ETHNICITY: TRENDS IN ISLAMISM AND ARAB UNITY
from

Global Issues of the Twenty-First Century
and United Nations Challenges
A GUIDE TO FACTS AND VIEWS ON MAJOR OR FUTURE TRENDS

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by Christopher Spencer
Former Senior Advisor International Organizations,
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Updated: 20 FEB 10




John L.Esposito The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Revised Edition(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 95):-plethora of recent books on Islam, Islamic Fundamentalism and the Islamic"threat" partly reflects a tendency in the West to confuse the new political power of Islamism(which is not”fundamentalist”in the Christian sense, and influences such major countries as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia)with Arab nationalism(which involves a considerably smaller number of states and people - from Morocco to Iraq - most deeply concerned with the Israeli issue). This book is among the best on Islamism. It is neither an apologia nor an alarm, but an objective and informative source for Western readers, particularly those concerned about an inevitable"Clash of Civilizations"(see Huntington,op.cit.). Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey(New York: Pantheon, 1998):-UN”peace agenda” seems overwhelmed by ethnic conflict, which competes with its Charter role of constraining broader national ambitions. Yet both ethnicity and nationalism have long provided motives for violence - and even world wars. Their deep-seated combination constitutes an inflammable and enduring cause of conflict, both inter- and intra-state. This is tragically true of the Arab world, through the 20th century a focus of instability. Ajami's well-written book tells the story of Arab intellectuals' key role in generating pan-Arabic nationalism, pro-and anti-Western cultural aspirations and hatred of Israel - and in impeding development. The very arguments and myths used to foster Arab identity are promoting ethnic conflict in Arab states. The process is globally relevant. Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad”in Foreign Affairs Vol.77/No.6(Nov/Dec 1998):-offers a valuable historical and religious gloss for the amazing, if largely ignored, declaration of jihad against“the Jews and the Crusaders”(sic)issued by bin Ladin(suspected of bombing two US embassies in Africa)and several Islamist leaders. The statement accuses the US of occupying, plundering and humiliating Islam’s holiest territory (i.e. Arabia) and of planning to repeat the slaughter of a million(sic)Iraqis, for religious(sic)and economic reasons and[of course]to serve Israel. Fatwa:“To kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, is an individual duty of every Muslim who is able, in any[possible] country”(p.15). A specific demand for mass terror. The Economist 19 Feb 00“Iran, Islam and Democracy”(19-20):-also takes a careful and objective look at Islamism, this time in the context of an Iranian election in which the world’s most revolutionary and militant theocracy was sharply instructed to become more democratic and tolerant by a generally religious electorate frustrated with“clerical despotism”opposed to all things Western. The Editor notes that while the Islamic world is“not burdened with examples of good government, let alone democracy,...religion is seldom the culprit; look, rather, for cruel autocrats, corrupt feudal systems, overbearing armies[, with] Arabs inhabiting the least democratic patch on God’s earth...Religion is largely irrelevant to this common misbehaviour”. Sometimes Islamism itself is a”principal villain”[Sudan, Afghanistan], but in general the”actions of a few zealots have helped to discolour understanding of political Islam.” While this“still provides dangers,[the Iranian example]also provides reasons for hope”. John F. Burns,“An Arab Militia, Glimpsing Victory, Could Lose Peace” New York Times 28 Feb:-rare summary of the history, actions and aims of Hezbollah, a key player in Middle East events, whose apparent mutation may be relevant to wider trends in terrorism, sub-state violence and religious politics. Hezbollah has”dispensed and suffered sudden death on a numbing scale for 18 years” -mainly around the“security zone” Israel has maintained in southern Lebanon since 1985, and from which Israel has undertaken to withdraw. Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, a Shiite cleric, still leads 1500 guerrillas and 20,000 active members, but the”Party of God”is no longer the umbrella body that“once directed the Middle East’s most brutal Islamic terrorists”. Instead it controls the largest single bloc in the Lebanese Parliament, and runs major social and media networks. Its two principal backers, Iran and Syria, and Lebanon’s government, will influence Hezbollah’s options following any general peace agreement, but its conversion to moderate politics and democracy, and from dreams of a militant Islamic state, appears to be genuine. Nevertheless, its self-identity as a trans-Arab and trans-Islamic movement remains, as does its membership. Jeffrey Goldberg,“The Education of a Holy Warrior”NYT 24 Jun:-Afghanistan’s Taliban regime may now be the world’s strictest theocracy. Moreover, its rule is based on an extremely rigid, reactionary, and belligerent interpretation of Islamic doctrine and tradition. This first-hand account of the methods and views found in or created by key religious schools(madrasas)that produced the Taliban zealots, thus gives valuable insight into the perspectives and motives of Osama bin Laden(accused of anti-US bombings), a variety of Islamic terrorist and combat movements, and probably many militant Islamist organizations. The 2,800-student Haqqania madrasa in the North-West Frontier Province produced many Taliban leaders, but is only one of 10,000 or so in Pakistan alone, most of their million students primarily studying militant Islam: “Haqqania madrasa is, in fact, a jihad factory”. This long essay also offers interesting examples of the attitudes of Islamists plus Pakistanis with broader views(e.g. General Musharraf)on world affairs and jihads. Susan Sachs, “Everyone Asks for Arab Unity. Getting It Is Harder”NYT 06 Aug:-offers a current view of the state and significance of the Arab identity following the impasse at Jul Arafat-Barak summit, specifically over the status of Jerusalem but reflecting the world’s most intensely-competing ethnicities. Diagnosis: no political slogan is“more musty with age”than“Arab unity”: chances for an Arab summit to regroup and create a new Arab consensus are slim.”Still, the chimera of a united Arab front continues to shimmer on the horizon”- and even the US is now hoping to see an agreed Arab compromise on Jerusalem. Yet, however the new leaders of Jordan, Morocco and Syria might wish more flexibility, all have inherited domestic imperatives, while Islamism has split all governments’ reactions. Arab“Unity...has historically been reactive: a collective“no”, and the region remains“clouded with illusions””. Foreign Affairs Vol.79/No.5(Sep/Oct 00)contains four Reviews of recent books directly relevant to this topic: Shaul Mishal and Abraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-includes possibility of bringing this violent group eventually into the peace process. Abdolkarim Soroush, Translated/Edited by Mahoud & Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2000)-a “penetrating and coherent”statement of ability to synthesize Islam with democracy and reason(science). L. Carl Brown, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2000)-a balanced analysis of Islamic political engagement that argues”fundamentalist”thought is a radical deviation [ordered for later summary focused on relevance to global issues]. Nehemia Levtzion & Randall L. Pouwels edit., The History of Islam in Africa(Athens: Ohio Univ. Press, 2000)-up-to-date reference book covering all aspects of the subject. The Economist 07 Oct 00:“The Road to War?”(19-20);“War in Palestine”(53-5);“Burn, Baby, Burn”(54):-the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seemed at last to be focusing on the final core issue - with a US-devised complex and delicate formula for fudging East Jerusalem’s hotly-disputed sovereignty. At this moment, like”a bull deliberately charging a china shop”, Ariel Sharon, the hard-line leader of Israel’s opposition Likud party, paid a“crudely provocative”visit to the deeply/doubly-revered Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, “to demonstrate Israel’s continuing sovereignty over Islam’s third-holiest shrine”. Palestinian anger over Israeli dominance, whether generated or just ignited by this taunt, at first took the form mainly of stone-throwing demonstrations, though even these - and Israeli reactions - were stronger and more bitter than during the 1980's Intifada. More relevant, however, as the(mostly Palestinian)death toll mounted, feelings on both sides became deeper and, in the Arab case, widespread. “[A]groundswell of fury has swept the[Arab] region. Angry protesters from Morocco to Oman have burnt Israeli flags...[S]eldom has an event stirred such feeling as the sight of Ariel Sharon trampling on Muslim holy ground. Even the Arab world’s undemocratic governments are having to sit up, listen and maybe do something”. Associated Press“Arab Unity Remains an Elusive Dream”NYT 11 Oct:-this article also stresses that protesters“all over the Arab world have spilled into the street to vent their outrage”, even from pro-Western Gulf countries. The imminent Arab summit will be under pressure from this”display of unity among Arab masses...to exhibit the same kind of solidarity”. Yet Arab unity is“a dream that has eluded its most ardent supporters”. Disputes and suspicions[still] divide, and have made the Arab League”little more than a talking shop”. Mubarak has long called for annual Arab summits like those of African states, but lamented,”we cannot even sit down and talk about a summit”. Can Arabs change? Economist 14 Oct“Pogrom: Libya and Africa”(56):-there are many recent cases of Muslim (particularly Islamist)violence against those whose different religion is a/the major factor in the conflict (Azerbaijan; Bosnia; Chechnya; Egypt; Fergana; India; Indonesia; Israel; Lebanon; Nigeria; Pakistan; Sudan; Xinjiang). Conscious racist(as opposed to ethnic)violence involving Muslims/Arabs is relatively rare(Irian Jaya). Article reports on vicious(ostensibly)anti-foreigner riots in Libya, which clearly had strong elements of racism. Not only did the Libyan mob spare the 1m Arab migrant workers, but it attacked some of the 1m indigenous black Libyans(all blacks were refused entry to some hospitals/public transport). At least 150 people were killed, including 16 Libyans. “Anti-black violence[was]fired by an economic crisis[in] Africa’s richest state...per person”where most oil income is spent on Qaddafi’s whims. Lately he was pushing a US of Africa, with open borders. One result was over 1m black African migrants. All of these are now being shipped“home”, dead or alive, and Qaddafi is rebuilding ties with other Arab states. In Letters, published in 28 Oct Economist(6),Geoffrey Davis fully supports an irrational, racist interpretation of the riots. He notes that the riot reported is”only the latest of several outbursts of anti-black sentiment over the past few years. It is not anti-Qaddafi in its origins or intent. Nor is it based on Africans taking away jobs that Libyans want. Workers from surrounding countries are cheap and do the manual and menial jobs that Libyans disdain”. Oil revenues enable Qaddafi to satisfy his whims and still give a previously poverty-ridden people the“good life”of cash, subsidies, and free services. “The problem is a lack of challenge and purpose in the lives of ordinary Libyans, coupled with a rumour-prone society...Black Africans are the convenient and innocent victims of bouts of madness in a sick society”. [Except for the aliens’ skin colour, this might describe any Gulf state.] Sachs,“Arab League Meeting May Seek Balancing Act”NYT 20 Oct:-the 21-2 Oct summit meeting of the whole Arab League faced a dilemma: to appease popular demand to punish Israel, yet not to threaten future Arab-Israeli peace talks. “The tide of anger - more open and more defiant than any display of grass-roots political activity in at least a decade - has left many...Arab leaders in a state of near panic that the demonstrations could turn into more generalized protest against their own governments”.This is ironic since it is government media that have been”stoking popular rage”. Yet even if particularly anxious to produce more than rhetoric, the leaders had varying if not contradictory positions on most issues. Radical proposals included using the”oil weapon” against the West, and providing mass arms transfers and Arab fighters to help in a Palestinian uprising; but more moderate/realistic views prevailed. Unusually, all supported Arafat, badly needing Arab backing for his next moves. Economist 21 Oct“Things Fall Apart”(29-31):-probes why recent Arab-Palestinian clashes inflamed the whole Arab world: New factors had made peace seem possible. “On the Arab side, the Gulf war had exposed both military weakness and political disunity. Combined with faltering economies and the threat of Islamic extremism, this concentrated leaders’ minds on the danger of letting old wounds fester. If the price of joining the new world order was a begrudging accommodation with Israel, it seemed just about worth paying-...belligerent rhetoric was now evidently worthless”. But Palestinians became frustrated by glacial progress, shocked at Israeli contempt for their essential needs, and weary of unabated“petty humiliations”-while Arafat’s high-handedness isolated him. The Camp David “package” was seen as an attempt to force Arabs into unthinkable concessions, so the stand-off was bitter. It turned to fury when Sharon(and 1,000 security men)taunted all Islam by desecrating holy ground, and the next day when police cleared stone-throwers from the sanctuary, killing five and injuring scores. “[If] you pit mobs ignited by a sudden outrage, fuelled by long oppression, against a nervous army that is equipped to kill and shaped by a national belief in never showing weakness, you tend to get bloody, lopsided battles, punctuated by nasty revenge attacks. Much more surprising is the wider Arab and Islamic resonance of these events”. The provocations had fallen on fertile ground: Islamic revival is making inroads, using the emotive language of victimization and xenophobia. Even Saddam Hussein, although ”widely recognized as... responsible for destroying the last vestiges of Arab unity”, is seen as severely punished for disobeying UN resolutions while Israel is treated leniently. So“Arabs identify with the Palestinians. It is an empathy not only of kith and kin, but also one born from a feeling that the huge injustice inflicted on the Palestinians is...a reflection of wider injustices experienced by Arabs and Muslims everywhere”. Reuters“Arabs Angry at Israel but Still Want Peace”NYT 21 Oct:-article reports the agreed summit statement charging Israel with jeopardising Middle East peace was so lacking in“practical measures that will deter the aggressive Israeli practices”that the Libyans walked out. Syria argued Arabs must show that they, and not“foreign forces”, determined the future of the region. “We have to understand the danger of taking empty decisions, which will only lead to more violence and more deaths”. Saudi Arabia proposed that Arabs raise $200m for the Palestinians and $800m to“retain the Arab and Islamic character of (East) Jerusalem”. Mubarak admitted all Arab were“angry and full of resentment”, but Arab leaders had a responsibility to ”attempt to salvage the peace process”. Iraq’s position alone was the call to liberate Palestine by jihad. Sachs, “Arab Leaders Declare Freeze on All Contacts with Israel”NYT 22 Oct; Sachs,“Arab States Take Diplomatic Steps to Punish Israel”NYT 23 Oct:-[significantly different articles using the same frame, as new material was available; these highlights include both.] The summit declaration inter alia stated: Arab states will freeze all contacts with Israel until it makes tangible progress towards peace; Israel has committedatrocities”,so the UN is urged to set up a war crimes tribunal to judge its actions; $1b in aid is pledged to protect Islamic and Arab properties in Jerusalem and help the families of killed or wounded Palestinians; Arab states will boycott any multilateral meetings on regional economic cooperation, and suspend trade and political contacts, with Israel; Jerusalem should not be recognized as the capital of Israel. Since Arab journalists repeatedly questioned whether the Arab League was truly in touch with the public mood and would follow through on its promises, the summit spokesman stressed that Arab governments were not indifferent to the anger in their streets at Israeli conduct. Yet old divisions were not healed(e.g. Kuwaitis/Saudis ignored Iraqis), and the meeting”provided a glimpse of the shape of future disputes among Arab leaders. Iraq and Syria[advocated] a long-term strategy that would approach Israel as a rival military and economic power”. Morocco and Jordan argued”military consolidation was outdated, that the world around the Middle East had organized itself into common markets and that the Arabs should concentrate on competing economically and technologically”. William A. Orme Jr.,“A Parallel Mideast Battle: Is It News or Incitement?”NYT 24 Oct:-stresses use of Palestinian radio/TV to generate and maintain support for the intifada or, as Israelis see it, to deliberately “incite mass violence and ethnic hatred”. For this reason, the Voice of Palestine, the Palestinian Authority radio network, was bombed off the air by Israeli helicopter attacks after the killing in a police station of two Israeli soldiers by an angry crowd. “[T]he network’s news bulletins, commentaries and martial music have become the ubiquitous soundtrack to life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, and radio and TV programs are ”regularly interrupted by live coverage of clashes with Israeli troops and eulogies for each Palestinian killed”- all are martyrs. More fundamental is the Palestinian “unapologetically nationalistic coverage. Radio talk shows praise Palestinian ‘resistance’ and excoriate Israeli ‘war criminals’”. Israeli news media beyond doubt also present at minimum a distorted view of events/deaths to their public -both in what they show and in what they leave out. The truce agreement reached in Egypt called for a halt to“incitement”, but it clearly continues-and will significantly impede ceasefires, let alone peace agreements. Sachs,“Anti-U.S. Fever: Arab Bitterness and Boycott Talk”NYT 27 Oct:-”Long a distant and sometimes bothersome distraction for ordinary people in Arab countries, the Palestinian issue has become a daily fixation and a rallying point for a revival of pan-Arab nationalism, which had been dormant for decades”. This article deals mainly with the major and continuing effect of the media in Arab countries in creating this new situation. The”fevered programming” on nearly all Arab radio and television stations, that began with the outbreak of violence,“has eased off somewhat...But reminders of the conflict are everywhere, stirring a sense of solidarity, and if the grass-roots anger can be sustained, even at a low level, the impact on regional politics could be substantial”. Various groups are contributing a day’s pay for the cause in response to a recommendation from the Arab League, an action described by an Arab journalist as”a qualitative leap in cooperation between rulers and ruled in support of a cause”. The”anti-US fever”in the title refers to calls on the media by radical anti-Israel groups to boycott US products/companies. Economist 28 Oct“After Peace Has Crashed”(14);“The Spreading of Palestine’s War”(42-3):-both Editorial and article express serious concern that the Arab/Muslim-Israel confrontation,”[w]ith passion and prejudice the ruling emotions”, could find Israel and its neighbours ”spiralling backwards into an ugliness from which retrieval would be[hard and long]”(14). Not only will Arab governments“nervously watch the spreading of pro-Palestinian feeling among their people”,but now“Arab leaders are fearful of being drawn into the Palestinian mayhem”(42). This was evident in the Arab summit “sound-and-fury”statement, but promised no action -and generated region-wide demonstrations.”[W]hat now most concerns the Arab regimes is not Jerusalem...It is their own survival”(43). Patrick E. Tyler,“Islamic Revival Wears Many Faces in a Secular Asian Land”NYT 29 Oct:-Tajikistan is unusual among the newly independent states of former Soviet Central Asia in that the Islamic Revival Party (IRP)is not only legal but has two members in Parliament and over 50 in local governments. Islamic parties are outlawed or suppressed in the other successor states since the Islamic revival spreading through the region is identified with Islamic extremism. Although Muslims took up arms in a 1992-7 civil war that left at least 50,000 dead, the IRP now joins the government in condemning the Islamic extremism practised by the Taliban in Afghanistan. An IRP leader(and ex-rebel)explains:”war is not the best means for creating an Islamic society...Now that the obstacles to propagating Islam have been removed in Tajikistan, we have the possibility to come to power, and that is the big difference[from] neighbouring countries”. Significantly, however, Islam seems less popular here than where it is repressed. Douglas Frantz,“Persecution Charged in Ex-Soviet Republic”NYT 29 Oct:-Uzbekistan, unlike Tajikistan, is waging a“largely unnoticed war”against those whose only crime is that they are pious Muslims. Religious and human rights leaders contend the government, “which has already banned opposition parties and silenced the independent press, is using a trumped-up threat of radical Islam to stamp out the last vestige of dissent”. It is true that”[s]ince the Soviet Union collapsed, there has been a slow resurgence of Islam in traditionally Muslim Central Asia. The governments have tried to control its growth[non-violently,b]ut officials across the region, who tend to have an authoritarian bent, fear Islamic extremism”. There are indeed fire-fights with Islamic movements, but the major Party of Liberation claims it promotes Islam as a religious and social force, and its leaders urge Muslims to pray and study for a future Islamic state; while critical of government corruption and repression, they have not promoted violence. Yet since 1992, 4-5,000 have been arrested for advocating an Islamic regime or simply distributing religious tracts, and received harsh sentences on spurious grounds. Clearly, many are tortured; many die in prison. Sachs“Defying U.S., Arabs Widen Iraqi Ties”NYT 01 Nov:-trans-Arab sympathy for Iraq is one spillover from the Palestinian-Israeli violence, and has“prompted a resurgence of public support for the idea that the West...behaves badly toward the Arab world”. Violation by Arab countries of UN air sanctions against Iraq reflects a strong feeling“across the Arab political spectrum”that the US follows a“double standard”in its reluctance to hold Israel to account for its treatment of Palestinians, and in its stubborn opposition to lifting the Iraqi sanctions. “Iraq has also found a newly receptive audience for its assertion that it is the only true defender of Arab and Palestinian interests”. AP“Qatar Shuts Israeli Trade Office”09 Nov:-following the Arab League meeting, the Organization of the Islamic Conference holds a summit 12-4 Nov to give greater support for the Palestinians. This meeting, in Doha, Qatar, will be attended by Iran’s President Khatami. Partly in this connection, Qatar is shutting down the Israeli trade mission in Doha. Since Oman had already severed relations with Israel, it left Qatar as the only Gulf state maintaining commercial ties with Israel. Tunisia and Morocco also closed their interest sections in Israel after the Arab summit. (Egypt and Jordan are the only Arab states to maintain full diplomatic relations with Israel.) Sachs,“Muslim Nations Bitterly Denounce Israel at Summit”NYT 13 Nov; Reuters “Muslims to