Global Issues of the Twenty-First Century
and United Nations Challenges
A GUIDE TO FACTS AND VIEWS ON MAJOR OR FUTURE TRENDS

Early in this new century, the most dangerous deliberate threat to any nation’s physical security is an attack using biological weapons(BW). That is the view of most experts on such issues; reasons are multiple. Possible assailants could now include almost any kind or size of group with adequate resources and motivation: a state, corporation, dissident/ethnic/religious movement, NGO, or (the most likely) terrorist body. Exploiting BW is becoming cheaper(almost all costs are in handling/delivery),less complex(safety is the big problem)and more option-rich(artificial pathogens are now realistic). Relevant knowledge/expertise are more widely available; materials(probably even ready-to-use weapons)are more cheaply and readily obtainable(mainly via the former USSR). Politically, BW are relatively unobtrusive to hide/ transport (though tricky to use effectively); and the means/source/even the existence of an attack can be hard/slow to identify. Also, they are theoretically very flexible in terms of: target(human, animal, food-plant); lethality(from death, to total/partial/localized, and temporary or permanent, incapacitation); timing (from instantaneous impact, to gradual symptoms(aiding the spread of infection), to long-delayed effects); means of contact(from concentrated local spray to the focused pre-contamination of air, soil, water or other vital material); and physical delivery(via air-,water-,food-,information-,or medication-distribution systems, missiles/vectors of any sort/ scale, aircraft-carried bombs/dispersants, infected carrier(s), etc.). Modern biotechnology not only makes artificial made-to-measure agents feasible, but can even ensure they attack only specific (types of) targets. Fortunately, the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention(BWC), now ratified by 143 nations, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of such weapons. Unfortunately, at the time it was drafted no provisions were included for ensuring compliance, since no feasible way to do so was then known. The addition of a compliance protocol(the Chemical Weapons Convention and other arms control texts all include such provisions)is increasingly important and urgent - and has been under negotiation for over six years. The following items describe the current world BW(C) situation. The Economist 12 Apr 97: two items on Iraq's Germ-Warfare Program(79-81)cover the attraction, components and potential of biological weapons, and the difficulties of controlling and detecting them. Like many other sources, they declare the greatest WMD threat is biological. John D. Steinbruner“Biological Weapons: A Plague Upon All Houses”Foreign Policy No.109 (Winter 97-98):-extremely useful non-experts’ report on intensified attempts to constrain the development and use of biological weapons. The threat is both increasing(more people, movement, knowledge have become available)and unique (they are "inexpensive, readily available and unusually dangerous")(86). Specialists must"work together to an unprecedented degree if the international community is to succeed in containing[BW]"(87). While the BWC does not yet include any enforcement provisions, global rules for the disclosure of selected pathogens to a global monitor (WHO) now seems possible, but intense discussion of the threat is essential/unavoidable. Richard K.Betts “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”Foreign Affairs Vol.77/No.1(Jan/Feb 98):-argues the greatest WMD threat now comes from biological weapons since they combine maximum destructiveness with availability. Source and nature of a WMD attack is now liable to be small-scale(i.e. not nuclear), derived from rogue states or terrorists, and aimed (surreptitiously?)at civilians: all this argues for BW. Hence the author urges a response through improved civil defence and intelligence. [Against BW effective intelligence would have to be pooled on an inclusive global basis, and therefore presumably involve the UN.] Letters in Vol.77/No.3(May/Jun 98)offer qualifying comment. Economist 09 Jan 99“An Ill-Wind Detector: Detecting Nerve Gas”(74):-sarin/soman (organophosphorous nerve gases, a drop of which can kill an adult in a couple of minutes)are excellent WMD for rogue rulers or terrorists, and detection is difficult. Johns Hopkins University has developed a fast, extremely sensitive, and selective detector using a fibre-optic cable plugged into a laser. Other end is coated with europium embedded in special plastic. It then reacts strongly, but only, with sarin and soman, by changing the wavelength of the light. Its UN role in anti-terrorism, verification, etc. is obvious. Economist 22 Jan 2000“Biological Warfare: America the Unready” (34):-begins:“Biowarfare could be the worst terrorist threat of all”. Then describes nature and scale of threat for US, and highlights its inadequate preparation. US Defense Secretary has warned that if a biological attack came, the contagion could spread horrifyingly. FBI head, while noting the risk of attack is relatively low, identifies BW as among the WMD that terrorists might well want to use, possession of bioweapons being perfectly legal. Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefence Studies believes the bioterrorism threat has increased, inter alia since BW recipes are accessible and BW cost/expertise are now modest. Smallpox(sic)and anthrax are the most formidable threats: either could quickly overrun a major city and create nation-wide epidemics, since vaccines/ isolation facilities are totally inadequate. New US anti-terrorism programs concentrate mainly on nuclear and chemical weapons, but real nightmare is a genetically-engineered pathogen with no vaccine or handy antidote. Ominously, Judith Miller“U.S. Aid Diverted to Germ Warfare, Russian Scientists Say”New York Times 25 Jan 00, reports that significant US funds, granted to Russian biological research institutes to help deter a scientific brain drain to rogue states and terrorists, have been obtained by Biopreparat. Ostensibly a state-owned drug firm, it once directed the USSR germ warfare program, is still led by the same military and intelligence staff, and runs 20 research bodies making“1,000 vaccines/medicines/ biotechnology products”. Economist 18 Nov 00“Bioterrorism’s Uncertain Threat: The Invisible Enemy”(93-4):-bioterrorism is growing cause for concern since(as reported elsewhere) terrorists are now often driven by hatred of entire countries, cultures, or religions, and so have fewer qualms about mass homicide and/or less interest in generating public support. Hence governments must strengthen their response systems, even if most(would-be)bioterrorists are home-grown crackpots and unlikely to produce widespread chaos. Moreover, while the BWC firmly prohibits biological materials for hostile purposes, and has been ratified by 143 states(not Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea),a 56-member Ad Hoc Committee has made slow progress (over 6 1/2 years)negotiating essential but missing clauses on inspection visits, compliance measures or export regulation to ensure banned toxins, equipment and technology are not transferred. Indeed a gloomy report on drafting a relevant protocol (or annex)is offered by Tibor Toth, Hungarian Chair of the Committee, in Reuters “Chairman: Little Progress in Biological Arms Talks”NYT 08 Dec 00. Article further notes that at least 12 countries are suspected of having biological warfare programs, while an expert points out that the material cost of“the poor man’s atomic bomb”is now tiny. Although a study of 1,000 threatened or actual uses of bioterrorism found”an extremely low incidence of real biological events”as compared to hoaxes, this may be explained by current factors: processing/handling toxic material is much harder than is generally thought; lethal delivery remains both difficult and expensive; very few understand the entire process. While another expert stresses the dangers faced by those making such weapons, and the problems of successfully using them against large groups of people, it is also noted that food supplies make good targets, producing chain health/trade/ economic effects far beyond direct danger zones/short time-periods. Laurie Garrett“The Nightmare of Bioterrorism”Foreign Affairs Vol.80/No.1(Jan/Feb 2001):-prominent writer on global medical issues makes strong case for what she sees as extremely serious threat posed by terrorism using BW, criticizes faults in recently-expanded US defenses, and makes a number of recommendations. [Author’s most recent book, Betrayal of Trust: The Collapse of Global Public Health (New York: Hyperion 00) includes long chapter(481-544)on BIOWAR. Following summarizes only her essay’s “threat analysis”.] Nations with BW: Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, China, North Korea, Russia, Israel, Taiwan; possibly Sudan, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan. [For an account of problems in destroying huge US BW/CW stockpiles see David Firestone“Plan to Burn Chemical Arms Worries Alabamians” NYT 03 Jul 01.] “In addition...militant political groups across the globe are now developing or seeking to purchase[BW]for terrorist use. Meanwhile, the sophistication of[BW]has improved by leaps and bounds...