sudan's
Darfur region goes on apace; war rages between Islamist militias and Ethiopian troops in Somalia; rebels
threaten the government in Chad; war may resume between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Sudan's
government and former rebels in autonomous south. [Edit. then recommends "...Doves of War", with
off.sum:"Too many conflicts, too few decent armies to sort them out". It also briefs other peacekeeping:
Burundi-Rwanda, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone.] UN is sending
unprecedented numbers of troops to the region. It already has 17,000 in Congo and 20,000 more due to
join existing 6,000-strong African Union (AU) force in Darfur - largest UN forces in the world. Another 2,000
between Eritreans-Ethiopians, plus 10,000 in south Sudan. AU also 1,600 Ugandan troops in Somalia...
In Congo, UN is doing its best to hold the ring between several rival ragtag armies, but elsewhere its fine
intentions have yet to bear fruit. In Darfur,.. imperative for UN is to provide both transport and attack
helocopters for [to-be-]expanded force. [A] robust/mobile force is vital if peace is to be restored to a
region where some 300,000 have already died and more than 2m are displaced. In Somalia,.. African
countries have failed to deliver. AU promised a force of 8,000 to keep peace in Mogadishu, [b]ut so far only
the Ugandans, too few to do the job, have turned up... and war threatens to engulf the capital again,
perhaps infecting whole region. Africa/West seem to have lost hope and interest... Main foreign
governments involved in negotiations... must not give up"; Economist 01 Dec 07"Lebanon: In Search of
a Government"(60) [directly follows:"Who's for President?" 29 Sep 07]:-off.sum:"Even as the country's
people get used to not having one". Highlights:"[F]inal day of President Emile Lahoud's term of office
[was 23 Nov], and parliament bound to elect a successor... Failure to choose a new head of state, many
said, could precipitate a slide into chaos and even a renewal of 1975-90 civil war... Tensions are still high,
but fears of imminent strife appear to have dissipated. Lebanese have resumed business [and] country
has muddled along without a legislature since last Nov... During this time divisions between ruling
majority [Sunni/Druze/smaller Christian factions] and opponents [Shia/populist Christian groups] have
solidified. Core dispute... concerns opposition demands for a bigger share in government[, but ]rendered
more complex by influence of foreign powers [Iran/Syria/France/US/Saudi Arabia] ... Syria might push its
Lebanese allies towards compromising over presidency in exchange for... attention to its claim on Golan
Heights... Yet there are also important Lebanese internal dynamics at play... between its three largest
sects... Most popular Maronite politician, Michel Aoun, has strong anti-Syrian credentials, but his volatile
nature and alliance with Hizbullah alienate many Christians... [Yet] army commander-in-chief, Michel
Suleiman, has gained respect for keeping his men above the political fray, and using them effectively to
maintain security. Although many Lebanese would be relieved to see the low-key general as president,
his election requires a change to constitution rules barring soldiers from civilian office";Economist 08 Dec
07"Iran's Bomb Program: Pressure Works('High Confidence')"(Edit.13-4) :-off.sum:"US's spies have
changed their minds. But nuclear Iran remains a danger". Highlights: "In 2005 [US intelligence] said that
Iran had a secret nuclear program and was determined to get a bomb. Now they say they were wrong
about that. [For more on the revised analysis and US reactions, see:"Iran: Nuclear Fallout [in
WSHDC]"(38):off.sum:"[US] spooks change their tune, and [US] politicians recalibrate". For also Iranian
reaction:"Iran's Nuclear Program: What's Not To Celebrate?"(53-4):off.sum:"Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
thinks Iran is home free".] NIE says with 'high confidence' that although Iran was indeed working on a
bomb until 03, it then stopped. By middle of 07, it had probably ('moderate confidence') not started again.
Unless it got fuel for a bomb from abroad, would take at least until late 09 ('moderate confidence'), but
more likely between 2010 and 15 to make it at home. [I]ntelligence is... system of best guesses based on
incomplete evidence[, but as] 16 agencies signed report[,] most unlikely to be a tissue of lies. [H]owever,
relieved [US] doves... had better read the report again[:] final sentence says ('high confidence') that Iran
has scientific/technical/industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if chooses. ['A]t a
minimum' it is keeping the option open[, t]roubling because Iran can continue to work towards a bomb
without resuming secret program US now thinks stopped in 03... But creating warhead is easier part of
building a bomb. Harder by far is making the fuel [which] Iran continues to do, in defiance of UNSC, at
uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz. For now, Iran enriching uranium at below weapons grade[, but] to
get the uranium to weapons grade it has only to run the stuff often enough through Natanz's centrifuges...