Slam Israel, Reject Terror - Delegates”NYT 13 Nov:-two articles reporting on decisions of the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC), whose 56 member-states ostensibly represent the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims. Being more politically variegated and less concerned with Israel than the Arab League, OIC triennial summits since the peace process began in 1991 have avoided referring to jihad against Israel - but the Doha Declaration included some pretty tough language. “An outpouring of anti-Israel feeling in their own countries has put pressure on many Arab and Islamic leaders to pay more than lip service to the Palestinian cause”. Still, since 20 members(mostly African and Central Asian) have diplomatic relations with Israel, a full boycott was rejected and the relevant resolution stated:”The leaders invite member states which have established relations with Israel, or are taking steps toward ties with Israel within the framework of the peace process, to cut these ties...and stop all forms of normalization until it complies accurately and honestly with UN resolutions dealing with Palestine and holy Jerusalem”. They did affirm however their “determination to cut relations with any country that moves its embassy to Jerusalem or recognizes it as the capital of Israel”. To allay Western(US)fears of armed reprisals by pro-Palestinian militants the leaders deploredall forms of terrorism from whatever source”,but also”reaffirmed the need to distinguish between terrorism and peoples’ struggle for liberation”.The Palestinians were promised full political and financial support. More valuable for Arafat would be solid political backing for his next move. Reuters,“Arab Women Slam Israeli Force Against Palestinians”NYT 18 Nov:-unprecedented Cairo“summit” organized by Arab League, Lebanese and Egyptian women’s groups, and bringing together most respected women in the Arab world, loudly denounced Israeli violence. Mrs. Mubarak claimed its voice was”raised in 1686protest against the terrible injustice”done to Palestinians, and”expressed the anger of half the Arab World population...at violations committed against Palestinian women and children”. While aimed primarily at Arab women’s common issues, supporting their rights to justice and equality in all fields, and calling for removal of societal restrictions, the impetus was evidently a unifying Arab concern over“the Palestinian problem”. Sachs,“News Analysis: Mubarak’s Move”NYT 22 Nov:-Egypt’s recall of its ambassador to Israelmarks the end of a long period of relative restraint in Arab-Israeli relations”. Mubarak’s angry response to Israel’s bombing of the densely populated Gaza Strip”signals that at least for now, he has abandoned the chatty personal diplomacy that had become his trademark”. The implications go to the substance of Arab engagement in peacemaking. Mubarak’s policy of moderation and dialogue have now subjected him to“a relentless storm of criticism from Arab commentators ...leaders”,and demands for stronger action from his own citizens. John F. Burns,“One Sheik’s Mission: To Teach the Young to Despise Western Culture”NYT 17 Dec:-since the terrorist attack on USS Cole in Aden harbor, US media/security services have paid special attention to Yemen and its ties with Osama bin Ladin(of Yemeni origin). Article describes the views and activities of Sheik Muqbel bin Hadi al-Wadi, a”seminal influence”on bin Laden and”one of the Arab world’s most militantly anti-Western Islamic clerics”. His main base/school is a large guarded compound located in Dammaj, northern Yemen, where at least 3,000 Islamic militants from the whole Muslim world -and even some from the West- teach and study. The FBI sees Sheik Muqbel’s study centers(five in Yemen)”as incubators for the Islamic holy war...declared against the[US]”(see above: Bernard Lewis,“Licence to Kill:”). He is a“font of vituperation against the[US]and Israel, Christians and Jews”, but contends the center is strictly a theological school -”albeit one that propagates a purist, militant, stridently anti-Western form of Islam...the essence of[which]is that Muslims should shun the corrupt ways of the modern world and return to the austerity and zeal of the Prophet”. Almost all technology is forbidden(plus music and women), but in the sheik’s view,”the most dangerous enemies of Islam...are Western life and culture - democracy, pluralism, tolerance and any kind of voting”. Western intelligence believes the centers,”even if not military camps, act as ideological proving grounds for young Muslims who go on to train elsewhere, often in Afghanistan, and to become terrorists”. Jane Perlez,“Fork in Arafat’s Road: New Peace or Old Victimhood”NYT 29 Dec:-written at a/the“moment of truth”in the Clinton-sponsored Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and from the viewpoint of Yasser Arafat, the profound dilemmas described apply in varying degrees to all Arabs and Israelis concerned. For these many, the sting of the dilemmas faced reflects their extremely emotive, deeply religious, and timeless historical nature. Even in the shorter term(over half a century), they relate to strong positions taken(and great sacrifices demanded)by most of the region's governments, that tie them to ethnic/religious identity and honour, and constitute”battle-criesthat brook no compromise. (For the origin of some utopian Zionist concepts, see The Economist, 23 Dec“Dreaming of Altneuland”(59-60)). Yet they are totally incompatible (“united Jerusalem”; ”right of return”, etc.)so that critical concessions are demanded of both sides, and any compromise - however balanced - will generate violent opposition and probably at minimum the political death of the compromisers. Yet the status quo is inherently unstable(besides being painful for millions). Such is the power of ethnicity. [During the first half of 2001, I may have missed, among my sources, key articles/essays/books on Arab/Islamic (dis)unity. However, my impression is that the huge volume of material on Palestinian-Israeli violence and their diplomatic impasse included little or no analysis directly relevant to these summaries. Partly related trends have been: a gradual reduction in the isolation of Iraq - but mainly by neighbouring states that gain economically; the increased isolation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan(except by Pakistan); and the redirection of Qaddafi’s interest from Arab to African unity. Finally, directly relevant is a follow-up to the Oct Arab summit on solidarity with the Palestinians.] AP“Arab States Slow in Paying Funds”NYT 18 Aug 01:-reports that the Islamic Development Bank privately admits Arab states have paid less than half the $1b they pledged at the summit. Although the total pledge was already cut to $693b after contributions fell short, so far 12 participating Arab nations have deposited only $442.5b. While there is no date by which countries should fulfil their pledges, Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and Syria have paid their commitments in full, totalling $100m. The most wealthy, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE, have given $325m of the $550m pledged. Yemen has paid over $8m of the $10m it pledged, Jordan $1.5m out of $2m pledged, Sudan $.5m out of $1m pledged, but Egypt only $7.5m out of $30m pledged. Contributions go into two accounts: for supporting the Palestinian Authority’s budget, and for development projects. So far, $240m has been spent: $225m for PA budget;$15m on projects. Reuters“Words, Not Deeds Expected at Emergency Arab Talks”NYT 22 Aug:-announces the opening of the fifth Arab foreign ministers’ emergency meeting to be held since the Palestinian uprising began in Sep 00. There have also been two Arab Summits: the first in Oct 00 pledged the $1b in assistance; the second in Mar 01 is remarkable mainly in being the first regular Arab League summit in 10 years. Since none of these meetings has produced anything substantive in the way of agreement/action except the unmet pledge, the article/analysts predict this one will again result only in soothing words for Palestinians, and condemnation of Israeli actions. The article quotes an Egyptian columnist:”The Arabs have made themselves laughing stocks ...We want a full scale economic and political boycott of Israel”. But this cannot be agreed upon, and Egypt, the host, is actually working as a peace mediator. Agreement might be reached to meet the original pledge, but Arab governments are aware”the pressure of public opinion is growing on them”. AP “Arafat Appeals to U.N. for State”NYT 22 Aug:-at Cairo meeting of 14 Arab FMs, Yasser Arafat called on the UNSC to stop Israel from“destroying the Palestinian dreamof a free, independent state. While the Qatari FM(and chair) assured Palestinians they will not be alone in their confrontation -”[t]he Arab brothers are standing with political, financial and moral support”- the Syrian FM was skeptical:”We’ve met many times...and we did not put forward any plan”. Meanwhile, Israeli and Palestinian delegates clashed in UNSC over an Arab-Muslim resolution calling for international monitors to be sent to the West Bank and Gaza. Reuters “Arab Foreign Ministers Are Urged to Aid Palestinians”NYT 23 Aug:-as expected, the two-day emergency meeting of Arab FMs ended with calls for political and economic help for Palestinians and the usual condemnation of “aggressive” Israeli policies. Inter alia the FMs”called on Arabs to refrain from opening contacts with Israel...but did not call on states to end existing ties”. They also called for a global boycott of Israeli goods produced in settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and a study of ways to revive the full Arab boycott of Israel - though difficult to apply. Some resolutions were not made public. AP “Arab League Ministers Discuss Mideast”NYT 09 Sep:-reports on another Arab League meeting, whose result was more appeal and advice than joint action. The foreign ministers urged the US to stop Israel’s“aggressive policies”and its assassination of Palestinian militants, and advised the(absent)Arafat about meeting Israeli FM Peres. Earlier, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council had issued a similar appeal and discussed a Saudi plan to present Arab concerns over Israeli violence to the Bush administration. Bernard Lewis What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response(New York: Oxford Univ. Press 02):-in recent years, many people in all parts of world, including in Middle Eastern countries and via the UN, have become seriously concerned why these people, in area that for centuries was most advanced and sophisticated on earth, are broadly missing advanced economies, widely-sympathetic governments, and ingenuity-benefited lifestyles. All are also concerned in some manner about the Middle Eastern generation of terrorist organizations. Expert writers offer interesting analyses on how the area is now, and will adapt in future(e.g. Marina Ottaway op.cit).This book, written by the doyen of Middle Eastern studies and foremost authority on Islamic history and culture, draws on his unique knowledge of area over recent centuries to describe how and why it absorbed slowly and selectively from world-dominant European rapidly-modernizing culture. It explains a great deal - both today and tomorrow. “If they can abandon grievance and victimhood, settle their differences, and join their talents, energies, and resources in common creative endeavour, then they can once again make the Middle East, in modern times as it was in antiquity and in the Middle Ages, a major center of civilization. For the time being, the choice is their own.”Amy Chua WORLD ON FIRE: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability(New York: Doubleday 03):-this easy-to-read 350page survey of special political/economic/social problems in many parts of the world has generated good reviews and more influence. Its strong warning is not against either globalization trade or pure democracy in developing countries, but against pressing these ideas too quickly when rich but unpopular minorities dominate their economies - widely common situation that is carefully described. She concludes by first naming three goals: "[1] the best economic hope for developing and post-socialist countries lies in some form of market-generated growth; [2] the best political hope for these countries lies in some form of democracy, with constitutional constraints, tailored to local realities; [3] avoiding ethnic oppression and bloodshed must be a constant priority. But if these goals are to be achieved - if global free market democracy is to be peaceably sustainable - then the problem of market-dominant minorities, however unsettling, must be confronted head-on. [Finally, four specific "tonics" are addressed:] (1) the possibility of 'leveling the playing field' between market-dominant minorities and the impoverished 'indigenous' majorities around them; (2) ways of getting the poor, frustrated majorities of the world a greater stake in global markets; (3) ways of promoting liberal rather than illiberal democracies; and (4) approaches that market-dominant minorities themselves might take to forestall majority-based, often murderous ethnonationalist backlashes". Chapter sub-titles show where and how these major challenges exist and must be addressed: (1)Chinese Minority Dominance in Southeast Asia; (2)'White' Wealth in Latin America; (3)The Jewish Billionaires of Post-Communist Russia; (4)Market-Dominant Minorities in Africa; (5)Ethnically Targeted Seizures and Nationalizations; (6)Crony Capitalism and Minority Rule; (7)Expulsions and Genocide; (8)Assimilation, Globalization, and the Case of Thailand;(9)From Jim Crow to the Holocaust;(10)Israeli Jews as a Regional Market-Dominant Minority; (11)US as a Global Market-Dominant Minority; (12)The Future of Free Market Democracy; Bernard Lewis The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror(New York: Modern Library 03):- Lewis "examines the historical roots of the resentments that dominate the Islamic world today and that are increasingly being expressed in acts of terrorism. [He] is internationally recognized as one of our era's greatest historians of the Middle East[, and] his books have been translated into more than 20 languages, including Arabic/Persian/Turkish/Indonesian"[from dustcover]. Chapters generally move from past to present - but can even be read individually: Introduction; I Defining Islam; II The House of War; III From Crusaders to Imperialists; IV Discovering America; V Satan and the Soviets; VI Double Standards; VII A Failure of Modernity; VIII The Marriage of Saudi Power and Wahhabi Teaching; IX The Rise of Terrorism. Final paragraphs include: "For Usama bin Laden, his declaration of war against US marks the resumption of the struggle for religious dominance of the world. For him and his followers, this is a moment of opportunity... But there are others for whom US offers a different kind of temptation - the promise of human rights, of free institutions, and of a responsible and representative government... It is difficult for us to help those people, but at least we should not hinder them... Meanwhile, there is a more urgent problem. If the leaders of Al-Qa'ida can persuade the world of Islam to accept their views and their leadership, then a long and bitter struggle lies ahead... If the fundamentalists are correct in their calculations and succeed in their war, then a dark future awaits the world"; "Anonymous"Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(DullesVA: Brassey's 04):-author is a senior US intelligence official with nearly 20 years experience in national security issues related to Afghanistan and South Asia. This strong critique of arrogant US/allies' policies towards Osama bin Laden/al Qaeda, and military action against Afghanistan/Iraq, proved quickly influential in many respects, and advocates less US loyalty to Israel/corrupt Muslim regimes or presence in Mideast. Motivation of Muslim terrorists is identified not as hatred/fear of Western national systems but of their broadly negative actions against Islamic peoples. All complex chapter titles: (1)Some Thoughts on the Power of Focused, Principled Hatred. (2) An Unprepared and Ignorant Lunge to Defeat - The US in Afghanistan. (3) Not Down, Not Out: Al Qaeda's Resiliency, Expansion, and Momentum. (4) The World's View of bin Laden: A Muslim Leader and Hero Coming into Focus? (5) Bin Laden Views the World: Some Old, Some New, and a Twist. (6) Blinding Hubris Abounding: Inflicting Defeat on Ourselves - Non-War, Leaks, and Missionary Democracy. (7) When the Enemy Sets the Stage: How US's Stubborn Obtuseness Aids Its Foes. (8) The Way Ahead: A Few Suggestions for Debate. Epilogue: No Basis for Optimism; James Fallows“Blind Into Baghdad”Atlantic Monthly Jan/Feb 04(52-74):-writer honoured US national correspondent for Atlantic. Carefully exposed account of US government’s relatively small and almost purely military attack on Iraq - relatively little involvement prepared to maintain conquered control/ restore economy/unify three rival peoples in democracy. Author’s knowledge of government’s simplified plan was substantially explained by Douglas Feith, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, who noted how more careful policies had been rejected by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and hence by President Bush. Key extracts from article:“U.S. occupation of Iraq is debacle not because government did no planning but because vast amount of expert planning was willfully ignored by people in charge...Problems encountered precisely ones U.S. expert agencies warned against...All government working groups concluded that occupying Iraq would be far more difficult than defeating it...If failure to stop looting was major sin of omission, disbanding Iraqi army was catastrophic error of commission - creating instant enemy class. Every pre-war study had warned against it.”The Economist 07 Aug 04“Arab Foreign Policy: Always Prickly, Sometimes Paranoid, Occasionally Pragmatic” (37-8);“Palestine: Who’s In Charge?”(38);“Morocco: The Slow March To Reform”(38-9);“Iraq’s Christians: Less Safe Than Before?”(39):-first report analyses outstandingly how Arab governments/peoples deal with outside world and each other, three other reports on national Arab states provide interesting descriptions of how different attitudes/prejudices within nations delay their progress. Arabs find it hard to act together to solve region’s manifold problems. Suspicion of US runs deep in Arab world and can generate strong misinterpretations of events.“Many Arab governments would sincerely like to help heal festering regional sores such as mayhem in Iraq and misery in Palestine and Darfur. Not only would this reduce risk of infection, it would also improve strained relations with superpower. But popular distrust of western, and particularly US, motives keeps getting in way...More western sensitivity to Arab concerns and less blinkered Arab prickliness about sacredness of sovereignty in countries with vicious regimes.” Jason Burke"Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror"(New York: I.B.Tauris & Co 03):-while I read this book long after summarizing Burke‛s valuable article in 04 Foreign Policy(op cit), many of author‛s FP views also stated/implied in book, so aren‛t repeated. Book, however, is a valuable - and concentrated(300 pp) - report on the origins/members/relationships/aims of "al-Qaeda" in global terms, plus involvement of bin Laden to events of 11 Sep 01. Material is derived from both author‛s extraordinary interviews/experience and information from many other personal sources. Advice in book‛s conclusion is of special importance - and has much in common with "Christopher Spencer" item: "We [West] need to counter the twisted vision of world that is becoming so prevalent. Every time force is used it reinforces that vision by providing more evidence of a ‛clash of civilisations‛ and a ‛cosmic struggle‛... ‛War on terrorshould have a military component [:] hardened militants cannot be rehabilitated[; b]ut if we are to win battle against terrorism, our strategies must be made broader and more sophisticated. [G]reatest weapon available in war on terrorism is the courage, decency, humour and integrity of the vast proportion of the world‛s Muslims [-] restricting the spread of ‛al-Qaeda‛ and its warped worldview. [B]attle between West and men like bin Laden...is not a battle for global supremacy. It is a battle for hearts and minds [-] battle we, and our allies in the Muslim world, losing. [Yet all] modern Islamic terrorism... can be acted on by well-judged, properly executed policies. Causes of terrorism must be addressed, careful analysis of...threat...undertaken, moderate Muslim leaders engaged, spread of hardline strands of Islam rolled back, and enormous effort to counter growing sympathy for ‛al-Qaeda‛ worldview must be made... All terrorist violence, ‛Islamic‛ or otherwise, is unjustifiable/ unforgivable/ cowardly/contemptible. But just because we condemn does not mean we should not strive to comprehend. We need to keep asking why"(249-50); Jason Burke"THINK AGAIN: Al Qaeda"Foreign Policy No.142(May/Jun 04):-summarizing (global) public (mis)concepts about current capacities and aims of al Qaeda forces and ideas, and its future strength, Burke, chief reporter of Britain's Observer and author of Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror(New York: I.B. Tauris 03)(op cit),offers nine widely believed views about issues, and then denies accuracy of each. "Al Qaeda Is a Global Terrorist Organization" -NO. "It is less an organization than an ideology... Today, structure that was built in Afghanistan has been destroyed... There is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. But al Qaeda workview... is growing stronger every day." "Capturing or Killing Bin Laden Will Deal a Severe Blow to Al Qaeda" -WRONG "If...he surrenders without a fight, which is very unlikely, many followers will be deeply disillusioned. If he achieves martyrdom in way that his cohorts can spin as heroic, he will beinspiration for generations to come. Either way, bin Laden's removal from scene will not stop Islamic militancy. "The Militants Seek to Destroy the West So They Can Impose a Global Islamic State" -FALSE "Islamic militants' main objective is not conquest, but to beat back what they perceive as an aggressive West. [S]econdary goal is establishment of...single Islamic state, in lands roughly corresponding to furthest extent of Islamic empire." "The Militants Reject Modern Ideas in Favor of Traditional Muslim Theology" -NO "Islamic hard-liners...have little compunction about embracing tools that modernity provides... [M]ilitants are framing modern political concerns ...within mythic and religious narrative. They do not reject modernization per se, but...resent their failure to benefit from that modernization." "Since the Rise of Al Qaeda, Islamic Moderates Have Been Marginalized" -INCORRECT "Al Qaeda represents lunatic fringe of political thought in Islamic world. While al Qaeda has made significant inroads in recent years, only tiny minority of world's 1.3b Muslims adhere to its doctrine." "The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Is Central to the Militants' Cause" -WRONG "Televised images... reinforce militants' key message that lands of Islam under attack, and that all Muslims must rise up and fight. However,...resolution...would not end threat of militant Islam...Two-state solution...would still leave 'Zionist entity' intact." "Sort Out Saudi Arabia and the Whole Problem Will Disappear" -NO "Inequities of Saudi system... continues to create sense of disenfranchisement that allows extremism to flourish...Saudi Arabia is one of many causes of modern Islamicmilitancy, but it has no monopoly on blame." "It Is Only a Matter of Time Before Islamic Militants Use Weapons of Mass Destruction" -CALM DOWN "Although Islamic militants...have attempted to develop basic chemical or biological arsenal, efforts have been largely unsuccessful due to technical difficulty...Islamic militants far more likely to use conventional bombs or employ conventional devices in imaginative ways." "The West Is Winning the War on Terror" -UNFORTUNATELY, NO "If countries to win war on