[B]iology in the last decade has been...a field of exponential discovery”(76). Western armed forces reacted by introducing many new/more anti-BW measures for troops, but“no one had a master plan”to deal with BW damage to civilians -collateral or deliberate. Example: 75m(deteriorating) smallpox vaccine doses remain in a world“free”of smallpox, so“if the...virus were released today[as BW]nearly two billion people could die”(77). Moreover, even if exactly the right antidote had been developed, had been stockpiled in sufficient quantity, and was immediately available, many(millions?)would still be dosed too late to help, because of lag times between exposure and: (1)first symptoms; (2)correct diagnosis; (3)administration of antidote; and/or (4)antidote’s time to create sufficient antibodies(anthrax vaccine takes up to a year, even with boosters, to become effective). To make matters worse, several types of extremists are both motivated and well-versed regarding bioterrorism, can obtain much directly relevant information -and rhetoric- on the Internet or in books, and some have even trained to use BW. Unfortunately, Barrett’s report on attempts to find a technological “quick fix”defense against BW concludes that finding one soon seems unlikely. She does, however, urge a global approach, and commends the WHO’s efforts to create a more vigorous disease-surveillance system to monitor the emergence of new epidemics. Elizabeth Olson“Talks Inching Ahead on Monitoring ‘72 Germ Warfare Pact” NYT 14 May 01:-gives an explanation for the slow progress in reaching agreement on a verification protocol to BWC, based partly on a briefing by Chairman Toth. Searching for common ground on how to detect/deter BW is complex, and underway since 95 when Iraq’s BW progress(as a BWC signatory)was discovered. (USSR research in BW was disclosed in 92, and this is now suspected in a dozen countries.) Toth had proposed a 210p compromise text(with 500p of explanation)to reduce the 1400 brackets in a draft BWC protocol. His hope was to focus debate on basic political problems, and he believed there was support for a $25-30m regime to control biological agents. The US position was unclear; while its delegation kept silent, others claim this indicated it had quietly withdrawn its support for whole process. Delay reflected disagreements over inspecting laboratories, protecting commercial secrets and North-South views on access to technologies. While hopeful agreement could be reached at next meeting, Toth felt BW had received too little attention. Michael R.Gordon & Judith Miller“U.S. Germ Warfare Review Faults Plan on Enforcement”NYT 20 May 01:-major article reports on the background and probable impact of a confidential Bush Administration review of the draft protocol to add the essential but missing ”enforcement” element to BWC. US officials say it recommends that US“not accept”the draft. The article(i.e. officials?) admit immediately that this is“certain to distress allies, who back the draft...and are concerned [Bush is not] concentrating...enough on treaties and nonproliferation. [Also, US] support for the protocol is critical to the effort to give the treaty teeth...[Yet the interagency review]concluded that the current version of the protocol would be inefficient in stopping cheating, and that all its deficiencies could not be remedied by the negotiating deadline [Nov 01]...White House is considered virtually certain to go along. [However, the review] does not rule out fresh attempts to address monitoring [,and the] administration has already been under fire for steering too unilateralist a course[,so]the White House is eager to avoid a new split.” Moreover, Toth argues:”Different constituencies...see different flaws, which indicates it is a pretty good compromise... If it still needs to be fixed, we have the time[; whereas if we fail,]it will send a very unfortunate message”. The article then recalls the protocol’s background/ obstacles, gives a summary of Toth’s 210p compromise text, plus national critiques, and finally offers more on US review’s history and conclusions, plus critiques by US experts. Authors conclude that US has three options: it can try to improve the draft in line with the review and before the Nov deadline, though with little chance of obtaining all it wants; it can ask for an extended deadline”so that negotiators would work on a substantially different protocol”; or it could ”propose a stripped-down version of the protocol that would provide for investigations when violations of the convention are suspected”(e.g. a suspicious outbreak of disease). Breaking off talks entirely was recognized as unfeasible because of heavy diplomatic costs. Economist 16 Jun 01 “Biological Weapons Convention: Stop the Clock, Support the Ban”(Edit.11-2);“BW: Bugs in the System”(47):-Editorial stresses that, in arms control, when compared to counting weapons or monitoring events(e.g. tests),”task of controlling biological-warfare agents...makes hair stand on end”. Not only can test-tube-sized quantities of bacteria, toxins and viruses cause pandemics or crop-failures, but it may become possible to direct attacks only at particular groups - removing the deterrent of unpredictability. Despite this terrible threat, the critical exercise to draft a“compliance” protocol for the BWC“is faltering”. Yet,”if this protocol falls, there will be plenty of blame to spread around”. Russia wants to continue some research. China doesn’t want snoopers. Germany and Japan want too many commercially-inspired restrictions on inspection. Most critical, US