The case for US pre-eption [attack] now becomes almost impossible to sell [ - ] probably a good thing.
[R]eport may also make it harder for US and EU to maintain, let alone sharpen, [UN] sanctions... to make
Iran stop work at Natanz... US may have to show new flexibility[:] it could offer to talk to Iran [ - which
might refuse,] but that would at least make it clear which side was the spoiler"; Economist 15 Dec
07"Afghanistan and Iraq: Must They Be Wars Without End?"(Edit.13):- off.sum:"No, as recent successes
show. But 'winning' will take many years, and cannot be achieved by force alone". Editorial initially raises
question:"Is it possible that [the two US-led wars] are at least beginning to come good?", and draws
attention to carefully relevant reports (with off.sums): "Briefing: Iraq: Can a Lull Be Turned Into a Real
Peace?"(28-30):"Surge of US troops has dramatically reduced violence. But Iraq's politicians may still
squander an obvious chance for reconciliation";"Briefing: Afghanistan: Policing a Whirlwind"(31-3):"As
foreign troops become more efficient, government is still the problem". Highlights common to both
wars:"At best, coming good will consist of a tapering off of violence, and a crab-wise movement towards
a political accommodation between the governments... and the militias now fighting them... As in Iraq, so
in Afghanistan: it would be both morally wrong and tactically foolish for West's politicians to exaggerate
temporary gains in the vain hope of stilling the domestic clamour for withdrawal... 'Victory'... will at most
mean preventing catastrophe; and even this modest aim will for years require spending Western lives and
money in campaigns that will demand as much attention to the once-reviled business of nation-building
as to the use of military force... As to whether either war is worth the prolonged struggle, that is question
whose answer must depend on the changing costs and benefits... Democracies need the courage to
withdraw from wars bringing no good, but also to persevere in just ones - even when the end is not yet
in sight"; Philip H.Gordon"Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War"Foreign Affairs
Vol.86/No.6(Nov/Dec 07):-Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, and author of Winning the Right War: The
Path to Security for America and the World(Times Books 07), from which the essay is drawn, strongly
criticizes Bush's anti-terror invasion of Iraq as having 'created more terrorists than it has eliminated'.
Instead he argues:"Considering possible outcomes of the war on terror makes clear that it can indeed be
won, but only with the recognition that this is a new and different kind of war. Victory will come not when
foreign leaders accept certain terms but when political changes erode and ultimately undermine support
for the ideology and strategy of those determined to destroy(sic) the US. It will come not when Wshdc and
its allies kill or capture all terrorists or potential terrorists but when the ideology the terrorists espouse
is discredited, when their tactics are seen to have failed, and when they come to find more promising
paths to the dignity, respect, and opportunities they crave". The arguments then put forward to gradually
change relevant views and situations abroad are similar in thrust to those very briefly implied in:
Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST...(op.cit); Michael Levi"Stopping
Nuclear Terrorism:The Dangerous Allure of a Perfect Defence"(131-140)Foreign Affairs
Vol.87/No.1(Jan/Feb 2008):-official summary: "Nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat to global security,
but seeking silver bullets to counter it does not make sense. Instead of pursuing a perfect defence, US
policymakers should create an integrated defensive system that takes advantage of the terrorists'
weaknesses and disrupts their plots at every stage, thereby chipping away at their overal chances of
success"; Economist 05 Jan 08"Global Migration: Keep the Borders Open"(Edit.8-9):-off.sum:"The
backlash against immigrants in the rich world is a threat to prosperity everywhere". Highlights: "[A]round
the rich world, immigration has been rising to the top of voters' lists of concerns - which, for those who
believe that migration greatly benefits both recipient and donor countries, is a worry in itself".[Editorial
draws top attention to"Special Report: Migration" (Unique 1-16):-the 8 sections' titles/off.sums: "Open
Up"/"Despite a growing backlash, the boom in migration has been mostly good for both sending/recipient
countries, says Adam Roberts". "Of Bedsheets and Bison Grass Vodka"/"Rich economies gain from high
levels of migration, but the benefits are unevenly spread". "The Politics of the Gun"/"Migration has once
again become a touchy political issue". "Keep Out"/ "Voters like the idea of tougher borders, but the cost
is high and the benefits are limited". "Send Me a Number"/Migrants' remittances help ease poverty back