terror, must eradicate enemies without creating new ones...Invasion of Iraq...has made task more pressing... Ben Laden's aim to radicalize/mobilize. He is closer to achieving goals than West is to deterring him". Reza Aslan No god but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam(New York: Random House 05):-The widely-read author defines his aim in the Prologue: "This book is not just critical reexamination of the origins and evolution of Islam, nor is it merely an account of the current struggle among Muslims to define the future of this magnificent yet misunderstood faith. This book is, above all else, an argument for reform"(xx). William Grimes, in his New York Times 04 May 05 review, quotes the book:"What is taking place now in the Muslim world is an internal conflict between Muslims, not an external battle between Islam and the West"(248). Grimes himself argues: "[Islam's] history, grippingly narrated and thoughtfully examined, takes up nearly all of 'No god but God'. Aslan... has written a literate, accessible introduction to Islam.,. carefully placing its message/rituals in historical context. Complete with glossary/annotated bibliography, it could easily serve as a college textbook". The 310-page book includes 21st century arguments: "[T]he attacks of 11 Sep 01 were not a defensive strike against a specific act of aggression against Islam. They were never sanctioned by a qualified mujtahid. They made no differentiation between combatant/noncombatant.,. indiscriminately killed women, children, and approximately 200 Muslims. In other words, they fell far short of the regulations imposed by Muhammad for a legitimate jihadi response, which is why, despite common perception in the West, they were so roundly condemned by the vast majority of the world's Muslims"(87). "Tragic events of 11 Sep... initiated a vibrant discourse among Muslims about meaning/message of Islam in 21st century... It may be too early to know who will write the next chapter of Islam's story, but it is not too early to recognize who will ultimately win the war between reform/counterreform... But the cleansing inevitable, and tide of reform cannot be stopped. Islamic Reformation is already here"(266). Jason Burke"It May Well Take 20 Years. But al-Qaeda‛s Days Are Numbered" Guardian 10 Sep 06:-Special Report by expert/famous journalist, published five years after "9/11", claims: "Osama bin Laden waits in vain for a Muslim ‛awakening‛. The lure of the West is just too powerful a force". Full Burke text (plus 70 optional pages of the item‛s wide Email reactions) is available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/alqaida/story/0,,1869182,00.html. Highlights: "There is a sense that history, far from ending, is accelerating. That the centre cannot hold. That the individual counts for nothing. [Burke‛s reactions to some of bin Laden‛s 01 claims: H]e was wrong. Yes, there is increasing radicalisation. Yes, a new and powerfully globalised ‛Muslim‛ identity is spreading, aided by communications technology that renders national frontiers obsolete. Yes, there is a small, if growing, number of Muslims who are attracted toal-Qaedismin its largest sense. But truth is that out of a total of 1.6b Muslims, very few have joined terrorist organisations. In [some Muslim] countries... there has been strong counter-reaction to the atrocities... World‛s Muslims are not behaving as bin Laden wants them to... The [London] bombs were a strike against a continuing and largely successful process of integration on a national scale. The attacks across the world in the past five years are strikes against a similar process of integration on an international scale. This process is largely driven by the continuing popularity and attraction of the Western model of secular liberal democracy, Enlightment values, and capitalist economics. It is the success of this model that has provoked the violence against it, not its failure. [N]eed to ask why so many people... recently came to view the apparently ineluctable process of Westernisation. [T]he arithmetic of terrorism means that you only need a small shift in public opinion to create enough angry individuals to cause a major problem... The appeal of the West is founded not just on a dream of a high level of material comfort but also on the satisfaction of basic and universal human values such as dignity, protection of life and justice. This gives West considerable moral capital,.. a fragile commodity... profligately spent in recent years... But for all the clumsiness with which the misconceivedwar on terror‛ has been handled, the attraction, however conflicted, of ‛the West‛ for billions of people remains our greatest strength. Remember that and, over 10 or 20 years, it will become clear bin Laden‛s life or death will indeed have no significance. He and his kind will have been consigned to the history books". Related Burke volume is:On the Road to Kandahar(Bond Street Books 06 or St. Martin‛s Press 07)"From one of world‛s leading experts..how we are to get to grips with radical Islam/what it really means". Paul William Roberts"A Profile of the Prophet" Globe & Mail 11 Feb 2006:-Focus: "The outrage sparked by the controversial cartoons published in Denmark has led many around the world to realize just how tenuous their grasp of Islam really is. To help fill the gap, Middle East specialist PAUL WILLIAM ROBERTS tells: the story of Mohammed and why it means so much to the Muslim faithful." [An excellent and sympathetic description of the origin and basic beliefs of the Islamic religion, written for Christian, Jewish, atheist, etc. readers, not to gain converts but to offer those with other philosophies and/or religious views an objective account that avoids assigning historical perfection. Viewed fair by my Islamic friends]; Faisal Devji Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy . Morality . Modernity(Ithaca: Cornell Univ.Press 05):-very thoughtful analysis of Al-Qaeda's jihad motives behind the 11 Sep 01 attack against USA. To determine and describe this, the less-than-200-page book draws often on written/spoken rationales by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in particular. Following is derived from its own summary: "Devji focuses on the ethical content of [the Al-Qaeda's] jihad, as opposed to its purported political intent. Al-Qaeda differs radically from such groups as... Muslim Brotherhood and Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, which aim to establish fundamentalist Islamist states. In fact,.. Al-Qaeda [has] a decentralized structure, and emphasis on moral rather than political action... Bin Laden and his lieutenants view their cause as a response to oppressive conditions faced by Muslim world[; not] an Islamic attempt to build states. Al-Qaeda culls diverse symbols/fragments from Islam's past in order to legitimize its global war against the 'metaphysical evil' emanating from the West. Most salient example of this assemblage... is concept of jihad itself, which Al-Qaeda defines as 'individual duty' incumbent on all Muslims, [and] weapon of spiritual conflict. Al Qaeda and its jihad, Devji suggests, are only the most visible manifestations of wider changes in the Muslim world. Such changes include fragmentation of traditional/fundamentalist forms of authority. [Hence] Al-Qaeda represents a dangerous new way of organizing Muslim belief/practice within a global landscape and does not require ideological/institutional unity. [Book] is at once a sophisticated work of historical/cultural analysis, and an invaluable guide to the world's most prominent terrorist movement"; The Economist 01 Jul 06"Democracy in the Arab World: Not Yet, Thanks"(42-3):-item illustrates how"Recent hopes for the steady advance of democracy are being widely stifled". It tells of many limited democracy-related movements in Arab countries, and counter-reform developments there more recently. General pictures then and now as follows: "A few years back, and especially in wake of US invasion of Iraq, many [Arab leaders] found it politic to sound responsive to mounting pressure for reform. It was partly internal, inspired by factors such as demography, fading potency of long-ruling ideologies, and impact of harder-to-control new media such as TV. External forces helped, too, most notably [US/]other Western governments, [pushing] political freedom as the ultimate foil for extremism... But now, the tide appears to have turned". Politically reactionary events are described in: Syria, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and even Lebanon. "Several factors explain the waning of reform momentum. One is the high price of oil. Exporters... find themselves so flush with cash that they can again buy off dissent. But a bigger factor is advance of Islamist opposition groups. In past year, religious parties have crushed secular rivals in Iraq, Hamas has captured shaky government of Palestine, Islamists have performed strongly in Saudi Arabia's polls, and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood won unprecedented fifth of parliament's seats... Islamic surge has frightened not only the region's governments, but also foreign promoters of democracy... Western officials and academics at a recent conference appeared to 'wash their hands of supporting democracy in the Arab world'. [Some US politicians have revived support for an old Arab leader.] Similar signs of return to [Western] realpolitik have been noted with relief by Arab governments". The Economist 22 Jul 06"Israel and Lebanon: The Accidental War"(Edit.13-4); "Special Report: The Crisis in Lebanon, Israel and Palestine: Ending Will Be Harder"(29-32):-My aim is to offer just titles/summaries of selected articles and books which provide valuable information and/or views on global issues. Hence I have offered for years a special 'chapter' on Lebanon/Syria under RECENT DEVELOPMENTS because of their unique developments/potentials. Outbreak of very serious violence between Israel and Lebanon-located Hizbullah 12 Jul 06 was a true 21st century crisis, and for at least weeks generated hundreds of articles a day. I do not have the time or speciality to list even their titles. Instead, here is a summary of the analytical sections or arguments by The Economist as one relatively reliable source on (global) issues involved. The essence of Editorial is:"A pointless war that no one may have wanted and no one can win. It should stop now". Highlights:"[I]t started with a pinprick[:] decision of Hizbullah's leader, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, to send his fighters on cross-border raid into Israel on 12 Jul, where they killed several soldiers and captured two... Israel says timing - 3 days before G8 summit - was no coincidence[:] Iran was using Hizbullah to deflect attention...Equally plausible explanation is[:] Nasrallah..doing nothing new... Hizbullah has mounted several similar raids into Israel. It got away with them[: Israel's] reactions astonishingly mild. Reason, as Nasrallah constantly boasted, was his arsenal of around 12,000 Iranian/Syrian rockets/missiles. With [such] deterrent[, he] felt free to pursue intermittent cross-border war against much stronger neighbour... This time too, Nasrallah may have expected usual token response. If so, he miscalculated[: capturing two Israeli soldiers]. Hamas movement had [just] mounted equally daring raid into Israel from Gaza[,] killing two soldiers, nabbing another. Perhaps precisely because his non-military background required him to look strong, Israel's new PM Ehud Olmert decided this double humiliation was more than he could survive or Israel could bear. So he has chosen to go to war [see Special Report]. Conditions for it have been building, in slow motion, for years. [S]ince Israel's invasion of 1982, Hizbullah has emerged as strongest local military force in Lebanon [,] cannot be disarmed [by] Lebanese army [and] has shown little interest in UNSC Resolution 1559 which calls...for disbanding of all Lebanese militias... Hezbullah is political party in parliament and government, but militia does not take [their] orders[, probably taking] ideological/tactical advice from Iran, its chief armourer and mentor. [B]y giving Hizbullah all those rockets and missiles, Iran has transformed a small militia into a strategic threat to the Jewish state [and] it was utter hubris for Hizbullah to believe that, with its rockets in reserve, its fighters could keep crossing into Israel with impunity. A war that starts by accident is not necessarily easy to end... Stakes could hardly be higher for both sides[; hence] both have rushed...up the ladder of escalation". The next issue of The Economist (29 Jul 06 in North America) contains another thoughtful Editorial and three related articles on the violence and initial discussion of peacekeeping. Titles and their own summaries are as follows: "Israel and Lebanon: Stuck in Lebanon"(Edit.):-"Why this war is likely to be long, unless US tries harder to shorten it";"The Lebanese Crisis: Can Diplomacy Be Given a Chance?":-"The first signs that Israel's attack on Hizbullah is losing momentum could give a fillip to the diplomacy now getting under way, but timing is crucial";"Lebanon's Government: So Who's Running the Show?":-"As Israel tries to destroy Hizbullah, Lebanon's government is floundering";"The Ethics of War: Mind Those Proportions":-"As the war in Lebanon shows, there are several ways to make a moral judgment". The essential and final argument of the second Editorial is, once again,"The right thing for US is to call for an immediate stop to the fighting, postponing its plans for the reordering of Lebanon until the period after the guns fall silent". Economist 22 Jul 06 "Arabs and Democracy: Not Yet, Say the Arabs"(79-80):-this review of three books is officially summed as arguing (like the above item): "Why democracy will not sink roots in the Arab world, at least in a hurry". It later says: "None of these books asserts categorically that the Arabs are unfit for, or incapable of, democracy, but all make plain how extraordinarily hard it will be for a system of one-person-one-vote to sink roots in such unfamiliar soil". Fouad Ajami The Foreigner's Gift: The Americans, the Arabs, and the Iraqis in Iraq(Free Press):-"[D]ominant tone...is one of lamentation. Despite the supposed attractions of new deal US offered Iraqis, beneficiaries have been patently unable...to grasp it". Rory Stewart The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq(Harcourt):-"[S]tory of appalling chaos, local Iraqi chicanery/violence, and administrative mayhem imposed from outside". Mark Allen Arabs(Continuum):-"[T]houghtful pot-pourri of observations on the Arab psyche and identity. [O]ld-fashioned bonds of blood, tribe, religion and pan-Arab identity tend to govern behaviour"; Economist 08 Jul 06 "Security in Asia: The Trouble With Pakistan"(Edit.10); "A Survey of Pakistan: Too Much for One Man To Do"(1-12); "Special Report: Afghanistan: A Geographical Expression in Search of a State"(22-4); "The Army in Afghanistan: Taliban Time for Britain"(50):-the four items are inter-related in their discussion of many problems that are both similar and found in two neighbouring states. Following is derived essentially from single Editorial commenting on both states. "Terrorism has many sources and claimed justifications, but if it can be said to have a centre, it lies in the training camps, madrassas and battlefields of northern Pakistan and south-eastern Afghanistan. There the Taliban and their ally, al-Qaeda, were both formed. From there, in hellish diaspora, jihadis have fanned out across the globe... [C]lear why what happens in those two places is of huge importance to the rest of the world. From neither place is there much good news. The West has invested a huge amount in Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power Oct 99... After 11 Sep 01 he was recast as a provider of relative stability in a dangerous neighbourhood and essential ally in 'war on terror'... In past 5 years, he has not done very much to make Pakistan a less dangerous place... [P]erhaps most damning criticism of Musharraf is that he continues to do grave damage to the long-term political health of Pakistan (see Survey)... It would not be fair to blame Pakistan for everything that is going wrong in Afghanistan. Government of Hamid Karzai is weak and corrupt; because of West's continued failure to live up to its promises, much of country, outside the big cities, is in the grip of bandits and warlords. But Pakistan's contribution...should not be underestimated. Both Taliban and remnants of al-Qaeda are able to take refuge on Pakistani soil, which makes job of the soldiers from Western countries who have been struggling to eliminate them for past 5 years much more difficult. Taliban... were in part a creation of Pakistan.., which saw in them a way to establish a friendly state on their western flank [since] locked in perpetual conflict with India to its east... As for al-Qaeda,.. Osama bin Laden is generally reckoned to be holed up in Pakistani soil... An unstable, nuclear-armed Pakistan, intertwined with a chaotic and Taliban-dominated Afghanistan: it is not a settling prospect. It has all happened before. Result was 11 Sep 01"; Economist 02 Sep 06"The World Since September 11th: Five Years On"(Edit.9-10);"Special Report: September 11th 2001: [US]'s Longest War"(22-4):-"Essence of [al-Qaeda] idea..is that Islam is everywhere under attack by the infidel and that every Muslim has a duty to wage holy war, jihad, in its defence... Jihadists are hungry to topple...superpower. [S]ince 11Sep01, number of jihadists and their sympathisers has probably multiplied, partly as result of way US responded... Al-Qaeda operated openly in Afghanistan and enjoyed protection of its noxious Taliban regime, which refused US request to hand Osama bin Laden over. US invasion...therefore enjoyed broad international support... By 04 a first-ever free election had legitimated presidency of Hamid Karzai; parliament took office in 05. Now plagued by warlordism and opium trade, and Taliban mounting a challenge in the south. But not yet look capable of dislodging new government in Kabul. [I]nvasion deprived al-Qaeda of a haven for planning/training. [H]owever, invasion of Iraq in Mar03 providing jihadists with both a banner around which to recruit and a live arena in which to sharpen their military skills... Like most Sunni extremists, some in al-Qaeda regard Shia Muslims as virtual apostates[, and] organised so many attacks on Shias/holy places that Shias at last struck back, turning into a bitter sectarian war... In [Iraq] the battle for world opinion...had calamitous consequences. [M]illions of Muslims now think US real aim in Iraq was to grab its oil, help Israel, or, as bin Laden said all along, wage war on Islam... Bush/PM Blair refused after the war to be embarrassed by the absence of the [Iraqi] weapons that had so alarmed them beforehand. [Their] arguments no longer sell in the West, let alone the Muslim world... Hussein's was a secular dictatorship in which Islamists of all stripes kept their heads down... But portraying the whole enterprise as if it had from the start been all about an experiment in democracy just makes Muslims crosser. [Now] poll after poll shows deep distrust among traditional US allies... Bush has played straight into anti-US hands. One vast mistake has been his neglect to push seriously for creation of a Palestinian state... But worse has been his disregard for civil liberties [Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo. So US] won more recruits for the jihadists. Still, not everything has gone al-Qaeda's way either. [I]f bin Laden's aim was to topple pro-US regimes in Muslim world, he has failed... Saudi regime...is still standing, and so far... the violence has served mainly to strengthen it. Another prize to have eluded al-Qaeda is Pakistan. [Also,] all of al-Qaeda's efforts to kill Musharraf, or to deflect from US alliance... have so far come to naught... [J]ihadists' grandiose aims and gruesome methods have prevented them from turning a resentment of US into an appetite for revolution at home. Most of [Iraqi] victims of al-Qaeda have been fellow Muslims,[while] attacks inside such as Indonesia/Turkey/Jordan, where the victims were mainly Muslim, have turned local people away from al-Qaeda's cause. If anything, that cause may have fared better in the West, among those whose identity as Muslims has come to take precedence over loyalty to the host country [Britain/Canada].To many susceptible Muslims the message that the faith is everywhere under attack is evidently compelling. Jihadists are skilled at weaving the 'resistance' in Palestine/Lebanon/ Kashmir/Chechnya/Iraq/Afghanistan into single narrative of persecution by the infidel. [H]ijackers proved in US/Madrid that small numbers of terrorists can produce devastating results. [J]ihadist notion that the faith is everywhere under attack looks absurd [cf. Palestine/Caucasus/ Kashmir/Balkans/East Timor]. In Kosovo, NATO [protected] Muslims from Christians. [Y]et a troubling recent development is emergence in US of an equal and opposite distortion[:] idea that West and its values are everywhere under attack, and everywhere by the same seamless front... It is wrong to look at post-11Sep world this way, as if every local conflict is part of a civilisational clash [cf. Hamas/Hizbullah/ Iran]. [T]errorism was the background noise of the second half of 20th century. But 11Sep seemed to portend something new... Al-Qaeda's fantastic aims - sweeping away regimes, reversing history and restoring the caliphate - are married to an appetite for killing that knows no limits. It boasts openly that it is seeking nuclear weapons... The world must still strive to destroy al-Qaeda and, even more, the idea it represents. But it had better do so with cleverer means than those Bush has used so far"; Economist 02 Sep 06"Special Report:The Middle East: A Big And Then a Bigger Mess"(25-6):-"Bombing of Beirut's suburbs was ugly episode in the latest of many nasty Mideast wars... Al-Qaeda's attacks did not themselves change Mideast, but...more now share [Osama] bin Laden's feeling Islam is under attack, and that US is their enemy. [S]wift intervention in Afghanistan Nov 01 bothered many Muslims, if only because it evoked memories of colonial invasions. But...most quietly glad to see obscurantist Taliban defeated... Determined US policies produced some tangible results... Yet several things went wrong. 'Crusade' to describe war on terror [created] damage... When Bush said you are either with us or against us, he in effect pushed fence-sitters into enemy camp... Iraq turned into crucible for terrorism[: US] so like Israelis stomping on Palestinans that many Arabs/Muslims grew simply to equate occupations as twin assaults. Guanatanamo/Abu Ghraib silenced US remaining fans. [R]eason for US invasion [seen as:] to control Iraqi oil/build military bases/help Israel[,and frightened] those who opposed US policy/ emboldened Iran... Hizbullah felt encouraged to escalate its hostility to Israel. Currency of anti-US [views] boosted Islamists[, including] Muslim Brotherhood. Most dramatic Islamist advance came in Palestine. Despite Bush's declared wish to see creation of Palestinian state, US did little to make it happen. Bush was disenchanted with Arafat... Israeli settlement accelerated. In Mar 02 all 22 Arab heads of state... agreed to end conflict if Israel withdrew to its pre-67 borders. However...Ariel Sharon reoccup[ied] West Bank, and idea went nowhere [except] evacuat[ion of] Gaza Strip. [L]ikelihood of resolution looked further away than ever. Palestinians voted in Hamas. Israelis elected...plan for unilateral withdrawal behind controversial 'security barrier' until peace. [S]oon clear that plan would not suit Israel after all[: t]o many, recent war in Lebanon, and Hizbullah's rain of rockets, proved that any disengagement with Arab neighbours in absence of political guarantees would be big mistake. Meanwhile, suffering of most Palestinians continued to mount[, so] Arabs said it was hypocritical to promote democracy and then balk at its results. Within this gloomy picture, [dizzy oil price] stands out";

Next item(drafted Oct 06),supported by varied Ottawans, is listed often as very broad issues are involved.

Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST COOPERATE - IN TERMS OF BOTH THEIR WEALTH AND KNOWLEDGE - IN ORDER TO SURVIVE:-Brief paragraphs first identify some genuine and trans-species (but not simply idealistic) physical and emotional human traditions, confrontations, disasters, or prospects that raise globally-relevant threats. These are followed by a few relatively cheap and realistic, but world-wide and trans-human, policies. The challenges reflect the already serious - and often inter-related - concerns of everyone, everywhere: all human beings now face “global” threats in terms of: (a) mobile, unprecedented inter-human violence; (b) widespread, potentially global, mis-health; (c) dangers generated to the earth on which all survive.

(1) All the wealthier societies on the planet now possess grand and growing assets of both physical goods - far beyond essential human needs - and rapidly-expanding scientific/technical/economic knowledge - enough to create/improve their comfort and health. It now appears possible, and universally profitable in terms of generating the good trade and health of all, to share such quantities of global assets with all who lack them, so all groups could fully address painful and globally-destabilizing needs. Even if competition were the pure motivation of large advanced companies, they would develop globally.

(2) Yet throughout the history of human beings, and contrary to the philosophy of the world’s strongest religions, four social factors have been dominant among the whole species: human groups have been mainly small (families or villages); their members have been grossly ignorant about almost all other groupscharacteristics, strengths and problems; they have exhibited deep and general dislike and often fear towards all other groups; and, above all, have felt no sense of responsibility for them. Violence against, or at least selfishness towards, other groups has been chronic - but is suddenly not beneficial.

(3) Now, for the first time in human history, the entire planet is massively/increasingly interdependent, not simply in terms of ‘globalization’ trade, but also regarding enormous travels/transfers of humans, goods and bacteria between societies. We are also now living in unprecedented planetwide situations where basic global knowledge is both vast and expanding - often via TV/Internet/phones in even isolated villages. All human beings, however rich/poor, educated/formally ignorant, global travellers/physically fixed, are potentially aware of other groups with greater/other power or assets - and/or apparent harm or nonrelationship - in their own societies or another. Any group can feel independent/hurt/frustrated/ opinioned toward another, physically or emotionally. Nature/scale of interdependence: widely unknown.

(4) An unprecedented but expanding global fact is that ills, ranging from the mildly-harmful to the multi-fatal, can now easily be transferred via weapons, explosives, poisons, virus, serious misuse of nature. The deliberate, unknown or accidental transfer of critical action to virtually anywhere else on earth, by land, sea or air - could in future be, deliberately or otherwise, generated or passed by groups or individuals that may or may not wish to inflict some ‘pain’ on others. Victims of such action/accident can be in or from any society at all, and can hurt any type or groups of humans, animals, machines, transport, buildings, towns or key liquids/gases/foods/ medicines/power-sources etc. The effects of deliberate or accidentalspreads” or organized action range from minor diseases to mass murders.

(5) Any group will ultimately be responsible for “using” any of a variety of existing or developable actions against/in any society on earth. Hence an essential way to reduce the world-wide threat - apart from easing sharp and dangerous ill-feelings - must involve help in reducing serious/perceived pain/poverty/ (potential)disease/global misuse. It would also involve obtaining - through cooperative intelligence/law among all regimes everywhere - advance information about relevant threats -since any/all societies may somehow be threatened. But the most defensive and selfishly-beneficial means of easing global threats is for the wealthier/more informed to provide the funds/goods/skills necessary to accelerate equity - by both offering and obtaining relevant knowledge. Richer societies would no longer live safely while ignoring any others’ agonies - nor even suffer from giving assistance. Isolation is no longer an option - anywhere - for any rich and/or traditional society. We must all think, at least minimally, as global citizens.


The Economist 21 Oct 06 "Iraq: Between Staying and Going"(Edit.12); "Special Report: The Arab World: Coalitions of the Unwilling"(25-8); "Moderates and Rejectionists: The Palestinian Test Case"(28):-while the three items' emphases vary, the main problems stressed are interrelated. Editorial's own summary:"A search for new ideas should not blind Americans to the stark choice they face in Iraq". Highlights:"[They] long for a middle way. Why not split the country into Shia, Sunni and Kurdish statelets? Instead of going right now, why not set a timetable, to galvanise the warring parties to settle their differences before a free-for-all? One far-fetched idea...is said to be to withdraw 'over the horizon' and control Iraq from a neighbouring country. Another is... to be less fastidious about establishing democracy, and concentrate on smaller aim of establishing a government that works. [N]one of these...stands up to scrutiny... At end of day, the three-pronged policy US is already pursuing may very well be the best of a bad lot. Stated briefly, this consists of trying to keep the lid on the violence, build up Iraq's own security forces, and prod Iraqi politicians into making a power-sharing deal... If US willing to stay... for a few more years, success is still possible... Only honest alternative is indeed probably just to go, and let one side win... But just going would be a fantastic gamble, not only with US's global power/prestige, but also with other people's lives. Better, still, to stay". Special's own summary:"Resistance to the West, and rejection of Israel, are the pillars of a rapidly strengthening alliance in the world's most volatile region". This substantial essay offers the following introductory arguments: "Some [of Mideast's] imagined threats to the global order have been leftist and nationalist, some reactionary and religious, some radical and violent. Yet all have drawn their mobilising power from... urge to challenge the dominant perceived injustice of the day... Most reliable populist cry today remains 'resistance': [Sudan, Iraq, Hizbullah]. Clearly, although times have changed, this dynamic has not. What has changed is that the call to resist now inspires unprecedented enthusiasm, galvanizing many disparate political streams at once, secular and nationalist as well as Islamist. Religious element, boosted by the great revival that has swept Muslim societies across the globe, adds a scriptural drumbeat to the call. Lately the impulse to resist also strengthened by failing prestige of traditional countervailing forces - US, moderate governments in region, and liberal-minded minority of their citizens". These points are then well-amplified. It concludes:"[C]lear that a powerful sector of Islamist opinion is so fundamentally rejectionist that it will never change. Best the West can do may be to ensure does not push more moderates into that camp. Could start by remembering that people choose to 'resist' when they feel threatened". Palestinian item's thrust: "Pressures on Hamas build from both sides...In recent months, poor Palestinians have, not for first time, found themselves used as rope in tug-of-war between Mideast 'accomodationist' and 'rejectionist' governments. [Yet] split would truly render PA ungovernable and peace talks impossible. Greg Mortenson & David Oliver Relin Three Cups of Tea: One Man's Mission to Fight Terrorism and Build Nations... One School at a Time (New York: Viking 06):-a beautifully written (by Relin), and very popular book: (often-quoted) Mortenson's extraordinary gift of life to northernmost Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a poor but pure mountain climber in 1993 he nearly died in attempting to conquer K2, "world's deadliest peak" whose height is exceeded only by Everest. He survived through the warm hospitality of an isolated, poverty-stricken village in Karakorum, Himalaya. He found it had no school, almost no access to rest of Pakistan; so in extraordinary thanks Greg promised to return one day and build a school for their boys and girls. On return to US, he launched what gradually became"one of the most remarkable humanitarian campaigns of our time". As director of the Central Asia Institute, Greg has built 55 schools serving Pakistan and Afghanistan's poorest communities. "He provides not only hope to tens of thousands of children, but living proof that one passionately dedicated person truly can change the world". Economist 21 Oct 06"Nuclear-Weapons Proliferation: Going Critical, Defying the World"(69-70); "Sanctions: History Lessons"(70-1);"North Korea: Pinched Bellies"(52):-Nuclear item's own summary: "A big-power stand against North Korea and Iran? Or rivalry as usual?" Highlights:"North Korea and Iran, past partners in missile roguery, seem bent on testing world's anti-nuclear rules to destruction... Whether Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) survives this combined assault depends on how big powers rise to challenge: by cooperating to press both regimes to abandon their nuclear exploits and uphold the rules, or by competing in the wider struggle for regional influence... China...has no wish to see Japan or South Korea frightened into going nuclear too, but North Korea may test credibility of US's deterrence pledge...[I]t calls new [UNSC] sanctions 'declaration of war'. Ms Rice's task: to win agreement from the neighbours on a sanctions regime 'unlike anything [North has] faced before'. Japan has banned ships...and halted trade/financial flows. But China wants to avoid economic collapse in North [which] would enable US to throw its weight about too much. [Yet] China is livid that Kim [Jong Il] brushed aside repeated warnings not to test... His nuclear antics have also upset South Korea's president,.. whose 'sunshine'policy towards North is in tatters...Traditional sanctions have their limits,..but UNSCresolution 1718 gives new backing to US-led Proliferation Security Initiative, posse of like-minded countries that share intelligence and intercept cargoes of suspected proliferators... North is dangerous, but isolated. An Iran with nuclear weapons...would be a 'game-changer'. Virulence of regime's revolutionary ardour, its role as 'central banker of terrorism' to organizations like Hamas and Hizbullah that preach and practise violence against Israel, and its ambition for dominance in the region and Islamic world, all make it imperative, from West's viewpoint, to stop Iran before it gets bomb. Sight of a nuclear-armed Shia Iran would probably encourage Sunni regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and elsewhere to want their own finger on a nuclear trigger... Sanctions are supposed to become steadily tougher if Iran carries on enriching... Helps Iran that, just as world gears up to enforce anti-nuclear rules, the rules may be changing. Spread of weapons of mass destruction is a clear threat to international peace and security. It remains to be seen whether tackling proliferation is something world's big powers are ready to put ahead of their own rivalries". Sanctions offers history of varied aims, effects and targets of past/continuing sanctions, both UN and US. Pinched covers fact: "Fresh sanctions on North Korea are not supposed to hurt its people, but may do[:] A nuclear capability may be toast of North's leaders, but blight on their poor countrymen's bellies... To feed itself, North needs 5.5m tonnes of grain/year. Cannot produce anything like this, even with bumper harvest last year... As if this not bad enough, 10 days after its offending missile tests, North suffered worst flooding in recent memory... To alleviate crisis, South said it would make flood relief an exception to its suspension of aid. But only half of promised 100,000 tonnes of grain had arrived before the nuclear test, whereupon South suspended the rest... Western powers seem unfussed by this shortage... Last year North imported over $1billion-worth of Chinese goods. New UN sanctions against it may change that... A barbed-wire fence going up along the border; China is taking no risks".Noah Feldman"Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age"New York Times 29 Oct 06:-this is the leading article of the New York Times Magazine of this date, and runs to 18 pages when printed from the Internet. This time the author is identified as follows:"Noah Feldman, a contributing writer, is a law professor at New York University and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations". Summarized extracts from the introductory section: "Today the nuclear game in [Mideast] has changed. When Arab League's SG... called for 'a Mideast free of nuclear weapons' this past May, it wasn't Israel that prompted his remarks. He was worried about Iran, whose self-declared ambition to become nuclear power has been steadily approaching realization. The anti-Israel statements of Iranian president.,. coupled with Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas, might lead you to think that Arab states would welcome Iran's nuclear program... But interests of Shiite non-Arab Iran do not always coincide with those of Arab leaders. A nuclear Iran... could potentially mean... a historic shift in the position of the long-subordinated Shiite minority relative to the power/prestige of the Sunni majority... Sunni Arab leaders...also seem worried that Iranians might actually use nuclear weapons if they got them. A nuclear attack on Israel would engulf the whole region. But that is not the only danger: Sunnis in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere fear that Iranians might just use a nuclear bomb against them... If Iran is going to get the bomb, its neighbours will have no choice but to keep up. North Korea, now protected by its own bomb, has threatened proliferation - and in the Mideast it would find a number of willing buyers... Given the increasing instability of the Mideast, nuclear proliferation there is more worrisome than almost anywhere else on earth. As nuclear technology spreads, terrorists will enjoy increasing odds of getting their hands on nuclear weapons... Bombing through an intermediary has its advantages: deniability is, after all, the name of the game for a government trying to avoid nuclear retaliation. [A]s more countries get the bomb, tracing the seller will become harder and harder, and the incentive to make a sale will increase". Much of item carefully discusses rationales used by/for Islamic killers of themselves, infidels, civilians, women and children”; Economist 25 Nov 06"The Future of NATO: The Test in Afghanistan"(Edit.12); "Special Report: NATO's Future: Predictions of its Death Were Premature"(24-6):-official summary of Editorial:"Thanks to some shortsighted European politicians, the world's foremost military alliance is at risk". Highlights: "[W]ith demise of Soviet communism,.. alliance has grown bigger,.. is busier than it ever was during cold war [and] faces many tricky questions about the future... NATO's leaders must find unity of purpose on one issue above all others: overcoming the weaknesses of mission in Afghanistan [where] for first time engaged in bloody ground combat. Task made even harder by two failures[:] to modernize... armies for expeditionary operations [or] to send soldiers... to dangerous regions where most needed. Although have 2.4m men under arms, NATO's European members...struggled to meet requests for extra 2,200... British and Dutch have put troops at sharp end in southern Afghanistan, heartland of Taliban[, while] Canadians...spearheaded NATO's assault on entrenched Taliban fighters. [But] too many others... are working in safer areas and refused to be deployed as NATO commander would like... It is difficult for any government to expose soldiers to danger in far-away lands; harder still to watch one's soldiers die while allies look the other way. No excuse for such half-heartedness. In Afghanistan, as distinct from Iraq, there should be no quarrel about the lawfulness of the mission. NATO is in the country under a UN mandate, operating in defence and at the behest of an elected government. The stakes are high: failure would not only bring back the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but embolden jihadists around the world. Military alliance that stretches across Atlantic will not always be able to unify around such a clear cause... NATO and EU do not need to see each other as competitors... Nor should a stronger NATO mean a weaker role for UN... May even be a case for UN one day to recruit military forces of its own, capable of intervening in conflicts under a UN mandate. [Now] NATO remains world's foremost military alliance. [Members] may no longer face one common enemy, but they face common dangers, including terrorism, Islamic radicalism, increasingly troublesome Russia, Iran nuclear ambitions and instability in Mideast. [A]ll the more reason not to fail the test in Afghanistan"; Economist 09 Dec 06“Lebanon: A Battle for the Nation’s Heart”(51-2):-official summary:“Outcome of bitter struggle in streets of capital could affect balance of power in wider region”. Highlights: “Lebanon not moving. It is stuck. Talks between faction leaders... collapsed last month. Since then, fractures between religious sects, divided political loyalties and clashing understandings of Lebanon’s own history/identity widened dangerously fast... Huge crowds gather nightly for [PM Siniora’s] downfall, even as he receives endless delegations of supportive dignitaries. [Showdown] shows no sign of ending soon. Protesters... insist vigil will not end until PM... appoints enough opposition ministers to grant them effective veto. Government... has offered bigger share of posts [but] remains adamant this must fall short of veto. Siniora said to have accepted proposal to up number of cabinet posts from 24 to 30, giving 9 or 10 to Hizbullah-led opposition, 19 to anti-Syrian coalition and couple to neutrals. Not enough said Hizbullah. Siniora’s lot [also raise issues of: tribunal to look into murder of ex-PM Hariri; replacement of pro-Syrian president.] In government’s view, demonstrations subverting democracy [with] aim not so much to achieve sectarian balance as to bring Lebanon back into orbit of Syria and Iran [and] renew ‘resistance’ against Israel. Nawaf Musawi [of] Hizbullah counters that government’s acceptance of UN troops and foreign aid is whittling away sovereignty... Opposition appears stronger[:] demonstrations of more than 1m[, with] Hizbullah [lending] formidable organizing skills [plus] menace of its unrivalled guerrilla force. Siniora not bereft[:] Western powers/Sunni Arab allies[;] strong support from anti-Syrian Christian factions [plus] near-unanimous backing from Sunni/Druze minorities... In fact, striking symmetry between sides[: e]ach accuses other of being stooge of foreign powers, of stoking sectarian rivalry and of ‘trading in blood of martyrs’... Both sides claim majority backing and both see the clash as defining moment for Lebanon - perhaps even for the wider region. Conservative Arab governments... are worried[: if] Siniora forced out,.. angry Sunni Arab fears of a new ‘Shia arc’...will grow”; Economist 16 Dec 06"Kurdistan: Can the Americans Satisfy Both Turks and Kurds?"(43-4):-official summary:"As tension rises between Turkish government and Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, Americans are in quandary". Highlights:"Iraqi Kurds enjoy extreme autonomy in what is now the only stable part of Iraq ...Turks, for their part, increasingly angered by renewal of attacks in Turkey by guerrillas of the home-grown Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) [and] have never liked idea of an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, seeing it as a magnet for Kurdish nationalism in the region - especially in Turkey... Growing chance Turkish army will, perhaps next spring, invade northern Iraq in effort to clobber PKK in its safe haven just inside Iraq [see full item:"Turkish Kurds in Iraq: Lonesome Rebels"(44)]. Iraqi Kurds might then feel obliged to help their ethnic kinsmen fight back. [U]nclear what US would do... Iraqi Kurds' biggest worry now is that US wobble might hasten the feared Turkish invasion... Iraq's 4-5m Kurds fear Turks' true aim would be to ruin their successful experiment in self-rule, which has been inspiring Turkey's own restive Kurds, some 14m strong... US would be loth to let the Iraqi Kurds help their PKK kinsmen fight back, since Turkey is a cherished NATO ally. [C]onfident Iraqi Kurds... now say they will no longer kill fellow Kurds [and] instead strengthening links with them... US been telling Turks to stay out of Iraq[, and Turks had hoped] US would deal with PKK[, but US] failure to do so is perhaps biggest cause of rampant anti-US feeling in Turkey. [Turkish PM warned Bush by phone] that he might be unable to restrain his hawkish generals [against PKK, whose] attacks went on despite its proclaimed ceasefire in Sep. One big reason for Turkish restraint against PKK has been repeated warnings from EU, [b]ut that restraint may weaken as EU... continues to snub Turkey... If Turkish forces do invade Iraq, US response will depend largely on scope/scale... Plainly in US interest to cut deal between Turks and Kurds, including to disarm PKK for good, in return for wider cultural/political rights for Kurds in Turkey. Conceivably, Turkey might then be persuaded to accept ...an autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan... But pessimists... say the Turks...will never tolerate Kurdish independence... If it comes to a stark choice, it is hard to say which way US would tilt".Related:"Turkey and Europe: The Blackballers' Club"(Edit.12-3);"[US] and Iraq: The War Over the War"(29);"Iraq: How Dare You[, US]"(45);"Charlemagne: Turkey and Enlargement"(53); Economist 13 Jan 07"Israel and the Jews: Diaspora Blues"(Edit.14-5); "Israel and the Jews: Second Thoughts About the Promised Land"(53-6):-Editorial's official summary:-"Jews around the world should join the debate about Israel, not just defend whatever it does". Highlights: "Early settlers came for a variety of reasons:.. to escape stifling constraints of religious dogma;.. hasten the coming of Messiah;.. as anti-Semitism grew, [gain] a safe haven; after the Holocaust, save Jewish lives. Soon another role: being a potential Israeli citizen became one of the anchor points of what it means to be a Jew. Since [its establishment,] Jews have continued debating/reshaping relationships to country. Secular Jews found Israeliness a handy substitute for religious observance. Some religious Jews revived... messianic Zionism, holding that to settle in all biblical land... is a God-given duty. To...ultra-Orthodox, state should [be] subsidising Jewish learning/maintaining piety... Meanwhile, diaspora Jews have developed an even more eclectic mix of Jewish culture and attitudes to Zionism(see 53-6),partly because... growing number neither feel comfortable with always standing up for Israel, nor... invoke Israel in defining Jewish[ness]. Yet big Jewish diaspora institutions not caught up[, but] still supporting [Israel] in times of crisis/critics. [True especially of] lobby groups in US, formed to influence foreign policy in Israel's favour... Their attitude persists [in suggesting Israel's] critics are anti-Semites[, and they] have an unholy alliance with evangelical Christian groups. This knee-jerk defensiveness of Israel does not help Jewish diaspora in keeping young Jews from leaving the faith [and] many are simply drifting away. [Also,] it locks diaspora Jews out of the fateful/often bitter debates that rage inside Israel itself[, where] interests have been diverging. [Israelis] disagree on the most basic questions: borders, who is a Jew, role of religion, status of non-Jews... Israeli Jews swim in a sea of conflicting ideas about who they should be... Helping Israel should no longer mean defending it uncritically. [D]iaspora institutions should...encourage lively debate about Israeli politics[,] allowing an Israel at peace to return to its original vocation of providing a safe and democratic haven for the world's Jews. Other items in this issue offer information on Israeli attitudes towards/from some vital Mideasterners (titles/pages plus official summaries): "Israel and Iran: How Imminent Or Real a Threat?"