now finds the proposed inspection rules ineffective, wants more than is necessary or practical, and threatens the whole exercise. Economist’s suggestion: agree on a strictly-limited period to work to improve the inspection rules as much as is now feasible; add a provision for adopting new and better verification techniques in the future, as and when these become feasible. Economist 07 Jul 01“Feeding Tomorrow’s Troops: Food Fight”(74):-a new report by US National Research Council entitled Opportunities in Biotechnology for Future Army Applications predicts that within the next 25 years high-tech food will “protect troops from attack by biological weapons, insulate them against cold weather and even make them visible to their commanders by satellite”. Regarding BW, article notes that experiments are already underway with“food plants that have immunity-inducing genes from viruses in them, so the[anti-BW idea]is not that incredible”. Moreover, “vaccinating soldiers the traditional way is slow, costly and(for the troops concerned)unpleasant”. Reuters“USA Has Problems with Germ-Warfare Enforcement Plan”NYT 21 Jul 01:-US Administration has publicly confirmed that, after reviewing the draft BWC enforcement protocol(presumably Toth’s compromise text),it has ”problems”and thinks“there’s more work to be done”. Washington Post claims US delegation would announce its government has “serious objections”; indeed Post was told:“There is agreement throughout the government[the protocol]is unworkable and unacceptable”. Although John Isaacs, president of the Council for a Livable World, has also been told the US was set to reject the protocol, he argued an imperfect text should not justify rejection. Reuters“Europe Backs U.N. Germ Warfare Pact, Eyes on U.S.”NYT 23 Jul 01:-reports that at reopened negotiations, the EU plus 13 central and east European states announced their support for the Chairman’s compromise proposals which, though they did not meet all EU demands, were ”base on which political decisions can be taken”. Draft is summarized as obliging signatory countries” to declare any industrial facilities that could be used for the manufacture of [BW]. It would also allow a monitoring body - yet to be established - to make pre-announced visits to verify work conformed to that declared. Lightning checks could also be carried out where there was suspicion of treaty violation”. No state has rejected the draft, but US is expected to do so. Gordon“Germ Warfare Talks Open in[Geneva]; U.S. Is the Pariah”NYT 24 Jul 01:-covers much the same ground as Reuters, though with somewhat more background and comment on the implications for US foreign policy. “The White House has sought to counter criticism that it is relying too much on its plans for a missile shield and not enough on arms control”. Reuters“Experts Warn Germ Warfare Pact a High-Stakes Game”NYT 24 Jul 01:-ten NGOs from Europe and US warned that“countries were on dangerous ground if they failed to back a compromise deal giving teeth”to BWC even though it was”far from perfect”. The experts said that missing the chance would be a”grave error” since the plan“offered the only real hope”of making the BWC enforceable. Miller“U.S. Explores Other Options on Preventing Germ Warfare”NYT 25 Jul 01:-important article, giving most detailed explanation yet of administration’s imminent rejection of compromise BWC protocol(“circulating less than six weeks after President Bush took office”). “Senior officials”assured NYT the White House“remains committed to strengthening”BWC and had“already begun exploring alternative ways of enforcing the ban and deterring and punishing cheaters”. US might seek to“strengthen export controls on the sale of sophisticated, germ-production equipment and technology”and pursue“international legal instruments”that would“prevent terrorist groups or countries from getting and misusing dangerous germs and toxins”. However the administration had decided it was“not feasible to verify whether states were abiding by[BWC]given the rapid advances in biotechnology and the ability of cheaters to hide illicit activities”:“You can’t apply traditional arms control thinking to biotechnology”; this kind of weapon is“unlike any other”. However US“would not be backed into a diplomatic corner by being forced to choose between approving the current version of the protocol[which neither stops BW threat, nor enhances verification, but does put US bio-defense activities and proprietary commercial interests at risk]or having no enforcement mechanism at all. Officials denied the administration is either hostile to arms control or pursuing unilateralist policies. They noted BWC is now violated by signatories(e.g. by Iran which has offensive BW program)who also(significantly)accept the draft protocol; so US wants to work with the”99%”of countries that respect BWC, to“strengthen ways to stop the abuse of this rapidly developing technology”and to“share information about ongoing research”. Hence it would