home, but they are not a cure-all". "You Don't Have To Be Rich"/"Developing countries attract migrants
too". "Circulate Or Integrate?"/ "A choice of migration policies". "The Long Term"/"Too much or not
enough?" Other relevant items in same issue: "Briefing: Germany's Jews: Latkes and Vodka"(40-2)/
"Immigrants from former Soviet Union are transforming Jewish life in Germany". "Immigration Controls:
Guarding British Soil"(47-8)/"Britain's immigration regime, long one of Europe's most liberal, is to tighten
up. Will it secure the jobs of British workers - or those of MPs?"] [M]ost often migration is about young,
motivated, dynamic people seeking to better themselves by hard work [and h]istory has shown [it]
encourages prosperity. Tens of millions of Europeans who made it to the New World in 19th and 20th
centuries improved their lot, just as... today. Many migrants return home with new skills, savings,
technology and bright ideas. Remittances in 2006 were worth at least $260b - more in many countries than
aid and foreign investment combined. Letting in migrants does vastly more good for the world's poor than
[foreign aid]. The movement also helps the rich world... Indeed, advanced economies compete vigorously
for outsiders' skills... Low-skilled are needed too, especially in farming, services and care for children and
the elderly. [So w]hy the backlash? Partly because politicians prefer to pander to xenophobic fears than
to explain immigration's benefits. But not all fear of foreigners is irrational. Voters have genuine
concerns... To keep borders open, fears have to be acknowledged and dealt with... [I]t is not just futile but
also foolish to build taller fences to keep them out. Better [to open] more routes for legal, perhaps
temporary, migration... Politicians in rich countries should also be honest about, and quicker to raise
spending to deal with, the strains that immigrants place on public services... The social integration of new
arrivals is also crucial... Better to seek ways to isolate the extremist fringe... Above all, perspective is
needed. The vast population movements of past four decades... have offered a better life for millions of
migrants and enriched receiving countries both culturally and materially. But... politicians need... to deal
honestly with the problems sometimes caused"; Economist 12 Jan 08"The Arabs: Between Fitna, Fawda
and the Deep Blue Sea"(40-2):-"Huge differences persist among 300m-odd Arabic speakers and 22
countries of Arab League. With oil prices high, some Arab economies booming[, but gulfs are as great
as any on earth.] Yet Arab world [displays] sameness of spirit. Particularly among people under 30 [vast
majority/one of world's fastest growth rates,] mood is one of disgruntlement/doubt. Factors[:] failing
public-education systems and resilience of social traditions often ill-suited to urban lifestyle - now Arab
norm - but politics above all shapes discontent. [T]he problem of Palestine has stuck out like a
troublesome nail. [Yet hope for its eventual justice] has taken a beating of late[:] if Palestinians cannot
unite,.. why should other Arabs help them? And which side to support? [I]n Iraq, 2003 invasion produced
all but universal Arab outrage[, b]ut the rights/wrongs have grown harder... Elsewhere, become harder
to blame slaughter in Darfur region of Sudan, or stalemate between Lebanon's sects... Many still see
Bush's 'war on terrorism' as crusade against Islam[, b]ut many also note al-Qaeda-style jihadism has killed
more Muslims than 'infidels'. In past, Arabs looked to leaders for guidance[, but m]ost of today's leaders
lack an inspirational project[, n]or is any country a natural leader. [P]ersonality-based leadership of 60s-70s has fallen out of fashion[, yet] not replaced by more institutionally-based system of rule, let
alone...democracy. [O]ften adopting the outward shape of reform [lacks] substance... The marginally freer
press [reflects] the impact of hard-to-block new media[, yet stratagems still] suck vitality out of politics
[and] voter turnout has steadily declined. [Experts] have long blamed oil wealth... for the survival of
authoritarianism [as governments] neatly absolve themselves of the need [for] heavy taxes. A less obvious
source of state power is a pervasive fear of what might happen in its absence[, and] Moslems have...yet
to resolve whether laws should emanate from the people or from God. [Here stress put on "Islam and
Democracy: The Practice - and the Theory"(53-4):-off.sum:"Can rule by people be reconciled with
sovereignty of Allah?"] [Resolution has] practical consequences. In most Arab countries, regimes hold
power by virtue of tradition or through military-backed movements that claim to represent the will of the
masses. Where top-down authority collapses,.. very hard for bottom-up politics to repair the damage. [N]ot
surprising that people prefer the devil they know to the fitna ( |