(43):-"Israelis vary in their views of Iranian menace"; "Obituary: Teddy Kollek"(78):-"Theodor('Teddy')Kollek, mayor of Jerusalem, died on 02 Jan 07, aged 95"; Economist 13 Jan 07"Chinese Foreign Policy: A Quintet, Anyone?" (37-8):-complements 06Jan"China: Coming Over the Horizon" item on trends in global role of a developing superpower. Official summary: "China making it clear it wants a bigger role in Mideast". Highlights:"[I]n Mideast, China is on good terms with everyone [and its] non-government seminar [of] former senior Israeli and Palestinian officials reached consensus... China should increase its influence in Mideast, and join 'Quartet'... pursuing peace efforts... To all sides, it still has much to offer. To oil-export[ers, it is] big customer/investor[; to Iran and Syria[, its] veto power at UN and shared misgivings about US make it a welcome friend. Refreshingly, China asks no questions about democracy. Israel... courts China['s] potential influence[, knowing they] share distaste for Islamic militancy [and are important military industry producers/markets]. US worries China has been hesitant to put pressure on Iran[, its] third-biggest supplier of oil, and Sudan[, where] China has invested hugely in oil. China sees advantages for itself in any diminution of US power[;] US preoccupation in Iraq strengthens China's hand in its dealings with Taiwan. In both Sudan and Iran, China has often balked at US-led initiatives in UN that could be seen as legitimising strong-arm tactics against countries deviating from international norms. China fear[ed] it might be next[, but] has recently edged closer to US position... Despite disdain for US-led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan,.. it has not attempted to frustrate US operations[,] has pledged more than $300m for Afghan reconstruction, begun debt-[cancel] negotiations with Iraq[ and, s]ince 1990s, far more sympathetic to US concerns about weapons proliferation. China worries about its dependence on US military might for the security of its oil shipments from Mideast [(see 06 Jan)] so has little choice but to support efforts to stabilise the region. It may not agree with US tactics, but will share the same broad objective". In same issue, these three items (their titles/pages plus their official summaries) discuss China's equally-vital international financial/trade relations: "Chinese Business: Truth From Facts"(Edit.13-4):-"The best test of China's new accounting standards: a few public disasters"; "Chinese Accounting: Cultural Revolution"(63-4):-"New accounting rules have replaced the Little Red Book [by Mao] as China's guide to self-improvement. Can the state handle the truth?"; "Briefing: The Problem With Made in China"(68-70):-"China is choking on its success at attracting the world's factories. That has handed its Asian neighbours a big opportunity"; Economist 24 Feb 07"India and Pakistan: Staying on Track"(Edit.18-9); "Terrorism in India: Murder on the Friendship Express"(47-8); "Pakistan: Musharraf Shows His Hand"(48-52):-Editorial‛s official summary:"United in anger at another atrocity, India and Pakistan should speed up their peace process". Highlights: "Every few months a bombing... in India [is] killing random unfortunates. [A]ttacks usually blamed on militant groups fighting Indian rule in part of divided Kashmir [and] set back painstaking progress.,. ending rancorous, bloody feud that has scarred 60 years since independence/partition. So far, however, none has succeeded in scuppering the 3-year-old peace process.[Latest bombing, of a train, is described in "Terrorism..." which notes:"Pakistan also seen more terrorism than usual.,. probably organised by the same militants, or by their Islamist allies".] Both countries condemned the outrage [and] insisted the peace progress was intact... Both should be urged to go further [and] make a real effort to bring it to a successful conclusion [- the] fanatics have political, religious and even financial interests in keeping [them] at odds. It would be easier to identify the culprits if India and Pakistan were to share intelligence more fully. [I]t is time to move from interminable process to possible outcome. [A]s each outrage proves, present dispensation is intolerable. [T]he outlines of a settlement acceptable to both sides are emerging. It would involvesofter‛ border, some cooperative institutions, greater autonomy for both bits of Kashmir and a gradual withdrawal of Indian soldiers from Kashmir as violence decreases... Such might not bring an immediate/ perpetual end to bombings, but it would dispel the murk of ambiguity where terrorism thrives... pointlessly."Economist 17 Mar 07"Lexington: The American-Jewish Lobby"(38):-official summary : "These are both the best of times and the worst of times for the... lobby". Highlights: "The American Israel Public Affairs Committee(AIPAC)[has] awesome power/unnerving efficiency... Congress has more Jewish members than ever before: 30 in House; 13 in Senate. Both parties are competing...to be ‛soundest‛ on Israel. About two-thirds [in US] hold a favourable view of the place. Yet... feel a bit nervous, too. Iraq debacle has produced a fierce backlash against pro-war hawks, of which AIPAC was certainly one. Also... awkward questions about US‛s alliance with Israel [and] a growing number of people want to push against AIPAC... Some of the most determined are Arab-Americans, who been growing in numbers/influence for years - probably about 3.5m of them [and] a growing political force... But so far their performance has been unimpressive. Arab-Americans are badly split between Christians(63%) and Muslims(24%). Also been late in taking to politics. AIPAC‛s ace is idea that it represents Jewish interests in a country generally philo-Semitic. But liberal Jewish groups... persuad[ed] Congress to water down a particularly uncompromising bit of legislation... which would have prevented any US contact with Palestinian leadership... A liberal version of AIPAC... has yet to materialise[, but] most Jews are fairly left-wing... An even bigger threat to AIPAC [is that] serious people... ask hard questions about US‛s relationship with Israel. [F]ormer security adviser worries that US is seen in Mideast as ‛acting increasingly on behalf of Israel‛... The biggest challenge facing AIPAC is how to deal with this changing climate... US needs an open debate about its role in Mideast"; Economist 24 Mar 07"Briefing: Iraq: Mugged By Reality"(29-31);"The Iraq War: Collateral[US] Damage"(33-4):-"What went wrong? [M]ost popular answer of US neoconservatives who argued loudest for the war is that it was a good idea badly executed... [Some] called Bush national-security team ‛among the most incompetent‛... Others also blame Iraqis for inability to accept US gift of freedom. That excuse too convenient[;] can be no denying project was bungled from the start. Western intelligence failed to discover Saddam had destroyed all his WMD - main rationale for war. However, incompetence beyond this: war launched by divided administration [with] no settled notion of how to run Iraq after conquest. Rumsfeld... sent too few and they did nothing to prevent looters. US plans for Iraq‛s political transition were also rudimentary, to extent they existed at all... State Dept. organized a pre-invasion Future of Iraq project, but Pentagon declined to adopt its ideas. [Under-staffed, ad hoc US body] received no intelligible instructions from Washington, and baffled the liberated Iraqis [who] could not [run] state whose institutions had collapsed. [Even the replaced US ‛viceroy‛] produced big mistakes[:] disbanded the Iraqi army and put tens of thousands of resentful, jobless men on the streets[;] turfed thousands of Baath Party members out of bureaucracy, depriving many ministries of their only trained staff. In the end, political transition of sorts on advice of UN [and] 2005 year of elections... Unfortunately,.. government cannot govern[, as] Iraqis voted along ethnic lines and produced impasse... Sunnis feel locked out of new Iraq dominated by Shias[ - themselves] divided... Main reason for government‛s inability to govern, however, is that it cannot stem a tidal wave of criminal and political violence [-] Baghdad and central Iraq in multiple conflicts. Many Sunnis have taken up arms against the new Shia-dominated order[;] al-Qaeda is running jihad against US and Shias alike, provoking a torrent of revenge killings[;] in places, Shia militias also attack US soldiers. Prevalence of violence and absence of law erodes the legitimacy of the elected government and makes it almost impossible to rebuild an economy that even before the war had been prostrated by a dozen years of UN sanctions... Only when the killing declines will Iraq‛s new government be able to buttress its legitimacy, suck support away from the militias, and rebuild the economy... Iraq‛s cabinet agreed last month on how to share oil revenues between the regions. [B]ut it is uncertain whether the politicians who claim to speak for the Sunnis are close enough even in the event of a political settlement. [T]ime may show that the democratic structure US worked so hard to install can neither run Iraq nor reconcile its warring clans". All remainder of Briefing and the entire "Collateral" item discuss the relevant US national policies/effects; Economist 28 Apr 07"The United States in the Middle East: Weakness - Or a New Realism?" (51-2):-official summary:"Why US is having to adjust policies in region". Highlights:"[T]hree-quarters of Iraqis think US plays 'negative role' in their country; most want US troops to go [see "Iraq: A Row Over a Wall"(51)]. [S]trengthening perception in Mideast of [US] administration at bay. [O]pinion survey in four Muslim countries - Egypt, Morocco, Pakistan, Indonesia - shows 79% of respondents believe US aims to divide and weaken Muslim world. Big majorities want US troops out of all Muslim [-] in Egypt, 91% endorse attacks on US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan ["Afghanistan: The Arrival at Last of Party Politics"(46)]. [This]reflected in government behaviour [:] exasperation with US/sense that Iraq debacle has sapped its will, [thus] stiffening resistance to US policies and emboldening others [-] Iran‛s ambitions/Sudan‛s intransigence/Arab-Israeli conflict/questioning democratic reform. [P]ressure is [more] on Bush to moderate own policies... US has rejected dealings with states/parties it considers hostile. But Bush agreed [to] talk directly to Iran [since] cannot be ignored [over] Iraq. US still chastises Syria [but]probably matter of time before... comes back from isolation... US-led boycott has failed to dislodge [Palestine regime] led by Hamas,.. prompting Saudi Arabia to [sponsor] a national-unity government that diluted Hamas's control but preserved its rejectionist stand towards Israel. US officials now re-engaged with Palestinian president [and] strongly endorsed relaunch [of Arab peace initiative]. Even US policy towards Sudan has shifted [:]deal for a far smaller [peacekeeping force in Darfur] under 'hybrid' UN-African Union command... Perhaps plainest shift is over democratic reform[:] recent political tide appears to have flowed back against [it]. Syria['s] budding reform movement floundering[, and many] have reacted passively to their government's latest crackdown. Egypt's government appears almost to relish... just to show it can fend off US scolding. Reforms in arch-autocratic Saudi Arabia have stalled completely, with no audible protest from Wshdc. Perhaps more serious... is the rumbling that can be heard in regional allies. Turkey has rarely found itself at such cross-purposes with US... Over Iraq it finds itself more in tune with Iran and Syria, due to worries about... Kurdish minority. Egypt and Jordan have close military ties to US too, but must constantly parry sniping from such exuberantly anti-US opponents as Muslim Brotherhood. Yet US military footprint in region remains huge. For Persian Gulf monarchies it is vital protector. US has close military ties to Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, UAE, and strongly beefing up military cooperation with array of countries in the Sahelian belt in their war against Islamist terrorism. Egypt, Jordan and Israel still bank on US aid, and stand as symbols that rewards of friendship with US [alone] can be [so] large. Do shifts in US policy reveal weakness, flexibility or renewed realism? Condoleezza Rice may be adopting less abrasive policies in region. 'They've come to realise that the multilateral approach can be more effective', says an Arab ambassador"; Economist 28 Apr 07"Capital Punishment: Edging Out of Fashion"(69-70):-official summary: "More and more countries have doubts about death penalty". Highlights:"[C]ruelly administered, or botched, executions are not confined to developing countries, or to lands that follow... traditional Islamic punishment... 'At least' 1,591 executions were carried out worldwide 2006, well down on 2005 but 40% higher than 2003. [N]umber of countries that carry out executions... has fallen steadily from 40 a decade ago to just 25 last year. Since 1985, 55 countries have ended the death penalty or, having already limited it to 'extraordinary' crimes,.. have now banned it outright. During the same period, only four reintroduced death penalty[:] Nepal/Philippines have since abolished it again, and in Gambia/Papua New Guinea, no executions. [In all,] 89 countries have abolished death penalty for all crimes, another ten for all but exceptional crimes, and a further 30 are abolitionist in practice. [UN] has called for complete abolition of death penalty. In Europe, where abolition is a condition of membership of both EU and 46-nation Council of Europe (Russia is member), Belarus is only country that still uses it. In Africa, only four carried out death penalty 2006, and in Americas, US is only country to have executed anybody since 2003. Only Asia and Mideast seem largely untouched by global movement away from death penalty. Even China [in 2006 death sentences may be near 8,000] might be having second thoughts [Olympics]. Six countries-China/Iran/Pakistan/Iraq/Sudan/US- accounted for 90%+ of 2006 known executions. Methods of execution vary widely [stoning/stabbing/beheading/electrocution/shooting/hanging/ lethal injection]. Injection is now the preferred method in all but one of 38 [US] states that retain death penalty... US is one of very few democracies [along with Japan/India/South Korea/Taiwan] still to have death penalty"; Economist 19 May 07"Pakistan: Time to Cut a Deal"(Edit.10):-official sum:"General Pervez Musharraf needs allies. Pakistan needs democracy. Enter Benazir Bhutto?" Highlights:"[This] key ally in fight against terrorism is facing the first large-scale popular protests since he grabbed power. [S]laughter of around 40 in Karachi 12-13 May was country‛s worst non-sectarian political violence in decades [and it] looks more unstable than ever". Analysis of a globally-relevant crisis in a state both complicated and strategically-located, offers the reasons/implications:"Briefing: Pakistan: A General State of Disarray"(23-5):-official sum:"A slaughter in Karachi/vengeful judge are signs... Musharraf is struggling to remain in power". Editorial continues:"A small war with al-Qaeda supporters along border with Afghanistan is fueling a wave of jihadist terrorism. In Islamabad, a hardline mosque staffed by armed zealots is defying government. Indeed, general's efforts to fight these forces, and his pro-US stance, are part of reason so unpopular. But a panicky clampdown not solve problems. Killing in Karachi carried out by weak [Musharraf coalition]. Many victims protested against his attempt to sack head of Supreme Court[, including] Pakistan's two mainstream parties, led by exiled former PMs, Benazir Bhutto/Nawaz Sharif. Violence was intolerable [and] unlikely to succeed[:] democracy has been rekindled... Combating militancy... requires more than hunting down militants[:] democratic institutions needed to address the defections terrorism feeds upon. [Musharraf understands this, yet] his efforts at controlled democracy have failed. [E]lections alone do not add up to 'real democracy'[, but] nor does autocrat. [E]lection is due this year which Musharraf looks determined to survive[: be] re-elected president in last days of current parliament. Common sense/constitution dictate he should instead seek election from next one[, so] legal challenges ahead. [That's]why he wants to see back of [the judge. He] can do better than this[: in aligning with US against extremism, and in efforts to make peace with India, he has shown foresight/readiness to take right risks. He needs to do the same to broaden his political support. Ms Bhutto, who leads biggest/most liberal party, thought to have offered to support his reform agenda/re-election. Price would be to escape corruption charges that hang over her, allowing return. She also demands fair election, and that general keep to constitution/shed uniform. [Deal looks least-bad option: Bhutto's demands are admirable for country. Pakistan needs genuine democracy, not imitation. [A]lso needs continuity/ stability army man able to provide... If general fears he would lose most from such cooperation, he is wrong. Without greater legitimacy, opposition will grow and his authority will diminish"; Economist 26 May 07"Lebanon: The Cauldron May Bubble Over Again"(47-8):-official sum:-"The latest outbreak of violence in northern Lebanon menaces the whole region". Highlights:-"Fighting between Lebanese army and radical Islamists entrenched in a Palestine refugee camp near Tripoli. [M]any of camp's 30,000 residents fled[, but] militants inside declared a fight to the death [-] a radical jihadist faction known as Fatah al-Islam... Though small/marginal, [it] has been linked to at least one of sporadic bomb attacks that have hit Christian areas... Violence comes at difficult time for Lebanon, shaken by devastating war with Israel last summer, [and] Western-backed government locked in stand-off against pro-Syrian coalition led by Hizbullah [demanding] veto-wielding share of cabinet. Though fighting in north pits a widely disparaged Sunni Muslim group against a national army.,. many Lebanese view clash through prism of this wider political contest. [O]fficials charge Syria is sowing such strife to regain its power-broking role [or] block [UNSC-involved] tribunal to try suspects in a string of political murders[, but] adamantly denies any link. [M]ost of Lebanon's Palestinian camps [long] controlled by Syrian military intelligence[, which] also known to have sponsored jihadist groups - against US in Iraq. Leader of Fatah al-Islam, whose ideology close to al-Qaeda's, [was ] in Syria before surfacing in Lebanon last year. [G]roup has recruited not only among Palestinian refugees [there], but also among international jihadists... When violence erupted, Palestinian factions united with Lebanon's rival parties, including Hizbullah, in rare unanimous condemnation of Fatah al-Islam as dangerous/alien force, [although] anxiety grew over danger to civilians [and] shelling looked indiscriminate... Some [refugees] claim gunmen holding the camp hostage[, while] most Lebanese solidly back their army, and government bolstered by support from Arab League/US... Whatever outcome, fighting is also reminder that Lebanon - and rest of world - should not let country's wretched Palestinian camps continue to fester as ghettos of misery/extremism which stoke up anger across region"; Economist 02 Jun 07"Palestinians in Lebanon: A History of the Hapless"(46):-official sum:"Long the unluckiest of the lot". Highlights:-"Lebanon [has] 12 Palestinian camps [-] dense warrens of breeze-block shanties. Three were flattened in the civil war [and all] residents were made refugees twice. [Two camps were laid waste; others ravaged in] attacks by everyone... Nahr al-Bared was only camp spared in those dark times; it prospered afterwards... Lebanese army siege of radical jihadist cult [there] has left at least 80 dead... One ingredient [for violence] is despair of Lebanon's 420,000 Palestinians. Not only has hope of returning to Palestine faded; living conditions have deteriorated too. The 4m or so UN-registered Palestinian refugees elsewhere in the diaspora - Jordan, Syria, Israeli-controlled territories - hardly been happy, but treatment in Lebanon notably harsh. Local laws give Lebanon's Palestinians a raw deal, reflecting fears assimilating them could upset [its] sectarian balance... Recent developments increase the poverty imposed[, and] UNRWA... stretched because of chaos in Gaza strip/West Bank. As one result, class sizes in schools UNRWA runs in Lebanon have soared. Troubles also slashed spending by...agencies that once...supported camps; foreign donors...diverted towards widespread destruction by Israeli bombing... Camps have grown more lawless[: initially were under PLO deal; then power vacuum in mid-80s, followed in 90s by Syrian military intelligence... Syrian withdrawal in 2005... left many camps with no effective administration[, so] grew more divided than ever[: split between Hamas-Fatah in Palestine,] exacerbated... by emergence of more extreme factions. [Y]ouths turned to pan-Islamist fervour. Many naturally turned to Nahr al-Bared [-] just outside Tripoli,.. a hotbed of Islamist radicals. Joined by hundreds of militants, very few of them Palestinian, the radical cult Fatah al-Islam has vowed to fight here to the death"; Economist 23 Jun 07"The Arab Predicament: Martyrs or Traitors"(Edit.15)[official sum after each title]"A choice the West must be careful not to force on the people of the Middle East";"The Palestinians: June Amazed Them"(30-2):"From now on, the Palestinians are not themselves"; "Reactions in the Region and Beyond: Emotions Not Politics"(32):"The Palestinians' chances of avoiding the worst depend partly on others"; [plus in previous issue 16 Jun 07:]"Palestine and Israel: As Bleak As It Gets"(16-8):"A civil war among Palestinians is bad for the Israelis too";"The Palestinians: War Between Brothers"(53):"The Palestinians' two main groups are on the verge of a struggle that could split the two parts of a putative Palestinian state in half":-Editorial's highlights:-"[S]cenes from Gaza have shocked Arabs far beyond Palestine... In one brutal week Hamas's swift destruction of Arafat's Fatah movement in Gaza summed up a change that is spreading across a broad swathe of Mideast. Secular nationalism... is coming to look like the weak force and radical Islam like the strong force. This poses huge danger... Western policy in danger of strengthening the wrong side by making Islamists looks like martyrs and secularists like traitors. [US President Bush's]hope is that if Gaza fails under Hamas while the West Bank prospers under Fatah, Palestinian opinion will eventually swing back behind the moderates. Can such a plan possibly work? [A]ssumption of many Muslims that a pro-US leader must in some way be a traitor to the cause extends beyond the Arab world[, while] US's allies cannot stop the martyrs from calling them traitors. US has made itself deeply unpopular in the Islamic world by invading Iraq and standing by Israel. This is bound to taint any Muslim leader who looks as if he owes his position to US military/economic power. But guilt by association is only half