support efforts to expand the surveillance and control of sensitive technology (e.g. through the 30-member”Australia Group”), and endorse national efforts to pass legislation and international agreements making it a crime to buy, build, acquire or use BW for terrorist attacks. Olson“U.S. Rejects New Accord Covering Germ Warfare”NYT 26 Jul 01:-reports that on 25 Jul US formally rejected compromise BWC protocol, and thus“appeared to effectively scuttle”the attempt to strengthen BWC by introducing compliance provisions. US delegate Mahley, top US negotiator on the agreement since 1993, stated,”We don’t think it can achieve its objectives, nor can it be fixed...In our assessment, the draft protocol would put national security and confidential business information at risk...[In fact, the exercise would not improve]confidence in compliance and will do little to deter those countries seeking to develop[BW]”. At least 37 items in the proposal reportedly made it “unacceptable”. A former Clinton administration official thought it would probably have worked with allies to”achieve a draft protocol that met all of our requirements”. Federation of American Scientists spokesman judged even the flawed text the”most effective way to strengthen the treaty”. A former US arms control negotiator doubted the administration would find much international support for the so-called alternatives it had discussed so far. An arms expert from Stimson Center, while not supporting text, felt it was incumbent on administration to”get back to the negotiating table soon with realistic proposals to strengthen the treaty”. Other delegations seemed to agree that present draft was dead. A senior US official emphasized however that,”We’re not walking out...We have a stake in[the whole]outcome... But biological arms control requires new ways of thinking about how to stop the spread of these unique weapons”. Anthony Lewis“The Vision Thing”NYT 28 Jul 01:-strongly criticizes US decision. “Bush wiped out eight years of effort[when US]delegate rejected a draft text that all others had accepted. [A]dministration could have called for further negotiations to improve the draft protocol [but] did not think it could be fixed. That effectively killed the project. US criticism that inter alia text would“give foreigners too much access to US bio-defense installations”sends a signal that(despite BWC)US defense people are still“working on ideas for biological warfare”and this can“only encourage others to think about new [BW]”. Moreover, there is”no sign”administration is”working on alternatives[to the rejected draft]in a serious way”. So once again, US was”all alone on a global issue”. Underlying Mr. Bush’s response on these matters there is a failure of vision. He takes a parochial view, driven by ideology and a narrow sense of where American interests lie. But in today’s close-knit world our interests cannot be so easily separated from global needs”. Economist 28 Jul 01“Germ Warfare: Stop the World, I Want To Get Off”(35):-this item on US rejection of BWC protocol admits inherent difficulty of reaching international agreement on any inspection regime. However it concludes:”The aim was never precise verification, but rather to use a process of admittedly imprecise inspections to make cheating gradually harder. In other words, it was an attempt to enforce norms of international behaviour by treaty. After five treaties have been shot down in seven months [ICC, Kyoto, ABM, small-arms, BWC], it is hard to avoid the suspicion that it is the very idea of multilateral co-operation that Mr. Bush objects to”. NYT Editorial “America On the Sidelines”:-another tough critique of the Bush administration’s evident hostility to treaties in that it “communicates a sense of arrogance and contempt for international cooperation that ill serves American interests”. Imperfect texts can be improved, but the US’s“compelling interest in helping to expand and shape international law”cannot be served from the sidelines. After recalling the five negative actions listed by Economist, the editor notes the administration has also indefinitely deferred seeking Senate ratification of both CTBT and START II. Conclusion:”This is not a productive role for the world’s leading country and the architect of much of the international law created over the last half-century. Contempt for the concerns of other countries will only erode American influence”. Maureen Dowd “Apetown, My Hometown”NYT 29 Jul 01:-this well-known columnist attends the remake of“Planet of the Apes”and finds their regime frighteningly like Bush’s Washington:”evolution hurtling backward. Progress in reverse. An arrogant determination to trash the compacts governing humans...menacing and antediluvian...W. and his Gerald Ford-era warlords...never meet an old idea they don’t like”. To the list of international treaties/conferences likely to be refused by Bush she adds: Anti-Personnel Landmine Treaty, and Conference on Racism. Reuters“U.S. and