of reason for the growing popularity of the martyrs and the spreading idea that US's allies must be traitors. Other half is that, by comparison with traitors, martyrs look clean[:] Hamas in Palestine, Hizbullah in Lebanon and Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt/Jordan have earned reputation for both honesty and efficiency[, and often] health/social services... Martyrs have another selling point[: Hizbullah and Hamas] are still 'resisting' Israel. [I]t is not enough for Israel and US to release the economic help withheld from Palestinians when Hamas was still formally in charge[:] principal grievance [is] Israel's occupation of West Bank as well as Gaza... US must now prove moderate Arab allies, far from being traitors, can actually deliver desirable results. In case of Palestine, [Fatah must] govern cleanly and get Israel to start dismantling outposts and leaving West Bank"; Economist 23 Jun 07"A Counter-Insurgency in Trouble: Fatal Errors in Afghanistan"(Edit.17-8); "Western Forces in Afghanistan: Unfriendly Fire"(51):-Editorial's sum:"Too few soldiers and too much bombing from the air is damaging the US-led campaign". Highlights:"Afghan civilian deaths caused by Western forces as dangerous as most callous of Taliban suicide-bombs. [Operation] was never going to be easy. [According to the famous "Anonymous"Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror(Wshdc: Brassey's Inc. 04), it was initiated by Wshdc in Oct 01 without reflecting the enormous knowledge accumulated by the intense US help to Afghans when occupied by USSR in 1979-89. Chapter 2.:"An Unprepared and Ignorant Lunge to Defeat - The United States in Afghanistan"(21-58).] But allies hobbled themselves by creating two separate forces - both dominated/led by US generals - that at times work at cross-purposes. One is International Security Assistance Force(ISAF), NATO-led operation that does peacekeeping, stabilisation and, for some contingents in south, counter-insurgency against Taliban. Combined Joint Task Force 82, consists of special force/elite infantry who hunt Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders under US's Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF). Two are supposed to coordinate their activity. Both groups have killed civilians, but [worst] are responsibility of OEF[see":Unfriendly"]. ISAF commanders complain... OEF troops often operate in their areas and undermine their work. [E]verybody suffers consequences of mistakes[:] anti-Western riots have started to break out [and President Karzai] complained civilian deaths/arbitrary searches of homes had reached unacceptable level. [Yet] 'mistakes' go on. [Since] foe hides among civilians,.. no amount of care will eliminate deaths of innocents. But West must do better, or risk losing support/[worse]... Having two separate forces makes little military sense. Many NATO... do not want to be too closely associated with US aggressive tactics [while] US reluctant to place its warriors too firmly under control of wishy-washy Europeans. Neither side wholly wrong. [F]orces should be merged, but if proves impossible, should be made clear ISAF has primacy, and oversight over OEF action. More important, aim of military operations should be to protect civilian population and win its trust, not to kill as many insurgents as possible... Unity of effort requires much more than rejigging command structures; it is about managing complexity of nation-building. Problem is not just strength of Taliban, but also weakness of Afghan government, and disillusion with corruption and slow reconstruction. [Above all,] Western and Afghan forces too thinly stretched [; and r]educing Afghan deaths will require... putting more Western soldiers in harm's way"; Economist 30 Jun 07"United States Power: Still No.1"(Edit.11-2); "Briefing: US Power: The Hobbled Hegemon"(29-32):-Editorial's official sum:"Wounded, tetchy and less effective than it should be, US is still the power that counts". Briefing's official sum:"Its troubles in Iraq have much weakened it; but US is likely to remain the dominant superpower". Inevitably very selective highlights from the substantial/complex Editorial: "[F]or a growing [US] number, superpower's inability to impose its will on [Iraq] is symptomatic of a deeper malaise... Nearly six years after 11 Sep 01, nervousness about state of US's 'hard power' is growing [refs. made to Briefing, then to the huge US army weight of Iraq and Afghanistan]. Other demons are jangling US nerves [China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, Europe, Arabs, Chavez]. Nor is it just a matter of geopolitics [Wall Street, borders, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, climate change, Palestinians]. A sense of waning power is not just bad for US self-esteem. It is already having dangerous consequences ['China-bashing', isolationism]. Outside US, consequences could be even graver [Islamic revolutionaries, Putin, Western alliance]. Yet US being underestimated. Friends and enemies have mistaken short-term failure of Bush admin for deeper weakness. Neither US hard nor soft power fading. Rather, not being used as well as could be. The opportunity is greater than the threat. [But] while [US] talk was loud, the stick was spindly. [I]t is hard to imagine any future US admins making such [Bush regime] howlers when it comes to regime change. Yet in one way Bush is unfairly maligned... US did not enjoy untrammelled influence abroad before he arrived [Vietnam, Iran, North Korea, France]. [Superpower's relative]strength lies as much in what it can prevent... as in what it can achieve. Even today, US's 'negative power' is considerable [Iran, North Korea, global warming, Arab-Israeli peace] - US is quite simply indispensable [since] still has the most hard power... Better diplomacy would enhance its power [- and] al-Qaeda is still small beer. [W]in the battle for hearts and minds and you do not need as much hard power to get your way. [This applies to China. US is] an undervalued market leader, in need of new management... More than any rival, US corrects itself... Bush has already rediscovered some of the charms of multilateralism; he is talking about climate change[; and] a Mideast peace initiative is possible. [E]lection offers a chance for renewal[, and US] will bounce back stronger again"; Economist 07 Jul 07"Lebanon: From Crisis To Crisis"(47-8):-official sum:"Echoes of civil war as the country slides towards political deadlock". Highlights:"War with Israel [in 2006] left 1,200 dead and thousands more homeless. [Since then, a political split] widened into a seemingly unbridgeable chasm, crippling a state struggling to manage reconstruction, $33b foreign debt, presidential election, continued series of assassinations. Meanwhile, siege of jihadist guerrillas holed up in Palestinian camp has killed more than 160 and uprooted 30,000 refugees, [plus] a roadside bomb hit UN peacekeepers, killing six. [L]ikely links between all these events[:] ruling majority... accuses Syria of having a hand in most troubles[, while] Syria's friends - Shia party-cum-militia Hizbullah - [blame] Israel/US/Sunni powers... More neutral observers agree that while Syria may indeed be fighting a covert struggle to defend its soft underbelly, unlikely to control any but a few of varied groups seeking to undermine Lebanese government... Outside meddling certainly plays a part in Lebanon's troubles. But much trouble stems from internal causes. Sectarian fragmentation that makes Lebanon the Arab world's most tolerant society also tends to generate scrappy, paranoid politics. [N]eed to resolve political crimes, reform electoral laws and contain jihadist groups are subsumed within struggles over turf and spoils... Talk in recent weeks among the opposition of setting up a parallel government of its own seems to have jolted consciences as well as sad memories [of Lebanon's 1975-90 civil war]"; Economist 14 Jul 07"Briefing: Internet Jihad: A World Wide Web of Terror"(28-30):- "[C]apability of the internet to promote terrorism is worrying intelligence agencies. Past technological innovations...have quickly been exploited by terrorists. But the information revolution is particularly useful to them. Encrypted communications, whether in e-mail or voice-over-internet audio, make it much harder for investigators to monitor their activity... More important, internet gives jihadists an ideal vehicle for propaganda, providing access to large audiences free of government censorship or media filters, while carefully preserving their anonymity. Its ability to connect disparate jihadi groups creates a sense of a global Islamic movement fighting to defend the global ummah, or community, from a common enemy. It provides a low-risk means of taking part in jihad for sympathisers across the world... Al-Qaeda now sends out regular 'news bulletins' with a masked man in a studio recounting events from the many fronts of jihad [Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Palestine]... Battlefield footage [appears] on the internet within minutes of attacks taking place[, some] with musical soundtracks. [T]he hand-held video camera has become as important a tool of insurgency as the AK-47 or the RPG rocket-launcher... Internet's decentralised structure... now gives jihadi networks tremendous resilience. Number of extremist websites increasing exponentially, from a handful in 2000 to several thousand today. Some are overtly militant, while others give jihad second place to promoting a puritanical brand of piety. [M]ost headline-grabbing material... is military manuals - giving instruction on a myriad of subjects, not least weapons/assassination/poisons/explosives. [I]nternet-based compilations... make it easier for self-starting groups around world to try their hand at terrorism. [I]n password-protected areas[,] participants can be gradually groomed... But very anonymity that internet affords jihadists can also work against them[:] police/intelligence agencies enter jihadists' without being identified... Contributors to jihadi web sites regularly told not to divulge secrets... For many who study jihadi websites, [big] danger is indoctrination... At least 60% of material...deals not with current events or with war videos, but instead ideological/ cultural questions. Jihadists... fighting less a war against West than 'a civil war for the minds of Muslim youth'... A key text is ever-expanding e-book, 'Questions and Uncertainties Concerning the Mujahideen and their Operations', which seeks to arm jihadists with responses to questions and doubts about their actions, ranging from admissibility of killing Muslims, use of weapons of mass destruction and acceptability of shaving one's beard for the sake of jihad... What is needed is a systematic campaign of counter-propaganda, not least in support of friendly Muslim governments and moderate Muslims, to try to reclaim the ground ceded to the jihadists"; Economist 21 Jul 07"Nuclear Proliferation: The Riddle of Iran"(Edit.11-2); "Special Report: Iran"(1-16 special pages):-Edit official sum:"Iran's leaders think nuclear weapon could rejuvenate their tired revolution. How can they be stopped?" Highlights:"Iran... moving relentlessly closer to where could build atomic bomb[:] has converted yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride; now spinning the gas through... centrifuges underground/ secretly. Guess is: if runs 3,000 centrifuges at high speed for a year, enough fuel for first bomb [-] next aim up to 54,000.[U]sable weapon will also take time. Experts[:] may have bomb by end of 09[; IAEA:]could build within 3-8 years. What Iran doing entirely illegal[:] signed NPT/says its aims peaceful. [D]isbelieved even by its friends. Russia and China joined UNSC passing two resolutions...applying sanctions. So what next? [Option analysed is:] Iran is attacked/enraged/ retaliates - and still ends up with a bomb anyway. [T]his would be attack from the air, aimed at disabling or destroying Iran's nuclear sites. [S]uch attack well within US capabilities... and perhaps within Israel's too. Yet would be huge gamble. Even if it delayed/stopped Iran's program, new holes in US relations with Muslim world [and] Iran almost certainly hit back[:] fire missiles at Israel, attack US forces in Iraq/Afghanistan, organise terrorist attacks in West, or choke off tankers through world's oil windpipe... Knowing that a nuclear attack on Israel or US would result in its own prompt annihilation, Iran could probably be deterred. [C]ontainment of a nuclear Iran would be less awful than a risky pre-emptive attack that would probably cause mayhem, strengthen the regime and merely delay the bomb. [Yet Iran's] mere possession might encourage it to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy[and] other countries in the region... would probably feel compelled to follow suit... But the sanctions so far are not working. [S]uggests that a third sanctions resolution, with sharper teeth, needs to be enacted without delay... Sanctions that cut off equipment for its decrepit oilfields or struck hard at the financial interests... would have immediate impact on its own assessment of the cost of its nuclear program... If at same time Iran was offered a dignified ladder to climb down - above all reconciliation with US - the troubled leadership of a tired revolution might just grab it"; Economist 21 Jul 07"Turkey's Election: Of Mullahs and Majors"(Edit.13-4); "Briefing: Turkey's Election: A Battle for the Future"(25-8):-Briefing's official sum:"The importance of this... election goes well beyond Turkey itself". Editorial's highlights:"General election is momentous not just for the country and region but for the cause of democracy in the Muslim world. It was called early by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PM and leader of ruling Justice and Development(AK) Party... Opposition harps on AK's Islamist roots and claimed election a fight between secularism and political Islam. In reality, it [was] over the future of Turkish democracy. AK Party [won]. The government has been a success[:] stable and relatively clean. [I]t has tamed inflation, seen economic growth of around 7% a year and lured in record foreign investment [see Briefing. A]lso has modernised constitution[,] shaken up judiciary[,] nudged army towards civilian control... AK has taken tentative steps to improve treatment of minorities, especially Turkey's 14m Kurds, although fighting against guerrillas of Kurdistan Workers Party(PKK) has flared up anew... These successes were crowned by negotiations for membership of EU. [While these] have run into roadblocks on both sides, [m]ost people in AK have become more like European-style Christian Democrats[;] no longer a huge threat to secularism. [W]ould be wise for Erdogan to reach out to his opponents, above all over presidency... Turkey faces two big foreign problems. First, what to do about PKK fighters in northern Iraq. Turkey has troops in the area now but a big invasion would be disastrous. Best bet is to persuade US/political leaders of northern Iraq to disarm PKK terrorists themselves, and to keep talking to modern Kurds... Second, how to keep door to EU ajar. [G]esture towards legitimacy of Cypriot government would help. But best policy is one of patience. Turkey should quietly continue to make the reforms needed for full membership"; Economist 28 Jul 07"Islam and Democracy: The Lesson From Turkey"(Edit.13):-official sum: "Islamist parties that follow the rules should be allowed to win elections". Highlights:"Decisive victory by [AK] shows every sign so far of having been an excellent result. [It] could have been a recipe for trouble, coups, internal strife[; b]ut in fact [was] a thoroughly democratic election, not too much violence, a big turnout and a clear result [see "Elections in Turkey: The Burden of Victory"(51-2), with official sum:"The ruling AK party has won resoundingly, but it needs to act cautiously"]. [T]his seems strong rebuke by voters to the army, which had hinted at interfering in AK's choice of presidential candidate [-] most do not feel it should intervene in politics. Also rewarding government... and punishing oppositions'... incoherent/unconvincing policies. Exactly how democracy should work... Is there a lesson in Turkey for the future of democracy in wider Muslim world? Yes, but approach with care... Turkey has an exceptional history[:] autocratic rule of a moderniser pushed Islam ruthlessly to the margins; then waited better half of a century for emergence of Islamist party that looks mild and moderate enough to be trusted. [T]rouble with this approach is that things can go calamitously wrong both at squeezing-out stage [experience of Iran described]and at letting-in stage [experience of Algeria described]. Recep Tayyip Erdogan ...as PM... got the gist of what democracy really means. There is now no serious doubt that AK would surrender power if it were to be defeated at the ballot box... [R]eal and arguably stronger discipline on AK arises from the experience of democracy itself[:] continuing political success and underlying legitimacy depend on listening closely to the desires of voters, which in turn requires it to moderate its Islamist ambitions and obey the rules of the democratic game... Islamic parties [elsewhere who] declare themselves willing to abide by the rules ought to be allowed to participate fully in electoral politics"; Christopher Hitchens God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything(Toronto:McClelland & Stewart 07):-while the basic aim here is to specifically criticize the beliefs and activities of all major religions, the widely-travelled, -researched, and -admired author deeply reports on the religious origin of instability in all parts of world. From official sum:"With his unique brand of erudition and wit, [he] addresses the most urgent issue of today: the malignant force of religion in the world". Chapter titles: (1)Putting It Mildly; (2)Religion Kills; (3)A Short Digression on the Pig or, Why Heaven Hates Him; (4)A Note on Health, to Which Religion Can Be Hazardous; (5)The Metaphysical Claims of Religion Are False; (6)Arguments from Design; (7)Revelation: The Nightmare of the"Old"Testament; (8)The"New"Testament Exceeds the Evil of the"Old"One; (9) The Koran Is Borrowed from Both Jewish and Christian Myths; (10)The Tawdriness of the Miraculous and the Decline of Hell; (11)"The Lowly Stamp of Their Origin"; Religion's Corrupt Beginnings; (12)A Coda: How Religions End; (13)Does Religion Make People Behave Better?; (14)There Is No"Eastern"Solution; (15)Religion as an Original Sin; (16)Is Religion Child Abuse?; (17)An Objection Anticipated: The Last-Ditch"Case"Against Secularism; (18)A Finer Tradition: The Resistance of the Rational; (19)In Conclusion: The Need for a New Enlightenment; William Langewiesche The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux 07):-this useful but selective description of nuclear weapons distributions and prospects is very easy for non-specialists to read. It does not attempt to analyse in detail all likely nuclear threats of the world this century, but offers three analyses carefully. First is the way in which nuclear weapons explode and the ways in which the key materials can be obtained/ created. According to the book, "For ordinary fission bombs, there are really only two choices - either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Plutonium is a man-made element produced by uranium reactors, from which it emerges initially mixed in with the other radioactive waste, but is separable through chemical processes... The alternative is highly enriched uranium, or HEU, containing more than 90% of the fissionable isotope, U-235"(21-2). Second subject analysed is danger of inadequately-secure Cold War assets falling into hands of terrorists: "US government reacted rapidly to a perception of chaos and opportunity in post-Soviet nuclear affairs and in 1993 launched an ambitious complex of 'cooperative' programs with all the former Soviet states to lessen the chance that nuclear weapons might end up in the wrong hands"(28). Third analysis is "the story of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the scientist at the forefront of nuclear development and trade in the Middle East, who masterminded the theft and sale of centrifuge designs that helped to build Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and who single-handedly peddled nuclear plans to North Korea, Iran and other countries potentially hostile to Western interests"(from dust-cover sum); Economist 11 Aug 07"US, Israel and the Palestinians: A Modest Ambition"(Edit.10-1):-official sum:"What George Bush should do for the Palestinians in the final phase of his presidency". Highlights:"Conditions have seldom looked less ripe for peace. Both sides' leaders are fragile and risk averse... Israelis have learned in Gaza and Lebanon that when they pull out of occupied territory without a peace deal, rockets/fighters pursue them across the border... Israel's only remaining option, apart from sitting still, is to negotiate agreement with Abbas, under which it can leave the West Bank and so make room for independent Palestine. [M]ight look easier now Hamas have been booted out[, but truth] is starkly different. Hamas... is not out of the picture [so] no peace deal without its consent. [It] remains popular not only in Gaza but also in West Bank [and] could swiftly sabotage any [opposed] peace by mounting violent attacks against Israel or [Abbas]. So long as Hamas remains excluded,.. Bush's meeting better be modest [eg] some sort of declaration of principles... For past 20 years, as Israeli settlements continued to spread in West Bank, Palestinians see negotiations as all process and no destination. By forcing Olmert to give Abbas a clear promise of what and where independent Palestine will be, US/Arab partners may be able to restore a modicum of Palestinian enthusiasm. This means writing down some detail on borders.,. refugees and Jerusalem. Since no Israeli PM [can] accept [any] refugees to homes now in Israel, Olmert will have to [offer] shared capital in Jerusalem [-] hellishly controversial in Israel but would play well with Arab states. [M]ay be gestures, too, such as evacuation of some Israeli outposts[, but] no grand bargain will be implemented against Hamas's will. Nor... a deal negotiated with Hamas on board... while it continues to reject the very principle of permanent peace with Israel. [Yet] the world should avoid temptation to punish Palestinians of Gaza economically for their leaders' obduracy" - see:"The Gaza Strip: Staying Alive"(39):-official sum:"Hamas brings some order, but little else, to embattled Gazans". Also see "Religion: Rules of the Game"(75-6): Review of Olivier Roy Secularism Confronts Islam(Columbia Univ Press 07),translated by George Holoch. "Central contention is that 'problem is not Islam but religion or, rather, the contemporary forms of the revival of religion'... New believers are often individualistic, rejecting conformity with either orthodox theology or institutionalised religion"; Nayan Chanda Bound Together: How Traders, Preachers, Adventurers, and Warriors Shaped Globalization(New Haven: Yale Univ Press 07):-this fascinating survey of the development of globalization since 6000BCE is valuable as a unique reminder - to specialists in history, politics, economics, religion, movement, technology, science, etc - of how their own knowledge relates to other specialized information, and to the present/future of the intense/expanding relations across this planet. (This aim corresponds exactly with my purpose in this information source.) Style is amusing, and novel in all areas but one's expertise, so it is delicious/constructive in all unstudied fields and hence globally constructive. Final para offers view that fits closely with that in Christopher Spencer Oct 06(op.cit.):"We benefit from all that the world has to offer, but we think only in narrow terms of protecting the land and people within our national borders - the borders that have been established only in the modern era. [All that separates us] from the rest of the world... cannot change the fact that we are bound together through the invisible filament of history. [W]e know how we have reached where we are and where we may be headed. We are in a position to know that the sum of human desires, aspirations, and fears that have woven our fates together can neither be disentangled nor reeled back. But neither are we capable of accurately gauging how this elemental mix will shape our planet's future. Still, compared to the past... we are better equipped to look over the horizon at both the dangers and the opportunities ...There is no alternative to rising above our tribal interests: over the centuries to come, our destinies will remain inextricably bound together. [W]e can attempt to nudge our rapidly integrating world toward a more harmonious course - because we are all connected"; The Economist 01 Sep 07"Mosques in the West: Islam, the American Way"(Edit.10); "The Politics of Mosque-Building: Constructing Conflict"(53-5):-Edit's official sum:"Why US fairer to Muslims than 'Eurabia'". Highlights:"[S]omething similar about [mosque-related] vignettes of inter-faith politics in the Western world. All illustrate the strong emotions, and opportunistic electoral games, surfacing many countries as Muslim minorities increasingly prosperous/confident, aspire more mosques/other communal buildings. All show way in which whipped-up fears of a 'clash of civilisations' can inflame humdrum politics of a locality. But there is a big transatlantic difference in way such disputes are handled". Major item then pressed. However both follow usual/unfair policy of comparing a large number of European states against a single North American one, pity when Canada's particular "multicultural" policy is unusually relevant to issue here discussed.] "Although US plenty of Islam-bashers ready to play on people's fears, it offers better protection to mosque builders. In particular, its constitution/legal system/political culture all generally take side of religious liberty... More important than... law ethos leans in favour of religious [who] 'new' (to their neighbours) and simply want to practise their faith in a way harms nobody... European Convention on Human Rights, and court that enforces, also protect religious freedom. But not central to European politics... Legal principles aside, there are pragmatic reasons for favouring US [and Canadian?] way. Most mosques in Western world pose no threat to non-Muslim citizens; but a few do pose such a danger, because of hatred preached in them. In such cases police generally have legal armoury need to step in and make arrests if necessary. Quashing extremism surely easier where founding/running mosques open/transparent business. .. Christians in West long complained about how hard for their brethren in Muslim lands to build churches... But they should practise what they preach". "Briefing: Capital Punishment in US: Revenge Begins To Seem Less Sweet"(20-2): much more critical of US legal/political system"; The Economist 01 Sep 07"Egypt: Bashing the Muslim Brothers"(38-44):-official sum:"Egypt‛s rulers are giving their Islamist compatriots an even worse time than usual". Highlights:"Muslim Brotherhood... now proclaims belief in freedom, democracy and rule of law... Their enthusiasm for violent jihad and constant framing of Islam as a faith threatened by vicious enemies helped spawn more radical Islamist groups... [Egypt's] president, Hosni Mubarak, recently chided Brothers for 'hiding behind religion to turn back the clock'[, and] past few months resulted in some 600 arrests... Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, a secular-leaning lobby, details some 567 cases of police torture in past 14 years, of which 167 led to death,[and] concluded torture is practised systematically in every place of detention in every part of Egypt... [It] is one of the world's most heavily policed countries. Its 75m enjoy relative freedom from crime. But recent years have seen growing public discomfort with the force... widely seen... squashing dissent. So current campaign against Brotherhood, officially outlawed despite having won a fifth of seats in last parliamentary elections as independents, has brought the group widespread sympathy. [P]unishment has several causes. Many cite the erosion of pressure for democratic reform from US... More immediately pressing, however, [is] Brotherhood's declared intention to challenge a recently imposed constitutional ban on religiously based political parties, by issuing a full-fledged legislative platform. [Suggests] group wants to capitalise not only on Egypt's strong and growing religious conservatism but also on public anger at government's perceived indifference to the country's myriad social ills"; Economist 15 Sep 07"Pakistan: The Wrong Direction"(Edit.14); "Briefing: Pakistan: Home And Away"(31-3):-Edit's official sum:"Why US should push General Musharraf harder towards democracy". Highlights:"It seems odd to claim that [Nawaz Sharif, an appalling PM 1990-93, and 1997-99 when overthrown by Musharraf,] is crucial to Pakistan democratic future [-] nevertheless true. Sharif represents something without which democracy cannot thrive - a real political movement with popular support. By expelling him.,. Musharraf has demonstrated is not serious about restoring democracy... Whether Pakistan moves back to democracy, or is condemned to authoritarianism, is of great interest to... the rest of the world... Musharraf in some ways been impressive leader: managed to stay in power/hold politicians at bay for 8 years. Technically, he restored democracy in 02, but has rigged elections [and] ignored Supreme Court ruling that he should allow Sharif back. [G]rowing majority of Pakistanis want him out but, by persuading US that holding line against Islamist extremists[, been helped to] hang on to power. Yet its getting difficult for general. [Briefing offers major report on complex/serious human region]. Presidential election is due next months; parliamentary one by Jan 08. He may explore [state of emergency]; or may try to do a deal with Benazir Bhutto, the only other political leader, who is demanding immunity from prosecution, [right to seek] third PM term, curbing of president's powers, and establishment of a caretaker government. [S]uch a cosy arrangement... depends on its terms. [I]nsisting Musharraf take off his uniform if he wants to be president would be worth doing. But a deal that divides power, general/Bhutto, and deprives Pakistanis of determining own future, would not... A stable Pakistan is crucial to regional peace and to securing the world against terrorism. But only way to discourage Islamist extremism in Pakistan is through democracy"; Economist 15 Sep 07"Terrorism: Visions of Osama Bin Laden"(73-4):-official sum:"Al-Qaeda's leader returns and foresees victory in Iraq". Highlights:"Osama bin Laden has returned from the wilderness to cast his curse against the evildoers. US, he predicts, will fall in Iraq... Capitalism and democracy are worst forms of 'polytheism', causing war, global warming, poverty and costly mortgages. Solution to such wickedness is for US to 'embrace Islam'. Then war would end and US would be richer, because Islam... has no income taxes except 2.5% title known as zakat. Call to convert is no rhetorical flourish: Islamic jurisprudence requires that non-believers be given a chance before attacked. [I]ntelligence will search... for clues about intentions... and state of health... Bin Laden's return... was his first video appearance since 04 [and] coincides with a resurgence of his movement... Al-Qaeda and its offshoots have regrouped, replaced lost commanders and built up a stronger following around the world. [L]atest reminders of violent jihadism [were] inspired, if not directed, by al-Qaeda. Experts debate whether al-Qaeda is as dangerous, or more so, as in 01. [Many say] it has recreated a safe haven in Pakistan's lawless tribal belt, alongside its strengthened Taliban allies. [For Pakistani involvement with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda see:"Briefing: Pakistan: Home And Away"(31-3) and particularly mid-section of Brief which reports: "Poll found that 46% of Pakistanis approve of al-Qaeda's chief, against 38% for their president".] Al-Qaeda's ideology, if not the movement itself, has become more globalised [and] underlines concern about home-grown terrorism across Europe. Much of al-Qaeda's propaganda, as well as its military training manuals, are spread through a large network of jihadist websites. Muslims anywhere can become radicalised and join the fights, with little or no involvement from al-Qaeda's leaders. [S]ome converts to Islam appear to be particularly prone to extremism... Though training is much easier abroad, home-grown cells may need no direction from overseas and can act faster, making it harder to detect them... Al-Qaeda has experienced some broader setbacks, however, notably in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, where violent jihadist campaigns have been largely squashed... Still, Iraq is stoking the cause[ and,] like Afghanistan after Soviet defeat, Iraq too will start exporting hardened terrorists". For relevant material on situation in Iraq - with official sums - see: "The Iraq War: Why They Should Stay"(13):-"For all General Petraeus's spin, Iraq is still a violent mess. That is why US should not leave yet"; "US and Iraq: The General Speaks"(37-8):-"David Petraeus says Iraq is improving and some 30,000 US troops can come home by next summer. Congress wants more"; "Iraq: How Fast Do the Iraqis Want US to Get Out?"(57):-"While US argues over how and when to bring their boys home, the Iraqis have their own equally mixed views"; Economist 29 Sep 07"Lebanon: Who's For President?"(48-9):-official sum:"Finding a new head of state may not stem the slide back towards bloody chaos". Highlights:"Lebanon's...plot is still getting thicker... On 19 Sep, car exploded in Beirut, killing MoP from ruling majority and four others [-] 11th prominent opponent of Syria to be so targeted... Not a single culprit has been caught so far. On 25 Sep, parliament, which has in effect been suspended since its speaker joined an opposition boycott of it last Dec, reconvened at last. [It] must elect new president before the term of widely disparaged/doggedly pro-Syrian incumbent expires 24 Nov. [But] too few showed up to have vote [and] speaker adjourned until end Oct... Ruling coalition, Sunni-Druze-Christian grouping, backed by West/Saudi Arabia, said may now elect president merely with simple majority. Opposition, which groups Shia Hizbullah/disgruntled Christians, backed by Syria/Iran, has declared such move illegal. 'Declaration of war' said former general Aoun, who believes his tactical alliance with Shia bolsters his own credentials for post. [S]uch talk is not taken lightly. Lebanon's internal schism mirrors the polarisation of wider region. It pits those who retain some faith in West/would seek accomodation with Israel, against who demonise US and dream of liberating Jerusalem. [For a deep issue against Israeli policy, see "Israel: The Land of Zion"(49):-extracts:"Jewish National Fund(JNF) was set up to buy land in Palestine for settling Jews there... Now fund is fuelling the tension inherent in Israel's desire to be both Jewish state and democracy... JNF owns nearly 2,600sqkm, 13% of Israel's land, and its covenant states the land can be leased only to Jews... Critics counter that at least half fund's lands... were seized by the state after their Palestinian owners fled in 48... At time when anti-Israel campaigners are seizing on chances to compare Israel with apartheid South Africa, has troubled some Jews".] Events, such as invasion of Iraq, war with Israel,..serial murders in Beirut, have fortified [Lebanese] convictions... Intensity of passions has grown, fears one diplomat, to where another assassination or big event further afield, such as military attack on Iran, could reignite civil war. [Yet] outcome not necessarily catastrophic... Amid meetings between leaders of opposing factions, talk of reaching a compromise over presidency grew louder. [No] effective president can afford to alienate Shias, who make up third of Lebanon's people. In any case, factional struggle will continue, no matter who occupies presidency. Several compromise candidates have been tabled... Most Lebanese at least agree almost anyone would be better than Lahoud"; Economist 06 Oct 07"Civil Liberties: Detention Without Trial: The Stuff of Nightmares"(70-1):-official sum:"Judges and parliamentarians are restraining the zeal of governments who want a free hand to fight terror". Highlights:"[US] Senate Judiciary Committee [discussing] to restore habeas corpus rights to Guantánamo detainees. Most have been held for nearly six years without charge, without access to a lawyer or any indication of when, if ever, they might be released... Guantánamo has become... reaction to the terror attacks of 11 Sep 01. In Britain, too, government has sought new powers to tackle Islamist terrorism. [I]n both, the doctrine of the balance of powers has passed a test... Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, coupled with the right to challenge it in an independent court... are among the civilised world's most sacred and ancient liberties... But these days, there is more talk of pre-emption and 'preventive detention', even in democracies. [I]s US's war on terror a real war in the legal sense? If not, then the detainees should be treated as ordinary criminal suspects. This is the path that most European countries have chosen. Even if it could be deemed a real war, it is clearly unlike an ordinary state conflict: it has neither a definable end nor even an identifiable enemy with whom to sue for peace. It could last for decades... US has also engaged in so-called 'extraordinary rendition' - the abduction of suspected terrorists to face not justice, but harsh interrogation, perhaps torture, in a third country... The new system [in Britain] seems as riddled with problems as the old, and almost as unfair... But no leader of a Western democracy has obtained a completely free hand in detaining people. US has seen a tug of war between the government and the courts, with many rounds... Many hope the Supreme Court will seize opportunity to give a view on whether [President] Bush's 'war on terror' is a real war. Congress, too, is beginning to show its teeth... In Britain, too, Parliament has baulked at some of the government's demands"; Economist 13 Oct 07"Civil Liberties: Freedom of Speech: The Tongue Twisters"(66-7):-official sum:"The difficulty of reconciling traditional freedoms of expression with the new demands of national security". Highlights:"In countries at war, freedoms of the press and of speech often restricted... Al-Qaeda's attacks of 11 Sep 01, by precipitating a 'war on terror', also raised questions - both legal and moral - about the role of the media in free societies. Several Western governments used national security as justification for limiting certain sorts of public information/public speech. Press itself has... sometimes refused to accept limits on its freedom of expression;.. sometimes has accepted them. If [accept] the lip service almost all countries pay to a free press - 160 UN members have ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - then freedom of expression has had a tough time... UN for first time issued statement condemning the targeting of journalists and calling for the prosecution of their killers... To some degree, the global increase in the number of journalists being killed, kidnapped and otherwise harassed may signify that more journalists at work, and growing bolder... Attacks on media, Freedom House points out, are not only bad in themselves; they are also a sign of worse to come: other democratic institutions. In repressive countries, internet has often been greeted as a wonderful way to bypass government control... For a while, relatively immune to regulation[, but] an academic think-tank says that censorship of internet has spread from just a handful of countries five years ago to 26 nations. Some... now blocking entire internet services. It is not surprising that such countries are suppressing freedom of expression... US gives greater protection to freedom of expression than any other country... Even so, a Century Foundation [man claims,] Bush's attempts 'to intimidate/punish the media, or at least to manipulate/mislead it, represents one of most concerted assaults on [constitution]"[, and] number of documents being stamped secret or classified has almost quadrupled... For many,.. administration has tilted balance too far towards maintaining'certain information...in confidence'... In Britain, freedom of expression has been under attack... It has now gone further [than US]... At first meeting of UNGA, delegates described freedom of expression as 'the touchstone of all human rights'. In practice, that freedom has never been totally unfettered... Under European Convention on Human Rights, freedom of expression is subject to a wide range of possible restrictions, including national laws banning speech likely to incite/'stir up' hatred against people... Since 01, these sorts of restrictions expanded to apply to Muslims... Free-speech critics insisted some element of intent be involved, claiming otherwise religious works... could be deemed unlawful... Sometimes the press has decided to censor itself... Attempts to gag press in democratic countries usually fail"; Economist 27 Oct 07"Armies of the Future: Brains, Not Bullets"(Edit.15); "Briefing: Fighting Insurgents: After Smart Weapons, Smart Soldiers"(33-6):-official sums:"Western armies good at destroying things. Can they be made better at building them?";"Irregular warfare may keep Western armies busy for decades. They will have to adapt if they are to overcome the odds that history suggests they are up to". Both tell what must be modified in any effective army in order to at least control insurgents that can arise anywhere. Most information relates to the West(,as does General Sir Rupert Smith The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World op cit). The issues apply to the whole world and involve more than just military action - above all cooperation(, as argued in: Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST COOPERATE - IN TERMS OF BOTH THEIR WEALTH AND KNOWLEDGE - IN ORDER TO SURVIVE op cit). Editorial highlights:"Firepower is of little use, and often counter-productive, when the enemy deliberately mingles among civilians. [West] must expect to fight protracted, enervating counter-insurgency wars that offer no clear-cut victories / risk prospect of humiliation ... Counter-insurgency... is 'armed social work'. It requires more brain than brawn, more patience than aggression. Model soldier should be... intellectual for 'the graduate level of war', preferably a linguist, with a sense of history and anthropology...Post-colonial politics, stronger concerns for human rights, the rapid dispersal of news: all these (good) things make today's conflicts even harder to win for occupiers. So it may well be better to step back and work through local allies. Few insurgencies have unseated existing governments. In 'war on terror' most important al-Qaeda suspects rounded up... by locals. Strengthening local forces is best way of salvaging Iraq and Afghanistan, and may help avoid the need for future interventions. [B]uilding 'partner capacity' may need... creating new specialist units to train allies, embed Western soldiers in local forces to improve their performance/call in air [aid], and help organise civil reconstruction [and diplomacy]. [S]hift in focus from destruction to construction... is certainly worth putting more money into manpower". "Briefing" highlights: "Modern wars are complex affairs conducted 'among the people'... The greater the accuracy of modern weapons, the louder the outcry when they kill or wound civilians... Guerrillas' main weapons: agility, surprise, support of at least some sections of the population and, above all, time. [New US manual says that] in fighting an enemy 'among the people', the central objective is not to destroy the enemy but to secure allegiance of the citizenry. All strands of a campaign - military/economic/political - must be strongly entwined ...Nationalist/pan-Islamic sentiments are much stronger than in the past. Information technology has helped jihadists spread 'single narrative' that Muslims everywhere are under attack. Internet provides a new and unassailable sanctuary from which to propagandise/organise/share tactics... A growing body of opinion... has concluded that insurrections are best fought indirectly, through local allies. [F]or local governments, fighting insurgents is a matter of survival... To build viable governments... has proved difficult enough even where the fighting has stopped and the main political forces have been cooperative (or at least acquiescent)... Although most armies have now relearnt the limits of force and importance of 'comprehensive approach', other branches of government have not [foreign policy, aid agencies. US army] needs not just more soldiers - nor even linguists, civil-affairs officers, engineers - but a fully fledged corps of advisers that will train and 'embed' themselves with allied forces around the world. Insurgencies may be the face of war for West in years ahead. [E]xtremists round the world have seen US vulnerability to the rocket-propelled grenade, AK-47 and suicide-bomber"; Economist 27 Oct 07"Afghanistan's Taliban: War Without End"(50):-official sum:"Not winning, but not losing either". Highlights:"[I]nfiltration routes from Pakistan will be blocked to the Taliban [soon by snow]. NATO commanders... feel they were on the front foot during the summer. Since Jan, almost 6,000 killed - 50% increase on 06. Included 200 NATO/more than 3,000 alleged Talibs. Insurgent violence up by 20% on 06, largely because [NATO] pushed into areas formerly held by Taliban. Nonetheless, few observers doubt Afghan insurgency has years to run[:] Taliban seem to have enough recruits[;] refuge /logistical base in Pakistan lawless tribal areas[;]enough funds -40% from drug trade... NATO's role stopgap, as $billions building Afghan security forces... 20-30% of population in south support Taliban[ -]whose fighters between 6,000-20,000. Some 6,000 Taliban reported killed since 05, with no sign [this] dented capability. [Hence]will not, by itself, end insurgency. Suicide bombings[, rare until 05,] this year more than 120. Roadside bombings also increasing. NATO claims this is sign of desperation [and] focused on attacking Taliban leadership[- some success]. Locals [say] Taliban taken severe punishment in south. [M]uch talk of prising away 'moderate Taliban' through negotiation[, but] Taliban fighters now appearing in previously placid provinces [and] NATO's nearly 35,000 not enough to take and hold all parts[- and] publicly divided. Taliban, too, fragmented. Far from monolithic Islamists they were in 01, they now span various groups with differing motivations. Alongside the diehard madrassa-trained Talibs are growing numbers of foreigners with al-Qaeda links. ['T]ier-2' fighters are drawn to fight for many reasons: unemployment; illegal opium; tribal loyalties... Many Afghans in south would support any force offering real hope of security/justice. [N]either Taliban nor Afghan government/Western backers have yet made a convincing case"; Economist 03 Nov 07"Faith and Politics: The New Wars of Religion"(Edit.15-6); "Special Report: On Religion and Public Life: In God's Name" (Unique 1-22):-Both official sums: "Faith will unsettle politics everywhere this century; it will do so least when it is separated from the state"; "Religion will play a big role in this century‛s politics. John Micklethwait asks how we should deal with it". Editorial's highlights:"[R]eligion is playing a central role. [P]eople have been slain in God's name; [religion-related] money/ volunteers have poured into regions [; and] religion has forced itself dramatically into the public square. [Brief references here; Report chapters: US, Turkey, India, Israel/Palestine, China, Iran.] How frightening (or inspiring) is this prospect? As Special Report explains, idea religion has re-emerged in public life is to some extent illusion. It never really went away... Its new power is mostly the consequence of two changes. First is failure of secular creeds. Second, although some theocracies survive in Islamic world, religion has returned to stage as much more democratic, individualistic affair... in tune with globalisation... Free up religion and ardent believers/atheists both do well... Culture wars... may become a global phenomenon; expect fierce battles about science. [R]eligious conflict today is result as much of popular will as of state sponsorship: bottom-up, driven by volunteers not conscripts, their activities blessed by rogue preachers not popes; fury mostly directed at apostates not competing civilisations... [P]oliticians...to deal with religion, two lessons - one principled, other pragmatic. Principle is that church and state best kept separate[; eg] teachers not allowed to teach children creationism as science. [Economist] disapproves of publicly financed faith schools. [R]eligion [in] public square most overtly is Islam... At its most theocratic, it forces people to follow sharia laws... Yet Islam can clearly co-exist with a modern liberal state [-] test case will be Turkey... Pragmatic lesson concerns those wars of religion... Western powers (and religious leaders) too reluctant to look for faith-driven solutions to religious conflicts... 'Interfaith dialogue'... is more realistic idea than presenting a secular peace to competing faiths... Atheists and agnostics hate the fact, but these days religion is inescapable part of politics... Unless politicians learn to take account of religious feelings and to draw a firm line between church and state, the new wars of religion may prove as intractable". All above discussed in Special Report; Economist 10 Nov 07"Martial Law in Pakistan: Time's Up, Mr Musharraf"(Edit.13); "Briefing: Pakistan: Lawyers Against the General" (31-4):-official sums:"No longer the potential solution, the general has become a big part of Pakistan's problem"; "However Pervez Musharraf tries to justify his actions, this is a dark time for his wretched country". Editorial's highlights:"General Musharraf has... seemed, despite his embarrassing lack of democratic credentials, a relatively safe pair of hands in charge of 165m-strong moderate Islamic nation [-with] nuclear weapons and prey to frightening extremist fringe. Over years, however, [he] has squandered the goodwill he enjoyed at home and abroad. [H]is alliance with US[, and] refusal to take off army uniform [or] allow unrigged elections, alienated [wide] opinion. [H]is second coup came 03 Nov when he dismantled constitutional facade,.. imposed martial law[,] locked up [hundreds and took] private TV off air. Many want him gone[ b]ut not obvious how to force his hand without endangering stability of Pakistan itself. [Musharraf] is now a central part of Pakistan's instability... In declaring 'a state of emergency', he cited two threats:.. the spread of violent extremism and the pesky interference of the judiciary in his efforts to deal with it. [Briefing is recommended here for details.] The extremist violence has spread from the lawless tribal areas where Pakistan blurs into Afghanistan to the neighbouring parts of Pakistan proper, and beyond [Islamabad, Karachi. Other threats include] involvement of Pakistan-trained terrorists in attacks in the West[, while] the radical mullahs of the border areas people the West's worst nightmares [of] a 'Talibanised', nuclear-armed Pakistan... But martial law has so clearly pitted [Musharraf] and army against the rest of the country that, rather than gain a sharper focus, he is now likely more distracted... US and Britain are loth to do anything that might jeopardise their links with Pakistan's army and its intelligence services... Logistical support for Afghan war, undermining Taliban's rear base in the tribal areas, intelligence on planned terrorist attacks in West: all demand Pakistani cooperation. For this reason,.. threat to withdraw US aid... is difficult to use. But it should be used... Musharraf has apparently promised to hold elections by mid-Feb... Pakistan can still be dragged back from the brink. Top brass of Pakistan army[ - ]their loyalty to their boss can be assumed to be finite... It must be made plain that [US] backing is dependent on restoring democracy, through a free election open to all. Otherwise, as military dictators go, so should General Musharraf"; Ömer Taspinar"The Old Turks' Revolt: When Radical Secularism Endangers Democracy"Foreign Affairs Vol.86/No.6(Nov/Dec 07):-off.sum:"The ruckus over election of a religious conservative as Turkey's president has exposed the illiberal nature of Turkish secularism - as well as the pragmatism of the country's reformed Islamists. Preserving democracy in Turkey by keeping the military out of politics will be a tall order, but the future of the Muslim world's most promising democratic experiment is at stake"; Economist 24 Nov 07"The Middle East Summit: Mr Palestine"(Edit.13-4):-off.sum:"George Bush is the only man who can bring an independent Palestine closer". [Earlier item on summit: 11 Aug 07; for update:]"Israel and Palestine: Cinderella at Annapolis"(27-9):-off.sum:"Muddled expectations and mismanaged diplomacy may mean Annapolis peace summit achieves far less than backers once hoped". Edit.highlights: "[T]wo sides have[recently] not bridged longstanding differences. [W]ould take immense courage for Abbas to modify Palestinians' mantra: a state on 1967 borders, a capital in Jerusalem and 'right' of refugees of 60 years ago to return to what is now Israel. [PM Olmert] governs in coalition with men who hate the very idea of an independent Palestine... Polls show many Israelis long to be rid of Palestine territories[, b]ut even they wonder how they can trust Abbas's Palestinian Authority to police state when already lost Gaza to Hamas and might well lose West Bank too... But Bush has it within his power to make so much more... Israelis right to say divided Palestinians in no shape right now to govern a state: Hamas has first to be bullied, bribed or cajoled into... joining the peace camp... In past, US asked Israelis and Palestinians to thrash out their differences on their own. But they can't. The gap is too wide. [A] US blueprint that commanded international support would, however, immediately transform the political dynamic. [Bush] should make it clear that when US talks of a two-state solution, it has in mind a border based on the pre-1967 line. [H]e can now tell Israel that it cannot keep more than a few percentage points - say 5% - of West Bank, and must offer Palestinians land from its own side in compensation. On refugees, right to 'return' should be exercised in new Palestine and not in pre-1967 Israel... Israel too must accept... Jerusalem... to be capital of both. [O]nly a deal along [these] lines... stands the remotest chance of bringing permanent peace"; Economist 01 Dec 07"The Annapolis Peace Summit: Much To Be Modest About"(Edit.16); "The Arab-Israeli Summit in Annapolis: Big Turnout, Small Result"(59-60):-off.sums:"George Bush sent Palestinian moderates home with little to show and less to sell";"An agreement on further peace talks, if not much else". Edit. highlights:"Israeli and Palestinian delegations at last minute approved 437 words for US president to read out, but this was the sort of declaration that makes the phase 'lowest common denominator' sound generous. It... is utterly silent on borders, Jerusalem, Israel's West Bank settlements, fate of the Palestinian refugees - all the issues that have confounded previous bouts... Hope that US president might fill the gap was confounded too [all amplified 59-60 item]. US still has pulling power: Saudi Arabia, Syria and a dozen other Arab countries turned up. [Yet Bush's] own speech was almost miraculously content-free. [S]aying out loud that the border would have to be based on that of 1967, or that the two states would have to share Jerusalem, was evidently too daring for this deadbeat White House... Talking is better than killing[, but] the start of even unpromising peace talks galvanises the spoilers from both sides[, and] the prospects of escalation are all too real. As soon as one of the many [Hamas rockets] kills a large number of Israelis, Olmert will come under intense pressure to send his army back into Gaza Strip... That could lead to war no less brutal than the one Israel fought against Hizbullah in Lebanon... But in asking Abbas to lead his exhausted/sceptical people back into the tunnel of negotiations, and neglecting to switch on a light at the end of it, Bush asking a lot of the Palestinian moderates. If they fail, he will deserve a big share of blame"; Economist 24 Nov 07"Africa: Promises, Promises"(Edit.15); "African Peacekeeping: The Doves of War"(52-4):-Editorial's off.sum:"It is time for both Africans and the rich world to walk the talk in Darfur and Somalia". Highlights:"Eastern Congo faces a humanitarian disaster; the killing in Sudan's Darfur region goes on apace; war rages between Islamist militias and Ethiopian troops in Somalia; rebels threaten the government in Chad; war may resume between Eritrea and Ethiopia and between Sudan's government and former rebels in autonomous south. [Edit. then recommends "...Doves of War", with off.sum:"Too many conflicts, too few decent armies to sort them out". It also briefs other peacekeeping: Burundi-Rwanda, Central African Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone.] UN is sending unprecedented numbers of troops to the region. It already has 17,000 in Congo and 20,000 more due to join existing 6,000-strong African Union (AU) force in Darfur - largest UN forces in the world. Another 2,000 between Eritreans-Ethiopians, plus 10,000 in south Sudan. AU also 1,600 Ugandan troops in Somalia... In Congo, UN is doing its best to hold the ring between several rival ragtag armies, but elsewhere its fine intentions have yet to bear fruit. In Darfur,.. imperative for UN is to provide both transport and attack helocopters for [to-be-]expanded force. [A] robust/mobile force is vital if peace is to be restored to a region where some 300,000 have already died and more than 2m are displaced. In Somalia,.. African countries have failed to deliver. AU promised a force of 8,000 to keep peace in Mogadishu, [b]ut so far only the Ugandans, too few to do the job, have turned up... and war threatens to engulf the capital again, perhaps infecting whole region. Africa/West seem to have lost hope and interest... Main foreign governments involved in negotiations... must not give up"; Economist 01 Dec 07"Lebanon: In Search of a Government"(60) [directly follows:"Who's for President?" 29 Sep 07]:-off.sum:"Even as the country's people get used to not having one". Highlights:"[F]inal day of President Emile Lahoud's term of office [was 23 Nov], and parliament bound to elect a successor... Failure to choose a new head of state, many said, could precipitate a slide into chaos and even a renewal of 1975-90 civil war... Tensions are still high, but fears of imminent strife appear to have dissipated. Lebanese have resumed business [and] country has muddled along without a legislature since last Nov... During this time divisions between ruling majority [Sunni/Druze/smaller Christian factions] and opponents [Shia/populist Christian groups] have solidified. Core dispute... concerns opposition demands for a bigger share in government[, but ]rendered more complex by influence of foreign powers [Iran/Syria/France/US/Saudi Arabia] ... Syria might push its Lebanese allies towards compromising over presidency in exchange for... attention to its claim on Golan Heights... Yet there are also important Lebanese internal dynamics at play... between its three largest sects... Most popular Maronite politician, Michel Aoun, has strong anti-Syrian credentials, but his volatile nature and alliance with Hizbullah alienate many Christians... [Yet] army commander-in-chief, Michel Suleiman, has gained respect for keeping his men above the political fray, and using them effectively to maintain security. Although many Lebanese would be relieved to see the low-key general as president, his election requires a change to constitution rules barring soldiers from civilian office";Economist 08 Dec 07"Iran's Bomb Program: Pressure Works('High Confidence')"(Edit.13-4) :-off.sum:"US's spies have changed their minds. But nuclear Iran remains a danger". Highlights: "In 2005 [US intelligence] said that Iran had a secret nuclear program and was determined to get a bomb. Now they say they were wrong about that. [For more on the revised analysis and US reactions, see:"Iran: Nuclear Fallout [in WSHDC]"(38):off.sum:"[US] spooks change their tune, and [US] politicians recalibrate". For also Iranian reaction:"Iran's Nuclear Program: What's Not To Celebrate?"(53-4):off.sum:"Mahmoud Ahmadinejad thinks Iran is home free".] NIE says with 'high confidence' that although Iran was indeed working on a bomb until 03, it then stopped. By middle of 07, it had probably ('moderate confidence') not started again. Unless it got fuel for a bomb from abroad, would take at least until late 09 ('moderate confidence'), but more likely between 2010 and 15 to make it at home. [I]ntelligence is... system of best guesses based on incomplete evidence[, but as] 16 agencies signed report[,] most unlikely to be a tissue of lies. [H]owever, relieved [US] doves... had better read the report again[:] final sentence says ('high confidence') that Iran has scientific/technical/industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if chooses. ['A]t a minimum' it is keeping the option open[, t]roubling because Iran can continue to work towards a bomb without resuming secret program US now thinks stopped in 03... But creating warhead is easier part of building a bomb. Harder by far is making the fuel [which] Iran continues to do, in defiance of UNSC, at uranium-enrichment plant at Natanz. For now, Iran enriching uranium at below weapons grade[, but] to get the uranium to weapons grade it has only to run the stuff often enough through Natanz's centrifuges... The case for US pre-eption [attack] now becomes almost impossible to sell [ - ] probably a good thing. [R]eport may also make it harder for US and EU to maintain, let alone sharpen, [UN] sanctions... to make Iran stop work at Natanz... US may have to show new flexibility[:] it could offer to talk to Iran [ - which might refuse,] but that would at least make it clear which side was the spoiler"; Economist 15 Dec 07"Afghanistan and Iraq: Must They Be Wars Without End?"(Edit.13):- off.sum:"No, as recent successes show. But 'winning' will take many years, and cannot be achieved by force alone". Editorial initially raises question:"Is it possible that [the two US-led wars] are at least beginning to come good?", and draws attention to carefully relevant reports (with off.sums): "Briefing: Iraq: Can a Lull Be Turned Into a Real Peace?"(28-30):"Surge of US troops has dramatically reduced violence. But Iraq's politicians may still squander an obvious chance for reconciliation";"Briefing: Afghanistan: Policing a Whirlwind"(31-3):"As foreign troops become more efficient, government is still the problem". Highlights common to both wars:"At best, coming good will consist of a tapering off of violence, and a crab-wise movement towards a political accommodation between the governments... and the militias now fighting them... As in Iraq, so in Afghanistan: it would be both morally wrong and tactically foolish for West's politicians to exaggerate temporary gains in the vain hope of stilling the domestic clamour for withdrawal... 'Victory'... will at most mean preventing catastrophe; and even this modest aim will for years require spending Western lives and money in campaigns that will demand as much attention to the once-reviled business of nation-building as to the use of military force... As to whether either war is worth the prolonged struggle, that is question whose answer must depend on the changing costs and benefits... Democracies need the courage to withdraw from wars bringing no good, but also to persevere in just ones - even when the end is not yet in sight"; Philip H.Gordon"Can the War on Terror Be Won? How to Fight the Right War"Foreign Affairs Vol.86/No.6(Nov/Dec 07):-Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, and author of Winning the Right War: The Path to Security for America and the World(Times Books 07), from which the essay is drawn, strongly criticizes Bush's anti-terror invasion of Iraq as having 'created more terrorists than it has eliminated'. Instead he argues:"Considering possible outcomes of the war on terror makes clear that it can indeed be won, but only with the recognition that this is a new and different kind of war. Victory will come not when foreign leaders accept certain terms but when political changes erode and ultimately undermine support for the ideology and strategy of those determined to destroy(sic) the US. It will come not when Wshdc and its allies kill or capture all terrorists or potential terrorists but when the ideology the terrorists espouse is discredited, when their tactics are seen to have failed, and when they come to find more promising paths to the dignity, respect, and opportunities they crave". The arguments then put forward to gradually change relevant views and situations abroad are similar in thrust to those very briefly implied in: Christopher Spencer REASONS WHY ALL SOCIETIES ON EARTH MUST...(op.cit); Michael Levi"Stopping Nuclear Terrorism:The Dangerous Allure of a Perfect Defence"(131-140)Foreign Affairs Vol.87/No.1(Jan/Feb 2008):-official summary: "Nuclear terrorism poses a grave threat to global security, but seeking silver bullets to counter it does not make sense. Instead of pursuing a perfect defence, US policymakers should create an integrated defensive system that takes advantage of the terrorists' weaknesses and disrupts their plots at every stage, thereby chipping away at their overal chances of success"; Economist 05 Jan 08"Global Migration: Keep the Borders Open"(Edit.8-9):-off.sum:"The backlash against immigrants in the rich world is a threat to prosperity everywhere". Highlights: "[A]round the rich world, immigration has been rising to the top of voters' lists of concerns - which, for those who believe that migration greatly benefits both recipient and donor countries, is a worry in itself".[Editorial draws top attention to"Special Report: Migration" (Unique 1-16):-the 8 sections' titles/off.sums: "Open Up"/"Despite a growing backlash, the boom in migration has been mostly good for both sending/recipient countries, says Adam Roberts". "Of Bedsheets and Bison Grass Vodka"/"Rich economies gain from high levels of migration, but the benefits are unevenly spread". "The Politics of the Gun"/"Migration has once again become a touchy political issue". "Keep Out"/ "Voters like the idea of tougher borders, but the cost is high and the benefits are limited". "Send Me a Number"/Migrants' remittances help ease poverty back home, but they are not a cure-all". "You Don't Have To Be Rich"/"Developing countries attract migrants too". "Circulate Or Integrate?"/ "A choice of migration policies". "The Long Term"/"Too much or not enough?" Other relevant items in same issue: "Briefing: Germany's Jews: Latkes and Vodka"(40-2)/ "Immigrants from former Soviet Union are transforming Jewish life in Germany". "Immigration Controls: Guarding British Soil"(47-8)/"Britain's immigration regime, long one of Europe's most liberal, is to tighten up. Will it secure the jobs of British workers - or those of MPs?"] [M]ost often migration is about young, motivated, dynamic people seeking to better themselves by hard work [and h]istory has shown [it] encourages prosperity. Tens of millions of Europeans who made it to the New World in 19th and 20th centuries improved their lot, just as... today. Many migrants return home with new skills, savings, technology and bright ideas. Remittances in 2006 were worth at least $260b - more in many countries than aid and foreign investment combined. Letting in migrants does vastly more good for the world's poor than [foreign aid]. The movement also helps the rich world... Indeed, advanced economies compete vigorously for outsiders' skills... Low-skilled are needed too, especially in farming, services and care for children and the elderly. [So w]hy the backlash? Partly because politicians prefer to pander to xenophobic fears than to explain immigration's benefits. But not all fear of foreigners is irrational. Voters have genuine concerns... To keep borders open, fears have to be acknowledged and dealt with... [I]t is not just futile but also foolish to build taller fences to keep them out. Better [to open] more routes for legal, perhaps temporary, migration... Politicians in rich countries should also be honest about, and quicker to raise spending to deal with, the strains that immigrants place on public services... The social integration of new arrivals is also crucial... Better to seek ways to isolate the extremist fringe... Above all, perspective is needed. The vast population movements of past four decades... have offered a better life for millions of migrants and enriched receiving countries both culturally and materially. But... politicians need... to deal honestly with the problems sometimes caused"; Economist 12 Jan 08"The Arabs: Between Fitna, Fawda and the Deep Blue Sea"(40-2):-"Huge differences persist among 300m-odd Arabic speakers and 22 countries of Arab League. With oil prices high, some Arab economies booming[, but gulfs are as great as any on earth.] Yet Arab world [displays] sameness of spirit. Particularly among people under 30 [vast majority/one of world's fastest growth rates,] mood is one of disgruntlement/doubt. Factors[:] failing public-education systems and resilience of social traditions often ill-suited to urban lifestyle - now Arab norm - but politics above all shapes discontent. [T]he problem of Palestine has stuck out like a troublesome nail. [Yet hope for its eventual justice] has taken a beating of late[:] if Palestinians cannot unite,.. why should other Arabs help them? And which side to support? [I]n Iraq, 2003 invasion produced all but universal Arab outrage[, b]ut the rights/wrongs have grown harder... Elsewhere, become harder to blame slaughter in Darfur region of Sudan, or stalemate between Lebanon's sects... Many still see Bush's 'war on terrorism' as crusade against Islam[, b]ut many also note al-Qaeda-style jihadism has killed more Muslims than 'infidels'. In past, Arabs looked to leaders for guidance[, but m]ost of today's leaders lack an inspirational project[, n]or is any country a natural leader. [P]ersonality-based leadership of 60s-70s has fallen out of fashion[, yet] not replaced by more institutionally-based system of rule, let alone...democracy. [O]ften adopting the outward shape of reform [lacks] substance... The marginally freer press [reflects] the impact of hard-to-block new media[, yet stratagems still] suck vitality out of politics [and] voter turnout has steadily declined. [Experts] have long blamed oil wealth... for the survival of authoritarianism [as governments] neatly absolve themselves of the need [for] heavy taxes. A less obvious source of state power is a pervasive fear of what might happen in its absence[, and] Moslems have...yet to resolve whether laws should emanate from the people or from God. [Here stress put on "Islam and Democracy: The Practice - and the Theory"(53-4):-off.sum:"Can rule by people be reconciled with sovereignty of Allah?"] [Resolution has] practical consequences. In most Arab countries, regimes hold power by virtue of tradition or through military-backed movements that claim to represent the will of the masses. Where top-down authority collapses,.. very hard for bottom-up politics to repair the damage. [N]ot surprising that people prefer the devil they know to the fitna (