Australia Gloss Over Germ War Differences”NYT 30 Jul 01:-reports conservative Australian government has been unusually supportive of Bush’s foreign policy. It is”virtually alone on the world stage in unambiguously backing the controversial US missile defence shield project and also sides with Washington in rejecting the 1997 Kyoto pact on combating climate change”. [This may not apply to equal rejection of the final Bonn compromise.] However, during annual bilateral ministerial meetings, FMs Downer and Powell apparently had“spirited”discussion of US dismissal of Toth’s hard-won compromise text for BWC protocol. This is “the first time[Downer’s] government has opposed a decision by the Bush administration”, and the FM had just described the US stand as“an enormous setback”. [The Labor party, leading in the polls, opposes the missile shield and is a strong supporter of the Kyoto treaty.] The most Downer could offer was an assurance that”no one should suggest the[US]is anything but vigilant and determined in its opposition to the proliferation and even the use of[BW]”. NYT“Symptoms: Biological Warfare Agent Resurfaces”31 Jul 01:- reports that a researcher in US Army’s leading anti-bioterrorism laboratory accidentally infected himself with glanders, a dangerous bacterial disease of horses and people not seen in a human in US for more than 50 years. Germans had attempted to use it for BW in WWI. Patient recovered once the infection was identified, but the report stated: “This case demonstrates the difficulties that microbiology laboratories may have in recognizing potential agents of [BW]. These microbes are rarely encountered and may be misidentified by conventional identification systems”. Reuters“Kyoto-Style Deal Excluded for Germ Warfare Treaty”NYT 03 Aug 01:-after consultations, Amb.Toth “ruled out any chance that other countries would ignore Washington’s opposition [to his draft protocol]and strike a deal among themselves... ‘Delegations would be reluctant to negotiate ...in absence of a major negotiating partner’”- particularly since decisions are to be taken by consensus. However, the chairman said there was general agreement(including the US)that the work of the past few years should not be simply cast aside. AP“Germ Warfare Group Suspends Talks”NYT 03 Aug 01:-reports that Ad Hoc Committee agreed without objection to the chairman’s recommendation that they suspend their negotiating efforts for 2001 and move on the following week to writing a report on where they stood after 6 1/2 years of negotiation. The Mexican delegate stressed:”To conclude the process without an agreement on a protocol is the worst possible scenario”in view of constant scientific advances relating to BW. AP“Germ Warfare Negotiators End”NYT 18 Aug 01:-Ad Hoc Committee was unable in the end even to reach agreement on its report - normally a formality. The developing countries wanted it to specifically fix the blame on the US delegation for lack of a result from so many years’ work. Failing that, they wanted all the session’s speeches(including the US delegate’s coup de grace)to be appended to the report. Total agreement was apparently never reached. Debate will move to the UNGA(which cannot negotiate such issues)and to a November meeting of all 143 parties to the BWC, which will at least inherit parts of the draft protocol”for possible negotiations in the future”. The item also notes that(besides US problems)six delegations - China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Cuba, and Iran - had asked for modifications to the Toth compromise text. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg & William J.Broad“U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits” NYT 04 Sep 01:-long, carefully-researched article reveals that over past several years US has engaged in a program of secret BW research. Three projects began under Pres. Clinton, but Bush administration intends to expand them: (1) Pentagon has drawn up plans to“engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax”in order to assess whether the vaccine now being given to US troops is effective against it. Final authority to proceed is expected imminently; (2) CIA built and tested during Clinton regime a model of a Soviet-designed germ bomb that it was feared might be on international market. It was made without a fuse and other essential parts; (3) Pentagon at about the same time assembled a germ factory from commercially available materials, to demonstrate”the ease with which a terrorist or rogue nation could build a plant that could produce pounds of...deadly germs”. The BWC, while forbidding nations from developing or acquiring weapons that spread disease, allows work on vaccines and other protective measures. A”senior Bush administration official”claimed all projects were“fully consistent”with the treaty, and that the administration“will pursue defenses against the full spectrum of biological threats”. Projects may have”aimed at better understanding the threat”, but internal controversy continues as to whether they violate the BWC. “Administration officials said the need to keep such projects secret was a significant reason behind Pres.Bush’s recent rejection of a draft agreement to strengthen the [BWC]”. If the protocol were adopted, the project sites would be subject to international inspections. Economist 02 Sep 2006"The World Since September 11th: Five Years On"(Edit.9-10);"Special Report: September 11th 2001: [US]'s Longest War"(22-4):-"Essence of [al-Qaeda] idea..is that Islam is everywhere under attack by the infidel and that every Muslim has a duty to wage holy war, jihad, in its defence... Jihadists are hungry to topple...superpower. [S]ince 11Sep01, number of jihadists and their sympathisers has probably multiplied, partly as result of way US responded... Al-Qaeda operated openly in Afghanistan and enjoyed protection of its noxious Taliban regime, which refused US request to hand Osama bin Laden over. US invasion...therefore enjoyed broad international support... By 04 a first-ever free election had legitimated presidency of Hamid Karzai; parliament took office in 05. Now plagued by warlordism and opium trade, and Taliban mounting a challenge in the south. But not yet look capable of dislodging new government in Kabul. [I]nvasion deprived al-Qaeda of a haven for planning/training. [H]owever, invasion of Iraq in Mar03 providing jihadists with both a banner around which to recruit and a live arena in which to sharpen their military skills... Like most Sunni extremists, some in al-Qaeda regard Shia Muslims as virtual apostates[, and] organised so many attacks on Shias/holy places that Shias at last struck back, turning into a bitter sectarian war... In [Iraq] the battle for world opinion...had calamitous consequences. [M]illions of Muslims now think US real aim in Iraq was to grab its oil, help Israel, or, as bin Laden said all along, wage war on Islam... Bush/PM Blair refused after the war to be embarrassed by the absence of the [Iraqi] weapons that had so alarmed them beforehand. [Their] arguments no longer sell in the West, let alone Muslim world... Hussein's was a secular dictatorship in which Islamists of all stripes kept their heads down... But portraying the whole enterprise as if it had from the start been all about experiment in democracy just makes Muslims crosser. [Now] poll after poll shows deep distrust among traditional US allies... Bush has played straight into anti-US hands. One vast mistake has been his neglect to push seriously for creation of a Palestinian state... But worse has been his disregard for civil liberties [Abu Ghraib/Guantanamo. So US] won more recruits for the jihadists. Still, not everything has gone al-Qaeda's way either. [I]f bin Laden's aim was to topple pro-US regimes in Muslim world, he has failed... Saudi regime...is still standing, and so far... the violence has served mainly to strengthen it. Another prize to have eluded al-Qaeda is Pakistan. [Also,] all of al-Qaeda's efforts to kill Musharraf, or to deflect from US alliance... have so far come to naught... [J]ihadists' grandiose aims and gruesome methods have prevented them from turning a resentment of US into an appetite for revolution at home. Most of [Iraqi] victims of al-Qaeda have been fellow Muslims,[while] attacks inside such as Indonesia/ Turkey/ Jordan, where the victims were mainly Muslim, have turned local people away from al-Qaeda's cause. If anything, that cause may have fared better in the West, among those whose identity as Muslims has come to take precedence over loyalty to the host country [Britain/Canada].To many susceptible Muslims the message that the faith is everywhere under attack is evidently compelling. Jihadists are skilled at weaving the 'resistance' in Palestine/Lebanon/ Kashmir/Chechnya/ Iraq/Afghanistan into single narrative of persecution by the infidel. [H]ijackers proved in US/Madrid that small numbers of terrorists can produce devastating results. [J]ihadist notion that the faith is everywhere under attack looks absurd [cf. Palestine/Caucasus/ Kashmir/Balkans/East Timor]. In Kosovo, NATO [protected] Muslims from Christians. [Y]et a troubling recent development is emergence in US of an equal and opposite distortion[:] idea that West and its values are everywhere under attack, and everywhere by the same seamless front... It is wrong to look at post-11Sep world this way, as if every local conflict is part of a civilisational clash [cf. Hamas/Hizbullah/ Iran]. [T]errorism was the background noise of the second half of 20th century. But 11Sep seemed to portend something new... Al-Qaeda's fantastic aims - sweeping away regimes, reversing history and restoring the caliphate - are married to an appetite for killing that knows no limits. It boasts openly that it is seeking nuclear weapons... The world must still strive to destroy al-Qaeda and, even more, the idea it represents. But it had better do so with cleverer means than those Bush has used so far";